In Re Term of Parental Rights as to D.A.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.A.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0210
FILED 05-15-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS521309
The Honorable Jay M. Polk, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Ayanna A., Phoenix
Appellant Mother

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Mesa
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Appellee Child

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC, Peoria
By Edward D. Johnson
Counsel for Appellee Father

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.A.
Decision of the Court

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Ayanna A. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s
denial of her petition to terminate the parental rights of Jinelove L.
(“Father”) to the child they have in common. Their child, D.A., through
counsel, joins in Mother’s request. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
juvenile court’s order denying the petition to terminate a parent’s rights.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

¶3 While living in Texas, Mother took a trip to New York in
March 2017, where she met Father. A few months later, Mother returned to
New York to visit Father. The parties exchanged a series of letters and text
messages afterwards.

¶4 In May 2017, Mother sent Father a letter informing him that
she was pregnant. Addressing him as “love,” Mother told Father,

We’re going to have a baby! I’m definitely a bit surprised but
kinda suspected it since the last time we were together.
Anyway, I’m excited about it and hope that you are as well!

Mother concluded the letter with, “I love you and miss you so much!”

¶5 At the end of May 2017, Mother wrote Father a letter that read
in part,

Hey love,

I miss you like crazy. I just want to be around you. I don’t
want to go through this pregnancy without you. . . .

I haven’t received any letters from you since the one that was
dated May 1st. I hope you’re still okay.

¶6 Father evidently responded, because Mother subsequently
wrote back, “That was the sweetest letter you sent to me.” “You really mean
a lot to me too,” she added, “and of course I think about you.”

¶7 D.A. was born in Texas in January 2018. Father had no contact
with him that year.

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Decision of the Court

¶8 In 2019, Mother petitioned for orders determining parental
rights and child support. As relevant here, the Texas court designated
Mother as D.A.’s primary residential parent and awarded Father parenting
time “one weekend per month of [Father’s] choice . . . provided that [Father]
gives [Mother] fourteen days written or telephonic notice preceding a
designated weekend.” The court further ordered Father to pay Mother
monthly child support of $450.

¶9 Father flew out from New York to visit D.A. three times in
2019. Although the record is not clear, it appears that the visits initially took
place in Texas. At some point, Mother and D.A. relocated to Arizona.

¶10 In the ensuing years, Father periodically contacted Mother by
text message to ask after D.A., and Father visited D.A. in person a total of
seven times.

¶11 The parties’ co-parenting relationship was not, however,
without conflict. In June 2021, Father petitioned to enforce parenting time
in New York state court, asserting that Mother had “missed” visits and
“been late for pickups or drop-offs for visits.” The New York court
dismissed Father’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.

¶12 Beginning in April 2023, Mother began to “prohibit[]” Father
from seeing D.A. On five separate occasions, Father traveled to Arizona to
see D.A., and Mother would not make the child available.

¶13 Although the record is not clear, it appears that in 2023
Mother and D.A. moved to a new residence in Arizona and that Mother did
not inform Father of their new address. Father wrote a letter to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in October 2023, stating that Mother “has
disappear[ed] with [his] son” and asking for assistance in locating them. An
FBI representative responded with a letter declining to assist Father.

¶14 Father subsequently learned of the new address and, in May
2024, flew to Arizona unannounced to visit D.A. Mother refused to allow
him to see D.A. and, shortly thereafter, petitioned for an order of protection
(“OOP”) asking that Father be prohibited from contacting her or their child.
In her petition, Mother alleged that Father “sexually assaulted [her] the first
day [she] met him,” that Father has “hit” D.A., and that Father denigrates
Mother in D.A.’s presence. The court issued an OOP that prohibited Father
from contacting Mother except through third parties. The OOP did not,
however, prohibit Father from having contact with D.A. Father contested
the OOP, but the court upheld it after a hearing.

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Decision of the Court

¶15 Father then filed another petition to enforce his parenting
time in New York state court, which, again, was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.

¶16 One Friday in May 2025, Father arrived in Phoenix and,
through a third party, asked to see D.A. that day. He was told that Mother
was too “tired” to bring D.A. to the location designated for parenting time
exchanges. Father said he “didn’t make it an issue” at the time because he
expected to see D.A. the following day. When Mother “[would] not allow
[him] to see [D.A.]” the following day either, however, Father called the
police and made a report, but to no avail. Father returned to New York on
Sunday without having seen D.A. In a subsequent court filing, Mother
claimed that Father had arrived in Phoenix “unexpectedly” that Friday and
that she was unable to arrange for Father to see D.A. “on such short notice.”
She further claimed that she attempted to arrange a visit before Father
returned to New York on Sunday, but that Father failed to contact her to
make the necessary arrangements. “I heard nothing” from him “over the
weekend,” she alleged, “about a time and set place to meet[.]”

