CLAXTON v. BROOKS

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of the Estate of:

MARGARET C. CLAXTON, Deceased.
__________________________

RICHARD WILLIAM CLAXTON, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

MARY MARGARET BROOKS, et al., Respondents/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0685 PB

FILED 05-18-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. PB1997-001803
The Honorable Elizabeth T. Bingert, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Richard William Claxton, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellant

Dyer Bregman & Ferris, PLLC, Phoenix
By Charles M. Dyer, Nathanael J. Scheer, Kyle H. Bycroft
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee Mary Margaret Brooks
CLAXTON v. BROOKS, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Veronika Fabian and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Richard W. Claxton (“Claxton”) appeals the superior court’s
order denying his motion to reopen Margaret C. Claxton’s (“Decedent”)
probate, asserting Mary M. Brooks (“Brooks”) breached her fiduciary duty
as personal representative of Decedent’s estate, committed fraud, and failed
to conduct an estate accounting. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Decedent executed her last will and testament in 1991,
naming Brooks as personal representative and dividing her property
among her four children, including $50,000 to Claxton to be held in trust by
Brooks. The will authorized Brooks to distribute no more than $500 of trust
net income to Claxton monthly, as directed by him, until the trust
terminated. The trust was to terminate upon Claxton’s death or when the
principal and interest were “used in full.” When Decedent died in 1997, the
superior court granted Brooks’ petition for probate of the will and
appointment as personal representative. At that time, Claxton was serving
two life sentences in prison.

¶3 Brooks filed a closing statement in October 2022, effectively
closing the probate. Brooks stated the final distribution of Claxton’s assets
took place in July 2022 and the estate had no other assets.

¶4 Claxton moved to reopen the probate in July 2025, alleging
Brooks breached her fiduciary duty by failing to: (1) open and fund an
interest-bearing account for Claxton’s $50,000 bequest, (2) distribute the
estate in accordance with the will, (3) timely close the probate proceedings,
and (4) provide notice or an accounting to Claxton. Brooks responded,
claiming Claxton’s motion was untimely. She also explained that she
deposited $50,000 into an account (“Account”), and Claxton was aware of
all transactions because he requested that Account funds be sent to prison,
given to his girlfriend, or used to ship items to him. Brooks also asserted
that the Account remained open until Claxton was able to obtain the

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CLAXTON v. BROOKS, et al.
Decision of the Court

remaining funds and close the Account, which then allowed her to file the
closing statement.

¶5 In denying the motion, the superior court construed Claxton’s
motion as a claim that Brooks “breached her fiduciary duty in the
administration of the [D]ecedent’s estate.” The court then explained:

[T]he closing statement was filed December 5, 2022. No
proceedings involving the personal representative were
pending at the one-year mark, and the present Motion was
filed July 7, 2025, which is more than 31 months after the filing
of the closing statement.

Whether construed as a general challenge to administration
or as a claim of fiduciary breach, the motion is untimely under
both A.R.S. § 14-3933(B) and § 14-3935. The statutory
deadlines operate independently but concurrently, and the
movant failed to initiate proceedings within the permissible
time under either.

¶6 Claxton moved for reconsideration, asserting in part the court
failed to consider whether fraud tolled the statute of limitations. The court
denied the motion. Claxton timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(9).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Claxton argues the superior court erred in rejecting his claims
that Brooks breached her fiduciary duties and committed fraud while
serving as personal representative of Decedent’s estate and as trustee of the
Account. We review questions of law, including the applicability of a
particular statute of limitations, de novo. Larue v. Brown, 235 Ariz. 440, 443,
¶ 14 (App. 2014).

