In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.T.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.T.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0209
FILED 06-23-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD43333
The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Justice H.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee DCS

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee D.T.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.T.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Justice H. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to D.T. and denying her motion to reopen
evidence. Although the court also terminated D.T.’s father’s parental
rights, he is not a party to this appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
juvenile court’s termination order. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 20 (2000).

¶3 In August 2023, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) was
notified that Mother failed to pick up eight-year-old D.T. from school for
the third time. Upon conducting a home visit, DCS observed a
methamphetamine pipe on a counter within D.T.’s reach. Mother’s
boyfriend, who lived with her, was visibly intoxicated and “passed out” for
forty-five minutes. He was woken up, at which time he reported that he
used methamphetamine and claimed the pipe was his. Mother reported
that her boyfriend took care of D.T. while she worked and that she herself
used cocaine.

¶4 DCS took custody of D.T. that day. The next day, it petitioned
the court to find him dependent based on Mother’s neglect and substance
abuse. The court found D.T. dependent in December 2023.

¶5 Over the next twenty months, Mother minimally engaged in
reunification services and only sporadically communicated with DCS. DCS
referred Mother to Family Connections six times, but each referral was
closed out due to her lack of engagement. Mother’s three referrals for
supervised visitation and case aide services were also closed out because of
her inconsistent engagement. Her participation in drug testing was
similarly minimal. She did not test between October 2023 and March 2024,
and the samples she did provide tested positive for various combinations

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Decision of the Court

of fentanyl, cocaine, methamphetamine, THC, and alcohol. Two years later,
in August 2025, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

¶6 The juvenile court set a trial in November 2025. Four days
before trial, DCS disclosed numerous records to Mother (the “November 13
disclosure”). On the day of trial, Mother moved for a continuance because
she had not finished reviewing the new documents. DCS stated it was not
seeking to admit any of the newly disclosed documents into evidence. The
juvenile court denied a continuance but informed Mother that it would not
issue its ruling until after December 5, 2025, and Mother had until that date
to file a motion to reopen the evidence if she discovered anything relevant
to her defense after reviewing the documents. But the court emphasized
that it would reopen evidence only for information discovered in the
November 13 disclosure and “[n]ot on anything additional that may be
coming out.”

¶7 At trial, the court heard testimony from Mother, Mother’s
substance abuse disorder counselor, the DCS case manager, and D.T.’s
court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”).

¶8 D.T.’s CASA testified that D.T. wished to reunify with
Mother. Mother testified that she moved to California a few months ago
and was now engaging in services because she had a familial support
system in California, which she lacked in Arizona. Mother started a full-
time job two weeks before trial and began attending an intensive substance
abuse treatment program. Mother’s counselor confirmed that Mother
started treatment the prior month but testified that the program took six to
twelve months to complete.

¶9 The case manager, however, testified that until recently,
Mother had consistently failed to engage in reunification services. Mother
frequently missed appointments, which she told DCS was due to her
methamphetamine usage keeping her up at night. He also testified that
D.T. was thriving in his foster placement, who was a family friend in
California, and that his placement wanted to adopt him. He noted that
D.T.’s placement had called California’s child protective services due to
concerns about another child in the home watching pornography, but that
D.T. had not been involved.

¶10 On December 5, 2025, Mother moved to reopen evidence,
requesting an additional day of trial and permission to submit additional
exhibits and to add and recall witnesses. Her proposed exhibits included:
(1) the case manager’s case notes from October 16, 29, and 30, 2025; (2) text

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Decision of the Court

messages between herself and the case manager; (3) a “unit consultation
summary” documenting her participation in services; (4) a visitation note;
(5) a November 7, 2025, service letter; and (6) a December 2, 2025, progress
update letter from her substance use disorder counselor. Mother claimed
she discovered information in these documents that conflicted with the
DCS case manager’s testimony, so she needed to cross-examine him further.
She also pointed to a case note stating that she “ha[d] family members
willing to be placement,” claiming that, “[u]pon further review” of the case
note, it had “come to light” that her roommate and aunt were each willing
to foster D.T. So she wanted to call her aunt to testify that she was willing
to foster D.T. and that DCS never contacted her about D.T.

