Dartanya Stapleton v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 7
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CR-22-171

Opinion Delivered January 18, 2023
DARTANYA STAPLETON
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CLARK COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 10CR-19-47]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE BLAKE BATSON,
APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge

Following a jury trial in the Clark County Circuit Court, Dartanya Stapleton was

found guilty of first-degree murder and a firearm enhancement and was sentenced to thirty-

five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Stapleton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the firearm enhancement, the denial of her motion to suppress, the exclusion of

certain testimony, and the denial of her motions for a curative instruction and mistrial. We

affirm.

Fifty-eight-year-old John Ratton was reported missing on January 23, 2019. Police

received information that earlier in the day, Ratton had driven Stapleton and Brock

Henthorn to the home Stapleton shared with her brother, William Pennino. Rick Loy of

the Clark County Sheriff’s Department spoke to Stapleton, who reported that Ratton had
given her and Henthorn a ride and then Ratton had left in a hurry before noon. Two

witnesses subsequently reported to law enforcement that they were inside the home with

Pennino that day when a car pulled up and honked. According to the witnesses, Pennino

went outside, and they looked out the window and saw Stapleton and Henthorn beating and

kicking a man who was not fighting back. Pennino then came back inside, got a rifle, and

told the witnesses to stay inside. The witnesses saw the car being driven down to a second

driveway, and Pennino walked in that direction. The witnesses then heard gunshots.

Law enforcement returned to Stapleton’s home that night. Clark County Sheriff

Jason Watson testified that officers observed blood in the location the witnesses said they

saw Ratton being attacked, and a trail of blood approximately 130 feet long led into a wooded

area. There, police found a shovel, blood, and disturbed ground indicating possible digging.

Pennino and Stapleton were arrested that night, and a knife was recovered from Stapleton

when she was searched at the jail. It was later determined that Ratton’s blood was on that

knife. Pennino later showed law enforcement where Ratton’s body was buried and told

them where to find Ratton’s burned car. Ratton had four gunshot wounds to the back of

his head and a six-to-seven-inch cut across the front of his neck. Stapleton, Pennino, and

Henthorn were all charged with murder.

Stapleton was interviewed by Sheriff Watson and Investigator Roy Bethell on January

24. In the interview, Stapleton admitted that she was “actually the one that slit his throat”

and that she shot Ratton three times in the back of the head with the gun Pennino brought

outside. She said that there was no specific reason for the killing, but she “just kind of

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wanted to.” Stapleton said that as they were sitting in the driveway in Ratton’s car, she

reached up from the backseat and slit Ratton’s throat. She described his extensive bleeding

as “awesome” but said that she felt bad that he was suffering, so she shot him. She said that

the knife found on her when she came to jail was the one she had used. She claimed that

Henthorn “really didn’t want to do it.”

Prior to trial, Stapleton moved to suppress her statements to police and the knife

recovered from her person. She alleged that law enforcement had illegally arrested her inside

her home without an arrest warrant. Following a hearing in which law enforcement testified

that Stapleton was arrested on her porch, the circuit court denied the motion to suppress.

The video and transcript of Stapleton’s interview were admitted into evidence at trial.

At trial, the State presented the testimony of Teresa Pollock. Pollock testified that

when she and Stapleton were incarcerated in the same jail in July 2019, Stapleton admitted

that she had killed a man and described the killing in detail. According to Pollock, Stapleton

told her that she and a man named Brock left her home to get cigarettes and went to an old

man’s house looking for someone to give them a ride. While in the man’s living room,

Stapleton and Brock talked about how she had been thinking about killing someone for a

while, and she tried to talk Brock into doing it. After the man had taken them to get

cigarettes and back to Stapleton’s home, Stapleton told Brock, who was in the front seat, to

“do it.” After Brock refused, Stapleton called him a “pussy,” and she slit the man’s throat

from behind. Brock then got out of the car, pushed the man to the passenger seat, and drove

the car to another driveway. The man then got out of the car, and Brock put him in the

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back seat. Stapleton’s brother heard the commotion, came outside and was mad, then went

back inside and got a gun. Stapleton told Pollock that Pennino had shot the man. At the

time of trial, Pollock was imprisoned for false imprisonment and aggravated assault. She

testified that she was not offered a sentence reduction and did not receive any consideration

for her testimony. Pollock said that she simply notified the Clark County authorities and

provided a handwritten statement in August 2019.

