Gonzalez v. Okewole

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KAREN GONZALEZ, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

RICHARD IYIOLA OKEWOLE, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0979 FC
FILED 06-26-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2018-006673
The Honorable James N. Drake Jr., Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Stanley David Murray Attorney at Law, Scottsdale
By Stanley David Murray
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Law Office of Brad Reinhart, LLC, Phoenix
By Brad Reinhart
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
GONZALEZ v. OKEWOLE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Veronika Fabian delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

F A B I A N, Judge:

¶1 Karen Gonzalez (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s
order designating Richard Okewole (“Father”) as the primary residential
parent for their minor child, (“Nate”) (a pseudonym), and approving Nate’s
relocation to live with Father in Oregon. Because Mother had adequate
notice that relocation was at issue and there were sufficient reasons to find
relocation was in Nate’s best interests, this Court affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father were never married. Nate has lived with
Mother in Phoenix his entire life (eight years). After separating, Father and
Mother both spent time with Nate, although no parenting order existed. In
November 2024, Father—then living in Tennessee—petitioned for legal
decision making and parenting time, which Mother contested. Shortly
thereafter, he amended his petition to request that Nate’s primary residence
be with Father. After filing the petition, Father moved to Oregon for a new
job.

¶3 Before the evidentiary hearing in May 2025, the parties
submitted separate pretrial statements. “Relocation” was not explicitly
mentioned in either party’s statement. Father’s statement did not mention
he recently moved. However, Mother’s statement acknowledged Father’s
recent move to Oregon, and Father’s was clear that he was asking for Nate
to reside with him during the entire academic school year.

¶4 At the evidentiary hearing, Father testified that Mother had a
history of preventing him from seeing Nate or conditioning visitation on
arbitrary demands. He introduced text messages to that effect. Father
presented himself as generally being open to Mother having significant
parenting time and claimed he would not withhold Nate from Mother.

¶5 Father testified he was worried about Nate’s education
because Mother had pulled Nate out of school multiple times beginning in
the first grade, Nate never finished a full year of school in a “brick-and-

2
GONZALEZ v. OKEWOLE
Decision of the Court

mortar” setting, and Mother had no training on developing or
implementing a homeschool curriculum. Father testified he was starting a
new job in Oregon and intended to have Nate attend the school where he
works. Father also testified he thought being in a “brick and mortar” school
would help Nate’s academic and emotional stability.

¶6 At the hearing, Mother acknowledged that she knew Father
had just moved to Oregon from Tennessee and he wanted Oregon to be
Nate’s primary residence. Mother testified that she does not think Nate
should “relocate” because she has a five-bedroom house, their family is
around, and Nate is doing well with homeschooling. With respect to
homeschooling, Mother testified she creates Nate’s curriculum using online
tools and Nate has a tutor who comes twice a week for three hours. Mother
also testified that the tutor says Nate is performing at grade level, but
admitted Nate hasn’t taken any standardized test and that she doesn’t
really know whether he is performing at grade level. Mother testified she
runs a non-profit, works as a nurse in the evenings, and is overwhelmed by
her “very, very busy life.”

¶7 Following the hearing, the court entered judgment relocating
Nate to Father’s custody in Oregon. The court made specific findings with
respect to each of the A.R.S. § 25-408(I) best-interests factors. Mother then
filed motions to amend or reconsider the court’s judgment, which were
denied.

¶8 Mother timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Mother argues the court erred in relocating Nate to live
primarily with Father for two reasons: 1) the issue of relocation was not
properly raised in Father’s petition and pretrial statement, and 2) the court
relied on improper factors in its § 25-408 relocation analysis.

¶10 This Court reviews a superior court’s orders concerning
custody and relocation determinations for an abuse of discretion. Murray v.
Murray, 239 Ariz. 174, 176 ¶ 5 (App. 2016). The superior court abuses its
discretion “when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to
upholding the [superior] court’s decision, is devoid of competent evidence
to support the decision.” State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz.
27, 30 ¶ 14 (App. 2003).

3
GONZALEZ v. OKEWOLE
Decision of the Court

I. Mother Had Adequate Notice That Relocation Was at Issue.

¶11 Mother argues that the superior court should not have
addressed relocation because Father never requested “relocation” in his
petition or pretrial statement. But relocation is at issue whenever there is a
change in a child’s primary residence outside of the state. See Woyton v.
Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 533 ¶ 11 (App. 2019). Father’s amended petition, which
listed his address in Tennessee, requested that Father be Nate’s primary
residential parent during the school year. Similarly, Father’s pretrial
statement made clear that he was requesting that Nate’s primary residence
be with Father. Mother, in her statement, acknowledged Father’s move to
Oregon. And at the evidentiary hearing, Mother confirmed she was aware
Father lived in Oregon and was seeking primary residential custody and
testified that she was opposed to Nate’s “relocation.” On these facts,
relocation was properly before the court.

