Stephanie Byrams v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Child

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 565
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-25-382

STEPHANIE BYRAMS Opinion Delivered November 19, 2025

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, EIGHTH
V. DIVISION

[NO. 60JV-23-688]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR
CHILD HONORABLE TJUANA BYRD
APPELLEES MANNING, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

Stephanie Byrams appeals the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s order terminating her

parental rights to Minor Child (MC) (DOB 10/16/20). She contends that the circuit court

clearly erred in finding that termination was in MC’s best interest. We affirm.

I. Facts

On July 24, 2023, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) received a

hotline report that police officers had responded to a call reporting that Byrams was standing

on her apartment balcony waving a knife around with MC in her arms. Byrams told the

responding officers that she was afraid and heard people talking through the wall. There was

no indication that Byrams made threats toward MC, and she was not charged with any

offense, although officers did confiscate her knife.
On July 27, a DHS family-service worker, Fiero Stewart, spoke with Byrams’s case

manager at the Veterans Administration (VA), Ashley Gilcrest, who had been working with

Byrams since 2020. Gilcrest told Stewart that Byrams had a history of drug use, that Byrams

was paranoid and having delusions when Gilcrest checked on her on July 25, that her mental-

health issues had recently gotten worse, that Gilcrest had made a visit to Byrams’s home on

July 27, and that Gilcrest had decided to have Byrams transferred to the VA Hospital by

ambulance due to the severity of her condition. That same day, Stewart met Gilcrest at

Byrams’s home. Byrams submitted to a drug screen—which was positive for

methamphetamine, amphetamines, and THC—and was transported to the VA Hospital.

Byrams’s sister, who agreed to keep MC while Byrams was in the hospital, told Stewart that

Byrams had a history of drug use and had eight other children who were in the care of other

family members.

At a DHS team decision meeting held on August 3, Byrams admitted that she had

used drugs that morning in the front room of her home while MC was in the back bedroom.

Byrams submitted to another drug test and again tested positive for methamphetamine,

amphetamines, and THC. DHS removed MC from her custody.

On August 7, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody alleging that MC was

dependent-neglected as a result of neglect and parental unfitness. The circuit court granted

the petition and entered a probable-cause order on September 18. MC was adjudicated

dependent-neglected after a hearing on September 19 due to parental unfitness and neglect

on the basis of Byrams’s mental-health instability and illegal drug use. The court also found

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aggravated circumstances in that there was little likelihood that services would result in

successful reunification in a time frame consistent with MC’s needs. The court set a goal of

guardianship with a fit and willing relative or adoption with a concurrent goal of

reunification. The court noted that neither Byrams’s sister nor MC’s grandmother could

handle MC and that MC had been placed in a specialized foster home. Byrams was awarded

four hours a week of supervised visitation.

After a review hearing held on December 19, the court found that Byrams was in the

VA dual-diagnosis program receiving treatment for mental-health and substance-abuse issues

and that she had participated in family time. The court ordered Byrams to complete the case-

plan services through the VA or other appropriate providers; demonstrate mental stability

and sobriety; and provide evidence that she had a safe and stable home, income, and

employment. DHS was ordered to make a referral for a psychological evaluation for Byrams

along with all other referrals necessary. The goal of the case remained guardianship or

adoption with a fit and willing relative with a concurrent goal of reunification or custody

with a fit parent. However, the court also authorized DHS and the attorney ad litem to file

a termination-of-parental-rights petition.

A second review hearing was held on March 28, 2024. The court found in its order

that MC had been tested and determined to be on the autism spectrum; was receiving

therapeutic foster-care services, speech therapy, occupational therapy, and additional

therapy; and was doing well in her therapeutic foster home. The court noted that MC had

difficulty after family visits, including trouble winding down and nightmares. The court

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found that Byrams was minimally compliant with the case plan, had participated in family

time but was not consistent and had missed four or five visits, had lived in three different

places since the last review hearing, and admitted that she would test positive for drugs if

tested on the day of the review hearing. Byrams completed her psychiatric evaluation and

drug-and-alcohol assessments, and both recommended a “dual diagnosis” of substance abuse

and mental-health issues. The court ordered her to assist her attorney in getting records from

the VA regarding her treatment there; participate in therapy with a DHS service provider;

make efforts to be more consistent with visits; work toward sobriety and being drug-free; and

submit to screens when requested.

