Tyler Chandler v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 566
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-24-746

TYLER CHANDLER Opinion Delivered November 19, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 72CR-22-638]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE JOANNA TAYLOR, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

Appellant Tyler Chandler filed his appeal after the Washington County Circuit

Court entered an order denying his amended petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant

to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. Appellant argues on appeal that the circuit

court erred in denying his amended petition for postconviction relief because (1) his trial

counsel was ineffective; (2) the circuit court failed to make specific written findings as

required; and (3) the circuit court erred in not giving him a hearing on his petition as

required. We affirm.

I. Background

Before addressing the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is necessary to

discuss some of the events leading to appellant’s jury trial and the evidence adduced at trial.

On January 19, 2022, appellant sexually assaulted the minor victim (MV) a day before her
sixteenth birthday after giving her a benzodiazepine. Appellant was charged by a third

amended felony information with two counts of second-degree sexual assault, a Class B

felony, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-125(a)(4)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2023);

and one count of introducing a Schedule IV controlled substance into the body of another

person, a Class C felony, in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-210(b) and

(c)(3) (Supp. 2023). A jury trial was held on June 20, 2023.

Amanda McClain, a licensed practical nurse, testified that she has two children.

Appellant is the father of one of her children, and Ms. McClain explained that, despite some

custody issues, they had been coparenting at the time of the incident. She had asked

appellant to watch both children on the night of January 19, 2022, while she worked an

overnight shift. MV is Ms. McClain’s niece. Ms. McClain testified that she had not

suggested nor had appellant told her that MV would also be at her home that night. When

she returned home after her shift, she found MV asleep in her bed. She thought appellant’s

behavior was “erratic,” and she testified that she discovered a plastic bag containing white-

colored rocks in appellant’s pocket that she suspected were drugs. Ms. McClain additionally

testified that she had seen appellant’s prescription bottle for clonazepam. She described the

side effects of the medication and stated that the pills inside the bottle were yellow and

round. She further opined that the bottle felt lighter the morning she returned home than

it had felt the night before she left. After appellant left the home and MV woke up, MV

disclosed to Ms. McClain that appellant had sexually assaulted her, and Ms. McClain called

law enforcement as a mandated reporter. Ms. McClain further testified that she purchased

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and administered a home drug-screening test, which showed that MV tested positive for

benzodiazepine. Ms. McClain explained that clonazepam is a benzodiazepine and that none

of MV’s prescriptions would “show positive for benzodiazepine.”

MV testified at trial that appellant sent her a message on Facebook Messenger on

January 19, 2022, asking her how she was feeling. She had been recovering from COVID-

19. These messages were admitted into evidence. MV told appellant that she felt better,

and appellant asked her if she wanted to come over to help him watch the children. MV

agreed, and appellant picked her up. MV testified that appellant left the children at Ms.

McClain’s home in a closed bedroom while he picked her up. MV stated that she played

video games for a while, and appellant put a frozen pizza in the oven for dinner. While

waiting on the pizza to cook, appellant asked MV if she had ever smoked marijuana and

offered MV two pills that he said would calm any anxiety she had. MV explained that she

took one of the pills, which she described as a tiny yellow disc.

After dinner, appellant put the two younger children to bed. MV stated at trial that

she had been watching television in the living room but “suddenly got, like really tired, but

[she] was, like, really aware of [her] surroundings . . . [she] just felt weird.” MV explained

that appellant sat down on the couch with her and held her hand, which she felt weird about

but did not say anything. At that point, appellant moved closer to MV and slid his hand

under her sweatshirt and felt her breasts, both above and under her bra. Appellant then

unbuttoned MV’s pants, pulled them down a bit, and tried to put his hand down her pants.

He then laid down next to MV. MV stated that appellant was not wearing any pants or

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underwear and that she could feel appellant’s penis against her leg. Appellant proceeded to

put his mouth on her breasts and tried to pull MV’s pants completely off. MV explained

that she became “really freaked out,” and appellant carried her to the bedroom. Appellant

laid down next to MV on the bed and continued to hold her. MV testified that appellant

told her that she was “a very sexy girl.” MV eventually was able to get up and get dressed.