¶11 DCS responded that each of the alleged inconsistencies
between the information in the exhibits and the case manager’s testimony
were not in fact inconsistencies or related to uncontested issues. Further,
Mother had access to any text messages between herself and the case
manager before the November 13 disclosure. DCS also argued that the
evidence she sought to introduce regarding a potential alternative foster
placement for D.T. went beyond the scope of information in the disclosure.
In fact, DCS asserted Mother never told DCS that she had an aunt who was
willing to foster D.T.

¶12 The juvenile court denied Mother’s motion, agreeing with
DCS that the information Mother sought to introduce was merely
cumulative to the testimony at trial and “nothing in the exhibits . . .
warrant[ed] additional cross examination of prior witnesses.”

¶13 The court then ruled, based on the evidence at trial, that DCS
had established both chronic substance abuse and fifteen months out-of-
home placement grounds for termination. The court acknowledged that
Mother was now employed, participating in services, and had stable
housing. But it found Mother had failed to make any of the necessary
changes to her life until a month or two prior and was “unable to provide a
cogent reason for why she did not make the changes . . . until shortly before
the severance trial.” Instead, for most of the dependency period, she “did
essentially nothing to place [D.T.]’s needs ahead of her own.” And because
she had only started treatment a few weeks ago, it found she “ha[d] not
demonstrated the ability to maintain sobriety.”

¶14 The court concluded there was reason to believe that Mother’s
substance abuse would continue for a prolonged period and that she had
been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused D.T.’s out-of-home
placement. Further, Mother’s chronic substance abuse caused her to be

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Decision of the Court

unable to discharge her parental responsibilities and there was a substantial
likelihood she would be unable to exercise proper parental care and control
in the near future. The court also found DCS had made diligent efforts to
provide reunification services to Mother. Its ruling detailed the “array” of
services DCS provided, including the Family Connections program, the
Nurturing Parenting Program, visitation, substance abuse testing and
treatment, and psychological and psychiatric evaluations.

¶15 The court then determined that termination was in D.T.’s best
interests. It found D.T. had been in his placement since December 2024, and
was bonded to his placement. Further, his placement was meeting all of
D.T.’s needs and wanted to adopt him. The court therefore terminated
Mother’s parental rights to D.T.

¶16 Mother timely appealed the court’s order denying her motion
to reopen evidence and terminating her parental rights. We have
jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235(A),
12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶17 Mother argues the juvenile court erred in denying her
motions to continue trial and reopen evidence. She further contends that
no reasonable evidence supported the court’s findings that statutory
grounds for termination existed and that termination was in D.T.’s best
interests. D.T. filed an answering brief adopting Mother’s arguments.

I. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mother’s request for a continuance and motion to reopen
evidence.
¶18 Mother argues the juvenile court violated her due process
rights by denying her motion to continue and her motion to reopen
evidence because it prevented her from being able to cross-examine the
DCS case manager about discrepancies between his testimony and case
notes. She further claims that, in doing so, the juvenile court improperly
excluded evidence bearing on the best interests determination.

¶19 We review alleged due process violations de novo. Jeff D. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 6 (App. 2016). But the juvenile
court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant motions to continue
and motions to reopen evidence. See Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346
(1992); McCutchen v. Hill, 147 Ariz. 401, 406-07 (1985). So we review the
denial of each motion for an abuse of discretion. In re Z.L., 256 Ariz. 138,

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Decision of the Court

142, ¶ 15 (App. 2023); Johnson v. Johnson, 64 Ariz. 368, 370 (1946). And we
will not reverse unless Mother demonstrates prejudice. In re Z.L., 256 Ariz.
at 142, ¶ 15; Grummel v. Hollenstein, 90 Ariz. 356, 361 (1962).