After a July 25 permanency-planning hearing, the court authorized a plan to place

custody of MC with Byrams, finding that she had made significant, measurable progress

toward the case-plan goals. The court found that she was taking her medication regularly and

had submitted to drug screens at the VA, which had been negative, noting that she had been

in the program at the VA since April and had not used drugs since that time. She had been

diagnosed with PTSD and psychosis. The court wanted to see Byrams demonstrate a longer

period of stability to be sure that MC could be returned to her safely, and it gave Byrams

three more months to continue her mental-health services, maintain her sobriety, obtain a

stable home for herself and MC, and demonstrate that she can provide full-time care of MC.

The circuit court held a fifteen-month review hearing on November 19. Dr. Bell

Tolliver, who has provided therapy to Byrams since August 2024, testified that Byrams could

care for MC as long as Byrams remained connected with the VA but that without VA

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involvement, things would deteriorate, and MC would be put at risk. Chad Strike, a therapist

with Second Chance Ranch who has treated MC since February 2024, said that MC has

autism-spectrum disorder and separation anxiety. He said that MC had made huge progress

but needed predictability and structure in her life.

The court recognized that in the three months the court had given Byrams to obtain

housing and demonstrate that she could provide a safe placement for MC, Byrams had

discontinued her therapy at the VA for PTSD and planned to start again in January; had

gotten an apartment; and was unquestionably doing better than she was when the case was

opened. The court then made the following findings in the review order:

5. . . . [T]he court is not at a point today where [MC] could be safely returned
to her mother’s custody. This case is now more about whether [Byrams] can provide
for the care of this non-verbal, autistic, but progressing child and meet her special
needs. The two conditions repeated over and over today that might ensure a safe
return are that [Byrams] and [MC] continue in all the services they are receiving and
restarting therapy for [Byrams]. These are great big “ifs.” They are essential for
continued progress for both [Byrams] and [MC]. . . .

Regression is not the goal here. The court will give the department the flexibility to
work toward unsupervised visits in the home, but there must be a period of supervised
visits in the home and some evidence of Ms. Byrams’s ability to calm [MC] or “put
the lid back on.” If [Byrams] never has a bad day experience, the court is unable to
assess her ability to provide full-time care for this child whose needs are great and very
specific. . . .

6. The court, mindful of the available permanency planning dispositions, does
hereby find that it is in the best interest of the juvenile that the goal of the case shall
be adoption with the department or the attorney ad litem filing a petition for
termination of parental rights.

On January 17, 2025, DHS and the attorney ad litem filed a joint petition to

terminate Byrams’s rights to MC on the grounds of twelve-months failure to remedy;

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subsequent factors; and aggravated circumstances—little likelihood of reunification—which

the court found in the adjudication order. DHS also alleged that termination was in the best

interest of MC.

The court held a termination hearing on February 20. Strike testified that MC has

ups and downs in her foster home but had recently begun engaging with the world around

her. He testified that she had made progress but also had periods of significant regression.

When he was asked about the effect on MC of her recent visits in Byrams’s home, he said

that it caused regression “across the board, O.T., P.T., Speech, her trauma responses.” He

said that when she returned from the visits, MC engaged in acts of aggression, struggled with

her behavior, and had difficulty sleeping. He said that the visits stopped for three weeks over

Christmas, and like the flip of a “light switch,” MC was calm, cooperative, and suffered no

tantrums. Strike observed only three of MC’s visits with Byrams and admitted that he had

not seen Byrams do anything concerning or that might have caused the regression. He said

that MC had been fine when visiting Byrams on the same day and time at the DHS office,

but she was not fine after visiting Byrams at her home. All he could say for “sure” was that

something was triggering MC when visiting in Byrams’s home. Strike said that MC’s foster

home has been her placement for thirteen months, and her brain is trying to figure out

which home is her “home base.” He said that MC is “a complex case” requiring a team of

services and that the key to her success is structure and consistency.

