Minor Child v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 552
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-25-10

MINOR CHILD Opinion Delivered November 19, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 35JV-24-44]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE EARNEST E.
APPELLEE BROWN, JR., JUDGE

REVERSED AND VACATED

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Chief Judge

Appellant was a minor child at the time he was alleged to have committed capital

murder, aggravated robbery, and terroristic act. He was ultimately adjudicated delinquent

on all the charges in the juvenile division of the Jefferson County Circuit Court and

committed to the Division of Youth Services (DYS). Appellant appeals his adjudications.

We reverse and vacate the adjudications.

Appellant was initially charged in the criminal division of the Jefferson County

Circuit Court with capital murder, aggravated robbery, terroristic act, and a firearm

enhancement. Following a hearing on appellant’s motion, the charges were all transferred

to the juvenile division of circuit court. In the juvenile division, the court granted the State’s

motion to designate the case as extended juvenile jurisdiction.
The charges were tried in a bench trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the court ruled

that it was dismissing the charges of aggravated robbery and terroristic act as well as the

firearm enhancement. Referencing appellant’s “level of involvement,” the court “reduced”

the charge of capital murder and adjudicated appellant delinquent on manslaughter. The

court entered a delinquency order on September 11, 2024, reflecting its bench ruling that

the charge of capital murder was reduced to manslaughter, of which appellant was guilty,

and dismissing all other charges. A disposition hearing was set for September 19, and

appellant was ordered to remain detained pending disposition.

On September 17, appellant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Crime Not Charged.”

Appellant argued that manslaughter is not a lesser-included offense of capital felony murder,

and a defendant may not be convicted of a felony for which he was not charged or that is

not a lesser-included offense of the one charged. Appellant also argued that he could not be

retried on the original charges because of the protections afforded to him by the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2,

section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution.

At the September 19 hearing, the court denied appellant’s motion, stating that “the

law allows us to correct an improper sentence.” The court found that it had not dismissed

the capital-murder charge, that the capital-murder charge was “reinstated,” and that appellant

was now adjudicated delinquent on that charge. Without conducting the disposition

hearing, the court committed appellant to DYS. An order was entered that same day denying

appellant’s motion, setting aside the September 11 delinquency order, reinstating all charges,

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and adjudicating appellant delinquent on all counts. The court entered a separate amended

delinquency order finding appellant guilty of capital murder, aggravated robbery, terroristic

act, and a firearm enhancement.

On September 25, 2024, appellant filed a “Motion to Set Aside Illegal Verdict and

Motion to Reconsider Motion to Dismiss.” Appellant argued that the circuit court’s

authority to correct an illegal sentence did not authorize it to modify an acquittal, that its

reversal of the acquittals violates due-process and double-jeopardy protections, and that its

reinstatement of previously dismissed charges was void as a matter of law.

On October 10, 2024, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the September 11

delinquency order, the September 19 order denying his motion to dismiss, the September

19 amended delinquency order, and the September 19 order of DYS commitment. On

October 11, 2024, the court entered an order denying appellant’s motion to set aside and

motion to reconsider. On October 25, 2024, appellant filed an amended notice of appeal

stating that he was appealing from the same orders listed in his original notice of appeal and

the “[d]eemed denied Motion to Set Aside Verdict under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-130, filed

on September 25, 2024. (Deemed denied on October 25, 2024.)”

On appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court (1) erred in denying his motion to

dismiss the manslaughter adjudication; (2) violated double-jeopardy protections in

adjudicating him delinquent on previously dismissed charges; and (3) erred in summarily

committing him to DYS without conducting a disposition hearing.

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We first address the State’s contention that most of appellant’s arguments are barred

because he failed to designate the order denying his posttrial motion in his notice of appeal.

As stated above, appellant’s amended notice of appeal stated in part that he was appealing

from the deemed denial of his motion to set aside verdict, that the motion was filed on

September 25, and that the motion was deemed denied on October 25. Appellant’s motion

was actually denied by an order entered on October 11. The supreme court has held that

when it is clear what order the appellant is appealing from given the issues raised in the

notice of appeal, an inaccurate date listed for the order appealed from in the notice of appeal

is merely a scrivener’s error. State v. Brown, 2010 Ark. 483. In Peugh v. State, 2025 Ark. App.