¶17 Later that month, Father filed a petition to enforce parenting
time in Arizona. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that
Father had “not met his burden by a preponderance of the evidence” to
prove a violation of parenting time orders.

¶18 In July 2025, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s parental
rights to D.A. on grounds of neglect and abuse, sexual assault resulting in
the child’s conception, and abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (2), (12).
Mother alleged that termination was in D.A.’s best interests because the
child would be free for adoption by Mother’s husband.

¶19 In December 2025, the juvenile court held a termination
adjudication hearing at which Mother and Father both testified. D.A. did
not testify, but the attorney appointed for him filed a prehearing statement
indicating that D.A. “is aligned with Mother’s position and supports the
termination action.”

¶20 Mother testified that D.A. “is a result of a sexual assault” by
Father. She further stated that Father “refused to have any interaction” with
D.A. for a year after his birth, that she “made ample attempts to help them
build a relationship[,]” and that Father “hasn’t had any interaction with
[D.A.] since April of 2023.” Even before April 2023, Mother added, Father
had not “been much involved” in D.A.’s life, asserting that Father has cited
“financial hardship” as an “excuse” for his failure to exercise more than a

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.A.
Decision of the Court

fraction of the monthly parenting time to which the Texas orders entitled
him. She further asserted that Father has “hit [D.A.] as a means of
discipline,” which “caused [the child] anxiety” about being with Father,
and that Father has “bad-mouthed” her and “tried to turn [D.A.] against
[her.]” She testified that her husband has a close and loving relationship
with D.A. and that her husband “intends to adopt” him.

¶21 In his testimony, Father stated that D.A. was conceived while
he and Mother were “dat[ing],” that he exercised visitation “as much as [he]
could” when D.A. was “one, two, three” years old, and that “things were
going good” for “the first four years.” He further stated that “for the past
three years” he has “not been able to see” D.A. because Mother
“prohibited” him from doing so. Since April 2023, he stated, he “flew” to
Arizona “five times” without being “able to see him.” He stated that he filed
petitions to enforce parenting time in New York and “contacted the FBI” to
re-establish contact with D.A., explaining, “I [didn’t] know what else to do.”
He further testified that he has paid “child support for seven years” without
“miss[ing] one payment[.]” “All I want to do,” he concluded, is “spend time
with my son.”

¶22 Father supported his testimony with copies of the letters that
Mother sent to him in 2017, photographs of himself with D.A., and a
printout from the Texas Child Support Disbursement Unit showing that
since 2019 he has consistently made twice-monthly child support payments
totaling over $57,000.

¶23 When asked on cross-examination why he did not see D.A.
for a year after his birth in 2018, Father replied, “I didn’t even know she was
pregnant then.”

¶24 After taking the matter under advisement, the juvenile court
issued a ruling denying Mother’s petition to terminate Father’s parental
rights. The court began by stating that it had “concerns as to the credibility
of both parties in this case.” The court noted, for example, that Father’s
claim that he was unaware of Mother’s pregnancy was belied by the letters
Mother sent him in 2017. The court further found that, in view of the
affectionate tone of those letters, Mother’s testimony that Father “sexually
assaulted” her was not “credible.” The court further found that no “credible
evidence” was presented that Father abused or neglected D.A. as those
terms are statutorily defined. See A.R.S. § 8-201(2), (25).

¶25 The juvenile court found that Father “has not maintained a
normal parental relationship with the child for a period of more than six

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.A.
Decision of the Court

months” and “has not had much in way of contact . . . since 2023.” The court
further observed, however, “just cause” for a parent’s failure to maintain a
normal parent-child relationship may defeat a claim of abandonment.
Referring to the conflict in the parties’ testimony about the reasons for
Father’s failure to maintain his relationship with D.A., the court found
Father’s testimony “more credible and more persuasive” than Mother’s.
The court determined that Mother “interfered with [Father’s] attempt to
maintain a normal parental-child relationship with” D.A., and that Father
“attempted to vigorously assert” his rights. The court therefore determined
that Mother had failed to prove statutory grounds for termination by clear
and convincing evidence. The court further found that Mother had failed to
“present credible evidence to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination” would be in D.A.’s best interests.