Strike did not know MC’s timeline for being “emotionally” able to return home with

Byrams. He did believe that it was “possible” for Byrams to establish a routine for MC in six

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to nine months. He said it had taken the foster parents thirteen months to get MC where

she is and acknowledged that even the most “conducive placement” would cause regression

for a child with MC’s diagnoses. MC did not have a meltdown in any of the visits he

observed, so he did not know if Byrams could manage one.

Byrams testified that, although she had a six-week break in therapy in November and

December when her therapist was too busy seeing other patients, she was actively receiving

therapy through the VA for PTSD and anxiety. She said she took medication as needed but

currently had no medications that were mandatory. She admitted that she had been

diagnosed with substance-induced psychosis when she was using drugs but said she no longer

has those issues because she had not used drugs since April 2024. Byrams also testified that

she has eight children in addition to MC and that all of them are being raised by other family

members. She had consented to the termination of her parental rights to three of them.

Byrams believed that her visits with MC were going well, but she did not believe they

had established sufficient stability due to issues with missed visits because of DHS. She

recognized the importance of MC having structure, predictability, and routine and said that

she had tried to instill that in her visits. She said that MC had gotten comfortable visiting in

her home and acted like she did not want to leave when she was there. Byrams testified that

she had not experienced one of MC’s aggressive tantrums, but she had experienced issues

when MC would get frustrated, and Byrams would hug MC to calm her down. Byrams

believed she had not experienced aggressive tantrums with MC because MC was more

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compliant with her. Byrams desired to be reunified with MC and did not believe she had

been given a “fair shot” to demonstrate that she could “put the lid back on MC” if necessary.

The DHS caseworker, Danyetta Pride, testified that Byrams had completed the

services and made “some progress” but did not think MC could be returned to Byrams’s

custody due to her lack of “mental health stability.” Although Pride admitted that there had

been no concern with drugs recently, she said that Byrams had used drugs in the past. Pride

referred to Byrams’s previous diagnoses, stating that these could cause Byrams to become

aggressive or manic. Pride said DHS was concerned about whether MC might trigger

Byrams’s mental-health issues. Pride said that termination was in MC’s best interest because

MC is a four-year-old autistic child who requires stability, structure, and a caregiver who can

be there “at the drop of a dime” because no one knows when MC is going to have an episode.

She said that MC needs a parent who can comprehend, be attentive, and cooperate with

those providing services. Basically, she believed that MC needs permanency, which Byrams

had not demonstrated she could provide. Pride could not say whether Byrams had been

given opportunities to learn about or assist MC with her specific needs, and she admitted

that when the visits were moved to Byrams’s home, MC’s therapist could have been brought

in to work with Byrams to learn about triggers and how to work with them, but that did not

happen. DHS adoption specialist Kieanda McFadden testified there were no barriers to MC’s

adoption and that there were 353 potential matches.

The last witness to testify was Linda Young, a DHS program assistant. She testified

that she had been driving MC to visitations with Byrams since June 2024 and had been to

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forty-three visits with her, seventeen of those in Byrams’s home. Young said that she had no

concern for MC’s safety in Byrams’s presence. She said that MC did not like change and that

it took MC a couple of months for her to get used to Young. Young testified that she had

observed two tantrums and that Byrams demonstrated that she can adequately address them.

On April 3, 2025, the circuit court entered an order terminating Byrams’s parental

rights on the ground of aggravated circumstances—little likelihood of reunification,

recognizing that it had previously made a finding of aggravated circumstances in the

adjudication order.1 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3) (Supp. 2023). The court

also found that termination was in MC’s best interest. The court recounted the testimony,

recognizing that there was no evidence that Byrams had demonstrated any recent concerning

mental-health behaviors but noting that there had been a months-long lapse in Byrams’s

therapy, and she had introduced no evidence that she had been released from mandatory

medication prescribed to her. Although the court sympathized with Byrams and recognized

that she clearly loves MC, it found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in MC’s best

interest to terminate Byrams’s parental rights:

The Court finds that [MC] would be at risk of serious regression and additional
negative impact to her mental health diagnoses if she were returned to [Byrams’s]
custody today due to the fact that this child has to have predictability, routine and
structure, and, as stated, visits have not ever progressed to unsupervised in [Byrams’s]
home. [MC] would also be at risk without the immediate access to the services she is
currently receiving, all of which work concurrently to provide appropriate stability
and progress for her. Per the testimony of [Strike], [MC] is not at a regular four-year-
old level, due to her challenges and will likely always be a little behind, but she needs

1
The circuit court dismissed the grounds of failure to remedy and subsequent factors
on the basis that the proof was not sufficient to support those grounds.

