Jamie Ann Ashby v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2021 Ark. App. 424
Elizabeth Perry ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
I attest to the accuracy and
DIVISION II
integrity of this document
No. CR-21-216
2023.07.13 12:23:08 -05'00'
2023.003.20244
Opinion Delivered November 3, 2021
JAMIE ANN ASHBY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 43CR-20-101]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
HONORABLE BARBARA ELMORE,
JUDGE

AFFIRMED

RITA W. GRUBER, Judge

Jamie Ashby appeals from the Lonoke County Circuit Court’s order convicting her

of possession of methamphetamine or cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of drug

paraphernalia, and misdemeanor possession of a Schedule IV or V controlled substance. Her

sole point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to suppress. We

affirm Ashby’s convictions.

On January 10, 2020, Officer Brandon Ray of the Lonoke Police Department

noticed a defective taillight on Ashby’s car and initiated a traffic stop. Lisa Ford was driving

the car at the time, and Ashby was in the passenger seat. Ford had an outstanding arrest

warrant and was taken into custody by Officer Ray’s partner. Officer Ray spoke with Ashby

and obtained her information to “run [it] through dispatch.” The dispatcher reported that

Ashby had a search waiver on file. Officer Ray then confirmed with Ashby that the car was

her vehicle and asked if she minded if he searched it. He informed her that she had a search
waiver on file. She responded “yeah” to his request, adding, “I mean, there’s nothing I can

do to stop it so . . . .” Officer Ray searched the vehicle and found a small multicolored bag

on the backseat floorboard. The bag contained drug paraphernalia, a baggie of

methamphetamine, two syringes loaded with a clear liquid, an elastic-band tourniquet, and

miscellaneous pills.

Ashby filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in her car, arguing that the

search was an illegal, warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and article 2, section 10 of the Arkansas Constitution. 1 She attached

documentation she said demonstrated that her suspended sentence ended before she was

arrested in January 2020 and that the conditions of her suspended sentence had not

contained a search waiver. She argued that the court should grant her motion to suppress

because the search was conducted without a warrant, and the exception relied on—a search

waiver—was erroneous.

The court did not address the motion until trial. At trial, Ashby introduced the

sentencing order and the conditions of the suspended sentence, which did not include a

search waiver. The court denied the suppression motion giving the following explanation:

I don’t know exactly what she told him, whether she told him she was on a
suspended imposition of sentence or what, but he told her he—that she had [a]
waiver on file, and she said, “Okay, yeah.” Had she said, “No, I don’t have a waiver
on file,” or had she said something else, then I would say that he didn’t do it in good
faith. But what he did was search the vehicle in good faith because he thought there
was a waiver on file. She didn’t tell him she didn’t have a waiver on file. What she
said was, Okay, yeah.” So under good faith, I’m going to allow the search.

1
We presume Ashby intended to cite article 2, section 15 of the Arkansas
Constitution regarding unreasonable searches and seizures. In any case, her arguments to the
circuit court and to us concern the Fourth Amendment and not the Arkansas Constitution.

2
The bench trial continued, and the court found Ashby guilty of possession of

methamphetamine with the purpose to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and

misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. Her only argument on appeal is that the

circuit court erred by denying her motion to suppress the evidence. She contends that there

was no valid search waiver and thus no consent for the search and that Officer Ray did not

have a good-faith basis to search.

On review of a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct

an independent inquiry based on the totality of the circumstances, evaluating findings of

historical facts for clear error. Wilson v. State, 2014 Ark. 8. We give due weight to inferences

drawn by the circuit court, and we will reverse the circuit court only if the ruling is clearly

against the preponderance of the evidence. Thomas v. State, 2020 Ark. 154, at 9, 598 S.W.3d

41, 46.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

A search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable

subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). A warrantless search of a person is reasonable only if it falls

within one of these recognized exceptions. Parks v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 267, at 4, 599

S.W.3d 382, 384 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013)). One of the specifically

established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search

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that is conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).

Thus, where there is consent, there is no Fourth Amendment violation.

Here, the circuit court made no finding that Ashby had consented to the search or

that there was a valid search waiver outstanding at the time of the traffic stop. Rather, the

circuit court denied Ashby’s motion to suppress and her request to exclude the evidence

because it determined that Officer Ray had acted in good faith in relying on the information

regarding the search waiver. Generally, when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule precludes its use in a criminal

proceeding. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The prime purpose is to deter

future unlawful police conduct. Parks, 2020 Ark. App. 267, at 8, 599 S.W.3d at 87.

However, the United States Supreme Court has adopted good-faith exceptions to

the exclusionary rule where application of the rule does not advance its remedial purpose.

Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the

Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the police conduct a search in

“objectively reasonable reliance” on a warrant later held invalid. Id. at 922. The Court noted

that where the police officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, excluding evidence would

not further the ends of the exclusionary rule because “the officer is acting as a reasonable

officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no

way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.” Id. at 920.

