State v. Thomas

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

PRENTICE RAY THOMAS, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0448 PRPC
FILED 06-11-2026

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2020-115720-002
The Honorable Aryeh D. Schwartz, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Gurion Legal, Phoenix
By Omer R. Gurion
Counsel for Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
STATE v. THOMAS
Decision of the Court

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Prentice Ray Thomas ("Thomas") petitions for review of the
dismissal of his first petition for post-conviction relief in which he asserted
ineffective assistance of counsel tainted his conviction. We grant review
and deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2020, the State charged Thomas with three counts of
sex trafficking, one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, one count
of kidnapping, two counts of involving or using minors in drug offenses,
and conspiracy to commit prostitution. In February 2024, the superior court
held a settlement conference. At the settlement conference, the superior
court explained to Thomas the jury trial process and the charges against
him. Thomas confirmed he understood. The State discussed the case it
would present against Thomas. Thomas asked questions about the State's
witnesses and his ability to cross-examine them. Thomas's counsel then
shared his appraisal of the case. The superior court reviewed the sentencing
range with Thomas and his counsel. Thomas discussed his concerns about
the plea offer and his concerns about going to trial with the superior court.
Thomas also addressed the State and discussed information about his life
which he believed should count for sentencing leniency. The State
explained its plea offer to Thomas. The State offered Thomas a sentencing
range of 10 to 22 years, with a presumptive sentence of 13 and a half years.
Thomas agreed to accept the plea.

¶3 The superior court conducted a plea colloquy with Thomas.
Notably, Thomas confirmed he had not taken any drugs, medications, or
alcohol in the last 24 hours. Thomas pleaded guilty to child sex trafficking
and two charges of attempted child sex trafficking. The superior court
found Thomas's plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

¶4 In March 2024, Thomas attempted to withdraw from his
guilty plea, arguing that he had not made a knowing and voluntary
agreement because he had taken prescribed psychiatric medications,
suboxone strips, "spice", and "jail house alcohol" before agreeing to the plea.
At the sentencing hearing, the superior court addressed Thomas's motion
to withdraw from the plea agreement. At the hearing, Thomas's counsel
explained that he agreed to type up the motion to withdraw from the plea
agreement and file it with the court, but that the facts and law involved
came from Thomas, and he did not endorse them. Thomas's counsel said
he wanted to make sure Thomas was heard on his concerns with the plea

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STATE v. THOMAS
Decision of the Court

agreement, but that based on his review, he could not adopt the argument
as his own. The superior court denied Thomas's motion.

¶5 Thomas timely petitioned for post-conviction relief alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. Thomas argues his counsel should have
investigated Thomas's medical records before filing the motion to
withdraw from the plea agreement. Had his counsel done so, Thomas
argues, his counsel would have discovered that Thomas had been
prescribed an anti-depressant medication and an ADHD medication that
could have affected his mental state at the time of the plea hearing,
bolstering Thomas's claim he did not enter the plea agreement voluntarily.

¶6 The superior court dismissed Thomas's petition for post-
conviction relief. The superior court concluded that Thomas had not
offered sufficient evidence to suggest his counsel failed to examine the
medical records. Based on Thomas's counsel's statements at the hearing on
the motion to withdraw from the plea agreement, the superior court
believed it possible that counsel investigated the circumstances around
Thomas's plea agreement and concluded there was no meritorious basis to
withdraw from the plea. The superior court further concluded that even if
Thomas's counsel had not examined the medical records, Thomas was not
prejudiced as a result, highlighting Thomas's active role in the settlement
conference and his apparent ability to understand the proceedings.

¶7 Thomas seeks review of the dismissal of his petition. We have
jurisdiction under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.16 and A.R.S. §
13-4239.

DISCUSSION

¶8 The State did not file a response to Thomas's petition for
review. Instead, the State filed a "Notice of Acknowledgement" indicating
it would not file a response. Generally, we consider a party's failure to
respond a confession of reversable error on any debatable issues. See Savord
v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259, ¶ 9 (App. 2014). Citing Arizona Rule of
Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 31.21, the State asserts its decision not to
respond to a petition for review is not a confession of error. But Rule 31.21
addresses petitions for review to the supreme court on direct appeal. See
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.21. Rule 31.21 does not apply to petitions for post-
conviction relief under Rule 33, and here the State's failure to respond may
constitute a confession of error. But because Thomas has not raised any
debatable issues, we do not treat the State's failure to respond as an implied
confession of reversible error. See Savord, 235 Ariz. at 259, ¶ 9.

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STATE v. THOMAS
Decision of the Court

¶9 We review the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 577, ¶ 19 (2012).
Petitioner bears the burden to establish the superior court abused its
discretion. State v. Reed, 252 Ariz. 236, 238, ¶ 6 (App. 2021). For ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims, a defendant must show both that counsel's
performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced as a
result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A counsel's
performance is deficient if it falls "below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Id. at 688. To establish prejudice, a defendant must "show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
A showing of prejudice requires more than "mere speculation." State v.
Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 268, ¶ 23 (App. 1999).

¶10 A guilty plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. See State v. Chairez, 235 Ariz. 99, 100, ¶ 8 (App. 2013). A court
may allow a defendant to withdraw from a guilty plea if necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.5. Regardless of whether
counsel examined his medical records, Thomas cannot establish prejudice
and the superior court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Thomas's
petition.

¶11 At his plea hearing, Thomas confirmed that he had not taken
any drugs, medications, or alcohol in the last 24 hours. The superior court
"was entitled to rely on [Thomas's] responses to the court's questions at the
change-of-plea hearing . . . ." Chairez, 235 Ariz. at 100, ¶ 8; see also United
States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003) ("The most important
consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an
evaluation of the [] colloquy at which the guilty plea was accepted.").
Further, Thomas points to no evidence to support his claim that a diligent
review of his medical records would have provided support for his motion
to withdraw. Instead, while Thomas points to medical records showing he
was prescribed medicines for depression and ADHD, those records also
show that he refused those medications the night before the plea hearing.

¶12 The superior court correctly relied on Thomas's denial of drug
and alcohol use. See, e.g., State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521, 525, ¶ 12 (App. 2017)
(noting that a defendant's statements during a plea colloquy are "'solemn
declarations'" that "'carry a strong presumption of verity'" and "'constitute
a formidable barrier' in a subsequent challenge to the validity of a plea"
(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977)). And, as highlighted
by the superior court, Thomas's active participation at the plea hearing
provides evidence he was not impaired by drugs, medications, or alcohol

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STATE v. THOMAS
Decision of the Court

during the plea colloquy. See Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1146 (9th
Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim that depression rendered a guilty plea
involuntary where the "record of the plea hearing indicates the opposite:
that Tanner lucidly and voluntarily decided to plead guilty"); cf. State v.
Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, 592, ¶ 25 (1998) (recognizing a "defendant's appropriate
and rational responses" as evidence a defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel), abrogated on other grounds by
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004). Given these facts, Thomas has not
met his burden to show that his motion to withdraw from his plea would
have been successful if his counsel had reviewed the medical records.
Because Thomas has not established prejudice, his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim fails.

CONCLUSION

¶13 We grant review and deny relief.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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