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an environment where she will thrive and succeed with the wrap-around services to
support her as she grows and progresses. Based upon the regression demonstrated in
just the few weeks that [MC] had once the in-home visits began, the Court finds that
it is not in the best interests of this autistic child with limited verbal skills to be pushed
to her limits of additional and more severe regression by returning custody to
[Byrams]. The Court finds that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best
interests, and the termination of parental rights petition is granted.

Byrams’s appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Cheney v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 209, at 6, 396 S.W.3d 272, 276. We will not reverse the circuit court’s

decision unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Perry v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark.

App. 323, at 10, 669 S.W.3d 865, 872. An order terminating parental rights must be based

on a finding by clear and convincing evidence that one of the grounds stated in the

termination statute is satisfied and that the sought-after termination is in the children’s best

interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341. Credibility determinations are left to the finder of fact.

Kerr v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 271, at 6, 493 S.W.3d 342, 346.

The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights statute is to provide permanency

in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is

contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return to the family home cannot be

accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative;

the issue is whether the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her

child. Schaible v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 541, at 8, 444 S.W.3d 366, 371.

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Moreover, a child’s need for permanency and stability may override a parent’s request for

additional time to improve the parent’s circumstances. Id., 444 S.W.3d at 371. Finally, a

parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior. Id., 444 S.W.3d at 371.

III. Discussion

Byrams’s sole point on appeal is that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that

termination is in MC’s best interest.2 Byrams argues that this case does not fit within the

normal potential-harm analysis; specifically, she contends that the analysis refers to the

potential harm to a child’s health and safety that might come from continued contact with

the parent. She argues that, here, the court did not terminate parental rights because

Byrams’s continued contact with MC presented a potential harm to MC’s health and safety

or because Byrams had failed to complete the case plan and was still not capable of caring

for MC. She argues that, instead, the court’s potential-harm finding concerned the

difficulties MC experienced with changes to her environment due to her autism diagnosis.

Byrams argues that the circuit court terminated her parental rights because it did not want

to disrupt the routine MC had established while in foster care and the services that MC was

receiving. Byrams understands these concerns but argues that the potential harm would exist

whether the court places MC with Byrams or places MC in any other adoptive home. She

2
Although she disputes that there was sufficient evidence at the time of the
termination hearing to support the ground of aggravated circumstances, she recognizes that
her failure to appeal the aggravated-circumstances finding made in the adjudication order
precludes this argument. Ussery v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 250, at 20, 646
S.W.3d 266, 278.

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claims that the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that any change in MC’s

environment would cause regression and that it had taken thirteen months in the foster

home for MC to achieve her current stability and structure.

In determining whether termination is in the best interest of a child, the circuit court

must consider the entire history of the case and all relevant factors in the case, including the

likelihood that the child will be adopted and the potential harm that would be caused by

returning the child to the custody of the parent. Jurls v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark.

App. 443, at 16, 676 S.W.3d 316, 327. The potential-harm analysis is to be conducted in

broad terms and is but one of the many factors that a court may consider in a best-interest

analysis. Dowdy v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 180, at 12, 314 S.W.3d 722, 728.

The polestar consideration is that termination must, after consideration of all relevant

circumstances, be shown to be in the child’s best interest. Grant v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2010 Ark. App. 636, at 13, 378 S.W.3d 227, 233.

We hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that it is in MC’s best

interest to terminate Byrams’s parental rights. The court considered the potential harm

caused by returning MC to Byrams and found that it included ongoing concerns regarding

Byrams’s stability, particularly as it related to her mental health, as well as her inability to

meet MC’s special needs and help her deal with her anxiety and past traumas. The record

shows that Byrams was initially incapable of caring for MC and that MC was at risk of serious

harm. Byrams had a history of drug use; suffered from hallucinations at the initiation of the

case; tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamines, and THC; and was transported

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to the VA Hospital for inpatient mental-health treatment. Byrams’s sister, who kept MC for

a week before DHS filed an emergency petition, told DHS that Byrams has a history of drug

use and has eight other children who were in the care of other family members because of

this history. During a meeting with DHS after she was released from the VA Hospital,

Byrams admitted that she had used drugs that morning in the front room of her home while

MC was in the back bedroom. Byrams submitted to a drug test at the meeting and again

tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamines, and THC.