She explained that she pretended nothing had happened because she was afraid appellant

would hurt her. After appellant left the next morning, she reported the incident to her aunt,

Ms. McClain.

Officer Chase Scallorn testified that he responded to the scene and saw that MV “was

very calm and reserved, almost like in a state of shock.” He explained that her behavior was

very common with victims who had experienced trauma.

Detective Hunter Helms testified that he investigated the allegations. He explained

that he did not have MV undergo a rape kit because there were no allegations of penetration.

Ms. McClain provided him with a list of medications she thought appellant was taking,

including clonazepam. Detective Helms testified that clonazepam is a benzodiazepine, a

Schedule IV controlled substance, and that it usually comes in the form of a yellowish round

pill. Detective Helms further testified that during his investigation, he interviewed appellant.

Detective Helms stated that although appellant denied the allegations, he thought appellant

appeared very nervous during the interview and that appellant was being deceitful. On cross-

examination, Detective Helms did admit that it was not unusual for some people to be

nervous when being questioned by law enforcement.

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Dale Chiddister, a civilian investigator with the Arkansas State Police Crimes Against

Children Division, testified that he conducted a forensic interview of MV. He explained

that after his investigation, he concluded that the allegations of sexual abuse against

appellant were true. He further explained that he has experience in determining whether a

victim had been coached on what to say during an interview, and given MV’s answers during

the interview, he did not think MV had been coached.

Appellant testified on his own behalf and denied the allegations. He further testified

that he had been communicating with Ms. McClain via Facebook Messenger on the night

in question, but he claimed that the messages had become inaccessible because Ms. McClain

deleted her account. Appellant claimed the messages proved that not only was Ms. McClain

aware that MV had come over but also that it was actually Ms. McClain’s idea that MV come

over to have her play with the children. He denied that Ms. McClain discovered that he had

drugs on him. Although he admitted he had taken three or four clonazepam pills to the

home, he denied giving any to MV.

After all the evidence had been presented, the circuit court reviewed the proposed

jury instructions. Both the State and appellant agreed that the jury instructions were

acceptable and that there were not any other proposed instructions they wished to give the

jury.

The jury convicted appellant of two counts of second-degree sexual assault and one

count of introducing a Schedule IV controlled substance into the body of another. The jury

recommended that he be sentenced to serve ten years’ imprisonment on each of the two

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counts of second-degree sexual assault and five years’ imprisonment on the count of

introduction of a controlled substance into the body of another, to be served consecutively,

which the circuit court imposed.

Appellant appealed his conviction to this court. On appeal, appellant argued that we

must reverse his conviction because (1) the State made improper comments during closing

arguments; (2) a jury instruction failed to comport with the underlying statutory language;

and (3) his defense counsel failed to perform an adequate investigation to aid in his defense.

Appellant acknowledged that he failed to make any of the three objections he complained

of on appeal before the circuit court; however, he nevertheless argued that we may address

those issues for the first time on appeal by applying the exceptions to the contemporaneous-

objection rules as outlined in Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980). We

disagreed and affirmed. Chandler v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 260, 688 S.W.3d 170 (Chandler I).

I. Petition for Postconviction Relief

After we affirmed on direct appeal and the mandate was issued in Chandler I,

appellant filed a timely petition for postconviction relief. In his petition, appellant argued

that his trial counsel was ineffective (1) when “he did not do an investigation into

[appellant’s] messages with [MV’s aunt] the night of the incident”; (2) for failing to file a

pretrial motion seeking to suppress the testimony of MV’s aunt, a licensed nurse, who gave

MV a drug test to determine if she had ingested a controlled substance; (3) for failing to

object to the testimony of a forensic interviewer, Dale Chiddister, who questioned MV

regarding the incident with appellant and testified that he found MV’s allegation to be true;

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(4) for failing to object to an allegedly unconstitutional jury instruction; (5) for failing to

object to remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument that defendant had the

burden of producing Facebook messages that he testified he had with MV’s aunt; (6) for

failing to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument that appellant’s explanation regarding

deleted Facebook messages was false; (7) for failing to object to the prosecutor’s remark in

closing argument that the State could have charged appellant with an additional offense; (8)

for failing to object to the prosecutor’s remarks that he is a “poor father”; (9) for failing to

properly argue his directed-verdict motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; and

(10) for failing to call any witnesses during the sentencing phase of appellant’s trial.

