Little Rock School District v. Ovid Lamb

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 265
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-23-822

LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT Opinion Delivered April 30, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
TWELFTH DIVISION
OVID LAMB [NO. 60CV-20-4815]
APPELLEE
HONORABLE CARA CONNORS

REVERSED AND DISMISSED IN
PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED
IN PART

RAYMOND ABRAMSON, Judge

Little Rock School District (LRSD) appeals from a Pulaski County Circuit Court

order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by appellee Ovid Lamb. Specifically,

LRSD argues the circuit court erred in finding that (1) LRSD’s 5 percent threshold for

triggering reduction-in-force procedures is invalid and unenforceable; (2) LRSD violated the

Teacher Fair Dismissal Act (TFDA)1 by failing to follow its own reduction-in-force policy;

and (3) LRSD did not have “just and reasonable cause” to not renew Lamb’s contract for the

2020–2021 school year. We reverse and dismiss in part and reverse and remand in part.

1
The parties’ arguments concern the TFDA, codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 6-17-1501
to -1510 et seq. (Repl. 2021). Although the TFDA has since been replaced by the LEARNS
Act, it was in effect at all times relevant to this case.
I. Background

Lamb was a teacher at McClellan High School in LRSD during the 2019–2020 school

year. During that time, LRSD was under control of the Arkansas Department of Education

because the LRSD School Board had been stripped of its powers by the Arkansas State Board

of Education. The secretary of the Arkansas Department of Education, Johnny Key, was

acting in the place of LRSD’s School Board. Secretary Key established a Community

Advisory Board to hold hearings and make recommendations to him on any teacher

contracts that would be nonrenewed.

On January 8, 2020, LRSD adopted a “Reorganization Resolution” that stated, “[I]n

order to comply with the recent directive of the Arkansas State Board of Education regarding

the reorganization of Hall High School” and “to treat all employees at the impacted schools

in the same way,” all positions at McClellan and J.A. Fair High Schools, in addition to those

vacated by the Arkansas State Board of Education at Hall High School, would be “declared

vacant.” The Reorganization Resolution noted that employees whose positions were vacated

would have the opportunity to apply for open positions at Hall High School and the new

Southwest High School. The Reorganization Resolution also alerted employees that “LRSD

expects to employ fewer teachers, building administrators and support staff in the 2020–

2021 school year,” so “teachers, building administrators and support staff who do not secure

an open position could receive a recommendation for nonrenewal.”

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Lamb has been a licensed teacher in the State of Arkansas since 1980. He began

working with LRSD in 1992 and was transferred to McClellan High School in 2006, where

he worked until the events that are the subject of the instant case. On May 8, 2019, Lamb

signed an employment contract for the 2019–2020 school district as a “non-probationary

teacher.” Following the Reorganization Resolution, Lamb applied for over fifty-three

positions that he met the qualifications to fill. He did not secure a position,2 and it was

recommended that Lamb’s contract not be renewed for the 2020–2021 school year. On June

9, 2020, Lamb participated in a hearing in front of the LRSD Advisory Board. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the LRSD Advisory Board unanimously upheld the nonrenewal

of Lamb’s contract.

On December 11, 2020, Lamb filed an amended complaint against LRSD alleging

that his nonrenewal violated the TFDA, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and

the Arkansas Age Discrimination Act. On August 17, 2021, Lamb moved for partial

summary judgment with respect to the TFDA and reduction-in-force-policy issues. On

September 9, 2021, LRSD filed a response to Lamb’s motion for partial summary judgment.

On May 5, 2022, the circuit court granted Lamb’s motion and found that LRSD’s reduction-

in-force policy did not comply with the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-2407 and

that LRSD had not acted in accordance with the TFDA and its own policy; accordingly, the

2
It is not clear from the record why he did not secure a position.
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circuit court found Lamb’s nonrenewal void. Following this, Lamb dismissed his age-

discrimination claims pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 41(a).

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment may be granted only when there are no genuine issues of material

fact to be litigated, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baker v.

Dir., 2017 Ark. App. 593, 534 S.W.3d 742. Ordinarily, upon reviewing a circuit court’s

decision on a summary-judgment motion, this court would examine the record to determine

whether genuine issues of material fact exist. Id. However, when the parties agree on the

facts, this court simply determines whether the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Id. In the instant case, the parties have stipulated to the underlying facts surrounding

the case. As to issues of law presented, this court’s standard of review is de novo. Id.

This court’s rules regarding statutory construction are clear and well established. We

review issues of statutory construction de novo because it is for this court to decide what a

statute means. Burkett v. Exxon Tiger Mart, Inc., 2009 Ark. App. 93, at 4, 304 S.W.3d 2, 5.