Byrams testified at the termination hearing that she had been diagnosed with

substance-abuse psychosis but contended she had not used drugs since April 2024 and thus

did not have “those issues” anymore. Just three months before the termination hearing, at

the fifteen-month review hearing, Byrams’s therapist testified that she believed Byrams could

care for MC as long as she remained connected with the VA but thought that without VA

involvement, things would “deteriorate” and put MC at risk. At the hearing, Byrams testified

that she had not attended therapy for several months and was no longer taking prescribed

medication. Although Byrams provided reasons for both at the hearing, the credibility and

weight of testimony is for the circuit court. Gibby v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App.

145, at 8, 643 S.W.3d 479, 485.

Additionally, the record reveals that Byrams never achieved unsupervised visitation

with MC. The three-week supervised visitation in Byrams’s home caused MC to regress

“across the board.” Strike testified that MC is a “complex case” requiring a team of services,

and he did not know the timeline for MC to be able to return to Byrams’s custody. He

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thought it was “possible” for Byrams to create a routine for MC within six to nine months,

which further supports the finding in the circuit court’s termination order that MC was

subject to a “risk of serious regression and additional negative impact to her mental health

diagnosis if she were returned to [Byrams’s] custody today.”

In support of her argument, Byrams cites Benedict v. Arkansas Department of Human

Services, in which we reversed the termination of a mother’s parental rights, holding there

was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding of best interest. 96 Ark. App. 395,

242 S.W.3d 305 (2006). In Benedict, the children had been removed from their mother’s

custody the day after she voluntarily admitted herself for treatment for what was preliminarily

diagnosed as postpartum psychotic depression. 96 Ark. App. at 399, 242 S.W.3d at 309. She

stipulated to an adjudication that the children were dependent-neglected and was ordered

to take her prescribed medications, follow all hospital-discharge recommendations,

participate in counseling, obtain a drug screen, and follow the DHS case plan, which she

did. Id. at 399, 242 S.W.3d at 309–10. Benedict’s therapist testified at trial that Benedict’s

psychosis came from major depression, that he saw no evidence of depression at the hearing,

that it had been a year since her acute episode, and that she had recovered from it. Although

he acknowledged that removing the children from foster care would be a disruption in their

lives, he opined that the disruption would pay off “if that natural parent could do the job.”

Id. at 405, 242 S.W.3d at 314. The court terminated her parental rights. We reversed the

termination—stating that Benedict had cooperated with the orders of the court, benefited

from the services provided by DHS, and shown objective improvement to the benefit of the

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children—and ordered the circuit court to continue reunification services. Id. at 412, 242

S.W.3d at 319.

We do not find Benedict persuasive. Here, unlike the parent in Benedict, Byrams’s

psychosis was substance-induced. Byrams was admittedly using drugs when DHS took

custody of MC and has a history of drug use, which appears to have resulted in the loss of

all eight of her other children. While she had not used drugs for ten months at the time of

the hearing, a parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of future behavior. Miller v.

Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 280, at 17, 626 S.W.3d 136, 145. Further, unlike

the mother in Benedict, Byrams has a lengthy history with DHS that resulted in her not having

custody of any of her other children. Finally, MC is a special-needs child who is autistic and

nonverbal and will require “wrap-around services” to grow and progress. She must be in a

stable environment that prioritizes predictability, routine, and structure. There was no

evidence that the children in Benedict required such a specific environment. Each

termination-of-parental-rights case is decided on a case-by-case basis. Dominguez v. Ark. Dep’t

of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 2, at 11, 592 S.W.3d 723, 729.

Byrams essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence and second-guess the circuit court’s

credibility determinations, which we will not do. The circuit court’s best-interest finding is

not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Byrams’s parental rights.

Affirmed.

TUCKER and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

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Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor child.

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