Without a hearing, the circuit court filed an eight-page order denying appellant’s

petition on July 15, 2024. After discussing the history of the case, the circuit court made the

following findings regarding each ground alleged by appellant:

12. Ground 1 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel “did
not do an investigation into defendant’s messages with Ms. McClain the night
of the incident.” Here, petitioner presented no persuasive evidence or facts to
support his conclusory allegations in Ground 1. Further, petitioner failed to
demonstrate that Trial Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness. The Court finds that Trial Counsel addressed this issue of
Petitioner’s alleged messages with Petitioner on his direct examination. RT
232, 11-25. The Court also finds that Trial Counsel’s choice not to pursue
locating messages that may or may not have existed was a matter of trial
strategy. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate how investigating the availability
of messages that may or may not have existed, prior to trial, could have
changed the outcome of the trial.

13. Ground 2 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel “did
not file a pre-trial motion concerning” the lack of “physical evidence” of a drug
test administered to the victim by Ms. McClain, the victim’s aunt. Here,
Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence or facts to support his conclusory

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allegations in Ground 2. Further, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Trial
Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
The Court finds that Trial Counsel’s addressing the issue through “cross-
examinations and closing arguments,” as indicated by Petitioner, was a matter
of trial strategy. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate how filing a pre-trial
motion addressing the lack of physical evidence of the drug text would have
changed the outcome of the trial.

14. Ground 3 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel failed
to “object to the testimony of Dale Chiddister with the Arkansas State Police.”
Specifically, Petitioner alleges that Counsel was ineffective because he could
have successfully blocked aspects of Mr. Chiddister’s testimony with a pre-trial
motion. Here, Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence or evidence to
support his conclusory allegations in Ground 3. Further, Petitioner failed to
demonstrate that Trial Counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. The Court finds that Trial Counsel
addressed Mr. Chiddister’s testimony on cross-examination RT 147-149, and
that any decision not to object to, or any choice not to file a pre-trial motion
to suppress the same, was a matter of trial strategy. Further, the Court finds
that the victim’s testimony in this case was credible, and petitioner has
provided no facts to show that the jury did not give the victim’s own testimony
its proper weight. A victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to secure a
conviction in the state of Arkansas. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how
failing to object to Mr. Chiddister’s testimony, or failing to file a pretrial
motion to suppress the same, would have changed the outcome of the trial.

15. Ground 4 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel “did
not object to clearly unconstitutional jury instructions.” Here, Petitioner
presented no persuasive evidence or evidence to support his conclusory
allegations in Ground 4. The court finds that there was nothing in the
instruction given that shifted the burden to Petitioner. Further, Petitioner did
not proffer the jury instruction that he alleges should have been given. Any
failure or choice not to object to the proffered jury instruction at the time of
trial was a matter of trial strategy. Petitioner has also failed to state how, even
if the jury instruction was correct, it would have changed the outcome of the
trial.

16. Ground 5 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel failed,
during closing arguments, to object to the prosecutor’s argument that
“defendant had the burden of producing Facebook messages.” Here,
Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence or facts to support his conclusory

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allegations in Ground 5. Further, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Trial
Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
The Court finds that Trial Counsel did object to prosecutor’s statements
regarding the Facebook messages during Cross-examination of the Petitioner;
the objection was sustained. RT 253 - 255. Any choice not to re-object to the
prosecutor’s synthesis and characterization of the Petitioner’s own testimony
during closing arguments was a matter of trial strategy. Petitioner also failed
to demonstrate how objecting to these statements during closing arguments
would have changed the outcome of the trial.

