In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Y.W.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Y.W.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0175
FILED 05-13-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD44683
The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Anna V. Vaszar
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda L. Adams
Counsel for Appellee Child Y.W.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Y.W.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Tyrell W. ("Father") appeals the termination of his parental
rights as to Y.W., arguing the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") did not
make diligent efforts to provide him reunification services. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother 1 gave birth to Y.W. in October of 2024. Father did not
establish his paternity at birth. At birth, doctors diagnosed Y.W. with
syphilis and substance-exposed to methamphetamine, THC, cocaine, and
fentanyl. Mother admitted that she and Father used cocaine and THC
together during the pregnancy. DCS removed Y.W. from her parents
shortly after birth.

¶3 DCS began dependency proceedings in October of 2024. DCS
alleged Y.W. was dependent as to Father because he was homeless and had
substance-abuse problems. In December of 2024, the superior court held a
pre-trial conference where both Mother and Father pled no contest to the
allegations in the dependency petition. Because Father had not established
his paternity, the superior court "suspended" the dependency findings as to
Father until his paternity could be established.

¶4 DCS began providing Father reunification services in October
of 2024. DCS offered Father paternity and drug testing, drug rehabilitation
services, trauma therapy, Family Connections, and visitation services. DCS
informed Father about the availability of services through face-to-face
communication and service letters. Father did not consistently participate
in services. Father appeared for one session of Family Connections, a
program designed to promote positive behavioral change and help parents
locate family and social supports, but stated he would not participate. He
was closed out of the program in February of 2025. DCS referred Father to

1 The superior court terminated Mother's parental rights to Y.W.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Y.W.
Decision of the Court

substance-abuse treatment in January 2025, but his referral was closed
when he did not participate. Father attended two trauma therapy meetings
but did not follow through with the program. Occasionally, Father
attended supervised parenting time, but he often fell asleep during his
visits with Y.W. In March 2025, Father completed a paternity test. That
same day, Father tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and
THC, and refused to provide hair samples for further drug testing. In April
2025, DCS canceled Father's supervised parenting time due to inconsistent
participation. That month, the superior court issued an order establishing
Father as Y.W.'s parent based on paternity test results.

¶5 In May 2025, law enforcement arrested Father for possession
of cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and trespassing. Father was
released with conditions. Around the same time, the superior court found
Y.W. dependent as to Father. The superior court also changed Y.W.'s case
plan from family reunification to termination and adoption. In June 2025,
DCS moved to terminate Father's parental rights based on substance abuse
and six-months' time-in-care grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3); (B)(8)(b).

¶6 In June 2025, law enforcement arrested and jailed Father for
possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Father did not
inform DCS of his arrest or incarceration. DCS did not learn Father was
incarcerated until July 2025. Even after learning that Father was in jail, DCS
had difficulty determining Father's location and contacting him. DCS did
not provide reunification services to Father during this time. After DCS
located Father, a caseworker met with him in jail and arranged for virtual
parenting time with Y.W. beginning in August 2025. DCS provided no
other services during Father's incarceration.

¶7 The superior court held a termination hearing in October
2025. DCS presented 13 exhibits, including reports about Father's
participation in services, Father's drug test results, and court documents
related to Father's arrests. Father's DCS case manager testified at the
hearing about the reunification services DCS offered Father, Father's
general lack of engagement with the reunification services, Father's
incarceration, and Y.W.'s bond with her foster family.

¶8 After the termination hearing, the superior court issued an
order terminating Father's parental rights to Y.W. based on substance abuse
and six-months' time-in-care grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (B)(8)(b).
The superior court also found DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to
provide Father with reunification services including Family Connections,
supervised visitation, drug testing, substance abuse treatment, paternity

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Y.W.
Decision of the Court

testing, and trauma therapy. Father timely appealed the termination order.
We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-120.21, and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Father argues DCS did not make diligent efforts to provide
reunification services. DCS argues Father waived this argument by failing
to raise it during the termination hearing in superior court. We review a
termination order for an abuse of discretion. Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child
Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 29 (2023). We accept the superior court's factual
findings when they are supported by reasonable evidence and inferences.
Id. at ¶ 30. We accept the superior court's legal conclusions about the
statutory grounds for termination unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at
478–79, ¶ 31.

¶10 DCS has a constitutional duty to provide reunification
services to a parent before seeking the termination of parental rights. See
Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 581 ¶ 18 (2021). When DCS
alleges substance abuse as a ground for termination, DCS must undertake
"reasonable rehabilitative measures" to remedy the substance abuse.
Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 n.3 (App. 2005).
When DCS alleges time-in-care grounds, A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) requires DCS
to make "a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services."
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8); see also Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 581, ¶ 18 (explaining DCS
must "engage in reunification efforts on constitutional grounds as a
necessary element of any state attempt to overcome . . . the fundamental
liberty interest of the natural parents in the care, custody and management
of their child" (cleaned up)). However, DCS is not required to offer every
possible service to a parent or ensure that a parent participates in
reunification services, if it provides a parent with the time and opportunity
to engage with reunification services and improve as a parent. Tanya K. v.
Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 154, 157, ¶ 11 (App. 2016). Nor is DCS
"required to leave the window of opportunity for remediation open
indefinitely." Id.

¶11 The superior court found DCS provided reunification services
to Father. That finding is supported by reasonable evidence and inferences.
See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 30. Father does not argue that services
provided by DCS before the superior court established his paternity should
be excluded from consideration. As discussed, supra ¶ 4, DCS provided
Father a variety of services beginning in October 2024. For the nine months
between October 2024 and June 2025, Father failed to participate
consistently in some of the services DCS offered, did not participate in drug

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Y.W.
Decision of the Court

rehabilitation, and refused to participate in hair-follicle testing and Family
Connections therapy. The superior court terminated Father's parental
rights in October 2025. Father had the time and opportunity to engage in
these services but declined to do so.

¶12 Father argues that the superior court abused its discretion by
finding DCS made diligent efforts to provide him reunification services
because DCS failed to provide him with services between June and August
2025, while he was incarcerated. We disagree. DCS actively offered Father
reunification services between October 2024 and May 2025, but Father
failed to engage with those services in any meaningful way. And after his
incarceration, DCS offered parenting time, and Father never requested
additional services. Nor does he now identify services that DCS should
have provided for that three-month incarceration period. See Shawanee S. v.
Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 18 (App. 2014) (finding waived
objection to adequacy of reunification services if a parent fails to raise the
issue and give DCS "a reasonable opportunity to address the matter"); In re
C.C., 1 CA-JV 24-0017, 2024 WL 3579920, at *6, ¶ 39 (App. July 30, 2024)
(mem. dec.) ("To the extent Father faults DCS for failing, after his
incarceration, to provide services beyond virtual visitation, he never
requested any additional services, nor does he identify any other service
DCS should have offered but didn't."). Based on this record, the superior
court did not abuse its discretion by finding that DCS made diligent efforts
to provide Father with reunification services.

¶13 Father does not otherwise contest the superior court's
grounds for termination or best interest findings, so we need not address
them further. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249,
¶ 13 (2000).

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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