Ngaruiya v. Gill

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JOSEPHINE NGARUIYA, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

JASPREET GILL, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-1021
FILED 06-16-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-018970
The Honorable Jason Easterday, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Josephine Ngaruiya, Mesa
Plaintiff/Appellant

Jaspreet Gill, Gilbert
Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
NGARUIYA v. GILL
Decision of the Court

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Josephine Ngaruiya appeals the superior court’s dismissal of
her complaint arising from the foreclosure and trustee’s sale of her home to
Jaspreet Gill. Because Ngaruiya’s opening brief does not cite the record as
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) 13 requires, because
her brief contains fabricated and materially misleading citations suggesting
the use of generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) without necessary human
checking, and because her claims fail on their merits, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In June 2006, Ngaruiya obtained a mortgage loan secured by
a deed of trust encumbering residential property located on West Adams
Street in Phoenix, Arizona (“the Property”). After Ngaruiya defaulted on
the loan, a notice of trustee’s sale was recorded on April 12, 2022,
scheduling a trustee’s sale for July 19, 2022. The trustee’s sale took place
that day, and title to the Property was transferred to Gill through a trustee’s
deed upon sale.

¶3 On July 18, 2024, Ngaruiya filed a complaint against Gill and
other defendants arising from the foreclosure and trustee’s sale of the
Property. According to the complaint, Gill purchased the Property at the
trustee’s sale and took possession of Ngaruiya’s personal belongings
remaining in the home without notice.

¶4 Ngaruiya served Gill, and thereafter repeatedly sought entry
of default against Gill, filing applications or motions for default on
November 14, 2024, February 17 and 18, 2025, and October 6, 2025. In her
final such filing, Ngaruiya sought damages, costs, and interest against Gill.
Meanwhile, the court dismissed the remaining defendants from the lawsuit.

¶5 On October 20, 2025, the superior court sua sponte dismissed
the complaint against Gill under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
The court concluded the action arose from the foreclosure and trustee’s sale
of Ngaruiya’s home, that no evidence showed Ngaruiya sought to enjoin
the July 2022 trustee’s sale before it occurred, and that the complaint thus
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against Gill.

¶6 The court entered judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(c). Ngaruiya timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. Ariz.
Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

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NGARUIYA v. GILL
Decision of the Court

ANALYSIS

I. Ngaruiya’s Brief Fails to Cite the Record as ARCAP 13 Requires,
Which Would Justify Dismissing Her Appeal.

¶7 ARCAP 13 requires every party appealing to this court to
include a statement of facts and an argument with citations to the record in
their opening brief, to allow us to assess their argument. ARCAP 13(a)(5),
(7). Ngaruiya’s opening brief doesn’t do this. It discusses Ngaruiya’s
hospitalization, alleged improper service upon her, the foreclosure
proceedings, claimed procedural irregularities, and alleged misconduct by
multiple parties. But it lacks citations to the record to support its many
factual assertions about these subjects. See ARCAP 13(a)(5), (7). We do not
search “records and exhibits to substantiate an appellant’s claims” or
reconstruct the factual basis for their appeal. Adams v. Valley Nat’l Bank of
Ariz., 139 Ariz. 340, 343 (App. 1984). Because the opening brief does not
comply with ARCAP 13’s requirement to cite the record, which is necessary
to our review of an appeal, ARCAP 25 supports dismissal of her appeal. See
ARCAP 25 (allowing dismissal of appeal as a sanction for violation of rules).

II. Ngaruiya’s Brief Contains Many Fabricated or Materially
Inaccurate Citations, Which Suggest Misuse of Generative AI, and
Which Would Also Justify Dismissing Her Appeal.

¶8 Ngaruiya’s opening brief contains many fabricated and
materially inaccurate citations to the law. This is an important breach of
her responsibilities to the court. All litigants, whether represented by
lawyers or not, are required to ensure the accuracy of the authorities they
present to the court. See State v. Gomez, 231 Ariz. 219, 223 ¶ 15 (2012) (self-
represented litigants must comply with procedural and substantive law);
Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (“Courts hold
unrepresented litigants in Arizona to the same standards as attorneys and
do not afford them special leniency.”).

¶9 Some principles for which Ngaruiya cites cases don’t appear
in the authorities she cites. Other cited authorities don’t support the
propositions for which Ngaruiya cites them. We note these examples:

• On page 13, the brief misquotes either Arizona Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4), Ruffino v. Lokosky, 245 Ariz. 165 (App. 2018),
and/or Hilgeman v. Am. Mortg. Sec., Inc., 196 Ariz. 215 (App. 2000),
though Ruffino and Hilgeman generally concern the asserted
proposition.