17. Ground 6 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel failed
to object to the prosecutor’s argument about how Facebook messages
technically work “despite presenting no evidence of the same.” Here,
Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence or facts to support his conclusory
allegations in Ground 6. Further, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Trial
Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
The Court finds that any choice not to object to the prosecutor’s synthesis and
characterization of the Petitioner’s own testimony during closing arguments
was a matter of trial strategy. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate how
objecting to prosecutor’s arguments regarding how Facebook messaging works
would have changed the outcome of the trial.

18. Ground 7 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel failed
to object to the prosecutor’s argument that petitioner “was getting a break
because defendant was not charged with additional crimes.” Here, Petitioner
presented no persuasive evidence or facts to support his conclusory allegations
in Ground 7. Further, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Trial Counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The Court
finds that any choice not to object to the prosecutor’s synthesis and
characterization of both the victim’s and Petitioner’s testimony during closing
arguments was a matter of trial strategy. RT 289, 5-19. Petitioner also failed
to demonstrate how objecting to the prosecutor’s comments would have
changed the outcome of the trial.

19. Ground 8 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel failed
to object to the prosecutor’s argument that Petitioner “was a poor father.”
Here, Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence or facts to support his
conclusory allegations in Ground 8. Further, Petitioner failed to demonstrate
that Trial Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. The Court finds that any choice not to object to the
prosecutor’s synthesis and characterization of the Petitioner’s own testimony

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during closing arguments was a matter of trial strategy. Petitioner also failed
to demonstrate how objecting to the comment would have changed the
outcome of the trial.

20. Ground 9 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel “did
not properly argue either directed verdict motion.” Here, Petitioner presented
no persuasive evidence or facts to support his conclusory allegations in
Ground 9. Further, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Trial Counsel’s
performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. The Court finds that regardless of how Petitioner’s motions
for directed verdict were argued, the State made a prima facie case for all
charged counts to go before the jury. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate
how Trial Counsel arguing the directed motions differently would have
changed the outcome of the trial.

21. Ground 10 alleges ineffective assistance of counsel because Trial Counsel
“declined to present any evidence of any kind at sentencing.” Here, Petitioner
presented no persuasive evidence or evidence to support his conclusory
allegations in Ground 10. Further, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Trial
Counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. The Court finds that Trial Counsel’s choice not put on
evidence at sentencing, or specifically, calling Petitioner’s parents at witness,
was a matter of trial strategy. The Court also finds that while the jury did
recommend the sentences to run consecutively, the Petitioner’s sentences were
legal, and that the aggregate of three hundred months is well under the
aggregate statutory maximum for which the Petitioner was convicted and
could have been sentenced. Petitioner also failed to demonstrate how calling
the parents to testify at sentencing, or putting on other evidence, would have
changed the outcome of the trial or the length of Petitioner’s sentence.

B. Conclusions of Law:

1. The Petitioner failed to present any persuasive or credible facts to support his
allegations.

2. The Petitioner has failed to show that Trial Counsel’s performance was
deficient in that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as counsel guaranteed by the 6th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.

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3. The Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of
Trial Counsel’s representation.

4. The Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Trial Counsel’s performance was
deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

5. The Petitioner failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that,
absent any errors allegedly made by Trial Counsel, a more favorable result
would have occurred for the Petitioner, specifically, that the jury would have
had reasonable doubt respecting the Petitioner’s guilt.

6. The Petitioner failed to show any prejudice in the proceedings which deprived
him of a fair trial. Because Petitioner’s Petition is without merit, and it is
conclusive on its face that no relief is warranted, the Petitioner is not entitled
to a hearing, and his Rule 37 Petition should be denied.

This appeal followed.1

III. Standard of Review

We do not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court’s

findings are clearly erroneous. Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, 433 S.W.3d 234. A finding is

clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, after reviewing the entire

evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

In making a determination on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court considers

the totality of the evidence. Id.

1
We acknowledge that on August 15, 2024, appellant filed a motion to reconsider,
for evidentiary hearing, and to clarify the record. Although appellant references this motion
in his brief, any denial of this motion is not properly before us. On December 11, 2024,
this court granted appellant’s motion to file a belated appeal from the circuit court’s order
denying his petition for postconviction relief. Therefore, the order denying appellant’s
petition for postconviction relief is properly before us in this appeal.

