State v. Ramirez

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER ESPARZA RAMIREZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0364

FILED 06-24-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
No. S1400CR202000311
The Honorable Darci D. Weede, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Karen Moody and Lily Sklar (Certified Limited Practice Student)
Counsel for Appellee

Ramos Law Firm, Scottsdale
By Paul A. Ramos
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. RAMIREZ
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Christopher Esparza Ramirez (“Ramirez”) appeals his
convictions for possessing a dangerous drug and possessing drug
paraphernalia involving methamphetamine. Because the superior court
did not err by not instructing the jury on mere presence, and because
sufficient evidence supports that Ramirez possessed a dangerous drug, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts most favorably to upholding the jury’s
verdict. State v. Reaves, 252 Ariz. 553, 558 ¶ 2 (App. 2022).

¶3 In March 2020, federal and state law enforcement involved in
a narcotics task force executed a search warrant at Ramirez’s residence.
They arrived shortly after midnight and entered the backyard through a
gate. As they did so, a deputy sheriff observed an individual (who was not
Ramirez) approaching as if trying to leave. The deputy sheriff instructed
that individual to get on the ground. Another officer detained and
remained with that individual (who had a glass pipe in his pocket) as the
deputy sheriff went into the backyard.

¶4 The deputy sheriff walked around the rear of the residence
and toward Ramirez’s room. He saw Ramirez standing halfway in his
doorway with one hand “clutched like a fist” holding “something that was
kinda protruding,” but the deputy sheriff did not see what the object was.
A police sergeant testified that he observed Ramirez with “a shopping bag
kind of hanging down” in his hand.

¶5 The deputy sheriff instructed Ramirez to exit his room.
Ramirez began doing so but then reversed course. Concerned about the
“unknowns” of the room, the deputy sheriff “grabbed” Ramirez’s shirt and
pulled him out. The deputy sheriff moved Ramirez towards a patio area
but felt Ramirez “redirect[] himself” to a “cesspool area” in the backyard,
about ten feet from the door. Ramirez’s shirt began to rip as he continued

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STATE v. RAMIREZ
Decision of the Court

toward the cesspool, which smelled “putrid” and contained “human
excrement, urine, and water.” A police sergeant described Ramirez as
“lunging” toward the cesspool.

¶6 Officers struggled to handcuff Ramirez. The deputy sheriff
testified Ramirez wrapped his arms around a pole and put his “clinched”
hands in the cesspool “like, he was holding something in both hands.” The
police sergeant testified that Ramirez moved his hand toward his
“waistband area.” The officers struggled to handcuff Ramirez. After doing
so, the deputy sheriff searched the area and found a plastic “bindle”
containing a substance “[r]ight next to” the cesspool. The deputy sheriff
explained that a bindle looks like a grocery store bag, and it typically is used
to carry drugs. The deputy sheriff also explained that a “ziplock-style bag”
containing a “white crystalline substance” was found in the cesspool. The
bag was “a little wet” and the substance inside looked like it had mixed
with water.

¶7 A federal agent confirmed that law enforcement found two
bags in the backyard, including one retrieved from the cesspool. Both bags
tested positive for methamphetamine. Law enforcement recovered a straw
“with a white crystalline substance” in Ramirez’s room and a glass pipe on
his couch. A field test on residue in the glass pipe returned positive for
methamphetamine. A pole in the cesspool had “multiple baggies” believed
to contain narcotics hanging from it.

¶8 The federal officer testified he did not see Ramirez throw
anything into the cesspool. Neither the deputy sheriff nor the police
sergeant remembered seeing Ramirez drop anything. Ramirez’s sister
testified she saw the other individual officers encountered take something
out of his pants, throw it into the “septic tank,” and then walk toward the
side of the house.

¶9 Before trial, Ramirez filed proposed jury instructions,
including a mere presence instruction. When the parties discussed final
jury instructions at trial, the State argued a mere presence instruction was
unsupported. Ramirez agreed that “based on where some of the evidence
was found at the crime scene” he was “not objecting to removing that
instruction.” So the court did not instruct on mere presence, but it did
instruct the jury on third-party culpability and finding a voluntary act.