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NGARUIYA v. GILL
Decision of the Court

• On pages 13 and 14, the brief contains two fabricated quotations
purportedly from Master Fin., Inc. v. Woodburn, 208 Ariz. 70, 74 ¶ 19
(App. 2004).

• On pages 14 and 15, the brief misquotes Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), though Mullane generally
concerns the asserted proposition.

• On page 15, the brief contains a fabricated quotation purportedly
from Bollermann v. Nowlis, 234 Ariz. 340, 342 ¶ 10 (2014), though the
case does not concern the proposition asserted.

• On page 16, the brief misrepresents In re Marriage of Thorn, 235 Ariz.
216, 220 ¶ 15 (App. 2014). The quoted language does not appear in
the opinion, and the case does not concern the proposition asserted.

• On page 17, the brief contains a fabricated quotation purportedly
from Sprang v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 165 Ariz. 257, 262 (App. 1990),
though the case does not concern the proposition asserted.

• On page 20, the brief contains a fabricated quotation purportedly
from State v. Silva, 222 Ariz. 457, 460 ¶ 12 (App. 2009), though Silva
generally concerns the asserted proposition.

¶10 These problems are consistent with a rising wave of briefs in
our court demonstrating lawyer and litigant misuse of generative AI. The
use of fake quotations, if tolerated, breaks law. Put another way, law won’t
work if we let lawyers and pro se litigants make things up without penalty.
If lawyers and pro se litigants made these things up from their
imaginations, we would punish them firmly and not consider their lie-
based arguments. We can’t afford to treat the same lies more lightly
because they come from generative AI programs, as if that makes it okay,
or less punishable. It’s not okay, and we shouldn’t punish it less.

III. Ngaruiya’s Claims Also Fail on Their Merits.

¶11 While failures to comply with court rules, including ARCAP
13, can justify dismissing an appeal, we retain the discretion to reach the
merits of the issues. See, e.g., Hill v. City of Phoenix, 193 Ariz. 570, 572-73 ¶
10 (1999). We do so here.

¶12 Even accepting Ngaruiya’s allegations as true — including
her allegations that she was involuntarily hospitalized after notice of the
trustee’s sale was posted and that Gill later took possession of her

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NGARUIYA v. GILL
Decision of the Court

belongings unlawfully — her claims against Gill fail as a matter of law.
Arizona’s deed-of-trust statutes required Nguariya to seek injunctive relief
before the trustee’s sale occurred. See A.R.S. § 33-811(C). Arizona courts
have repeatedly held that “a person who has defenses or objections to a
properly noticed trustee’s sale has one avenue for challenging the sale:
filing for injunctive relief.” Zubia v. Shapiro, 243 Ariz. 412, 415 ¶ 16 (2018)
(quoting BT Capital, LLC v. TD Serv. Co. of Ariz., 229 Ariz. 299, 301 ¶ 10
(2012)). A trustor who fails to obtain such relief “waives his claims to title
of the property upon the sale’s completion, and also waives any claims that
are dependent on the [validity of the] sale.” Id. at 415 ¶ 18 (quoting Morgan
AZ Fin., LLC v. Gotses, 235 Ariz. 21, 23-24 ¶ 7 (App. 2014)). That waiver rule
applies even when the plaintiff later alleges serious defects in the
foreclosure process. Id. at 417 ¶¶ 26–28.

¶13 Nguariya’s claims against Gill depend entirely on the alleged
invalidity of the trustee’s sale. In Madison v. Groseth, the plaintiff alleged
the purchasers at the trustee’s sale committed conversion, fraud, deceit, and
trespass by taking possession of property after the sale, and further alleged
the purchasers were not bona fide purchasers because they knew of
disputes concerning title. 230 Ariz. 8, 12 ¶ 10 (App. 2012). The court
nevertheless held those claims were waived under A.R.S. § 33-811(C)
because the plaintiff failed to obtain an injunction before the trustee’s sale
occurred. Id. at 13 ¶ 13. Nguariya’s claims are even weaker. Unlike
Madison, there is no evidence or developed allegation that Gill was not a
bona fide purchaser or had actual notice of alleged defects in the trustee’s
sale. Because Nguariya did not obtain injunctive relief before the July 2022
trustee’s sale, any claims against Gill which depended on the invalidity of
the sale were waived.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm. Because Gill did not respond to Ngaruiya’s brief,
we decline in our discretion under ARCAP 25 to sanction Ngaruiya.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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