¶20 “Due process requires that parties have an adequate
opportunity to present factual and legal claims fully.” Dep’t of Child Safety
v. Carel G., 260 Ariz. 263, 270, ¶ 26 (App. 2025) (citation omitted). Further,
“[a] court generally must hear any competent and potentially significant
evidence that bears on the best interests of the child.” James A. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 319, 322, ¶ 8 (App. 2018). Accordingly, the juvenile
court “may continue” a termination hearing for up to 30 days “if it finds
that the continuance is necessary for the full, fair, and proper presentation
of evidence and the best interests of the child would not be adversely
affected.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(b)(3). But “[m]otions to continue will be
granted ‘only if in the discretion of the [juvenile] court circumstances exist
making delay indispensable to the interests of justice.’” In re Termination of
Parental Rts. as to H.B., No. 1 CA-JV 24-0198, 2025 WL 1693398, at *2, ¶ 11
(Ariz. App. June 17, 2025) (mem. decision) (quoting State v. Ashelman, 137
Ariz. 460, 465 (1983) (citation modified)).

¶21 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mother’s motion to continue and instead offering her the opportunity to
move to reopen the evidence if she discovered information in the
November 13 disclosure that was relevant to her defense. When Mother
filed her motion to continue, she had not finished reviewing the documents,
so neither Mother nor the court knew whether they contained any relevant
information. Without this information, the court could not determine
whether a delay was in fact necessary for Mother to fully present her case.
By offering Mother the opportunity to move to reopen evidence if she
discovered relevant information, the court protected both her right to due
process and D.T.’s interest in not delaying the proceeding. See Pima Cnty.
Juv. Severance Action No. S-2462, 162 Ariz. 536, 538 (App. 1989) (noting that
“determinations regarding children whose best interests are at risk . . .
require expedient consideration”).

¶22 Further, Mother suffered no prejudice from the court’s denial
of her motion to continue. The court gave her over two weeks to review the
documents and file a motion to reopen before it issued its decision. She
filed a motion presenting all the information she believed was relevant to
her defense. The court reviewed all of her proposed exhibits and found
them cumulative to the evidence at trial.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.T.
Decision of the Court

¶23 Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying her
motion to reopen evidence. In deciding whether to reopen evidence, the
court considers “whether all the evidence, offered in good faith and
necessary to the ends of justice has been heard.” State v. Doody, 187 Ariz.
363, 378 (App. 1996) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
It does not need to reopen for evidence of little probative value. Id.

¶24 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings on
how her proposed exhibits were cumulative to the evidence at trial. She
merely argues the court prevented her from fully cross-examining the DCS
case manager on inconsistencies between his testimony and information
she found in the documents. But the juvenile court found “nothing in the
exhibits . . . warrant[ed] additional cross examination” of the case manager.
This was not clearly erroneous.

¶25 Mother alleged five inconsistencies she claims warranted
further cross-examination.1 She first points to the case manager’s October
16, 2025, case note, which stated that “[a] psychological evaluation has not
been completed even though recommended by the Unit Psychologist.” She
claims this contradicts the unit psychologist’s notes, which left the
“psychological assessment” unchecked in a list of recommended services.
DCS explained that the note meant to say “psychiatric evaluation” instead
of “psychological evaluation” and the discrepancy was likely just a clerical
error. Regardless, Mother knew what type of evaluation she was supposed
to get. Numerous case reports consistently indicated that DCS
recommended Mother complete a psychiatric evaluation and Mother
herself testified she knew DCS asked her to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation. She nevertheless failed to do so. The court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the discrepancy was not relevant.

1 DCS’s answering brief correctly notes that Mother’s brief does not identify

what specific discrepancies she needed to cross-examine the case manager
about. Mother responds that “it is impossible for [her] to explicitly
articulate what would have been elicited [on cross examination] as Mother
does not know what she does not know.” We may consider an appellant’s
failure to develop an argument waiver of the issue. Christina G. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 234, ¶ 14 n.6 (App. 2011). But we decline
to do so here because a child’s best interests are implicated. See Nold v. Nold,
232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 10 (App. 2013). We therefore address on the merits the
inconsistencies Mother alleges in her motion to reopen evidence.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.T.
Decision of the Court

¶26 Mother further points out that same case note stated that
Mother indicated that D.T. missed two virtual visits. Mother claims this
contradicted the case manager’s testimony that she had been inconsistent
with visitation. But Mother herself admitted she did not regularly
participate in visitation. And the fact that D.T. missed two visits does not
negate the fact that Mother herself missed half of all scheduled visits.
Further, D.T.’s CASA testified that D.T. had missed one or two virtual visits
due to connectivity issues.

