In Re Term of Parental Rights as to T.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0114
FILED 06-11-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD43639
The Honorable Gregory Como, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Father

Maricopa County Legal Advocate’s Office, Phoenix
By Amanda L. Adams
Counsel for Child

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Autumn Spritzer
Counsel for Arizona Department of Child Safety
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision in which Presiding
Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Eduardo C. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother 1 and Father never married but share one minor child
(“Child”) born in 2020. The three lived together with Maternal
Grandmother for the first three months of Child’s life before Father moved
out. Over the next three months, “Father had no more than a handful of in-
person visits” with Child. When Child was eight months old, Father was
arrested and later convicted of Child Sex Trafficking, a Class 2 felony. The
court sentenced Father to eight years’ imprisonment.

¶3 Mother began a relationship with a new boyfriend
(“Boyfriend”). At times, Mother, Child, and Boyfriend lived with Maternal
Grandmother. In 2023, Mother gave birth to Child’s half-sibling (“Sibling”).
Soon afterwards, Mother ended her relationship with Boyfriend. But
Boyfriend maintained contact with Sibling and Child through Maternal
Grandmother, visiting them each week.

¶4 Paternal Grandmother regularly babysat Child when Child
was a toddler and arranged phone and video calls between Father and
Child. Father sent some letters and crafts to Child through Paternal
Grandmother. After Paternal Grandmother allowed a different family
member to spend time with Child against Mother’s wishes, Mother stopped
allowing contact between Paternal Grandmother and Child for a time.

¶5 When Child was almost three years old, Mother and Child
moved back in with Maternal Grandmother. Over the next year, Maternal
Grandmother made at least four phone calls to the Department of Child
Safety (“DCS”) to report her concerns about Mother’s parenting. During its

1 Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights and is not a

party to this appeal.

2
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

investigation, DCS received audio recordings of Mother physically and
verbally abusing Child.

¶6 In January 2024, DCS took temporary custody of Child and
placed her with Maternal Grandmother. DCS petitioned for dependency.
Father pled no contest to DCS’s allegation that he was “unable to safely
parent due to incarceration.” DCS recommended a case plan of family
reunification and, after confirming Father was permitted to have contact
with children despite his felony conviction, facilitated weekly virtual visits
between Father and Child. DCS also approved Paternal Grandmother for
visits.

¶7 During one visit, Paternal Grandmother revealed to Child
that Father, not Boyfriend, was her biological father. Child was then four
years old. After a few months of weekly visits, Child expressed resistance
to visiting with Father. Child’s anxious behavior, including bedwetting and
night terrors, increased. DCS and Child’s attorney requested that Child’s
visits with Father stop, or that the frequency of the visits be reduced. Over
Father’s objection, the juvenile court reduced the frequency of remote visits
to twice a month. Child continued to have weekly visits with Boyfriend.

¶8 In March 2025, DCS moved to change the case plan to
severance and adoption, alleging the statutory ground of Father’s felony
length of sentence resulting in the deprivation “of a normal home for a
period of years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). Father objected and requested a
bonding and best-interests assessment to support his request that either
Maternal or Paternal Grandmother be appointed as Child’s guardian.

¶9 The juvenile court scheduled a contested termination
adjudication hearing to begin in June 2025. Ten days before the hearing,
Father renewed his request for a bonding and best-interests assessment of
Child’s relationship with both grandmothers. On the day before the final
day of trial, Father filed a supplemental list of exhibits, indicating he wished
to admit the audio recordings of Mother abusing Child. Citing relevance
and timeliness, Maternal Grandmother objected. Father acknowledged
DCS disclosed the recordings weeks earlier, but he failed to supplement his
exhibit list because he hoped the case would “settle.” The court refused to
admit the recordings into evidence, finding Father’s request was untimely.

¶10 After the conclusion of the termination adjudication hearing,
at which Maternal Grandmother testified she wished to adopt Child, the
juvenile court issued a detailed written order terminating Father’s parental

3
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

rights and denying Father’s motion for a bonding and best-interests
assessment.

¶11 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A),
12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶12 Though fundamental, a parent’s right to the care, custody,
and control of his child is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). To terminate parental rights, a court
must find at least one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and
convincing evidence, id. at 249, ¶ 12, and that termination is in the child’s
best interests by a preponderance of the evidence, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210
Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005). “We will affirm a termination order unless the
juvenile court abuses its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported
by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470,
474, ¶ 14 (2022).

