Paul Gill v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 83
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-25-55

PAUL GILL Opinion Delivered February 11, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ASHLEY
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 02CR-22-272]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBERT B. GIBSON III,
APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

Paul Gill was convicted by an Ashley County Circuit Court jury of twenty-two counts of

committing a terroristic act and one count of aggravated residential burglary. He was sentenced

to ten years’ imprisonment for each count of committing a terroristic act and forty years for the

count of aggravated residential burglary, with all sentences running concurrently. On appeal,

Gill argues that circuit court reversibly erred by failing to give the jury an alternative-sanction

instruction regarding the terroristic-act charges at sentencing. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

At Gill’s trial on June 25, 2024, the following evidence was presented. On November 11,

2022, after months of strained relations over a driveway, Gill and John Lowery, his neighbor

and brother-in-law, got into a heated argument over a barbell left in the driveway. At the time of

the argument, Lowery was in the driveway about to go pick up his wife (Gill’s sister) at work and
leave town for the weekend. Lowery returned November 13, and as he was in the driveway

getting his belongings out of the truck, he heard Gill’s door slam. Lowery saw Gill approaching

him with an AR-15 rifle, and Lowery ran to his house. Gill shot at Lowery as he reached his

front door. Lowery ran inside and retrieved his shotgun from his bedroom. When he turned

back toward the living room, he saw Gill standing inside the living room holding the rifle.

Lowery shot Gill several times, then called the police as Gill lay on the floor incapacitated. In

their search of Lowery’s home, police officers found twenty-two shell casings that were later

determined to match Gill’s rifle. Additionally, Dr. Benjamin Silber testified that he evaluated

Gill to determine whether he was fit to proceed to trial and to identify factors regarding Gill’s

criminal responsibility and any circumstances that mitigated the offense or possible punishment.

Pursuant to his examination, Dr. Silber determined that Gill was psychotic at the time of the

incident; however, Dr. Silber explained that he could not opine whether Gill was able to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform his behavior accordingly because Gill had

no recollection of the event.

The jury convicted Gill of twenty-two counts of committing a terroristic act and one

count of aggravated residential burglary. Before the sentencing hearing, Gill requested that the

court give the jury instruction AMI Crim. 2d 9111, a closing instruction that presents possible

alternative sentencing for the terroristic-act counts, namely probation or a suspended sentencing

and a fine. The State objected to the alternative sentencing and the related forms, and Gill

responded that “the legislature saw fit to make it possible for the alternative sentencing, so

apparently, they think it’s appropriate.” The court ruled that “based on the totality of the case,”

including the forensic reports and Gill’s mental-health history, this was not “a probation case.”

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The court found that presenting the jury with alternative probation instructions would be

confusing because the aggravated-residential-burglary charge is not a probationary offense, and

the court would not accept a recommendation of probation on the terroristic-act convictions

under these circumstances. The court explained that “it would clearly confuse them because it’s

not an option in the (Class) Y (felony),” and the minimum sentence for aggravated residential

burglary is ten years’ incarceration. The court found that “even if they gave probation on the

others, he would still go to the Department of Corrections[.]” The circuit court additionally

considered the nature of the charge, the offense, and the extent of violence and found, “That’s

not something even on a first offense that the court would consider probation on.”

Gill proffered the alternative sentencing instructions and verdict forms. The jury

recommended ten years’ incarceration on each terroristic-act charge and forty years’

incarceration for the aggravated-residential-burglary count. The circuit court followed the

recommendation. Gill timely filed his notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.

II. Discussion

For his sole point on appeal, Gill contends that the circuit court reversibly erred by

refusing to offer the alternative sentencing instruction proposing probation for each of the

twenty-two counts of terroristic threatening. Gill contends that he suffered prejudice from this

decision because the jury could have considered the alternative instruction and sentenced him

to probation or less time overall. His argument fails.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-97-101(4) (Repl. 2016) provides that the circuit

court may instruct the jury that counsel may argue as to alternative sentences for which the

defendant may qualify. See Hayes v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 158, at 1–2, 544 S.W.3d 587, 588–89.

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The jury then may make a recommendation as to an alternative sentence; however, this

recommendation shall not be binding on the court. Id. The decision to allow alternative

sentencing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. This standard of review is a high threshold,

requiring that a circuit court not act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.

Id. Mechanical imposition of the jury’s recommended sentences or an unwavering court policy

refusing to instruct the jury on alternative sentences with respect to certain offenses is not an

exercise of discretion. Rodgers v. State, 348 Ark. 106, 71 S.W.3d 579 (2002).

In Steele v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 257, at 13, 434 S.W.3d 424, 432, the circuit court

rejected the “proffered alternative sentencing instruction based on the sexual nature of the

offense and the fact that some jurors cried over what they saw depicted in the images.” Steele

argued that the that the statute (distributing, possessing, or viewing matter depicting sexually

explicit conduct involving a child) provides that a person convicted of this crime is eligible for

probation, and the circuit court erred by refusing the alternative instruction. We disagreed and

held that

[t]he trial court exercised its discretion by citing specific reasons for finding that
an instruction on alternative sentencing was inappropriate, including the jurors’
reactions to the images. Further, the trial court reasoned that the jury convicted Steele
on all twenty counts and sentenced him to much more than the minimum punishment.
The trial court concluded that it was unlikely that the jury would have recommended
probation for Steele’s possession of child pornography. Given the ultimate sentence
imposed, it was also unlikely that the trial court would have accepted a non-binding
recommendation of probation.

Id.

The same holds true here. As in Steele, the circuit court exercised its discretion by citing

several specific reasons that the alternative instruction would not be appropriate here. The

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circuit court stated that “the court does not consider this a probation case, and so it would be

giving the jury something to consider that the court would not accept.” The court noted that

probation was not an option for the aggravated-residential-burglary charge of which Gill also was

convicted; thus, jury instructions regarding probation for the terroristic-act convictions were

impractical. As in Steele, the court also considered the violence of Gill’s actions. Regarding

prejudice, even if the court erred, no prejudice resulted. The jury recommended ten-year

sentences on each count of committing a terroristic act.1 The minimum sentence for that crime

is five years, and the jury recommended a sentence of more than the minimum; thus, the jury

would not have recommended probation if the instruction had been offered. On the aggravated-

residential-burglary conviction, Gill was sentenced to forty years for a crime that carries a ten-

year minimum prison sentence, making the alternative sentencing instruction even more

irrelevant. We hold that the circuit court did not act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without

due consideration in rejecting the alternative sentencing instruction. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and MURPHY, J., agree.

Lancaster Law Firm, PLLC, by: Clinton W. Lancaster, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Dalton Cook, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

1
Terroristic act is a Class B felony that carries a sentencing range of not less than five
years nor more than twenty years of imprisonment. Aggravated residential burglary is a Class Y
felony, and the sentence shall be not less than ten years and not more than forty years, or life.
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401 (Repl. 2024).

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