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Our standard of review also requires that we assess the effectiveness of counsel under

the two-prong standard set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Conley, supra. In asserting ineffective assistance of counsel

under Strickland, the petitioner must first demonstrate that counsel’s performance was

deficient. Sartin v. State, 2012 Ark. 155, 400 S.W.3d 694. This requires a showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed

the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Woods v. State,

2019 Ark. 62, 567 S.W.3d 494. In other words, the petitioner must show that his counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Mancia v. State, 2015 Ark.

115, 459 S.W.3d 259. Additionally, counsel is allowed great leeway in making strategic and

tactical decisions, particularly when deciding not to call a witness. Johnson v. State, 2018 Ark.

6, 534 S.W.3d 143. Matters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably improvident, fall

within the realm of counsel’s professional judgment and are not grounds for finding

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. A court must indulge in a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Woods,

supra. The burden is on the petitioner to overcome this presumption and to identify specific

acts and omissions by counsel that could not have been the result of reasoned professional

judgment. Sims v. State, 2015 Ark. 363, 472 S.W.3d 107. Conclusory statements that

counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for postconviction relief. Id.

Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense, which requires a demonstration that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive

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the petitioner of a fair trial. Conley, supra. This requires the petitioner to show that there is

a reasonable probability that the fact-finder’s decision would have been different absent

counsel’s errors. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id.

Unless a petitioner makes both Strickland showings, it cannot be said that the

conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result

unreliable. Id. We also recognize that “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective

assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an

insufficient showing on one.” Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 488, at 3–4, 385 S.W.3d 783, 787

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

IV. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claims

In his first point on appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court “erred generally in

not giving appellant relief under Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 37 by holding that

trial counsel for appellant was not ineffective despite the record and petition clearly showing

that trial counsel was ineffective.” He suggests that the merits of his petition “may not be

ripe because appellant was unable to present evidence, specifically testimony from trial

counsel and testimony from potential sentencing witnesses, that were necessary to develop

appellant’s arguments.” Instead, he suggests that his petition presented a question as to trial

counsel’s effectiveness that should have been “explored with an evidentiary hearing,” which

we address in our discussion of appellant’s third point on appeal. Much of appellant’s

argument in his first point on appeal complains that the circuit court found that trial

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counsel’s decisions constituted a matter of trial strategy. However, we note that the circuit

court made other findings regarding each ground and that trial strategy was not the sole basis

for the circuit court’s denial. We address appellant’s specific arguments for reversal

regarding the denial of each ground alleged in his petition2 as follows.

A. Failing to Investigate Facebook Messages

In the first ground of appellant’s petition, he alleged that appellant was ineffective for

failing to “do an investigation into defendant’s [Facebook] messages with Ms. McClain the

night of the incident.” More specifically, appellant alleged in his petition that his trial

counsel should have investigated into the existence of the Facebook messages appellant

testified transpired and Ms. McClain denied transpired at trial. Appellant alleged that if the

messages could have been introduced as rebuttal evidence at trial, it would have “put all of

Ms. McClain’s testimony into doubt.” That said, appellant readily admitted that he did not

have the messages and that he did not know if any messages existed that could have been

presented at trial. As quoted above, the circuit court denied appellant’s first ground on the

basis that appellant “presented no persuasive evidence or facts to support his conclusory

allegations,” appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel’s “performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness,” counsel’s “choice to not pursue locating messages that

may or may not have existed was a matter of trial strategy,” and appellant “failed to

2
Although the circuit court denied the eighth ground alleged in appellant’s petition,
appellant has failed to specifically raise any argument for reversal regarding that ground on
appeal. Therefore, any argument is considered abandoned. Elliott v. State, 2022 Ark. 165,
653 S.W.3d 776.

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demonstrate how investigating the availability of messages that may or may not have existed,

prior to trial, could have changed the outcome of the trial.”

Counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary; but where a petitioner under Rule

37.1 alleges ineffective assistance for failure to perform adequate investigation, he must

delineate the actual prejudice that arose from the failure to investigate and demonstrate a

reasonable probability that the specific materials that would have been uncovered with

further investigation could have changed the trial outcome. Reynolds v. State, 2023 Ark. App.

106, 661 S.W.3d 259. The burden is entirely on the claimant to provide facts that

affirmatively support his or her claims of prejudice; neither conclusory statements nor

allegations without factual substantiation are sufficient to overcome the presumption that

counsel was effective, and such statements and allegations will not warrant granting

postconviction relief. Id.

On appeal, appellant argues that “trial counsel’s lack of a pretrial investigation into

Facebook Messages was professionally unreasonable and that unreasonableness prejudiced

the defendant.” He suggests that trial counsel failed to investigate the messages because “trial

counsel did not understand how to perform an investigation” and therefore cannot be part

of any trial strategy as found by the circuit court. However, as noted above, the circuit court

did not deny appellant’s first ground on the sole basis of trial strategy. Appellant fails to

specifically address those additional findings on appeal or explain why those findings were

clearly erroneous. Instead, he simply concludes his first argument on appeal by stating the

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following: “Since, with the exception of appellant’s ninth point, the record does not clearly

show that counsel was effective then not only is appellant entitled to a hearing under

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.3(c) but also appellant argues based upon

appellant’s petition, motion to reconsider and this appeal that trial counsel was ineffective.”

Conclusory statements in a brief on appeal are insufficient to overcome the presumption

that counsel was effective. Boston v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 555, 681 S.W.3d 519. Further,

we do not research or develop arguments for appellants. Id. Accordingly, we cannot say that

the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s first ground was clearly erroneous and affirm.

B. Failing to File Pretrial Motions

In the second and third grounds of appellant’s petition, he argued that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to file pretrial motions. He alleged that trial counsel should have

moved to suppress Ms. McClain’s testimony regarding the over-the-counter drug test because

there “was no physical evidence.” He also alleged that trial counsel should have moved to

suppress Mr. Chiddister’s testimony that he found MV’s allegations to be true because it was

not relevant and “extremely prejudicial.” The circuit court denied these grounds on the basis

that appellant “presented no persuasive evidence or facts to support his conclusory

allegations,” he failed to demonstrate that counsel’s “performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness,” counsel’s choices were a “matter of trial strategy,” and he failed

to demonstrate how filing a pretrial motion would have changed the outcome of the trial.

On appeal, appellant complains that the circuit court “again indicated that not filing

pre-trial motions was trial strategy without indicating why.” As with appellant’s first ground,

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appellant fails to specifically address the other bases for the circuit court’s denial. Conclusory

statements in a brief on appeal are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel

was effective. Boston, supra. Further, we do not research or develop arguments for appellants.

Id. Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s second and third

grounds was clearly erroneous and affirm.

C. Failing to Object to Jury Instructions

In the fourth ground of appellant’s petition, he argued that the jury instructions to

the circuit court were inaccurate and alleged that the instruction improperly shifted the

burden to him. The circuit court denied this ground on the basis that appellant “presented

no persuasive evidence or facts to support his conclusory allegations,” “there was nothing in

the instruction given that shifted the burden” to appellant, appellant failed to proffer the

jury instruction that he alleges should have been given, counsel’s choices were a “matter of

trial strategy,” and appellant failed to state how a different jury instruction would have

changed the outcome of the trial.

On appeal, appellant’s entire discussion regarding this specific ground is limited to

three sentences:

Appellant’s fourth point argues that trial counsel should have objected to a
clearly erroneous jury instruction. The court skirts the issue of whether the jury
instruction was erroneous and rather indicates that since trial counsel did not object
or proffer a different instruction then trial counsel’s actions amounted to trial
strategy. This does not make logical sense as the record is unclear on whether trial
counsel even noticed that the jury instruction was clearly erroneous.