¶27 The October 16, 2025, case note also indicated that Mother met
with the case manager that day, informed him she was participating in
treatment, and gave him her counselor’s contact information. She claims
this contradicted the case manager’s testimony that he was unaware of her
progress in services until he received a written update from her counselor
in November. But Mother provides no record citation to where in the
transcript this testimony can be found, nor have we been able to locate it.
Regardless, the mere fact that Mother told the case manager she was
participating in services does not mean that the case manager is aware of
her progress in those services.

¶28 Mother next contends that the case manager’s November
2025 service letter to her instructing her that it was important for her to
maintain employment contradicted his testimony that she should not be
focused on employment. Again, Mother provides no record citation for this
testimony and we cannot find it. At most, the case manager testified that
Mother had not yet proven an ability to balance full-time work, substance
abuse treatment, and parenting responsibilities. And he expressed concern
that she had already missed several virtual visits with D.T. due to her
inability to manage her work schedule.

¶29 Finally, Mother points to a text message she sent her case
manager, requesting assistance with bus passes in California, and the
November 2025 service letter, which instructed her she would need to
complete weekly drug testing but did not provide testing location
information. She claims this information rebuts the case manager’s
assertion that DCS made reasonable efforts to provide reunification services
to Mother. It does not. The case manager’s response to her text message
informed her that he would inquire into getting her bus passes. And the
service letter stated that DCS had submitted an out-of-state request to locate
a testing facility close to where she lived and would inform her once it had
done so. Further, if Mother had trouble getting DCS’s help with
transportation or been confused about where to do the drug test, she would

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Decision of the Court

have known this at the time of trial, but she never made either assertion at
trial.

¶30 Because the record supports the court’s conclusion that none
of the information Mother discovered in the November 13 disclosure
warranted further cross-examination of the case manager, the juvenile court
did not err in denying Mother’s motion to reopen. Compare Johnson, 64 Ariz.
at 369 (superior court abused its discretion in declining to reopen the case
to hear testimony that “contradicted much of the testimony” at trial and
implicated the best interests of the children) with Aussie v. Hashemi, No. 1
CA-CV 11-0253, 2012 WL 1622355, at *3, ¶ 9 (Ariz. App. May 8, 2012) (mem.
decision) (superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen
the case for evidence relating to alleged child abuse because it “added
nothing substantive to the court’s consideration of the issues”). Mother’s
due process rights were satisfied, and the court heard all evidence relevant
to D.T.’s best interests.

II. The juvenile court’s termination order was not clearly
erroneous.
¶31 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the juvenile court
must find (1) by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory
ground for termination exists and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence
that the termination is in the child’s best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018); see also A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (listing
grounds for termination). As the trier of fact, the juvenile court “is in the
best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We therefore accept
the juvenile court’s factual findings unless no reasonable evidence supports
them and affirm a termination order unless it is clearly erroneous. Id.

A. Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of
chronic substance abuse.

¶32 To terminate parental rights on chronic substance abuse
grounds, the juvenile court must find that (1) the parent had a history of
chronic substance abuse, (2) the parent was unable to discharge her parental
duties because of the substance abuse, and (3) there were reasonable
grounds to believe the condition would continue for a prolonged,
indeterminate period. Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450,
453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005); A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The court must also find that
DCS “made reasonable efforts to reunify the family or that such efforts
would have been futile.” Jennifer G., 211 Ariz. at 453, ¶ 12.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.T.
Decision of the Court

¶33 Mother argues no reasonable factfinder could find she had a
history of chronic substance abuse because she had only begun using
substances shortly before DCS took custody of D.T. She further argues no
reasonable factfinder could find her substance abuse or inability to parent
was likely to continue because she was now sober, in treatment, employed,
and had housing.

¶34 In support of her argument, Mother claims she only began
using “hard drugs” shortly before DCS took custody of D.T., unlike the
father in Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., who began using drugs at
age twelve. 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 17 (App. 2010). But Mother testified that
“marijuana ha[d] always been a part of [her] life[],” and that she used it to
“sustain [her] depression and anxiety.” Based on her own report to a DCS
substance abuse service provider, Mother had been using marijuana for
over fourteen years, beginning at age seventeen, and was using it multiple
times a week. The court was also “not convinced that Mother only started
using ‘hard drugs’ shortly before th[e] dependency case began.” Further,
there is no bright-line rule as to how long a parent must have used drugs
for substance abuse to be considered “chronic.” Mother’s consistent
inability to abstain from substances until the last two months of a nearly
two-year dependency period supports the court’s finding that Mother had
a history of chronic substance abuse. See id. at 379, ¶ 29 (father’s failure to
remedy substance abuse despite pending termination is evidence he has not
overcome his dependence on drugs and alcohol).

