In Re Term of Parental Rights as to Z.B.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Z.B.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0125
FILED 04-22-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD42638
The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Czop Law Firm PLLC, Queen Creek
By Steven Czop
Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Ingeet Pandya
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee Child
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Z.B.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

M O R S E , Judge:

¶1 Malik B. ("Father") appeals the termination of his parental
rights to Z.B. ("Child"). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Keyanna N. ("Mother") are the parents of Child,
born in May 2024.1

¶3 In January 2023, Father's older child, K.B., was born
substance-exposed to fentanyl. Upon petition by the Department of Child
Safety ("DCS"), the juvenile court deemed K.B. dependent due to Father's
substance abuse and incarceration. DCS provided Father with reunification
services including substance-abuse treatment, drug testing, parenting
classes, and supervised visitation, but he did not participate in drug testing
or any substance-abuse services.

¶4 One year later, the juvenile court changed K.B.'s case plan to
severance and adoption, and DCS moved to terminate Father's parental
rights based on both the substance-abuse and the six-months' time-in-care
grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) and (8)(b). In April 2024, Father pled no
contest, and the court granted the motion on both grounds.

¶5 In May 2024, Child was also born substance-exposed to
fentanyl. Father was present at Child's birth. Child remained hospitalized
in the neonatal intensive care unit for over a month suffering from
withdrawal symptoms, but Father never visited Child. Upon Child's
discharge from the hospital in June 2024, DCS took temporary custody of
Child and petitioned for dependency. For the next several months, Father
did not request services, test for drugs, or seek to visit Child.

¶6 In October 2024, Father was arrested for fleeing from the
police. DCS's case manager located him in jail later that month and

1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Z.B.
Decision of the Court

arranged for him to have a telephonic visit with Child. Father disclosed he
was receiving suboxone in jail to treat his opioid addiction. He was
transferred to prison the following month with an early release date in two
years.

¶7 In December 2024, Father pled no contest to the dependency
petition. The court set a family-reunification case plan and directed DCS to
communicate with Father's corrections officer to arrange visits and any
substance-abuse or parenting classes available to him while incarcerated.

¶8 The case manager attempted to coordinate services with
Father's corrections officers. She arranged virtual visits in prison between
Father and Child, although visits in May and June 2025 were canceled
because DCS did not have a visit supervisor. She also sent Father a service
letter in March 2025 and held a Team Decision Making Meeting that same
month, which he attended.

¶9 Father also appeared virtually at periodic review hearings
and requested additional services in prison. The juvenile court directed
DCS's case manager to speak with Father about services available in prison
and to look into whether DCS could provide "substance abuse workbooks
or programs." The case manager confirmed the prison did not offer
substance-abuse services, but she did not follow up on drug testing or a
substance-abuse workbook.

¶10 In May 2025, DCS moved to terminate Father's parental rights
to Child under the substance-abuse and the prior-termination statutory
grounds. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (10).

¶11 At the contested termination hearing in June 2025, the case
manager testified that Father had not participated in any services or visited
Child before Father's incarceration. She acknowledged that DCS's efforts
to provide reunification services during his incarceration were limited to
virtual visitation and attempts to coordinate services with his corrections
officers. She also acknowledged he did not receive any referrals for
substance-abuse services because of his incarceration. She characterized
these efforts as "not so diligent," but she explained that even if DCS could
provide substance-abuse services in prison, DCS would need to see Father
establish six months of sobriety after his release from prison. She also
explained that Child would need to wait about two years for Father to be
released from prison and establish sobriety, which she did not believe was
in Child's best interests.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Z.B.
Decision of the Court

¶12 Father testified that he was present at the hospital for Child's
birth and spoke with the case manager at the hospital. He admitted he
failed to participate in substance-abuse treatment or drug testing during
K.B.'s dependency and before his current incarceration. But he reported he
had negative drug tests while incarcerated and described participating in
GED classes, as well as classes on decision-making and changing offender
behavior. He acknowledged the prison did not offer substance-abuse
treatment.

¶13 In August 2025, the court terminated Father's parental rights
to Child on both the chronic substance-abuse and the prior-termination
grounds.

¶14 Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶15 A parent's right to custody and control of his or her own child
is fundamental but not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196
Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). To terminate a parent-child relationship,
the juvenile court must find at least one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B) by clear and convincing evidence and that termination is in the
child's best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Alma S. v. Dep't
of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149–50, ¶ 8 (2018).

¶16 In reviewing the juvenile court's termination order, we accept
the court's factual findings if reasonable evidence and inferences support
them and affirm the court's legal conclusions about the statutory grounds
unless clearly erroneous. Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471,
478–79, ¶¶ 30–31 (2023). We will not reweigh evidence or reevaluate
witness credibility on appeal. Maria G. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 253 Ariz. 364,
366, ¶ 8 (App. 2022).

