State v. Hyde

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

JASON CLIFFORD DENNIS HYDE, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0435 PRPC
FILED 06-25-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. CR-2021-00541
The Honorable Richard D. Lambert, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Mohave County Attorney’s Office, Kingman
By Jacob Cote
Counsel for Respondent

Jason Clifford Dennis Hyde, Kingman
Petitioner
STATE v. HYDE
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Andrew J. Becke and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Jason Clifford Dennis Hyde seeks review of the
superior court’s order summarily denying his first post-conviction relief
(PCR) petition. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32. Absent an abuse of discretion or
error of law, this court will not disturb a superior court’s ruling on a PCR
petition. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577 ¶ 19 (2012). Because Hyde has
shown no such error, this court grants review but denies relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 A jury found Hyde guilty of failing to stop at the scene of an
accident involving serious physical injury or death, a Class 2 felony (Count
1), and criminal damage, a Class 5 felony (Count 2). The jury also found
Hyde caused the accident and, as an aggravating factor, the victim or the
victim’s immediate family suffered physical, emotional, or financial harm.
The superior court imposed aggravated prison sentences of seven years for
Count 1 and a consecutive sentence of two years for Count 2. Hyde’s
convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Hyde, 1 CA-CR
22-0600, 2024 WL 248716, at *5 ¶ 21 (Ariz. App. Jan. 23, 2024) (mem.
decision).

¶3 Hyde filed a PCR notice. After appointed counsel informed
the superior court that he had not identified any colorable claim for relief,
Hyde filed a self-represented PCR petition. Hyde alleged his trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to hire an accident reconstruction expert, call his
Mother to testify, investigate the State’s witnesses’ criminal records for
impeachment, cross‑examine a victim’s family member during the
aggravation phase, present evidence that Hyde was not under the influence
at the time of the accident, establish that one of the State’s witnesses testified
falsely, show the jury photographs of the accident scene and video of
Hyde’s truck in the McDonald’s drive‑through, communicate with Hyde,
and make an opening statement. He also asserted appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to communicate with him and for not raising an
alleged police “vendetta” against his family or trial counsel’s purported

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STATE v. HYDE
Decision of the Court

ineffective performance. Hyde also raised claims of prosecutorial
misconduct and newly discovered evidence. The superior court summarily
dismissed the petition, finding none of Hyde’s claims stated a colorable
claim for relief. This timely petition for review followed.

DISCUSSION

¶4 In seeking review by this court, Hyde repeats the arguments
raised in his PCR petition in superior court.1 He first argues his trial counsel
was ineffective. “To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance fell below
objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced the
defendant.” State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 567 ¶ 21 (2006) (citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Under the first prong, “we must
presume ‘counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance’ that ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”
State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 444 ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” State v. Pandeli, 242 Ariz. 175, 180
¶ 6 (2017) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Conclusory allegations and
speculation are insufficient to state a colorable claim of prejudice. State v.
Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521, 528 ¶ 22 (App. 2017); State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406, 414
¶ 21 (App. 2000). “Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is fatal
to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Bennett, 213 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 21
(citation omitted).

¶5 Hyde argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain
an accident reconstruction expert. He asserts an expert would have shown
he was not at fault for the accident and the victim’s injuries resulted from
not wearing a seatbelt. Even assuming trial counsel’s performance was
deficient, Hyde fails to show prejudice. The evidence shows Hyde ran a
stop sign and hit the victim’s car from the side; the front end of Hyde’s truck
was damaged and the victim’s vehicle sustained significant side damage.
Hyde fails to show an expert would have explained the evidence consistent
with his theory, and his conclusory assertions do not entitle him to relief.
Leyva, 241 Ariz. at 528 ¶ 22. Further, whether the victim wore a seatbelt is

1 Hyde does not develop any meaningful argument in support of his newly

discovered evidence claim and has therefore waived it. See State v.
Stefanovich, 232 Ariz. 154, 158 ¶ 16 (App. 2013) (insufficient argument
waives claim); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.16(c)(4) (failure to raise an issue
in a petition for review is waiver).

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STATE v. HYDE
Decision of the Court

irrelevant to his convictions. See A.R.S. § 28-661(C) (a driver who caused an
accident resulting in death or serious physical injury and then fails to stop
is guilty of a class 2 felony); A.R.S. § 13-1602(A)(1) (“A person commits
criminal damage by . . . [r]ecklessly defacing or damaging property of
another person.”); cf. State v. Aragon, 252 Ariz. 525, 530 ¶ 14 (2022) (holding
a victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt is not an intervening cause relieving the
defendant of responsibility for resulting injuries). Thus, Hyde has not
shown a reasonable probability that, had counsel hired an expert, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.

¶6 Hyde next argues trial counsel was ineffective for not making
an opening statement. He contends counsel told the court that, by waiving
opening statement, counsel intended to save time for defense witnesses,
including Hyde’s Mother, but then did not call any witnesses. He asserts
counsel failed to provide the jury with guidance on the defense theory,
including that Hyde was not at fault because the stop sign was obstructed
and the victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt caused the injuries. He also
contends this left the jury with the State’s opening statement
“unchallenged” and prejudiced his defense.

¶7 Hyde does not overcome the presumption that counsel’s
decision was trial strategy or establish that counsel’s conduct prejudiced his
defense. During closing argument, counsel presented the theories Hyde
claims should have been introduced in an opening statement. Hyde does
not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached
a different verdict “but for” counsel’s decision to waive an opening
statement.

¶8 Hyde next argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
investigate the criminal records of two State witnesses’, J.V. and H.G., for
impeachment purposes. He asserts counsel failed to impeach J.V. with his
prior misdemeanor convictions for false reporting to law enforcement and
possession of drug paraphernalia. He also asserts counsel failed to obtain
H.G.’s out-of-state conviction records.

¶9 Witnesses may be impeached with convictions that are
punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, or that
involve dishonesty or a false statement. Ariz. R. Evid. 609. A misdemeanor
conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia is inadmissible for
impeachment because it does not fall into one of those categories. Id.; A.R.S.
§ 13-3415, -707. Although J.V.’s misdemeanor conviction for false reporting
under A.R.S. § 13-2907.01 likely would have been admissible under Rule
609(a)(2), Hyde does not show a reasonable probability that impeaching J.V.

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STATE v. HYDE
Decision of the Court

with one misdemeanor conviction would have altered the jury’s assessment
of the evidence or changed the verdict. Further, because H.G. did not
testify, Hyde does not show ineffective assistance or prejudice.

¶10 Hyde argues trial counsel failed to establish Hyde was not
under the influence at the time of the accident, and J.V. (one of the State’s
witnesses) had been drinking before the accident but testified falsely about
that at trial. But he fails to show how this prejudiced his defense. Hyde also
argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate with
him. Appellate counsel submitted an affidavit stating he contacted Hyde
while preparing the appeal. Hyde has not established ineffective assistance
or prejudice.2

¶11 Hyde argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct
by failing to disclose J.V.’s criminal records. But his claim is precluded
because it could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. Ariz. R.
Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3).

CONCLUSION

¶12 Because Hyde has not shown the superior court abused its
discretion by summarily dismissing his PCR petition, this court grants
review but denies relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

2 Hyde does not raise some of his ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel claims in his petition for review, including trial counsel’s alleged
failure to cross‑examine a victim’s family member during the aggravation
phase, to show the jury photograph and video evidence, and to
communicate with him, and appellate counsel’s alleged failure for not
raising an alleged police “vendetta” against his family or trial counsel’s
purported ineffective performance. He has thus waived those claims. Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 32.16(c)(4).

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