¶13 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B), one of the enumerated grounds for
termination of parental rights is a parent’s incarceration for a felony
conviction “of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home
for a period of years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). Section 8-533(B)(4) offers “no
bright line definition of when a sentence is sufficiently long to deprive a
child of a normal home for a period of years.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251,
¶ 29 (citation modified). Instead, the juvenile court:

should consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited
to: (1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship
existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which
the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured
during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the
relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that
incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the
length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent
[or permanent guardian] to provide a normal home life, and
(6) the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the
child at issue.

Id. at 251–52, ¶ 29 (modified by Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 477, ¶ 27 (directing
the juvenile court to also consider a permanent guardian in the fifth factor)).

4
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

¶14 Father raises several issues on appeal. We address each in
turn.

I. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Statutory
Ground for Terminating Father’s Parental Rights

A. Visitation

¶15 Father argues DCS failed to make reasonable and diligent
efforts to provide reunification services while Father was incarcerated. See
Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 581–82, ¶ 20 (2021) (“Because
parents incarcerated for a lengthy period still possess a fundamental liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children, DCS must
make diligent efforts to preserve the family by providing services to assist
parents in maintaining a bond with their children.” (citation omitted)).

¶16 Father’s contact with Child (or lack thereof) is presumably
relevant to factor two in the Michael J. analysis of the length-of-conviction
statutory ground. DCS took custody of Child on January 26, 2024, but six
months passed before Father received his first virtual visit with Child.
Father also challenges the juvenile court’s decision to reduce his visits to bi-
weekly while maintaining Child’s weekly visits with others, including
Boyfriend and Paternal Grandmother.

¶17 DCS explained it had an obligation to verify that Father was
allowed to have contact with any child given the nature of his conviction,
but experienced a delay (the cause of which is unclear from the record) after
requesting Father’s criminal records. Father objected to the delay but did
not provide DCS with his criminal conviction records, despite a duty to do
so. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 315(a) (requiring a party to a dependency or
termination proceeding to disclose to other parties all relevant information
that is not privileged). After confirming Father was not prohibited from
having contact with Child, DCS then sought a psychological consultation
to ensure Child’s mental safety. DCS explained that Child didn’t know
Father or have a bond with him. The court noted that Child was only
months old when Father was incarcerated and had long believed Boyfriend
to be her father. After Child’s own statement that she didn’t want to see
Father and Child’s reported dysregulation following her virtual visits with
Father, the court reduced the frequency of the visits.

¶18 The juvenile court concluded that DCS made reasonable and
diligent efforts to provide services to Father despite the “obstacles to
providing . . . parenting time due to the nature of [Father’s] conviction.” We
affirm the juvenile court’s factual findings when reasonable evidence and

5
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

inferences support them. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478,
¶ 30 (2023). While we acknowledge a delay in providing visitation to Father,
the factual circumstances here, including the nature of Father’s conviction,
the limited nature of his relationship with Child before his incarceration,
and Father’s own failure to disclose the necessary criminal records, support
the court’s conclusion that DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to
provide visitation to Father while prioritizing Child’s well-being.

B. Michael J. / Timothy B. Factors

¶19 Father next argues the juvenile court erred in its analysis of
the factors outlined by Michael J. in light of the modification provided by
Timothy B.—namely that the court failed to properly analyze whether
Father was incapable of providing a normal home life through a
guardianship. See Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 477, ¶ 27. A “‘normal home’ does
not necessarily require the incarcerated parent’s physical presence.” Id. at
476, ¶ 24. “[A] ‘normal home’ can consist of a home in which the child has
a permanent guardian, and the birth . . . parent is not physically present in
the home but has some relationship with the child that serves the child’s
best interests.” Id. at ¶ 25.

¶20 Father urged the juvenile court to reject termination and
instead conclude that guardianship would serve Child’s need for a safe and
loving home while protecting Father’s fundamental parental rights. To be
sure, the court cannot ignore “the parent’s interest in maintaining a positive
parent-child relationship.” Id. at 478, ¶ 31. And “the juvenile court should
consider whether another person is willing to be the child’s permanent
guardian and . . . [whether] a guardianship would be in the child’s best
interests.” Id. at 477, ¶ 27. But our supreme court firmly rejected the premise
“that a court must give equal weight to a parent’s interest in the custody
and care of a child and the child’s interests in security and stability” when
making a best-interests determination. Id. at 478, ¶ 32. “[I]t is a given that
the child’s best interests predominate.” Id. at ¶ 31.

¶21 Father specifically challenges the juvenile court’s analysis of
factors one, two, five, and six. We do not reweigh evidence on appeal, see
Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 479, ¶ 32, and accept the juvenile court’s factual
findings if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, id. at 478,
¶ 30.

