Rezoana v. Lavey

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

ROMIO REZOANA, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

HOBBES CLARK LAVEY, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0765 FC
FILED 05-13-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2025-001574
The Honorable Richard J. Hinz, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Romio Rezoana
Plaintiff/Appellee

Hobbes Clark LaVey, Gilbert
Defendant/Appellant
REZOANA v. LAVEY
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Hobbes Clark LaVey appeals the continuation of an order of
protection in favor of Romio Rezoana. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 LaVey and Rezoana have a child together. Rezoana filed a
petition for an order of protection in April 2025. In support of her petition,
she listed several incidents dating back to August 2022. The most recent
incident was sometime between December 2024 and February 2025 when
LaVey allegedly placed a tracking device on her car without her
knowledge. She also alleged that between August 2022 and December 2023,
LaVey punched, bit, and kicked her on three different occasions and
threatened to kill her if she left him.

¶3 The superior court issued an ex parte protective order. LaVey
requested a contested hearing, at which both parties testified. The superior
court continued the protective order, finding a preponderance of the
evidence showed that LaVey may commit an act of domestic violence or
has committed an act of domestic violence within the past year. The order
did not specify which incident supported the protective order or list a
statutory domestic violence offense.

¶4 LaVey timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b). See also Ariz. R. Prot. Ord. P. 42(a)(2), (b)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶5 We review the superior court's continuation of an order of
protection following an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion but
review questions of law de novo. Shah v. Vakharwala, 244 Ariz. 201, 202, ¶
5 (App. 2018). LaVey challenges the order of protection on several grounds.
At the outset, we note there is no transcript of the evidentiary hearing.
LaVey must ensure the record on appeal contains the transcripts necessary
for this Court to consider the issues on appeal. See ARCAP 11(c)(1); State ex

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REZOANA v. LAVEY
Decision of the Court

rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30, ¶ 16 (App. 2003). When
such transcripts are not included, "we assume the missing portions of the
record would support the [superior] court's findings and conclusions."
Burton, 205 Ariz. at 30, ¶ 16.

¶6 LaVey claims the protective order is based on hearsay
evidence from Rezoana that a sheriff told her LaVey admitted placing a
tracking device on her car. He argues that her hearsay testimony was
unreliable and violated his right to due process. In a protective-order
hearing, the court has discretion to admit any relevant evidence provided
its probative value is not "substantially outweighed" by a countervailing
danger, such as a lack of reliability. Ariz. R. Prot. Ord. P. 36(a); see also
Martinez v. Estes, 258 Ariz. 354, 358, ¶ 14 (App. 2024) ("Relevant evidence,
including hearsay, is generally admissible to obtain an injunction against
harassment."). Additionally, according to Rezoana, the record also includes
"independent, non-hearsay" evidence to support the order. Because we lack
a transcript from the hearing, we presume the evidence at the hearing
supported the allegation that LaVey placed a tracking device on Rezoana's
car. See Burton, 205 Ariz. at 30, ¶ 16.

¶7 LaVey also challenges the evidence supporting Rezoana's
allegation that he placed the tracking device on her car; cites evidence he
presented to dispute the allegation; and attacks Rezoana's credibility. Not
only is our review limited because there is no transcript, but LaVey asks
this Court to reweigh the conflicting evidence presented to the superior
court. We defer to the superior court's determinations of witness credibility
and do not reweigh the evidence. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284,
¶ 20 (App. 2019).

¶8 For a protective order to remain in effect after a contested
hearing, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the respondent either committed an act of domestic violence within the
preceding year, or longer if there is good cause to look beyond one year, or
that the respondent may commit domestic violence in the future. A.R.S. §
13-3602(E)(1), (2); Ariz. R. Prot. Ord. P. 23(e)(1), 38(g)(3); Kamma v. Gaun, --
- Ariz. ---, ---, ¶ 5, 584 P.3d 534, 536, ¶ 5 (App. 2025). Because LaVey and
Rezoana have a child in common, harassment constitutes domestic
violence. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(A)(2), -2921.

¶9 As relevant here, a person commits harassment if he
knowingly surveils another person in a manner that harasses. A.R.S. § 13-
2921(A)(3). "'[H]arass' means conduct that is directed at a specific person
and that would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed,

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REZOANA v. LAVEY
Decision of the Court

annoyed, humiliated or mentally distressed and the conduct in fact
seriously alarms, annoys, humiliates or mentally distresses the person."
A.R.S. § 13-2921(E); see also Ariz. R. Prot. Ord. P. 3(e).

¶10 LaVey suggests that placing a tracking device on Rezoana's
car was an "isolated or trivial incident" that cannot support the protective
order. The statutory definition of harass does not require multiple acts. See
A.R.S. §§ 13-2921(A)(3), -2921(E); compare Du v. McGeary, 2 CA-CV 2023-
0204, 2024 WL 3319828, at *2, ¶ 9 (Ariz. App. July 5, 2024) (mem. decision)
("An order of protection [based on § 13-3602] requires only a single act of
domestic violence or threat of the same."), with Wood v. Abril, 244 Ariz. 436,
438, ¶¶ 7–11 (App. 2018) (vacating an injunction against harassment under
A.R.S. § 12-1809 based on a single act because that statute requires a "series
of acts"). Furthermore, we assume the evidence showed that LaVey's
conduct was not trivial and, in fact, caused Rezoana serious alarm or mental
distress. See Burton, 205 Ariz. at 30, ¶ 16. Because this conduct supports the
order of protection, we need not address the other allegations in LaVey's
petition. See A.R.S. § 13-3602(E); Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins.
Co., 143 Ariz. 547, 548 (App. 1985) (explaining appellate courts should not
decide questions unnecessary to disposition of appeal).

CONCLUSION

¶11 We affirm the order of protection.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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