Juan Gomez v. Lucilla Velazquez De Gomez

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 590
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-24-527

JUAN GOMEZ Opinion Delivered December 10, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE POPE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 58DR-21-342]

LUCILLA VELAZQUEZ DE GOMEZ HONORABLE GORDON W. “MACK”
APPELLEE MCCAIN, JR., JUDGE

AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Juan Gomez appeals the Pope County Circuit Court’s decree divorcing him from his

former spouse, Lucilla Velazquez de Gomez. On appeal, Juan argues that the circuit court

abused its discretion by denying his motion to approve their settlement agreement. Lucilla

did not file a response. We affirm.

Juan and Lucilla married in 1984. On June 1, 2021, Juan filed a divorce complaint

against Lucilla. On July 7, Lucilla answered and counterclaimed for divorce. On February

21, 2024, the circuit court held a pretrial hearing and issued a scheduling order setting trial

for April 16 by Zoom. The court noted that both parties required Spanish-speaking

interpreter services.
On April 16, the parties appeared for the trial, and both parties utilized interpreter

services. At the beginning of the hearing, the court recessed so that the parties could discuss

a settlement agreement.

After the recess, the parties informed the court that they wanted to proceed with the

trial, and Juan’s attorney stated that the only issue for the court to decide was the division of

their property and debts.1 He explained that the parties had three pieces of real property with

one property in Mexico and two properties in Arkansas. He stated that the parties did not

dispute whether the properties were marital or nonmarital, and he noted that Juan had

inherited the Mexican property but that they agreed that improvements made during the

marriage were marital property.

He further stated that

[t]he only reason that we are here proceeding is that [Lucilla] may be making a
decision that is contrary to her financial wellbeing and that is why [her attorney] has
been very clear and has attempted to explain the consequences of everything
specifically to her. So we, the attorneys do not have any issues. We are presenting the
information and just the background information that will not be adverse to
[Lucilla]’s financial interest in the long term.

The court responded, “As both [c]ounsel know, my normal approach is when there is no

agreement to divide something equally is to sell it . . . it is not a sale through a real estate

agent, it will be an auction.”

Juan’s attorney then informed the court that he wanted to offer Juan’s testimony that

Juan was willing to give Lucilla one of the two properties in Arkansas, sell the Mexican

1
The parties did not have minor children and did not contest the grounds.

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property, and divide the marital proceeds. Lucilla objected to the testimony because it was

part of the proposed settlement agreement.

The court then again stated, “If there is no agreement, the property is sold at auction

and the parties split the proceeds.” Juan’s attorney asserted that the parties would suffer

financially from the costs associated with the auction. The court acknowledged the costs but

stated that “it can’t be helped when we are stuck with property that can’t be divided,” and

“the best way [the court] can divide a piece of property is to have it sold at a public sale

through an auction.” Lucilla did not object and stated, “[T]hat actually resolves all of the

property issues.”

The court explained the auction procedure and stated, “Once that goes in, it’s not

going to be undone. So, any subsequent agreement is not going to be considered by the

court.” The court recessed again and gave the parties another thirty minutes to discuss a

resolution. The court noted it “would rather the parties come to an agreement.”

After the second recess, Juan’s attorney informed the court that Juan agreed to pay

Lucilla one-half of $23,988.80 for marital improvements on the Mexican property and that

the sum would be paid from his portion of the auction proceeds. 2 The parties were unable

to agree about the other property. The court and parties then discussed the extent of the

2
Juan had the property appraised, and Lucilla did not object to the appraisal.

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property and debt, which included the Mexican property, two Arkansas properties,3 a

manufactured home, two vehicles, and a tractor.

Juan testified and explained that he had inherited the Mexican property from his

grandfather. He stated that improvements had been made to the property during the

marriage totaling $23,988.80. He stated that he would pay one-half of $23,988.80 to Lucilla

from the proceeds of the auction of the Arkansas properties. He also testified that he

understood that the court was ordering that the Arkansas properties be auctioned.

Lucilla testified and acknowledged that she would receive about $12,000 representing

her share of the Mexican property from Juan’s share of the auction proceeds of the Arkansas

properties. She further acknowledged that the Arkansas properties would be sold at a public

auction and that the proceeds would be equally divided after the auction expenses.

Following the hearing, on April 24, the court entered an order of sale of personal and

real property at public auction. Specifically, the court ordered that a vehicle, a tractor, a

mobile home, and the two real properties in Arkansas be sold. 4

On April 25, the court emailed the parties, and the email was filed on the record that

day. The court stated that it had received text messages from Juan’s attorney stating that the

parties now want to settle and that they were “coming in today or tomorrow” to sign the

agreement. The court explained that to avoid an undue burden on the auction company, it

3
The parties stated that the two Arkansas properties were mortgaged in the amount
of approximately $90,000.
4
The order stated the tentative auction date as “TBD.”

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had verbally instructed the company to delay setting an auction date. The court stated that

it would delay directing the auction company to proceed until (1) the time for a motion for

reconsideration expires, (2) both parties formally waive their right to file a motion for

reconsideration, (3) the motion is filed and ruled on, or (4) another posttrial relief is sought

and addressed.