Stapleton testified that she started hanging out with Henthorn four days before the

murder when he came to her home and used methamphetamine with her, Pennino, and her

friend Reshelle Murillo. Stapleton testified that she had met Henthorn once before and had

heard he was possibly violent. Henthorn was asked to leave her home after he became

paranoid and physically attacked another friend. Stapleton claimed that at this point, she

became afraid of him. Stapleton said that a couple of days later, she was in a car with

Pennino, Henthorn, and another friend when Henthorn choked the other friend. Stapleton

continued to use methamphetamine with Henthorn, and he went with her to visit her

grandmother in the hospital.

Stapleton testified that at around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. on January 23, Henthorn insisted

that the two of them walk to a friend’s house in the rain to get a ride to the store for cigarettes.

The friend could not give them a ride, but a neighbor took them to Ratton’s home, where

Henthorn insisted they wait for the store to open. Ratton was sleeping, but other people in

the home were awake. Stapleton testified that Henthorn was acting paranoid, accusing her

of things, and talking about planning to hurt someone. She said that he had talked about

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killing the woman who gave them a ride and killing people who were at Ratton’s home.

Stapleton said that he asked her to kill one woman, but she declined, and Henthorn became

more insistent about killing someone as the night went on. Eventually, Henthorn woke up

Ratton, who gave them a ride to the store and to Stapleton’s house.

Stapleton testified that Henthorn told her that if she did not do what he said, he

would make her family watch as he killed her, and then he would kill her family. Stapleton

said that when they parked, Henthorn told her, “You’re going to do it.” She initially refused,

but she realized by the look he was giving her that he was going to kill her if she did not do

it. Accordingly, she reached around the front seat with her pocketknife and cut Ratton “a

little” on his neck. Stapleton said that Ratton honked the horn and tried to get out of the

car, and Henthorn pulled out his own knife and cut Ratton’s throat after moving him to the

passenger seat. She said that Henthorn punched Ratton repeatedly as Ratton tried to escape

again, and she tried to pull Henthorn off of him. Stapleton said that Pennino came outside

with a rifle and shot Ratton in the back of his head three times.

Stapleton admitted that she did not entirely tell the truth to the police. She claimed

that she was still high when she gave her statement, that she was trying to protect her brother,

and that she was worried Henthorn would kill her if he knew that she told the police he did

it. She claimed that the knife found on her was the one Henthorn had used and that he

had given it to her to clean, but she forgot about it. Stapleton claimed that she did not

confess to Pollock and that Pollock’s statement to police looked identical to Henthorn’s

statement; thus, she asserted that Pollock must have stolen her discovery file from under her

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bed. On cross-examination, Stapleton acknowledged that she had denied to the police that

she was taking “the rap” for her brother, and she told police that Henthorn was “really not

a bad guy.”

Cynthia Gilbert testified on behalf of the defense that she had ended her close

friendship with Henthorn because he had a temper, and she was a little scared of him. Near

the time of the murder, Gilbert had heard Henthorn talk about planning to kill someone.

Reshelle Murillo and Eli Bergess also testified that they had heard Henthorn express that he

wanted to kill someone and that he had been acting paranoid in the days leading up to the

murder. Bergess testified that he was in Stapleton’s home when he heard a horn honk, and

he looked out the window and saw Stapleton and Henthorn at Ratton’s car. Bergess said

that it looked like Stapleton was trying to help Ratton.

The jury was instructed that Stapleton asserted the defenses of duress and of extreme

emotional disturbance and that she could be convicted as an accomplice. Stapleton was

found guilty of first-degree murder and employing a firearm as a means of committing

murder. She was sentenced to thirty-five years’ imprisonment.

I. Firearm Enhancement

Stapleton first argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction of

the firearm enhancement because her confession to shooting Ratton was not corroborated

by any other evidence. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-89-111(d)(1) (Supp. 2021)

provides that a confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, does not warrant a

conviction unless accompanied by other proof that the offense was committed. The

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requirement for other proof is sometimes referred to as the corpus delicti rule and requires

only proof that the offense occurred and nothing more. Meadows v. State, 2012 Ark. 57, 386

S.W.3d 470. In other words, under the corpus delicti rule, the State must prove (1) the

existence of an injury or harm constituting a crime and (2) that the injury or harm was caused

by someone’s criminal activity. Id.

Here, Stapleton confessed to police that she had shot Ratton in the back of his head,

and the medical examiner testified that Ratton had four gunshot wounds to the back of his

head. This proof satisfies the corpus delicti rule. Stapleton argues that other evidence

indicated that it was Pennino who had shot Ratton. However, proof that she fired the shots

is not required. To corroborate a confession, the State is not required to connect the

defendant to the criminal act through independent evidence; rather, the State need only

show that the offense occurred. Meadows, supra. The proof established that Ratton sustained

gunshot wounds to the back of his head due to someone’s criminal activity, and this

constitutes sufficient evidence to corroborate Stapleton’s confession.

