Vincent Tyler v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 248
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-25-388

Opinion Delivered April 22, 2026
VINCENT TYLER
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 35CR-23-312]
V.

HONORABLE ALEX GUYNN, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED

CASEY R. TUCKER, Judge

Vincent Tyler appeals his conviction of first-degree murder with a firearm

enhancement in the Jefferson County Circuit Court. On appeal, Tyler argues that the circuit

court erred in submitting a nonmodel jury instruction on flight when there was no evidence

he had fled and in denying his motions to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses

of second-degree murder and manslaughter. We affirm.

The State charged Tyler with capital murder, alleging that on May 18, 2023, he caused

the death of John Payne with premeditated and deliberated purpose. The State alleged that

Tyler was subject to a firearm enhancement. The trial took place on March 20, 2025.

John Payne was shot and killed on May 18, 2023. According to Dr. Adam Craig, who

performed the autopsy, Mr. Payne died of multiple gunshot wounds. Two bullets entered

the right back side of Mr. Payne’s scalp, traveled upward through his brain from right to left,
and exited through a shared wound on the left upper part of his scalp. A third bullet entered

Mr. Payne’s head further down on the right side and traveled right to left and slightly upward

below his brain case before exiting his left cheek. The fourth bullet entered the right back

side of his neck, traveled slightly upward, also right to left, and exited through his left lower

cheek. A fifth bullet entered Mr. Payne’s upper right back, came out the top of his shoulder,

and entered his neck where it lodged underneath his skull. The sixth gunshot was to the

back of Mr. Payne’s right shoulder; this bullet traveled through the humerus before exiting

through the front of his shoulder. The two bullets that traveled through Mr. Payne’s brain,

alone, would have been fatal, and the two that exited his left cheek could have proved fatal.

Dr. Craig determined that Mr. Payne died as the result of multiple gunshot wounds and that

his manner of death was homicide.

Anthony Morehead, an armed guard for Valero, testified that he had just left work

and was walking home on May 18 when he heard gunshots. As he went in the direction of

the gunshots, a woman approached him and told him she needed to use a phone. A “guy”

on a bicycle passed between Morehead and the woman so closely that he almost hit the

woman. The person on the bicycle appeared to hand something to the woman, or vice versa,

then rode away. Morehead offered the woman his phone, but she did not reply, so he

continued walking. He then saw a truck in the middle of the street with its lights on. This

was when he called 911. When Morehead first saw the woman in the street, she appeared

to be coming from the truck. The woman turned out to be Melissa Colbert, Tyler’s mother.

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Morehead’s recorded call to 911 was played for the jury. In that call, Morehead

identified himself then told the operator that as he was heading home from work and

walking down 23rd Street, he heard “a lot of gunshots.” Then he saw a heavyset woman in

a thin dress pacing back and forth. She would not answer him when he asked if there was a

shooting. Morehead told the operator that there was a truck sitting in the middle of the

street with its lights on, possibly still running, and he thought the driver had been shot and

was probably dead.

Colbert testified that she and Mr. Payne had dated for approximately ten years. Tyler

and Mr. Payne knew each other. Colbert never saw them have an altercation. Colbert

previously had given a sworn statement to the police, and the State played the recording for

the jury. In the statement, Colbert told the police that on the night Mr. Payne was killed,

she, Tyler, and Mr. Payne were in Mr. Payne’s pick-up truck together. Mr. Payne was driving;

she was in the front seat, and Tyler was sitting behind her in the back seat. A friend of

Tyler’s deceased brother, Paul Haltiwanger, Jr., had been in the truck, but they dropped him

off where he lived and then headed back to Colbert’s mother’s house where she was living.

Suddenly Colbert saw bright flashing lights, and the truck stopped. Mr. Payne slumped

forward, and Colbert exited the truck. She went to call for help and ran down the street to

her cousin’s house. She did not know where Tyler went but thought he also went to call

someone. Colbert called Mr. Payne’s aunt, who picked her up and took her to the hospital.

When they arrived at the hospital, they were told that Mr. Payne was not there. Colbert first

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said she had not seen Tyler since Mr. Payne was shot, but she later changed her answer and

said Tyler had been by her mother’s house where they were staying.

After the audiotaped interview was played for the jury, direct examination continued.

Colbert denied that the recording refreshed her memory. She also denied having told the

police that Tyler always caried a gun. Colbert testified on cross-examination that she hears

a woman’s voice in her head and that she had been hearing it since she was in her early

twenties. She is on medication for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Colbert reluctantly

agreed with the State that she, Mr. Payne, and Tyler were the only ones in the truck at the

time of the shooting. She denied having shot Mr. Payne. Colbert testified that all her

children had a good relationship with Mr. Payne.