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Appellant’s argument in his appellate brief is conclusory, and he does not cite any authority

in support of his argument or otherwise develop the issue of why the circuit court’s multiple

bases for denying this ground were clearly erroneous. See Sims, 2015 Ark. 363, 472 S.W.3d

107. This court does not research or develop arguments for appellants. Id. Bare assertions

of ineffectiveness are not enough, and conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective will

not sustain a Rule 37 petition. Id. Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court’s denial

of appellant’s fourth ground was clearly erroneous and affirm.

D. Prosecutor’s Comments During Closing Arguments

In the fifth through seventh grounds of appellant’s petition, he argued that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to three comments made by the prosecutor during

closing arguments: (1) “the prosecutor argued that defendant had the burden of producing

[F]acebook messages”; (2) “the prosecutor argued about how technically [F]acebook messages

work despite presenting no evidence of same”; and (3) “the prosecutor argued that defendant

was getting a break because defendant was not charged with additional crimes.” He further

argued without any citation to authority that the prosecutor’s comments led to appellant’s

guilty verdict because they were “geared toward inflaming the passions of the jury instead of

sticking to the relevant evidence presented, switched the burden of proof upon the

defendant and testified as an expert on [F]acebook messages.” The circuit court denied these

grounds on the basis that appellant “presented no persuasive evidence or facts to support his

conclusory allegations,” appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel’s “performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness,” counsel’s choices were a “matter of trial

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strategy,” and appellant failed to demonstrate how any objections would have changed the

outcome of the trial.

On appeal, appellant’s argument again focuses only on the circuit court’s denial on

the basis of trial strategy. Appellant’s entire discussion regarding these three specific grounds

is limited to the following three sentences:

Appellant’s five through seven points argue that prosecutorial statements
during closing were clearly objectionable and that trial counsel did not object. Here
Judge Taylor indicated that trial counsel’s trial strategy was to object to similar
questions during case in chief and then to not again object during the prosecutor’s
closing remarks. It does not make sense nor is it supported by the record that
objecting in one place and not another to similar issues is trail strategy.

Conclusory statements in a brief on appeal are insufficient to overcome the presumption

that counsel was effective. Boston, supra. Appellant does not cite any authority in support of

his argument or otherwise develop the issue of why the circuit court’s other bases for denying

this ground were clearly erroneous. See Sims, 2015 Ark. 363, 472 S.W.3d 107. Further, we

do not research or develop arguments for appellants. Id. Accordingly, we cannot say that

the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s fifth through seventh grounds was clearly erroneous

and affirm.

E. Directed-Verdict Motions

In the ninth ground of appellant’s petition, he argued that trial counsel was

ineffective because he failed to “properly argue either directed verdict motion.” The circuit

court denied this ground on the basis that appellant “presented no persuasive evidence or

facts to support his conclusory allegations,” appellant failed to demonstrate that counsel’s

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“performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and appellant failed to

demonstrate how trial counsel arguing the directed-verdict motions differently would have

changed the outcome of the trial.

On appeal, although appellant curiously argues that trial counsel’s decisions at trial

were not a matter of trial strategy, he concedes that he “could not prevail [on this ground] as

the record appears clear that even if trial counsel properly argued the motion for directed

verdict[,] the motion would have failed due to the prosecution making a prima facie case.”

Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s ninth ground was

clearly erroneous and affirm.

F. Failing to Call Any Witnesses During the Sentencing Phase

In the tenth ground of appellant’s petition, he argued that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to call his parents as witnesses during the sentencing phase. He claimed that his

parents were local and would have said “good things.” He further argued without any

citation to authority that the jury sentenced him “more harshly because counsel did not

argue on behalf of his client or present evidence/testimony of a family member that could.”

The circuit court denied this ground on the basis that appellant “presented no persuasive

evidence or facts to support his conclusory allegations,” appellant failed to demonstrate that

counsel’s “performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” counsel’s choices

were a “matter of trial strategy,” appellant’s sentences were legal and well under the aggregate

statutory maximum, and appellant failed to demonstrate how his parents’ testimony would

have changed the outcome of the trial or the length of his sentence

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On appeal, appellant’s argument again focuses only on the circuit court’s denial on

the basis of trial strategy. Appellant’s entire discussion regarding this specific ground in his

brief states the following:

Appellant’s tenth argument is that since trial counsel declined to present any
evidence or argument at all during sentencing then that was ineffective assistance.
The trial court again invoked that trial counsel’s decision to not present evidence or
argument that defendant should receive a lighter sentence was trial strategy. There is
nothing in the record that would agree with this conclusion.