¶22 In its consideration of factor one—length and strength of any
parent-child relationship existing prior to incarceration—the juvenile court
found that “Father had no more than a handful of in-person visits with

6
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

[Child]” between the time he moved out of Maternal Grandmother’s home
(when Child was three months old) and his arrest and incarceration.
Moreover, Child’s therapist and both grandmothers acknowledged that
Child believed Boyfriend to be her father until the age of four. The record
supports these findings.

¶23 As to factor two—the degree to which the parent-child relationship
can be continued and nurtured during incarceration—Father argues that
Mother’s “nomadic living situation” frustrated his ability to have consistent
contact with Child before the dependency. Then, as explained above, Father
experienced a delay in getting visitation arranged through DCS. He argues
that if “the juvenile court had properly provided [him] with full visitation
since the initiation of the case, his bond with [Child] would be that much
stronger.” But factor two focuses on continuing and nurturing the parent-
child relationship during incarceration. Here, Father barely had a
relationship with Child when he went to prison. Tellingly, Child believed
Boyfriend to be her father. While Father made efforts during his
incarceration to establish a relationship with Child as she grew, the court’s
conclusion that their relationship is “not likely to be a close parent-child
bond” is supported by the record and reasonable inferences drawn from
the record.

¶24 Father asserts that factor five—the availability of another parent
or permanent guardian to provide a normal home life—should have weighed in
his favor. Specifically, Father contends that Child could have a normal
home life with a guardian while Father was incarcerated. Timothy B. directs
the juvenile court to consider whether the incarcerated parent’s affirmative
acts contribute to, rather than detract from, the child’s stable family
environment with a permanent guardian. 252 Ariz. at 477, ¶ 27. The juvenile
court heard testimony from Child’s therapist and both grandmothers about
the effect of visitation with Father on Child. The court concluded “Maternal
Grandmother credibly testified that Father’s visits with [Child] cause
emotional upheaval for her.” “Because the juvenile court is in the best
position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility, we accept the
juvenile court’s findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences
support them.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2016). The
therapist’s notes record that Child reported at multiple appointments not
wanting to see Father. While there are supervised visitation notes
documenting Child willingly engaged with Father, the notes also reflect
Child said she didn’t want to visit with Father, resisted engagement with
Father, consistently ignored Father, and turned the camera away from
herself. The record here supports the court’s conclusion that this factor
weighs in favor of termination.

7
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

¶25 Lastly, Father challenges the juvenile court’s analysis of factor
six—the effect of the deprivation of parental presence on the child—concluding
that depriving Child of Father’s presence is unlikely to have a significant
impact on her. The court reasoned that Father never established a normal
parent-child relationship with Child, that Father has not seen Child in
person for “approximately five years,” and that Child views Boyfriend as
her father. It is undisputed that Father has been incarcerated since Child
was only months old and Child believed Boyfriend was her father until
four-years-old. Although Father had virtual visits with Child, those visits,
taken alone, do not constitute a normal parent-child relationship.
Reasonable evidence and inferences support the court’s findings. See
Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 30.

¶26 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in its analysis
of the Michael J. and Timothy B. factors in finding DCS proved the statutory
ground of “felony length of sentence” by clear and convincing evidence as
a basis for termination.

II. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding that
Termination of Father’s Parental Rights Was in Child’s Best
Interests

A. Bonding and Best-Interests Assessment

¶27 Next, Father argues the juvenile court erred by denying his
motion for a bonding and best-interests assessment. Because the court
failed to consider “the child’s interests in an ongoing relationship with
Father,” he argues the court “ignored” his relationship with Child when
weighing whether guardianship or termination was in Child’s best
interests. DCS counters that “the juvenile court’s best-interests
determination is distinct from any subsequent placement decisions, and a
parent whose parental rights have been terminated lacks standing to
challenge post-termination placement decisions or the child’s adoption.”
See In re O.M., 254 Ariz. 543, 545–46, ¶¶ 9–10 (App. 2023).

¶28 In In re O.M., the mother did not challenge the juvenile
court’s finding that statutory grounds for termination existed or that the
best-interests findings proved termination of parental rights was in her
child’s best interests. Id. at 545, ¶ 8. Instead, she challenged only the court’s
placement determination. Id. She acknowledged that “generally, a parent
lacks standing to challenge the placement of the child on appeal from the
termination order.” Id. at ¶ 9. But she argued that “a parent may do so if the
juvenile court’s placement determination was ‘inextricably intertwined’

8
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

with the child’s best-interests analysis.” Id. (quoting Antonio M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 222 Ariz. 369, 371, ¶ 3 (App. 2009)). This court rejected
her argument. Id. at 546, ¶ 10.