¶26 Mother and D.A. timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶27 Mother argues that the juvenile court was “wrong” to deny
termination, maintaining that the court’s ruling was based on “factual
errors” and “misinterpret[ation]” of the evidence. D.A. asserts that Father’s
extended absences from D.A.’s life established a prima facie showing of
abandonment, and that Father’s “sporadic[] . . . attempts” to re-establish his
relationship with D.A. since then did not “cure the prior abandonment[.]”
D.A. further argues that the undisputed evidence that Mother’s husband
intends to adopt him establishes “a clear affirmative benefit to [him] if the
termination petition was to be granted[.]”

¶28 Terminating parental rights “entail[s] a two-step inquiry.”
Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 8 (2018). First, the party
seeking termination must prove at least one statutory ground under A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence. Id. (citing A.R.S. § 8-533(B)).
Second, the party seeking termination must establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interests. Kent K. v.
Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005).

¶29 A juvenile court’s ruling on a termination petition will be
affirmed “unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the court’s
findings are not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474, ¶ 14 (2022). Because “[t]he juvenile court . . .
is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts[,]” an appellate court

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.A.
Decision of the Court

“view[s] the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to sustaining the court’s decision.” Jordan C. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citation modified).

¶30 In her petition, Mother cited Father’s purported abuse and
neglect of D.A. as a ground for termination. See A.R.S. § 8-533(A)(2). In her
briefing on appeal, however, Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s
determination that she failed to meet her burden to justify termination on
this ground. She has therefore abandoned the claim, and we need not
consider it further. See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577,
¶ 5 (App. 2017).

¶31 Mother also alleged, as a ground for termination, that Father
sexually assaulted her and D.A. “was conceived as a result,” see A.R.S. § 8-
533(A)(12). At the hearing, she testified that she conceived D.A. when
Father sexually assaulted her, an allegation Father denied. The juvenile
court found that Mother had failed to establish this statutory ground.
Mother challenges the court’s determination, asserting that the court
“ignored” her testimony. Not so; the court expressly considered, and
rejected, her testimony on this point. In effect, Mother asks us to reweigh
the parties’ testimony and reach a conclusion different from the one reached
by the juvenile court. We will not do so. See In re J.C., 259 Ariz. 60, 68, ¶ 34
(App. 2024) (“Because the superior court is in the best position to evaluate
the testimony, this court will not reweigh the evidence.”).

¶32 In rejecting Mother’s sexual assault allegation, the juvenile
court cited the affectionate tone of the letters Mother wrote to Father in
2017. Mother argues on appeal that the court erred in making “assumptions
about the way someone who has been sexually assaulted should be
expected to act[.]” According to Mother, the court’s ruling runs counter to
People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1990), which she describes as a
“landmark” case holding that “expert testimony” is “allow[ed]” to “counter
myths about a victim’s behavior that might seem counterintuitive.”

¶33 In Taylor, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
admission, at a sexual assault trial, of expert testimony about “rape trauma
syndrome” to explain the victim’s behavior in the aftermath of the assault.
Id. at 138. Since Mother never offered expert testimony, Taylor does not
support her position. In any event, Mother never argued to the juvenile
court that the content of the letters she sent Father in 2017 was consistent
with the behavior of a sexual assault victim. Because Mother neither raised
this argument at trial nor presented evidence to support it, we will not
consider it for the first time on appeal. See Kimu P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.A.
Decision of the Court

218 Ariz. 39, 44, ¶ 19, n.3 (App. 2008) (“New arguments may not be raised
for the first time on appeal.” (citation omitted)).

¶34 Finally, Mother alleged abandonment as a ground for
termination. See A.R.S. § 8-533(A)(1). Abandonment is the “failure of a
parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with
the child, including providing normal supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1).
“Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without
just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). However, a showing of “just cause” can
rebut the prima facie case of abandonment. In re B.W., __ Ariz. __, 572 P.3d
88, 95, ¶ 18 (2025).

¶35 It is undisputed that Father did not exercise the monthly
parenting time that the Texas court granted him. Father testified, however,
that he traveled to Arizona when he was able to, that he inquired after D.A.
in text messages to Mother, and that he consistently complied with his child
support obligation. He further testified that he traveled to Arizona five
times since April 2023 and Mother denied him access to the child each time.
After hearing from both parties, the juvenile court found Father established
just cause for his failure to maintain a normal relationship with the child,
determining that Mother “interfered” with his ability to do so. Although
Mother insists that she “has not interfered” with Father’s exercise of
parenting time, the juvenile court expressly found Father more credible on
this point, and we defer to that court’s factual findings. See Jesus M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002) (noting that the
resolution of conflicts in the evidence “is uniquely the province of the
juvenile court as the trier of fact”). The court’s finding that Mother
interfered with Father’s relationship with D.A. supports its conclusion that
Mother failed to prove abandonment under Section 8-533(A)(1). See Calvin
B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 293, ¶ 1 (App. 2013) (“[A] parent who has
persistently and substantially restricted the other parent’s interaction with
their child may not prove abandonment based on evidence that the other
has had only limited involvement with the child.”).