However, this court will accept a circuit court’s interpretation of the law unless it is shown

that the court’s interpretation was in error. Cockrell v. Union Planters Bank, 359 Ark. 8, 194

S.W.3d 178 (2004). The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent

of the legislature. Rodgers v. Ark. Parole Bd., 2024 Ark. 176, 700 S.W.3d 876. We first construe

a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in

common language. Worsham v. Bassett, 2016 Ark. 146, 489 S.W.3d 162. When the language

of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no
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need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Pillow v. Dir., 2024 Ark. App. 76, 684

S.W.3d 302.

Our standard of review in matters involving the TFDA is limited to whether the

circuit court’s decision was clearly erroneous. Kasinger v. E. End Sch. Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs.,

2011 Ark. App. 595, 385 S.W.3d 885. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there

is evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a firm

conviction that an error has been made. Id. Facts in dispute and determinations of credibility

are within the province of the fact-finder. Id. Whether a school district has complied with

the TFDA, however, is a question of law. Id. A circuit court’s conclusions on a question of

law will be given no weight on appeal. Id.

III. LRSD’s Reduction-in-Force Policy and the TFDA

We faced a nearly identical issue in Overton v. Little Rock School District, 2025 Ark.

App. 123, at 6–7, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. In Overton, an assistant principal with Hall High

School during the 2019–2020 school year failed to obtain an open position within the

district during the same Reorganization Resolution. Like Lamb, Overton argued that LRSD’s

reduction-in-force policy was contradictory to the TFDA and requested that her nonrenewal

be found void. In that case, we held:

Arkansas Code Annotated section 6-17-2407 requires a school district to have
a written policy on reduction in force based on the criteria listed in the statute.
The statute does not prohibit the use of a threshold number to trigger
reduction-in-force policies. Arkansas precedent is clear regarding a school
board’s broad authority to determine its policies. See Bentonville Sch. Dist. v.
Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, at 12–13, 643 S.W.3d 763[, 772]. In considering the
meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their
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ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Pulaski Cnty.
Special Sch. Dist. v. Lewis, 2017 Ark. App. 264, 521 S.W.3d 142. Therefore,
considering this precedent and the clear and unambiguous language contained
in the statute, we conclude LRSD complied with the requirements of Ark.
Code Ann. § 6-17-2407.

Overton, 2025 Ark. App. 123, at 6–7, ___ S.W.3d at ___. We again confirm that LRSD’s

reduction-in-force policy was valid, enforceable, and did not conflict with Ark. Code Ann. §

6-17-2407.

Next, LRSD argues that a reduction in force never occurred, and thus, LRSD did not

violate its policy. In response, Lamb argues both that a reduction in force occurred and that

the LRSD violated the TFDA by failing to follow its own policy. For the reasons previously

stated, LRSD’s policy states that a reduction in force is not triggered until 5 percent of the

affected population is reached. It is undisputed that LRSD lost only thirty teachers between

the 2019–2020 and the 2020–2021 school years, despite anticipating that it may lose as many

as ninety-four teachers. Regardless, both the projected loss and the actual loss were well below

the LRSD’s 5 percent threshold. There can be no violation of LRSD’s reduction-in-force

policy when a reduction in force does not occur. Overton, 2025 Ark. App. 123, at 7, ___

S.W.3d at ___.

IV. Nonrenewal of Lamb’s Contract

Finally, LRSD argues that it had good cause for not renewing Lamb’s contract, despite

his position as a nonprobationary teacher. Under the TFDA, a teacher who achieved

nonprobationary status could be terminated or have his contract not renewed only when

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[t]here is a reduction in force created by districtwide reduction in licensed
personnel, for incompetent performance, conduct which materially interferes
with the continued performance of the teacher's duties, repeated or material
neglect of duty, or other just and reasonable cause.

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-1510(b). In the instant case, we have already determined that there

has not been a reduction in force. Furthermore, LRSD does not allege that Lamb performed

incompetently, neglected his duties, or conducted himself in such a way that interfered with

his continued performance. Accordingly, LRSD could elect not to renew his contract only if

there was “other just and reasonable cause.”

The circuit court declared LRSD’s nonrenewal of Lamb’s contract void because LRSD

did not substantially comply with the TFDA and its reduction-in-force policy. As this court

has previously stated, LRSD did not fail to comply with the TFDA or its reduction-in-force

policy. Therefore, the circuit court clearly erred on this point.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand on this claim. See Mattox v. Mountain Home Sch.

Dist., 2024 Ark. App. 303, at 15–16, 689 S.W.3d 453, 462 (reversing and remanding upon

finding that the circuit court erred in its initial determination).

V. Conclusion

We reverse and dismiss the claim that LRSD’s 5 percent threshold conflicted with

the TFDA. We further reverse and dismiss the claim that LRSD failed to abide by its

reduction-in-force policy. Finally, we reverse and remand on the final claim and direct the

circuit court to determine whether Lamb’s nonrenewal was for just and good cause.

Reversed and dismissed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

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KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and MURPHY, J., agree.

Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP, by: Christopher Heller, for appellant.

Mitchell, Blackstock, Wright & Alagood, PLLC, by: Clayton Blackstock, Greg Alagood, and

Michael Muskeli, for appellee.

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