II. Motion to Suppress

Stapleton contends that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress her

confession and the knife found on her because her arrest was illegal. Testimony at the

suppression hearing established that after receiving the witnesses’ accounts, several law

enforcement officers went to Stapleton’s house to investigate. Sheriff Watson and other

officers followed the blood trail while Deputy Loy and Montgomery County Sheriff David

White knocked on the door. Pennino answered the door and was arrested on an outstanding

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warrant. Loy testified that after he had searched Pennino and handed him off to another

officer, he turned his attention back to the porch where Stapleton was already in custody.

Loy testified that he never entered the house during the arrests, and he did not see anyone

else enter the house to make the arrests. Watson testified that after the officers found the

shovel and disturbed ground, he advised them to retreat so they could apply for a search

warrant. Watson then walked toward the porch where he saw Pennino being arrested and

Stapleton standing on the porch screaming that Ratton was not there and that the police

had no business being there. Watson told Sheriff White to arrest Stapleton, and White did

so on the porch.

Stapleton testified that when law enforcement knocked on her door, Pennino

answered the door, and she stepped away to put some things up. She said that when she

walked back toward the door, she saw at least two officers inside the house who were asking

Pennino to step outside. She said that after Pennino stepped outside, several officers came

inside the house and started asking her questions about Ratton. Stapleton testified that she

was then arrested inside the house and taken outside.

The circuit court denied the motion without providing any reasoning. In reviewing

the circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we make an independent

examination based on the totality of the circumstances and reverse only if the decision is

clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Stutte v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 139, 432

S.W.3d 661.

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On appeal, Stapleton argues that her arrest was illegal because she was either arrested

inside her home or because the officers asked her to step outside to arrest her. See Norris v.

State, 338 Ark. 397, 993 S.W.2d 918 (1999) (A warrantless felony arrest in the home is

prohibited under the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause and exigent

circumstances.); Lamb v. State, 23 Ark. App. 115, 119, 743 S.W.2d 399, 401 (1988) (“We

have held that this rule is applicable where the arrest is accomplished without an entry by

police officers who knock on a person’s door and ask him to step outside.”). Although there

was no testimony that officers asked Stapleton to come outside, Stapleton notes that in the

State’s response to her motion to suppress, the State wrote that law enforcement “requested

Defendant to come out after knocking on the door.” Stapleton argues that this constitutes

a judicial admission for which no evidence is needed; however, she did not preserve this

argument for appeal. Although Stapleton testified that she was arrested inside her home,

the circuit court was free to believe Sheriff Watson’s testimony that Stapleton was standing

on the porch when he returned from finding the blood trail into the woods and made the

order to arrest her.1 We hold that the circuit court’s denial of Stapleton’s motion to suppress

was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

III. Exclusion of Testimony Regarding Henthorn Fighting

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Stapleton contends that we should not give any factual deference to the circuit court
because it made no factual findings in denying the motion to suppress, and it denied her
subsequent motion for findings. However, she cites no authority that requires a circuit court
to provide such findings.

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Stapleton argues that the circuit court erred in excluding certain testimony from

Reshelle Murillo. Murillo testified that she met Henthorn a few days prior to the murder,

and defense counsel asked her if there was an occasion where she saw Henthorn in a fight.

Murillo answered in the affirmative, and defense counsel asked her to tell the jury about

that. The State objected, arguing that Murillo’s seeing Henthorn engaged in a fight was not

relevant. Defense counsel argued that Stapleton saw the fight and that it was relevant to her

duress defense. The court sustained the objection.

On appeal, Stapleton maintains that Murillo’s testimony regarding Henthorn’s

fighting individuals in front of Stapleton was relevant to her defense that she legitimately

feared Henthorn when he threatened her. She argues that evidence of her knowledge of

Henthorn’s specific instances of violence was admissible, and she claims that it was critical

that Murillo’s testimony corroborate her own testimony about the fights. The State first

contends that the argument is not preserved because Stapleton did not proffer Murillo’s

testimony. While Stapleton did fail to make a formal proffer, it is well settled that an offer

of proof is not necessary when the substance of the evidence sought to be introduced is

apparent from the context within which the questions are asked. Pryor v. State, 71 Ark. App.

87, 27 S.W.3d 440 (2000). During arguments to the court, defense counsel stated, “If this

person -- and if you want me to say: ‘Did she see it?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And was Dartanya there?’ ‘Yes.’