¶35 Reasonable evidence also supports the court’s finding that
Mother’s condition was likely to continue. In considering whether a
parent’s substance abuse is likely to “continue for a prolonged
indeterminate period,” courts may consider “the length and frequency of
[the] substance abuse, the types of substances abused, behaviors associated
with the substance abuse, prior efforts to maintain sobriety, and prior
relapses.” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 20 (App.
2016). And “[g]enerally, a parent’s temporary abstinence from drugs and
alcohol does not outweigh her significant history of abuse or her consistent
inability to abstain during the case.” Id. at ¶ 17.

¶36 The court acknowledged that Mother was “now in a better
place,” but it also expressed concern that there remained “much uncertainty
. . . as to Mother’s battle with substance abuse,” given that Mother started
treatment less than two months before the hearing and “has not been able
to demonstrate more than a few weeks of sobriety at best.” Indeed, Mother
only stopped using marijuana less than two weeks before trial after having
used it for over fourteen years. While Mother’s recent improvements are

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Decision of the Court

commendable, it was within the juvenile court’s discretion to find they did
not outweigh her history of chronic substance abuse, and we will not
reweigh the evidence. Id. at 286-88, ¶¶ 16-17, 25.

¶37 Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of
chronic substance abuse grounds. Because only one statutory ground is
required to support a termination, we do not address Mother’s arguments
regarding the out-of-home placement grounds. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 578, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).

B. Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
termination was in D.T.’s best interests.
¶38 To conclude termination is in a child’s best interests, the
juvenile court must find that “the child would benefit from a severance or
be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.” Matter of Appeal in
Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). “When a
current placement meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective
adoption is otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find
that termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s
best interests.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3-4, ¶ 12 (2016).

¶39 The juvenile court here found that D.T. was bonded to his
placement, which was meeting all of his needs and wanted to adopt him.
Permitting D.T. to be adopted by a placement that was meeting his needs is
a benefit to termination that is sufficient on its own to support a best
interests determination. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3-4, ¶ 16. But the court
also found D.T. “ha[d] waited for over two years for Mother to get herself
together” and that “it would be unfair for [D.T.] to wait any longer.” See id.
at ¶ 15 (“protect[ing] a child’s interest in stability and security” is “of
foremost concern”) (citation omitted). The court acknowledged that D.T.
did not want Mother’s parental rights to be terminated but concluded that
termination was ultimately in his best interests. Cf. A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(4)
(child’s wishes are a factor to consider, but not dispositive, in the best
interests analysis for legal decision-making and parenting time).

¶40 Mother does not challenge any of these findings. Instead, she
claims the juvenile court failed to consider two facts: (1) that placement
wanted to move to Jamaica with D.T. against D.T.’s wishes, and (2) that
placement’s biological child was attempting to groom D.T. But we presume
the court considered all of the evidence before making its ruling. See Fuentes
v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55-56, ¶ 18 (App. 2004). And although the court
must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining a child’s best
interests, Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150-51, ¶ 13, it need not list every fact on

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which its ruling is based, Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445,
451-52, ¶ 19 (App. 2007).

¶41 Further, the evidence does not support either of these
assertions. The case manager testified that placement “ha[d] plans of
traveling, but no plans of permanent[ly] moving . . . out of the United
States,” and the alleged “grooming” incident was placement’s biological
child watching pornography, which D.T. was not involved in. Mother
claims the case manager “simply downplay[ed] the issues.” She is, in
essence, asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Mary Lou
C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004) (“[T]his court
will not reweigh the evidence but will look only to determine if there is
evidence to sustain the [juvenile] court’s ruling.”). Sufficient evidence
supports the juvenile court’s best interests determination based on D.T.’s
adoptability and need for permanency.

CONCLUSION

¶42 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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