¶8 We first note that Claxton’s briefing contains serious
deficiencies. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring parties to cite legal authority
and portions of the record on which they rely); see also Ritchie v. Krasner, 221
Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (appellant must “present and address
significant arguments, supported by authority that set forth [his] position
on the issue[s] in question”). Many of Claxton’s factual assertions lack
specific record cites, he includes several fictitious or inaccurate case
citations, and he relies on numerous law firm articles without explaining
their relevance or persuasive value. Though we could conclude that he has

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CLAXTON v. BROOKS, et al.
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waived his arguments, in our discretion we decline to do so. See Delmastro
& Eells v. Taco Bell Corp., 228 Ariz. 134, 137, ¶ 7 n.2 (App. 2011)
(acknowledging ARCAP 13 waiver is discretionary).

¶9 Turning to the merits of Claxton’s appeal, Brooks filed the
closing statement in December 2022. In July 2025, well beyond the six-
month limitations period for asserting claims against a personal
representative for breach of fiduciary duty, see A.R.S. § 14-3935, Claxton
moved to reopen the probate. Thus, the superior court properly concluded
that Claxton’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against Brooks as personal
representative is barred. To the extent Claxton claims that Brooks breached
a separate duty as Account trustee, he has waived that claim because he did
not raise it in the superior court. See BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Espiau, 251
Ariz. 588, 594, ¶ 25 (App. 2021).

¶10 Claxton also suggests the court erred by failing to recognize
Brooks committed fraud by failing to deposit Decedent’s $50,000 bequest
into an interest-bearing account. Fraud, however, must be alleged with
particularity. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Town & Country Chrysler Plymouth v.
Porter, 11 Ariz. App. 369, 371 (1970) (stating elements of fraud). Claxton’s
unverified motion failed to adequately allege such facts against Brooks.
Thus, his fraud claim cannot prevail.

¶11 Claxton further claims Brooks failed to provide final or
annual accountings. Under A.R.S. § 14-3935, the six-month statute of
limitations following the filing of the closing statement does not include
“rights to recover from a personal representative for fraud,
misrepresentation, or inadequate disclosure related to the settlement of the
decedent’s estate.” However, as this court explained in Tovrea v. Nolan, 178
Ariz. 485 (App. 1993),“‘inadequate disclosure’ cannot be singled out and
separated from its accompanying context of ‘fraud’ and
‘misrepresentation.’” Id. at 489. Therefore, an inadequate disclosure claim
must be accompanied by a fraud or misrepresentation claim. Id. (“We do
not believe the legislature intended to exempt from the six-month limitation
period the mere failure or refusal to provide the accounting required under
§ 14-3931, absent some form of fraud or purposeful misrepresentation,
which appellants failed to demonstrate.”).

¶12 As noted, Claxton has not pled a proper claim for fraud; nor
has he alleged misrepresentation. He was deprived of the opportunity to
present his claim only by his own inaction. See id. His accounting claim,
which he raised more than two years after the filing of the closing
statement, is barred.

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CLAXTON v. BROOKS, et al.
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¶13 Claxton also asserts Brooks did not prudently invest, protect,
or distribute the $50,000 bequest. But Claxton first raised this issue in his
motion for reconsideration, and we generally do not consider arguments
raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. See Evans
Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, ¶ 15 (App. 2006).
Thus, we decline to address this issue.

¶14 According to Claxton, Brooks also failed to give him proper
notice of the probate proceedings. But notice of the personal representative
appointment hearing was published in the newspaper and mailed to
Claxton. The record also shows that notice of Brooks’ appointment as
personal representative, as well as the closing statement, were mailed to
Claxton. He has not shown that Brooks failed to comply with applicable
notice requirements.

¶15 Claxton further asserts a notice of lis pendens recorded in
relation to a parcel of real property owned at one time by the estate
confirms the need for judicial protection over the estate. But he has not
shown how that unrelated litigation has any bearing on the issues about the
Account.

¶16 Finally, Claxton claims Brooks’ appellate counsel has a
conflict of interest. Even assuming that is true, we have no jurisdiction over
attorney discipline matters. See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 46(a) (recognizing the
jurisdictional authority of the Arizona Supreme Court and the State Bar of
Arizona over lawyer disciplinary issues).

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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