¶29 In essence, Father makes the same argument as the mother in
In re O.M. Father argues a bonding and best-interests assessment would
have guided the court when weighing whether guardianship or adoption
was in Child’s best interests, suggesting that the ultimate placement is
“intertwined” with the best-interests analysis. He seems to argue that
guardianship is in Child’s best interests because such placement would
provide for a continuing relationship with Father.

¶30 But this argument fails. Once the juvenile court determined
that termination was in Child’s best interests because termination would
provide stability and permanence, Father lacked standing to assert
guardianship was in Child’s best interests. Moreover, while Father’s
interest in the parent-child relationship is a consideration for the juvenile
court, the child’s interests are paramount. Supra, ¶ 20; see Timothy B., 252
Ariz. at 478, ¶ 31. The juvenile court considered at length whether
guardianship was in Child’s best interests, infra ¶¶ 32–33, and concluded
otherwise.

B. “Guardianship” or “Termination and Adoption”

¶31 Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
concluding that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best
interests instead of a guardianship with either grandmother.

¶32 The court’s thorough 14-page ruling expressly considered
guardianship, the possible guardians, and whether such placement would
be in Child’s best interests. The court “heard extensive testimony by”
Mother, Father, both grandmothers, and Child’s therapist. All who testified
“agreed that [Child] loves both of her grandmothers.” However, when
asked by her therapist to identify people she trusts, Child included
Maternal Grandmother, Sibling, and Boyfriend, along with a couple of
other relatives, but did not mention Father or Paternal Grandmother. Her
therapist testified that when discussing adults Child could potentially live
with, Child was unaffected by the possibility of not seeing Father or
Paternal Grandmother, but “was visually upset and scared” by the
possibility of not seeing Maternal Grandmother again. The court concluded
“[t]his is natural given that [Child] has lived with [Maternal Grandmother]
for roughly 70% of her life.”

9
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

¶33 The juvenile court reasoned that guardianship opens the
possibility of future litigation once Father is released from imprisonment,
concluding this “would likely be very unsettling to [Child], even if”
unsuccessful. The court also found that termination of parental rights was
in Child’s best interests “because it will allow her to be adopted. Adoption
will provide [Child] with the benefits of permanency and stability.” Given
the strength of the relationship with Maternal Grandmother and the
planned adoption, the court concluded “adoption is in [Child]’s best
interest compared to a guardianship.” The record also shows that Child is
bonded with Sibling, who is also currently placed with Maternal
Grandmother.

¶34 We “view the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s decision.” Jordan
C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). Because
extensive evidence supports the court’s decision here, Father has not shown
where the court abused its discretion in determining that termination was
in Child’s best interests.

C. Excluded Evidence

¶35 Lastly, Father sought to introduce audio recordings of Mother
abusing Child while living in Maternal Grandmother’s home. Father argues
the court erred by excluding the recordings. He contends the recordings are
relevant because “they go to the best interest of the child,” inferring that
continued placement with Maternal Grandmother was not in Child’s best
interests. DCS and Child (through Child’s attorney) argue that Father’s
request was untimely because he waited more than two weeks after
receiving the recordings to seek their admission, supra ¶ 9. DCS also asserts
that Father failed to show prejudice he suffered because of the court’s
decision to exclude the recordings.

¶36 We review the juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for an
abuse of discretion. E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 60, ¶ 19 (App.
2015). We will not disturb the court’s “decision absent a clear abuse of its
discretion and resulting prejudice.” Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
210 Ariz. 77, 82–83, ¶ 19 (App. 2005) (defining an abuse of discretion as
“manifestly unreasonable” or based on “untenable” grounds or reasons
(quotation omitted)).

¶37 Here, Mother admitted at trial she physically and verbally
abused Child while living in Maternal Grandmother’s home. That abuse
prompted Maternal Grandmother to contact DCS. DCS’s report for the

10
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.
Decision of the Court

initial dependency and preliminary protective hearing summarized the
abuse memorialized by the recordings, and that report was later admitted
into evidence by stipulation. Consequently, the factual details of Mother’s
abuse of Child were already before the court. Father has not shown any
prejudice he suffered as a result of the court refusing to admit the
recordings into evidence.

¶38 Moreover, the juvenile court received extensive testimony
from witnesses and from Child’s therapist’s notes about the strength of
Child’s bond with Maternal Grandmother and the safety Child feels in her
care. The court emphasized that the “one constant, stable presence in
[Child]’s life has been” Maternal Grandmother. Father alleges that because
the abuse occurred in Maternal Grandmother’s home, Child’s placement
there would not be in Child’s best interests. But the evidence contradicts
Father’s assertion. The outcome Child truly fears is being removed from
Maternal Grandmother. On this record, the court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the recordings.

CONCLUSION

¶39 We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

11