104, at 4, we held that a notice of appeal from a “judgment and sentence” that designated

the record of a jury trial conducted on October 26 was sufficiently clear to identify the

sentencing order entered on October 30 despite the notice not specifically identifying the

order by name or by date. In McBride v. State, 99 Ark. App. 146, 257 S.W.3d 914 (2007),

we held that the notice of appeal was effective to appeal the denial of a motion for new trial

that was deemed denied on March 23 even though the notice did not identify that the

motion was deemed denied and instead stated that the motion was denied on March 21.

Here, appellant’s amended notice of appeal did not specifically identify the October 11 order

denying his motion, but it was timely as to that order and stated that he was appealing the

denial of his motion. We hold that the notice of appeal is effective to appeal the denial of

his motion.

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Turning to the merits of appellant’s arguments, we agree with appellant that his

adjudications violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy and must be

reversed and vacated.1 Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

article 2, section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution require that no person be twice put in

jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense. Mitchell v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 119, 662

S.W.3d 660. These constitutional provisions protect criminal defendants from being

subjected to a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal of that offense. Id.2

This protection is also found in Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-112(1)(A) (Repl.

2024). An acquittal is “a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of

the offense charged.” Mitchell, 2023 Ark. App. 119, at 5, 662 S.W.3d at 664 (quoting United

States v. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977)). Whether based on a jury verdict of

not guilty or on a ruling by a court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, a judgment of

acquittal terminates jeopardy and bars retrial. Id.

The finality of a verdict of acquittal is the most fundamental aspect of double-jeopardy

jurisprudence. Penn v. State, 57 Ark. App. 333, 945 S.W.2d 397 (1997). Here, at the

conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court granted appellant’s motion to dismiss the

charges of aggravated robbery and terroristic act, and an order was entered dismissing those

1
As a result of this holding, it is unnecessary to address appellant’s other points on
appeal.
2
It is settled that jeopardy does attach within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
as applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, in an adjudicatory delinquency
proceeding in juvenile court. Avery v. State, 311 Ark. 391, 394, 844 S.W.2d 364, 366 (1993).

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counts as well as the firearm enhancement. The September 11 delinquency order clearly

states that those charges were dismissed. Accordingly, a clear and final adjudication of

acquittal was entered on those charges. The court’s subsequent order finding appellant guilty

of those charges violated double-jeopardy protections as argued in appellant’s motion to

dismiss.

Regarding capital murder, the circuit court ruled from the bench that it was

adjudicating appellant delinquent on manslaughter based on the evidence presented, and

the charge of capital murder was “reduced” to manslaughter. The written order repeats this

finding. This clearly appears to be an attempt to adjudicate appellant guilty of a lesser-

included offense. A determination of guilt of a lesser-included offense is an acquittal of the

greater inclusive offense although the conviction is subsequently set aside. Ark. Code Ann.

§ 5-1-112(1)(B)(ii). As argued by appellant below, however, felony manslaughter is not a

lesser-included offense of capital felony murder. Perry v. State, 371 Ark. 170, 264 S.W.3d

498 (2007).

In Cash v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 556, 614 S.W.3d 891, the circuit court instructed

the jury to determine whether Cash committed a rape or a sexual assault on the mistaken

belief that second-degree sexual assault was a lesser-included offense of rape of a person less

than fourteen years of age. The jury convicted Cash of second-degree sexual assault. On

appeal, this court reversed and vacated his conviction and directed the circuit court to enter

a new sentencing order reflecting that Cash was acquitted of rape. Although the defendant

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was found guilty of an offense that was not a lesser-included offense, the acquittal of the

greater offense was still valid.

Here, the September 11 delinquency order states that the court “reduces the charge

of Capital Murder to Manslaughter. All other charges in this matter are hereby dismissed.”

We conclude that this was an acquittal because it was “a resolution, correct or not,” of the

capital-murder charge. Mitchell, 2023 Ark. App. 119, at 5, 662 S.W.3d at 664. A defendant

cannot be retried on the same charge regardless of whether the defendant’s acquittal was a

result of the circuit court’s legal error. Carter v. State, 365 Ark. 224, 227 S.W.3d 895 (2006).

Accordingly, because appellant had been acquitted of capital murder by virtue of the

September 11 delinquency order, the court’s later order adjudicating appellant delinquent

on this offense violated double-jeopardy protections as argued in appellant’s motion to

dismiss. Therefore, we reverse and vacate the amended delinquency order adjudicating

appellant delinquent on the charges of capital murder, aggravated robbery, terroristic act,

and a firearm enhancement.

Reversed and vacated.

HARRISON and BROWN, JJ., agree.

James Law Firm, by: William O. “Bill” James, Jr., and Drew L. Curtis, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Jason Michael Johnson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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