‘Then describe it,’ I’ll do that.” Accordingly, we hold that Stapleton did preserve an

argument regarding testimony that Stapleton was present on an occasion when Henthorn

was fighting someone. See Pryor, supra (holding that the substance of the evidence was readily

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apparent from the questions posed to a prior witness and defense counsel’s argument to the

circuit court).

A circuit court’s evidentiary ruling will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of

discretion and a showing of prejudice. Taffner v. State, 2018 Ark. 99, 541 S.W.3d 430. Even

if it was erroneous to exclude Murillo’s testimony that Stapleton was present when Murillo

saw Henthorn fighting, we hold that Stapleton was not prejudiced by this ruling. Stapleton

testified that she and Murillo were present when Henthorn attacked their friend about four

days before the murder. She also testified that she, but not Murillo, saw Henthorn attacking

another friend a couple of days later. Murillo was allowed to testify that in the time she was

around Henthorn, she saw him fighting someone, and he expressed that he wanted to kill

someone. Cynthia Gilbert, Eli Bergess, and Stapleton herself also testified that they had

heard Henthorn talk about planning to kill someone, that he had been acting paranoid, and

that he has a temper. In light of all the evidence that was admitted regarding Henthorn’s

violent character, Stapleton cannot demonstrate prejudice from the exclusion of Murillo’s

testimony that Stapleton was present at a single fight she witnessed. An argument as to any

other testimony Murillo may have given was not preserved for appeal. 2

IV. Exclusion of Testimony Regarding Similarities in Witness Statements

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Stapleton’s brief states that Murillo was prevented from corroborating Stapleton’s
own testimony about multiple fights Henthorn engaged in on the “night of the murder.”
However, Stapleton testified that one fight, for which Murillo was present, occurred four
days before the murder, and the other fight, for which Murillo was not present, occurred
“about a day-and-a-half after that.”

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Stapleton attempted to question Sheriff Jason Watson about “some unusual

similarities” in the statements given to him by Pollock and Henthorn. The State objected to

any questions about any statements made by Henthorn under Arkansas Rules of Evidence

402, 403, and 801. Stapleton argued that the line of questioning was relevant to show that

Pollock’s knowledge of the case came from reading Stapleton’s discovery file, not from

Stapleton’s confessing to her. She argued that this was extremely probative and that it was

not prejudicial because nothing from the statements was being offered for the truth of the

matter asserted. Because nothing was being offered for the truth of the matter, she argued

that it was not hearsay. The objection was sustained, and Stapleton proffered Pollock’s

written statement, the transcript of Henthorn’s interview, and a document created by the

defense purporting to show similarities in the two statements. On appeal, Stapleton repeats

her arguments that the statements were relevant, not unfairly prejudicial, and not hearsay.

We hold that Stapleton cannot show prejudice from the exclusion of this evidence.

According to both Henthorn’s account to police and Stapleton’s alleged account to

Pollock, Ratton probably did not hear them talking about killing him because he was “old,”

and Henthorn declined Stapleton’s request that he “do it.” They both said that Henthorn

tried to choke Ratton but then stopped, that Pennino was mad and asked why they had

brought this “shit to the house,” and that Pennino had shot Ratton in the back of his head.

According to both of them, the first place Henthorn tried to dig a hole was too rocky or too

hard, and Stapleton stayed at the house when Henthorn and Pennino disposed of the car

and buried Ratton’s body in the woods.

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Although the State was precluded from questioning Sheriff Watson about the alleged

similarities, Stapleton’s defense that Pollock’s account was stolen from Henthorn’s interview

was submitted to the jury through defense counsel’s questioning of Pollock and through

Stapleton’s testimony. After having Pollock confirm statements she had made in her written

statement, defense counsel stated as follows:

And what I want you to tell the Jury now is that why all of those statements are in
Brock’s statement to the police, and nowhere else in the file. Did you read Brock’s
statement to the police, and then call the -- and then tell Jason Watson the story
that you made up?

Defense counsel later stated that “I know you [read her discovery file] because it’s identical

to Brock’s statement.” Stapleton testified that she did not confess to Pollock and that

Pollock must have stolen the discovery file from under her bed to know the things she

testified about. Stapleton said that Pollock’s statements looked identical to Henthorn’s

statement.

The State argues that repeating the same inquiries to Sheriff Watson would have been

cumulative to Pollock’s testimony and that the proposed examination of Watson would have

reinforced that Pollock was telling the truth because she recounted the same story as

Henthorn. We agree that even if Henthorn’s statements were read to the jury, there is

nothing in the list of alleged similarities that cannot be explained by the fact that two

participants, Henthorn and Stapleton, were recounting the same incident to the police and

Pollock, respectively. Rather than containing “unusual similarities” or “identical”

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statements, their accounts merely tell the same story. Accordingly, Stapleton’s defense was

not prejudiced by this exclusion.