On April 29, the court emailed the parties and stated that it had not received a

response from its April 25 email, and it reminded the parties to update the court on their

intentions. The same day, Juan’s attorney responded that he and Lucilla’s attorney had

drafted a proposed agreement, but they needed more time to meet with their clients. He

noted that they had to meet their clients in person with translators.

On May 9, the court emailed the parties again, and the email was filed of record that

day. The court stated it would lift the moratorium on the auction process on May 15, but it

did not intend to alter the time for a reconsideration motion.

On May 10, the parties tendered a settlement agreement in which the parties agreed

that Juan would receive the Mexican property and one of the Arkansas properties and that

Lucilla would receive the other Arkansas property. The settlement agreement further

provided that “[i]n order to equalize the value of the property allocated,” the parties agreed

that Juan would “obtain the release of [Lucilla] and [her Arkansas property] from any liability

for the outstanding mortgage debt” and that Juan would pay Lucilla an additional $30,000.

The parties also agreed that Juan would receive a vehicle and the tractor and that Lucilla

would receive a vehicle.

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On May 15, Juan moved for approval of the property settlement agreement and to

vacate the auction order. He noted that the court had not entered the divorce decree, and

he asserted that settlements are favored in the law and conserve judicial resources. He further

argued that if the auction proceeded, the parties would experience significant financial

hardship that would constitute a miscarriage of justice. He pointed out that the court’s

auction order awarded the auctioneer a 10 percent buyer’s premium for their real property,

a 10 percent auction fee for their personal property, and $2,500 in advertising fees and costs.

He further asserted that they would experience significant interest expenses and borrowing

costs to purchase their own assets at the auction and that they could be precluded from

bidding due to lending requirements.

On May 23, the court entered a five-page order denying Juan’s motion to approve the

settlement agreement and to vacate the auction order. The court stated that at the pretrial

hearing, it had advised the parties that “the failure to reach an agreement before trial would

result in the sale of all property.” The court further stated that at trial, it gave the parties

multiple opportunities to settle, encouraged the parties to settle, and again informed the

parties that the property would be sold at an auction in the absence of a settlement

agreement. The court pointed out that the parties did not request a continuance of the trial

to give them time to finalize a settlement agreement and did not complain about

technological issues or a language barrier. The court cited “[j]udicial economy, [and] the need

for finality of an action that is over two (2) years old and still taking up space on the [c]ourt[’s]

docket.” The court also noted that approval of the settlement agreement would promote

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future litigants to “roll the dice, have a trial, see what the decision is and if [they] don’t like

it, [they] will negotiate afterwards.”

On June 5, the court entered the divorce decree, ordering that the property be

auctioned and the proceeds equally divided. The court also ordered that the auction order

be modified to include the second vehicle. On June 6, Juan appealed the May 23 order and

the decree.

On appeal, Juan argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his

motion to approve the settlement and to vacate the auction order. He argues that public

policy favors settlement agreements, parties can settle at any time, and courts have a duty to

encourage settlement agreements. He additionally claims that the court’s recognition of the

settlement agreement would prevent a miscarriage of justice given that the auction would

result in major economic loss to both him and Lucilla.

The law is well settled that, although divorcing spouses may enter into settlement

agreements, the court is not bound to accept them, even in the absence of fraud or coercion.

Walls v. Walls, 2014 Ark. App. 729, at 4, 452 S.W.3d 119, 122 (holding that the circuit court

acted within its discretion in disregarding the parties’ marital dissolution agreement);

Rutherford v. Rutherford, 81 Ark. App. 122, 98 S.W.3d 842 (2003) (holding that the circuit

court acted within its discretion in rejecting the parties’ property settlement agreement and

ordering that their property be auctioned). It is within the sound discretion of the circuit

court to approve, disapprove, or modify the agreement. Rutherford, 81 Ark. App. 122, 98

S.W.3d 842. Further, a circuit court has an obligation to manage and control its docket in

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an efficient manner. Frost v. Frost, 2009 Ark. App. 290, 307 S.W.3d 41 (2009) (reviewing the

circuit court’s decision on the denial of a continuance). It is crucial to our judicial system

that circuit courts retain the discretion to control their dockets. Id.

In this case, we hold that the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying Juan’s

motion to approve the settlement agreement and vacate the auction order. The divorce case

had been pending since 2021. At the February 2024 pretrial hearing, the court advised the

parties that their failure to reach a settlement agreement before trial would result in a sale of

their property. At the April 16 trial, the court encouraged the parties to settle, and it provided

the parties multiple opportunities to settle. The court again advised the parties that the

property would be auctioned in the absence of a settlement, and it stated that a subsequent

settlement agreement would not be considered. Both parties testified and acknowledged that

their property would be auctioned, and they did not request a continuance. However, they

waited until May 10 to tender their settlement agreement. Given these circumstances, we

find no error by the circuit court.

Affirmed.

THYER and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson; and Peel Law Firm, P.A.,

by: John R. Peel, for appellant.

One brief only.

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