MD Shahriyar—the crime-scene technician for the Pine Bluff Police Department—

testified that when he arrived on the scene, Mr. Payne was already deceased. His body was

still buckled into the seatbelt of the driver’s seat of his truck. There was a bullet hole on the

driver’s side window and outside mirror. There were no bullet holes on the passenger side

of the truck. There were shell casings inside and outside the truck. Officer Shahriyar

observed and photographed the victim with gunshot wounds to the right side of his head,

neck, and shoulder. He also photographed the blood splatter on the inside of the driver’s-

side pillar of the truck. There was no blood splatter on the passenger side of the truck. The

casings were all the same caliber. Officer Shahriyar did not find a firearm at the scene.

Jennifer Floyd, who works at the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory, examined the bullets and

casings and determined that they had all been fired from the same gun.

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Paul Haltiwanger, Jr., testified that he knew Colbert because he was friends with

Colbert’s younger son who recently had died. Colbert and Mr. Payne had given him a ride

home the night of the shooting. Haltiwanger was seated behind the driver, Mr. Payne. Tyler

also was in the truck, seated on the passenger side of the backseat, behind Colbert. Before

the truck reached Haltiwanger’s house, they stopped and picked up a man who smelled like

liquor. Haltiwanger got out of the truck at his house before the shooting took place.

Sergeant Chris Wieland of the Pine Bluff Police Department testified that he

investigated this shooting, beginning at the crime scene on the night it happened. He

observed the victim in the driver’s seat of the truck. He also observed a bullet hole in the

driver’s-side rearview mirror on the car door and in the door window. He concluded, from

his experience, that the bullet came from inside the car. Due to the location of the victim,

the victim’s wounds, and the casings and projectiles, Sergeant Wieland concluded that the

shooter was sitting on the passenger side of the back seat. Sergeant Wieland interviewed

Colbert the night of the shooting and learned that she, Haltiwanger, and Tyler had been in

the truck with Mr. Payne and had let Haltiwanger out of the truck before the shooting

occurred. When Sergeant Wieland interviewed Haltiwanger, Haltiwanger told him they had

picked up another person but had let him out of the truck. Colbert told him that she, Tyler,

and Mr. Payne were the only people in the truck when Mr. Payne was shot. Tyler turned

himself in on June 10, almost a month after the incident, and requested an attorney.

At the close of the State’s case, Tyler’s attorney moved for a directed verdict,

summarizing his argument as “our position [is] that the State didn’t meet its burden,

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conflicting testimony of whether Vincent Tyler was there at the time of the murder.” The

court denied the motion. Tyler did not call any witnesses and renewed his motion for

directed verdict, which was denied.

The State requested that the jury be instructed on capital murder and the lesser-

included offense of first-degree murder. Tyler’s counsel requested jury instructions on the

lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter, to which the State

objected. The court denied Tyler’s request for those instructions without argument on the

issue. Tyler’s attorney proffered the instructions for the record.

While instructing the jury, the court paused to call a bench conference and stated

that it did not recall anything about flight. The State responded that Tyler did not remain

at the scene of the shooting and did not turn himself in until almost a month later. Defense

counsel responded that there was no evidence that Tyler fled the scene “as an admission or

inadmission of guilt.” The court determined that it would give the instruction and instructed

the jury as follows: “Evidence that the defendant fled to avoid arrest or detention by the

police may be considered by you in your deliberations as circumstantial evidence

corroborative of guilt of the defendant.”

During closing argument, Tyler’s counsel argued that the State failed to prove that

Tyler was the person who shot Mr. Payne, stating, “We’re here for this—is—did this man do

it?” He argued, “My point is, you can’t prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was Vincent

Tyler that killed John Payne.” Trial counsel argued that the State’s case was weak and that it

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did not present any type of images or produce a weapon or “somebody definitively placing

him at the scene, besides law enforcement.”

The jury found Tyler guilty of first-degree murder and that he had used a firearm in

committing the murder. The jury affixed his sentence at forty years in the Arkansas Division

of Correction on the first-degree-murder charge and fifteen years’ incarceration on the

firearm enhancement. The court sentenced Tyler accordingly and ordered that the sentences

run consecutively. Tyler timely appealed.

I. Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Instructing the Jury on
Fleeing as Evidence of Guilt

On appeal, Tyler first contends that the circuit court erred in giving a nonmodel jury

instruction on fleeing as circumstantial evidence of guilt. He argues that there was no

evidence that he fled following the shooting. Tyler further argues on appeal that in discovery,

he had asked the State to provide him with evidence of other crimes pursuant to Arkansas

Rule of Evidence 404, and the State had not produced this evidence. He asserts that the

Arkansas Model Jury Instructions state that when evidence of other crimes is being admitted

into evidence, the court should give AMI Crim. 2d 203, which was not done in this case.