¶10 The jury found Ramirez guilty of possessing a dangerous
drug and possessing drug paraphernalia involving methamphetamine.
The jury found Ramirez not guilty of tampering with physical evidence.

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The court sentenced Ramirez to 6 years for possessing a dangerous drug
and 2.25 years for possessing drug paraphernalia, to run concurrently.

¶11 Ramirez appealed timely. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S.
§ 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Mere Presence Instruction

¶12 Ramirez argues the court erred by not instructing the jury on
mere presence. He concedes he did not object at trial to removing a mere
presence instruction, so we should review for fundamental error. The State
argues Ramirez invited any error because he “verbally assented to
removing the mere-presence instruction[.]”

¶13 To show fundamental error, an appellant must show trial
error. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142 ¶ 21 (2018). If error occurred, an
appellant must also show the error was fundamental because it (1) went to
the foundation of the case, (2) took away an essential right necessary to
demonstrate a viable defense or rebut the prosecution’s case, or (3) was so
egregious that he could not possibly have received a fair trial. Id. at 141–42
¶¶ 18–21. Finally, when an appellant relies on prong one or two, he must
separately show prejudice. Id. at 142 ¶ 21. “The [appellant] bears the
burden of persuasion at each step.” Id.

¶14 But when an appellant invited error, even “strategically[,]
. . . the defendant cannot obtain appellate relief even if the error was
fundamental and prejudicial.” Id. at 145 ¶ 38. “The invited error doctrine
prevents a party from injecting error into the record and then profiting from
it on appeal.” State v. Rushing, 243 Ariz. 212, 217 ¶ 14 (2017). For invited
error to apply, the record must demonstrate the defendant “engaged in
affirmative, independent action to create the error or argue in favor of it.”
State v. Robertson, 249 Ariz. 256, 260 ¶ 18 (2020).

¶15 The Revised Arizona Jury Instruction (“RAJI”) on “mere
presence” states the following:

Guilt cannot be established by the defendant’s mere presence
at a crime scene, mere association with another person at a
crime scene or mere knowledge that a crime is being
committed. The fact that the defendant may have been
present, or knew that a crime was being committed, does not
in and of itself make the defendant guilty of the crime

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charged. One who is merely present is a passive observer
who lacked criminal intent and did not participate in the
crime.

Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr. Stand. Crim. 43 (6th ed. 2025). The court may decline
to instruct on mere presence if “the evidence d[oes] not support it.” State v.
Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 65 ¶ 36 (1998).

¶16 On appeal, Ramirez contends he had a “right to argue that
guilt could not be established by the factors described in the mere presence
instruction” and that the court “took away” that right. But that contradicts
what he told the superior court. He told the court “based on where some
of the evidence was found at the crime scene” he was “not objecting to
removing” a mere presence instruction. Put differently, Ramirez said he
did not object to removing the instruction because the evidence did not
support it. See id. By doing so, Ramirez invited the error he now argues on
appeal. See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 565–66 ¶ 9 (2001) (“If an error is
invited, we do not consider whether the alleged error is fundamental[.]”);
State v. Dutton, 106 Ariz. 463, 466 (1970) (refusing to consider a defendant’s
argument on appeal that the jury instructions requested by the defendant
at trial misstated the law).

¶17 Even if Ramirez had not invited any alleged error, he has not
established that the court committed prejudicial, fundamental error in
declining to instruct on mere presence. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 141–42
¶¶ 18–21. The court gave the following instruction on third-party
culpability:

The State has the burden of proving that the defendant is the
person who committed the alleged crime[s]. If you have a
reasonable doubt whether the defendant committed the
alleged crime[s] because the crime may have been committed
by a third party, you must find the defendant not guilty.

¶18 That instruction acknowledged Ramirez’s defense theory at
trial that “another person was present” who “actually committed the
possession crimes.” Part of Ramirez’s closing argument focused on the
individual the officers first encountered in the backyard. He told the jury
that if they thought “the crime may have been committed by a third party[,]
. . . you must find [Ramirez] not guilty.” Based on that argument, the court
instructed the jury on third-party culpability.