¶36 A finding of abandonment requires an assessment of a
parent’s efforts to maintain his or her relationship with the child. Steven M.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 254 Ariz. 426, 430, ¶ 12 (App. 2023) (“When a parent
cannot exercise traditional methods to bond with” a child, the parent “must
act persistently to establish the relationship however possible[.]” (citation
omitted)). Here, Father presented evidence that he attempted to enforce his
parenting time by filing enforcement petitions in New York state court and
even tried to enlist the assistance of the FBI. The juvenile court found that

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.A.
Decision of the Court

while Father “may have pursued remedies in the wrong forum, or in the
wrong manner,” his actions demonstrate that he made efforts to maintain
his relationship with D.A. Although Mother argues on appeal that Father’s
enforcement efforts were entitled to little weight because his “enforcement
request [was] based on clearly false grounds[,]” she does not identify any
false statement that Father purportedly made in his filings in New York or
his communications with the FBI. Mother has therefore waived this
argument by failing to sufficiently develop it. Crystal E., 241 Ariz. at 577,
¶ 5.

¶37 D.A. argues, in his briefing, that Father’s “attempts to pursue
remedies in . . . incorrect forums does not overcome the prima facie case of
abandonment shown by Mother[.]” But Father’s lack of understanding of
proper enforcement mechanisms does not refute the juvenile court’s
finding that he tried to enforce his rights. In re M.L., No. 1 CA-JV 22-0279,
2023 WL 4633403 at *6, ¶ 34 (Ariz. App. July 20, 2023) (mem. decision) (“[I]n
the face of continual and active opposition, a parent’s efforts” to maintain a
parent-child relationship “need not be perfect.”). In any event, it is for the
juvenile court, not this court, to determine the weight to be given to
evidence of Father’s unsuccessful enforcement efforts. See Bobby G. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 510-11, ¶ 14 (App. 2008) (deferring to
juvenile court’s finding that father put forth “minimal at best” effort in
maintaining relationship with child because “[t]he juvenile court, as the
trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the
evidence” (citation omitted)).

¶38 Mother also argues that the juvenile court “overlooked”
evidence that she made efforts to “encourage a relationship between the
father and child[.]” She identifies no evidence, however, that she was
unable to present at trial, and we presume that the court considered all of
the evidence before it. Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55-56, ¶ 18 (App.
2004) (stating that appellate court presumes trial court considered all
evidence presented); see also Toren C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 21-
0287, 2022 WL 872834 at *6, ¶ 25 (Ariz. App. Mar. 24, 2022) (mem. decision)
(rejecting mother’s argument that juvenile court failed to consider child’s
“familial bond” with her siblings when it ordered termination of mother’s
parental rights, the Court “presume[d] that the juvenile court considered
[this] factor” even though it “did not specifically address” it).

¶39 In her briefing, Mother argues that the juvenile court “stated
interference according to A.R.S. § 13-1305 yet the record does not reflect
such[.]” Although it is not entirely clear, Mother appears to suggest that the
court improperly found that she committed the crime of access interference.

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Decision of the Court

See A.R.S. § 13-1305 (“A person commits access interference if . . . the person
knowingly engages in a pattern of behavior that prevents, obstructs or
frustrates the access rights of a person who is entitled to access to a child
pursuant to a court order.”). If this is, in fact, Mother’s argument, nothing
in the record supports it. The juvenile court’s ruling makes no reference to
Section 13-1305, nor is a showing of a Section 13-1305 violation required to
establish interference sufficient to defeat a claim of abandonment under
Section 8-533(A)(1). On the contrary, a parent may defeat a claim of
abandonment by showing that the other parent unreasonably interfered
with his or her “opportunity and ability to develop a normal parental
relationship[.]” Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 297, ¶ 21. Here, the juvenile court
found that Mother did just that, and the record supports that finding. We
therefore affirm the court’s determination that Mother failed to prove
abandonment, or any other statutory ground for termination.

¶40 In his briefing, D.A. argues that the court erred in determining
that Mother failed to establish that termination would serve his best
interests, insisting that “adoption by his step-father would be a clear
benefit” to him from termination. Because we affirm the court’s
determination of statutory grounds for termination, we need not consider
whether termination would be in D.A.’s best interests. See In re E.C., __ Ariz.
__, 579 P.3d 452, 458, ¶ 32 (App. 2025).

CONCLUSION

¶41 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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