The only part of Tyler’s appellate argument on this point that is preserved for this court’s

consideration is the argument that there was no evidence of fleeing to support giving the

instruction. Since he did not raise the other particulars of his appellate argument in the

circuit court below, we do not address them on appeal. See Anderson v. State, 2015 Ark. 18,

454 S.W.3d 212 (stating that an appellant is limited to the scope and nature of his arguments

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raised before the circuit court, and this court will not consider arguments that were not

considered by the court below).

The standard of review regarding the use of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.

Bynum v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 298, 626 S.W.3d 154. “Abuse of discretion is a high

threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision, but requires that

the circuit court act improvidently thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.” Doerhoff v.

State, 2023 Ark. 149, at 4–5 675 S.W.3d 877, 882. This court’s role on appeal is not to

weigh the evidence but to determine whether there is any evidence to support the jury

instruction. Mitchell v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 233, 711 S.W.3d 838. “A party is entitled to

a jury instruction when it is a correct statement of the law and when there is some basis in

the evidence to support giving the instruction.” Bynum, 2021 Ark. App. 298, at 13, 626

S.W.3d at 162.

In the present case, the evidence was that the bullets that killed Mr. Payne came from

the back seat of the truck. There was evidence that Tyler was one of two passengers in the

truck when the shooting occurred. After the shooting, Tyler left the scene. Nearly a month

passed before he reappeared, turning himself in to the police. These facts provide “some

basis in the evidence” to support giving the instruction on fleeing. 1

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We note that the court instructed the jury with a nonmodel jury instruction, and
such instructions should be given only when the model instructions do not correctly state
the law or there is no model jury instruction on the subject. Smith v. State, 2025 Ark. 26,
708 S.W.3d 336. There is no model instruction on fleeing as evidence corroborative of guilt.
Id. However, the instruction the circuit court gave in this case is a correct statement of the

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Since there was some basis in the evidence to support giving the instruction on fleeing

and the instruction given was a correct statement of the law, the circuit court did not err in

giving it.

II. Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Refusing to Instruct the Jury
on Second-Degree Murder and Manslaughter

Tyler argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-

included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter. We disagree.

It is reversible error to refuse to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses when

such instruction is supported by the slightest evidence. Montgomery v. State, 2024 Ark. App.

302, 689 S.W.3d 463. Conversely, the circuit court may refuse to instruct on a lesser-

included offense when there is no rational basis to acquit on the charged offense and convict

on the lesser-included one. Id. As this court has explained, “it is not erroneous for the

circuit court to decline to give the proffered instruction on the lesser offense when the

evidence clearly shows that the defendant is either guilty of the greater offense charged or

innocent.” Id. at 11, 689 S.W.3d at 470. It follows that when the defendant claims

innocence, there is no need to instruct on the lesser offenses.

Tyler was convicted of first-degree murder as defined by Arkansas Code Annotated

section 5-10-102(a)(2) (Supp. 2025), that “with the purpose of causing the death of another

person, [he caused] the death of another person.” “A person acts purposely with respect to

law. In fact, it is identical to the instruction used by the circuit court and affirmed on appeal
in Smith, supra.

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his or her conduct or a result of his or her conduct when it is the person’s conscious object

to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the result.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1)

(Repl. 2024). Tyler had requested and was denied an instruction on second-degree murder

pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2024), which provides

that a person commits second-degree murder if “the person knowingly causes the death of

another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human

life.” As to the culpable mental state provided in subdivision (a)(1), a person acts “knowingly”

with respect to the person’s conduct or attendant circumstances “when he or she is aware

that his or her conduct is of that nature or that the attendant circumstances exist.” Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-2-202(2)(A). The mental state of “purposely” encompasses the mental state

of “knowingly.” Marshall v. State, 2021 Ark. 158, 627 S.W.3d 810. In the present case, there

was no rational basis for an instruction on second-degree murder.

In Cypert v. State, 2025 Ark. 11, at 11, 705 S.W.3d 496, 502, the supreme court

explained that “a defendant is not entitled to a second-degree murder instruction where all

the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant acted solely with the purpose of

killing the victim.” The court in Cypert determined that the appellant was not entitled to

the lesser-included-offense instruction because he followed the victim out of a house and

fired a high-velocity rifle at her six times. The fact that some of the shots were nonlethal and

some missed did not negate his intent to kill the victim. And, as in the case at bar, the

evidence in Cypert was that the fatal shots were not the result of an atypical trajectory or a

warning shot gone wrong or a misfire, which supported the finding of purposeful intent.

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The court concluded that no rational basis existed to acquit the appellant on the first-degree-

murder charge and convict him of second-degree murder.