I. Substance-Abuse and Prior-Termination Grounds.

¶17 To terminate parental rights under the substance-abuse
ground, DCS must prove that (1) the parent cannot discharge parental
responsibilities because of a history of chronic substance abuse and (2)
"there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for
a prolonged indeterminate period." A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Z.B.
Decision of the Court

¶18 The prior-termination ground requires DCS to prove that (1)
the parent's parental rights to another child were terminated within two
years for the same cause and (2) the parent "is currently unable to discharge
parental responsibilities due to the same cause." A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(10).

¶19 Father concedes that his parental rights were terminated as to
K.B. within the prior two years because of his substance abuse. But, he
argues, the record contains insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court's finding that he abused substances around the time of Child's birth
and before the termination hearing. He asserts this evidence was needed
to establish the remaining elements of the grounds alleged: (1) that he was
currently unable to discharge parental responsibilities and (2) that his
substance abuse would continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.

¶20 The evidence presented at the termination hearing, however,
establishes both elements. Father has a longstanding substance-abuse
problem he had not resolved by the time of the termination hearing.
Beginning in 2016, he has had multiple substance-abuse related arrests and
convictions. While on probation in 2021, he tested positive for cocaine. In
February 2023, he was arrested on warrants and had drug paraphernalia on
him. In May 2023, he was arrested for DUI after he overdosed in his car
and bystanders had to break his car window and put his car in park to
prevent an accident. In April 2024, the court terminated his parental rights
to K.B. based on substance abuse.

¶21 When Child was born in May 2024, Father did not contact
DCS to engage in substance-abuse services or visits, and he refused drug
testing. When he was arrested in October 2024, he needed suboxone
treatment in jail to treat his opioid addiction.

¶22 By the time of the termination hearing, Father had not
engaged in any substance-abuse services or demonstrated any ability to
remain sober outside of prison. He also acknowledged that someone else
would need to parent Child until his release from prison.

¶23 This record adequately supports the juvenile court's findings
that Father was unable to discharge parental responsibilities at the time of
the termination hearing because of a long history of substance abuse "and
that the conditions causing the prior termination will continue for a
prolonged and indeterminate period."

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Z.B.
Decision of the Court

II. Reunification Services.

¶24 Under both the substance-abuse and the prior-termination
grounds, DCS must also prove it made a reasonable effort to provide the
parent with appropriate reunification services or that such effort would be
futile. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 49, ¶ 15 (App.
2004) (citing Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 193, ¶ 42
(App. 1999)). DCS meets this obligation by providing the parent with "the
time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help [him or]
her become an effective parent." Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904,
180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). But DCS need not provide every conceivable
service or ensure the parent participates in the services offered. Id.

¶25 Father argues the juvenile court erred by finding DCS made a
reasonable effort to provide him with reunification services. He contends
DCS provided him with no reunification services at the time of Child's birth
and, after he was incarcerated, DCS provided only a few virtual visits. He
points out that even the case manager conceded DCS's efforts were "not so
diligent."

¶26 The record shows DCS offered Father services before his
incarceration, and he chose not to engage with services. For instance,
during K.B.'s dependency, Father did not engage in substance-abuse
treatment or drug testing. After Child was born in May 2024, Father did
not visit Child in the hospital or attempt to participate in services. He
appeared by telephone at a dependency hearing in August 2024, and at his
request, the court continued the hearing to September 2025. Yet he did not
appear at the continued hearing or communicate with the case manager
during this time, who described him as "unreachable."

¶27 Moreover, once Father was incarcerated, the prison did not
offer substance-abuse services and only minimal visits were possible. The
court thus did not err in finding that, although DCS made a less diligent
effort at providing reunification services for Father than it did for Mother,
the lack of services was due in large part to Father's actions and his
incarceration. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 451,
¶ 17 (App. 2007) (observing that "incarceration will as a practical matter
typically preclude all but minimal visits"); see also Jaime G. v. Dep't of Child
Safety, No. 2 CA-JV 2018-0091, 2018 WL 6583985, at *4, ¶ 17 (Ariz. App. Dec.
12, 2018) (mem. decision) ("To the extent [the father's] incarceration . . .
made it more difficult to provide him with services, the fault lies with [the
father], not DCS.").

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO Z.B.
Decision of the Court

¶28 Under the totality of the circumstances, the record supports
the court’s determination that DCS made a reasonable effort at reunification
services for Father. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 17 (noting that the court
will affirm an implicit finding if reasonable evidence supports it); cf. Donald
W. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23, ¶ 49 (App. 2019) (noting that the
juvenile court must consider the totality of the circumstances when
determining whether DCS made "diligent efforts" to provide services under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)).

¶29 The juvenile court therefore did not err in concluding that
DCS proved both grounds for termination by clear and convincing
evidence. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (10). Furthermore, Father does not challenge
the juvenile court's determination that terminating his parental rights was
in Child's best interests, and the record supports that finding. See Crystal E.
v. Dep't of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 578, ¶ 6–7 (App. 2017).

CONCLUSION

¶30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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