V. Exclusion of Testimony Regarding a Question Henthorn Asked

Prior to trial, the State moved to exclude testimony that Henthorn had asked Murillo

if she wanted him to kill her friend. The State argued that the question was hearsay.

Stapleton disputed that a question could be hearsay and argued that the question was

admissible as a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, such as his intent or

plan. The circuit court granted the State’s motion without explanation. On appeal,

Stapleton maintains that a question is not hearsay because it is not a statement offered in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Alternatively, she argues that if it is

hearsay, it falls under the exception in Rule 803(3) as a statement of the declarant’s then

existing state of mind. Stapleton argues that her defense was prejudiced by the exclusion of

the question because it would have shown Henthorn’s desire and plan to kill someone and

corroborate her testimony that she acted out of fear of Henthorn.

We agree with the State that Stapleton cannot show prejudice as a result of any error.

Although Stapleton was not permitted to ask Murillo if Henthorn posed such a question to

her, she was allowed, over the State’s objection, to ask Murillo if Henthorn had told her he

planned to kill someone. Murillo testified that Henthorn had expressed that he wanted to.

Furthermore, Eli Bergess and Cynthia Gilbert both testified that they had heard Henthorn

talk about planning to kill someone. This testimony allowed Stapleton to show Henthorn’s

desire and plan to kill someone and corroborated Stapleton’s own testimony. We agree with

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the State that the difference between the questions counsel was allowed to ask and the

question that the court excluded is negligible.

VI. Closing Argument

During the State’s second closing argument, Stapleton objected following these

remarks by the prosecutor:

They want you to disregard Teresa Pollock’s testimony. What did Teresa Pollock gain
by trotting in here in ADC white and sitting down and telling you guys what the
Defendant told her in the cell, other than being labeled a snitch when she gets back
to ADC? Nothing. Nothing. Now, there’s these suggestions that maybe she – there’s
no evidence that she received any consideration for that. So what is her motive?
What’s she doing? The Defendant is looking to leverage that for motivation like
Teresa Pollock? They don’t call Sheriff Watson to come take a statement. They call
their attorney and say, “See if you can work me out a deal.”

Stapleton asked for a curative instruction and a mistrial because the prosecutor had told the

jury without any evidence that “attorneys are the ones that would leverage a deal, and you

wouldn’t call the sheriff.” The court overruled the objection.

Stapleton argues that the prosecutor’s statement was outside the evidence adduced at

trial because there was no testimony concerning the normal method of giving information

to authorities in exchange for a deal. In reviewing closing arguments, the circuit court has

discretion to control closing argument and is in a better position to determine the possibility

of prejudice by observing the argument firsthand. Stewart v. State, 2012 Ark. 444. We will

not reverse the action of the circuit court in matters pertaining to its controlling, supervising,

and determining the propriety of the arguments of counsel in the absence of manifest gross

abuse. Id. Closing arguments must be confined to questions in issue, the evidence

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introduced during the trial, and all reasonable inferences and deductions that can be drawn

therefrom. Id. When an attorney’s comment during closing arguments directly reflects, or

is inferable from, testimony at trial, there is no error. Id.

In her testimony, Pollock denied that she had received any consideration for

providing a statement and agreed that she had “just notified the Clark County authorities

and told Sheriff Watson.” The defense challenged her credibility by noting the charges she

faced in three counties before she provided her statement and the lesser offenses she

ultimately pleaded guilty to, but there was no evidence that Pollock had contacted her

attorney and asked for a deal. In denying defense counsel’s accusation that she stole

Stapleton’s discovery file, Pollock testified that she had never seen an inmate with a discovery

file and had never even seen her own because she lets her lawyers handle those matters. The

prosecutor’s closing argument pointed out that Pollock had not contacted her attorney for a

deal despite her testimony that she lets her lawyers handle her cases. It was a reasonable

inference from the evidence that a defendant “like Teresa Pollock” would have asked her

attorney for a deal if that was her motivation. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse

its discretion in overruling Stapleton’s objection to the State’s closing argument. To the

extent Stapleton argues that the State improperly vouched for Pollock’s credibility, this

argument was not preserved for review. See Noel v. State, 331 Ark. 79, 960 S.W.2d 439 (1998).

Affirmed.

ABRAMSON and VIRDEN, JJ., agree.

Short Law Firm, by: Lee D. Short, for appellant.

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Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Jason Michael Johnson and Christopher R. Warthen, Ass’t

Att’ys Gen., for appellee.

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