Similarly, in Dixon v. State, 2019 Ark. 245, 581 S.W.3d 505, the supreme court

affirmed the lower court’s decision to refuse an instruction on second-degree murder. The

appellant in Dixon was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting the victim in the head

at close range and argued that the court erred in refusing the second-degree-murder

instruction. The supreme court disagreed, stating that there was no evidence of any

argument or altercation, nor was there evidence that the victim brandished his firearm. The

evidence was consistent that Dixon shot the victim in the head at close range in the absence

of any provocation. In affirming the circuit court, the supreme court stated that there was

no rational basis for giving the lesser instruction. This reasoning directly applies to the case

at bar.

In the present case, no witness testified that there was an altercation or argument or

weapon brandishing. In fact, Colbert testified to the opposite, averring that her children

had a good relationship with the victim and that she had never seen Tyler and Mr. Payne

have an altercation. The evidence was simply that Tyler was the only person sitting in the

backseat of the truck when Mr. Payne was shot six times in the back of the right side of his

head, his neck, and his shoulder. Further, the evidence was that all the shots were fired from

the same firearm and from within the vehicle. In the face of undisputed evidence that Mr.

Payne was shot six times in the same area at such close range, it is clear that the shooter acted

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with the purpose of causing Mr. Payne’s death. There was no rational basis for acquitting

him of first-degree murder and convicting him of the lesser offense of second-degree murder.

Tyler also requested an instruction on manslaughter pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 5-2-104(a)(1) (Repl. 2024), that he “recklessly caused the death of John

Payne.” A person acts “recklessly” when he “consciously disregards substantial and

unjustifiable risk that the attendant circumstances exist or the result will occur.” Ark. Code.

Ann. § 5-2-202(3)(A). The risk must be of a nature that disregarding it constitutes a gross

deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise. Id. § 5-2-

202(3)(B). In Ellis v. State, 345 Ark. 415,, 418, 47 S.W.3d 259, 261 (2001), the supreme court

agreed with the circuit court’s refusal to give a reckless-manslaughter instruction. In doing

so, the court stated that the appellant’s argument that his conduct could be found to be

reckless when he shot the victim in the stomach at a range of three to five feet was “wholly

without merit.” Similarly, in Bankston v. State, 361 Ark. 123, 205 S.W.3d 138 (2005), the

supreme court held that firing a gun four times into a car known to be occupied went beyond

a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise; thus,

the circuit court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on reckless manslaughter. In the

present case, in which the evidence was that Tyler shot Mr. Payne in the head, neck, and

shoulder at a range of about three feet, Tyler’s argument that the court should have given

the reckless-manslaughter instruction is wholly without merit.

In addition to the evidentiary bases already discussed, we note that a circuit court

does not err in refusing lesser-included-offense instructions when the defendant’s only

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defense is innocence. In Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491, the appellant

appealed his conviction of first-degree murder and argued on appeal that the circuit court

erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of second-degree murder

and manslaughter. The supreme court disagreed, stating:

Armstrong did not introduce any evidence to show that he shot the victim but
that the murder was committed in self-defense or under the influence of
extreme emotional disturbance. Rather, he argued only that Thornton shot
herself. We have held that no rational basis exists for giving a lesser-included
instruction when the defense to the charge is a total denial of wrongdoing. See, e.g.,
Friar v. State, 2016 Ark. 245 (affirming refusal to give lesser-included
instructions on first- and second-degree murder where defense was that
appellant was not the perpetrator of the shooting); Brown v. State, 321 Ark.
413, 903 S.W.2d 160 (1995), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 909 (1998) (holding that
lesser-included-offense instruction for possession of controlled substance was
properly rejected where appellant’s entire defense was based on alibi theory);
Doby v. State, 290 Ark. 408, 720 S.W.2d 694 (1986) (holding that there was no
rational basis to give lesser-included-offense instruction where defense was that
of innocence). Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
Armstrong’s proffered jury instructions in this case.

2020 Ark. 309, at 10, 607 S.W.3d at 498–99 (emphasis added).

In the case before us, Tyler’s only defense was that he was not the person who shot

Mr. Payne. In his opening statement, Tyler’s counsel asserted, “It’s our position that it wasn’t

Mr. Tyler. He wasn’t on the scene when this happened.” Likewise, in his motion for a

directed verdict, Tyler’s counsel argued that the State had not proved Tyler was present at

the time of the murder. In closing argument, Tyler’s counsel argued that the question for

the jury to determine was “did this man do it.” Tyler did not make any arguments—to either

the court or the jury—regarding mens rea, justification, recklessness, or any other defense to

justify his having shot Mr. Payne at close range, nor would the evidence have supported such

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a position. Under these circumstances the circuit court did not err in refusing to instruct

the jury on second-degree murder and manslaughter.

Affirmed.

BARRETT and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Sharon Kiel, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Pamela Rumpz, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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