II. Competent Evidence Supported the Court’s Finding That
Relocation Was in Nate’s Best Interests.

¶12 Mother also argues the superior court erred because the
evidence does not support the court’s finding that relocation was in Nate’s
best interests. This Court disagrees.

¶13 Section 25-408 governs relocation, even in the absence of an
existing order, whenever the court changes a child’s primary residence over
a parent’s objection. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. While the language of § 25-408 seems to
limit its application to where there is a “written agreement or court order
providing for custody or parenting time by both parents,” this Court has
held that those prerequisites only apply to the notice subsection and not the
entire statute. Id. at ¶ 8 (citing Berrier v. Rountree, 245 Ariz. 604, 606 ¶ 9 n.2
(App. 2018)).

¶14 Relocation is appropriate when it is in the “child’s best
interests.” A.R.S. § 25-408(G). “The burden of proving what is in the child’s
best interests is on the parent who is seeking to relocate the child.” Id. The
superior court “must make specific findings on the record as to all relevant
factors [under A.R.S. § 25-408(I)] and the reasons its decision is in the child’s
best interests. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 20 (App. 2009). Importantly,
“no single factor is controlling . . . all of them should be weighed
collectively.” Pollock v. Pollock, 181 Ariz. 275, 278 (App. 1995).

¶15 Here, the court conducted a full § 25-408 analysis. It analyzed
each of § 25-408(I) factors (and the incorporated § 25-403(A) factors) in
determining what was in Nate’s best interests.

4
GONZALEZ v. OKEWOLE
Decision of the Court

¶16 Mother argues that the court improperly relied on her facial
expressions while she was not testifying in making its relocation
determination. The superior court noted that “one of the most compelling
reasons [it] approves of relocation is because when Father was testifying
about the challenges that he faced in trying to acquire parenting time,
Mother would smile and grin every time he spoke of a challenge. Mother
appeared to be relishing her past work on thwarting parenting time.”

¶17 Even assuming the court’s reliance on Mother’s non-
testimonial demeanor was improper, the record still provides competent
evidence to support the court’s best-interests determination. See Burton, 205
Ariz. at 30 ¶ 14. The court found Father credibly testified he would honor
Mother’s parenting time following relocation. See A.R.S. § 25-408(I)(4). The
court noted Father placed a premium on education and Mother
acknowledged his improved stability since getting married. See A.R.S.
§ 25-408(I)(3). Similarly, the court found that Father’s emphasis on
education would enhance Nate’s long-term stability and opportunities,
even though the move to Oregon would likely cause some short-term
challenges. See A.R.S. § 25-408(I)(8). And although the court found both
parties were acting in good faith, it found Father had struggled to obtain
his parenting time. See A.R.S. § 25-408(I)(2). Independent of Mother’s
demeanor, the court found that “Mother has been thwarting Father’s
parenting time.” See A.R.S. §§ 25-408(I)(1), 403(A)(1). That finding is
supported by Mother’s text messages and Father’s testimony. Finally, the
court expressed legitimate concerns about Mother’s capacity to effectively
homeschool Nate, noting that her work schedule would limit her
availability, and the only evidence of Nate’s grade-level performance came
from a weekly tutor rather than Mother’s direct observation. See A.R.S.
§ 25-408(I)(6). In contrast, the court found Father has a viable education
plan at a brick-and-mortar setting where he teaches. See id. This Court
discerns no error in the superior court’s determination that the collective
weight favors Father. Pollock, 181 Ariz. at 278.

¶18 Mother argues the court’s education findings reveal an unfair
bias against homeschooling, but the record reveals no prejudicial bias, and
this Court will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Mary Lou C. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004). The record supports the
court’s determination that homeschooling was not in Nate’s best interests
because of Mother’s specific capacity to implement it. Mother testified to
running multiple home-based businesses, working nights, and feeling
overwhelmed. The court also noted the only evidence Nate was performing
at grade level was from his tutor.

5
GONZALEZ v. OKEWOLE
Decision of the Court

¶19 Mother’s reliance on Smith v. Smith, 90 Ariz. 190 (1961), to
support her bias argument is misplaced. Smith v. Smith addressed whether
a parent giving instruction on religious doctrines at odds with majority
views could justify a change in custody. 90 Ariz. at 193. The constitutional
principles addressed there do not prevent a court from assessing whether a
specific parent has the time and expertise to deliver a homeschool program
effectively.

¶20 Because competent evidence supports the court’s best-
interests determination, the superior court did not err. See Burton, 205 Ariz.
at 30 ¶ 14.

III. Fees and Costs on Appeal.

¶21 Both Mother and Father request attorney fees incurred on
appeal. This Court finds insufficient evidence of financial disparity or an
unreasonable position taken and therefore declines to award either party
fees on appeal. See A.R.S. § 25-324. But, as the prevailing party, Father is
entitled to his costs on appeal upon compliance with Rule 21 of the Arizona
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. See A.R.S. § 12-341.

CONCLUSION

¶22 This Court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

6