¶19 The court also defined a “voluntary act.” That informed the
jury that the State needed to prove Ramirez performed a bodily movement

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STATE v. RAMIREZ
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“consciously” and that they “must consider all the evidence in deciding
whether [Ramirez] committed the act voluntarily.” That instruction
supplemented the court’s other instructions on the elements of the crimes,
including knowledge and possession.

¶20 Although Ramirez was “entitled to an instruction on any
theory reasonably supported by the evidence,” the superior court was “not
required to give a proposed instruction when its substance [was]
adequately covered by other instructions.” State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58,
61 ¶ 16 (1998). That happened here when the court instructed on third-
party culpability and voluntary acts. By doing so, the court ensured the
jury would not find Ramirez guilty simply because officers found
methamphetamine near him. Ramirez has not shown the court erred, let
alone that any error was fundamental and prejudicial. See Escalante, 245
Ariz. at 141–42 ¶¶ 18–21; State v. Crain, 250 Ariz. 387, 397 ¶ 33 (App. 2021)
(“By finding [the defendant] knowingly possessed the handgun, the jury
implicitly rejected his assertion that he was merely present.”).

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

¶21 Ramirez also contends there was insufficient evidence
supporting his conviction for possessing a dangerous drug. We review de
novo whether the record contains substantial evidence supporting that
conviction. State v. Pena, 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 5 (2014). Substantial evidence
is proof that “reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State
v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505 ¶ 7 (App. 2005) (citation omitted). Substantial
evidence can include circumstantial or direct evidence. Id. Again, we view
the facts most favorably to affirming the verdict, resolving all reasonable
inferences against Ramirez. See State v. Gill, 248 Ariz. 274, 276 ¶ 2 (App.
2020).

¶22 The jury found Ramirez guilty of possessing a dangerous
drug. See A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(1). Methamphetamine is a dangerous drug.
A.R.S. § 13-3401(6)(c)(xxxviii). Possession means voluntarily and
knowingly “exercis[ing] dominion or control over property.” A.R.S. § 13-
105(35). Possession can be actual or constructive. State v. Gonsalves, 231
Ariz. 521, 523 ¶ 9 (App. 2013). Actual possession means “knowingly
exercis[ing] direct physical control over an object.” Id. Constructive
possession means control over the drug itself or the location where it was
found. Gill, 248 Ariz. at 277 ¶ 7. Knowledge means “a person is aware or
believes that the person’s conduct is of that nature or that the circumstance
exists.” A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(b). To convict, the State had to show “specific

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facts or circumstances that [Ramirez] exercised dominion or control over
the object.” Gonsalves, 231 Ariz. at 523 ¶ 10 (cleaned up).

¶23 Ramirez says “[n]o drugs were found” on him because the
bindle was found only near him, no one saw him put anything in the
cesspool, and his sister testified she saw another individual throw
something into the cesspool. But Ramirez ignores other evidence the State
presented. A deputy sheriff testified he saw Ramirez with “something that
was kinda protruding” out of his hand, and a police sergeant testified he
saw Ramirez with “a shopping bag kind of hanging down.” Both the
deputy sheriff and police sergeant saw Ramirez move toward the cesspool,
and the deputy sheriff testified he saw Ramirez put his hands into the
cesspool with “both hands clinched . . . like, he was holding something in
both hands.”

¶24 None of the officers said they saw Ramirez drop anything, but
there was a skirmish and physical altercation while officers attempted to
handcuff Ramirez. The jury heard testimony that after officers handcuffed
Ramirez, the deputy sheriff found a plastic bindle containing a dangerous
drug “[r]ight next to” him. And that a “ziplock-style bag” containing a
“white crystalline substance” was found in the cesspool. Despite testimony
from Ramirez’s sister, the jury could infer from the officers’ testimony that
Ramirez dropped the bindle and bag during the altercation with law
enforcement. See State v. Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 500 (App. 1995) (finder of fact,
not appellate court, determines witness credibility). The jury also heard
testimony that both bags and the glass smoking pipe found on Ramirez’s
couch contained methamphetamine. The evidence at trial was more than
sufficient for a jury to conclude that Ramirez possessed a dangerous drug.

CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm Ramirez’s convictions and sentences.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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