As in other grounds, appellant does not cite any authority in support of his argument or

otherwise develop the issue of why the circuit court’s other bases for denying this ground

were clearly erroneous. Sims, 2015 Ark. 363, 472 S.W.3d 107. We do not research or

develop arguments for appellants. Id.

Moreover, the decision to call a witness is generally one of trial strategy and outside

the purview of Rule 37. Whiteside v. State, 2024 Ark. 30, 684 S.W.3d 588. The fact that

there was a witness or witnesses who could have offered beneficial testimony is not, in itself,

proof of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id. When a petitioner under Rule 37 asserts that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failure to call a witness or witnesses, it is incumbent on the

petitioner to name the witness, provide a summary of that witness’s testimony, and establish

that the testimony would have been admissible. England v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 137, 543

S.W.3d 553. Because appellant failed to provide a summary of the potential witnesses’

testimony in his petition, the allegation was conclusory and did not merit further

consideration. A conclusory claim is not a ground for postconviction relief. Id. The burden

is entirely on the petitioner in a Rule 37 proceeding to provide facts that affirmatively

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support the claims of prejudice. Id. Conclusory statements without factual substantiation

are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective. Id. Accordingly,

we cannot say that the circuit court’s denial of appellant’s tenth ground was clearly erroneous

and affirm.

V. Specific Written Findings

Appellant complains that the circuit court failed to make specific written findings

when it denied his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Arkansas Rule of Criminal

Procedure 37.3(a) states that “[i]f the petition and the files and records of the case

conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the trial court shall make written

findings to that effect, specifying any parts of the files, or records that are relied upon to

sustain the court’s findings.” If the circuit court fails to make such findings, it is reversible

error, except in cases where it can be determined from the record that the petition is wholly

without merit or where the allegations in the petition are such that it is conclusive on the

face of the petition that no relief is warranted. Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d

55.

Here, the circuit court’s findings are sufficient to specify the basis for its ruling. In

its order, the circuit court stated that it reviewed the pleadings and transcripts in denying

appellant’s petition for postconviction relief. The circuit court filed an eight-page order

outlining each of appellant’s ten grounds and the reasons for its denial of those grounds.

Accordingly, appellant’s argument lacks merit, and we affirm.

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VI. Hearing

Appellant finally complains that the circuit court denied his claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel without holding a hearing. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.3

requires an evidentiary hearing in a Rule 37.1 postconviction proceeding unless the petition

and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no

relief. Horton v. State, 2016 Ark. 424, 504 S.W.3d 582 (per curiam); Crawford v. State, 2023

Ark. App. 341, 669 S.W.3d 889. If the files and the record conclusively show that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief, the circuit court may simply make written findings to that

effect, “specifying any parts of the files, or records that are relied upon to sustain the court’s

findings.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3(a). Conclusory allegations that are unsupported by facts

do not provide a basis for either an evidentiary hearing or postconviction relief. Henington

v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403 S.W.3d 55. There is no requirement that the court grant an

evidentiary hearing on an allegation other than one of specific facts from which it can be

concluded that the petitioner suffered some actual prejudice. McDaniels v. State, 2014 Ark.

181, 432 S.W.3d 644. Furthermore, the supporting facts must appear in the petition, and

the petitioner cannot rely on the possibility that facts will be elicited from witnesses if a

hearing is held. Id. Postconviction relief is not available to the petitioner who wishes to have

a hearing in the hopes of finding some ground for relief. Id. From our review, we conclude

that it is clear from the petition and the files and records of the case that appellant is entitled

to no relief and that the circuit court did not err in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Affirmed.

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KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and BARRETT, J., agree.

Samuel L. Hall, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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