The Court applied a similar rationale in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011),

holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable when the police conduct a search in objectively

reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent. The Court extended the good-faith

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exception to searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on statutes subsequently

declared to be unconstitutional in Krull, supra. The Court also held that the good-faith

exception applied when police officers seized evidence in reliance on incorrect computer

records due to clerical errors of court employees. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). In

Evans, Phoenix police found marijuana during a routine traffic stop after their patrol car’s

computer indicated the defendant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Id. at 4. It was

later determined that the warrant had been quashed before the arrest but had not been

reported to the police department by court personnel. Id. at 5. The Court held there was

no indication that the officer was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied on the

police computer record and held it fit within the good-faith exception to the exclusionary

rule. Id. at 15–16.

Finally, the Court extended the good-faith exception to a situation similar to that in

Evans but where the error was not made by court personnel but by police personnel. In

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009), police officers, relying on another county’s

warrant clerk and computer database, arrested Herring and conducted a search incident to

that arrest resulting in Herring’s arrest for possession of methamphetamine and felon in

possession of a firearm. It was later determined that the warrant was not valid and should

not have appeared in the computer database. The Court affirmed the denial of Herring’s

motion to suppress, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.

The court distinguished errors that were merely negligent from those that were reckless or

deliberate. Id. at 140. In holding that these types of searches fall within the good-faith

exception, the Court reasoned:

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To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate
that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence
is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary
rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not rise
to that level.

....

The pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective, not an
“inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers,” Reply Brief for
Petitioner 4–5. See also post, at 710, n. 7 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). We have
already held that “our good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable
question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search
was illegal” in light of “all of the circumstances.” Leon, 468 U.S., at 922, n. 23. These
circumstances frequently include a particular officer’s knowledge and experience, but
that does not make the test any more subjective than the one for probable cause,
which looks to an officer’s knowledge and experience, Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 699–700 (1996), but not his subjective intent, Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 812–813 (1996).

....

If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system,
or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests,
exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause
a Fourth Amendment violation. We said as much in Leon, explaining that an officer
could not “obtain a warrant on the basis of a ‘bare bones’ affidavit and then rely on
colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was
obtained to conduct the search.” Id., at 923, n. 24 (citing Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo.
State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971)). Petitioner’s fears that our decision will
cause police departments to deliberately keep their officers ignorant, Brief for
Petitioner 37–39, are thus unfounded.

....

Petitioner’s claim that police negligence automatically triggers suppression
cannot be squared with the principles underlying the exclusionary rule, as they have
been explained in our cases. In light of our repeated holdings that the deterrent effect
of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice system, e.g.,
Leon, 468 U.S., at 909–910, we conclude that when police mistakes are the result of
negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard
of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not “pay its way.” Id.,
at 907–908, n. 6. In such a case, the criminal should not “go free because the

6
constable has blundered.” People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587
(1926) (opinion of the Court by Cardozo, J.).

Herring, 555 U.S. at 144–48.

We now turn to Ashby’s arguments on appeal. She first argues that the waiver was

not valid, and as a result, there was no consent for the search. The circuit court did not rule

on this issue; instead, the court denied Ashby’s motion to suppress the evidence because it

found that Officer Ray had acted in good faith in relying on the dispatched information.

Thus, we will assume for the sake of argument that there was no consent for the search and

turn to Ashby’s argument that Officer Ray did not have a good-faith basis to search her car.

She cites Bogard v. State, 88 Ark. App. 214, 197 S.W.3d 1 (2004), in support of her

argument.

In Bogard, probation officers made a routine visit to probationer Scott Crow’s

residence. Crow was married to, and lived with, Barbara Bogard. When the probation

officers arrived at the home, Bogard answered the door and told them Crow was at work.

She then excused herself to monitor breakfast that was cooking on the stove. The testimony

differed with regard to exactly how the officers came inside the home, but they did a “walk

through” of the residence and discovered a baggie containing residue on the bed. They then

conducted a “full search” after calling their supervisor and discovered pipes, pills, counterfeit

bills, baggies containing white powder residue, and other paraphernalia. The officers testified

that Bogard let them inside after they told her they were there to do a home visit on Crow.

Bogard testified that she told the officers Crow was not home and to wait outside while she

finished cooking. She said they came in, began to search, and asked her questions about

what they had found. Bogard, not Crow, was charged with various offenses on the basis of

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the search and moved to suppress the evidence. Crow’s probationary period had actually

expired, which the State conceded, but the State argued that the probation officers had acted

in good faith. The circuit court denied Bogard’s motion to suppress on the basis of good

faith. We reversed and remanded, holding that there was no evidence of good faith. We

noted that the search was not conducted by police officers but by probation officers who

should have known the status of Crow’s probation; there was no evidence in the record as

to what information the probation officers relied on in conducting the walk through of the

residence or, “for that matter, whether they even consulted their records,” Bogard, 88 Ark.

App. at 221, 197 S.W.3d at 4; and while the State suggested that the officers relied in good

faith on a consent-to-search form signed by Crow, there was no evidence of such a form

in the record. Finally, there was no testimony that Bogard consented to the full search, even

assuming she invited them into the home.

Ashby’s reliance on Bogard is misplaced. First, Bogard involved the search of a home

by probation officers on the basis of authority to supervise a probationer who was not

Bogard. Ashby was searched after a legitimate traffic stop by police officers relying on

information specific to Ashby. There is nothing in the record to suggest Officer Ray acted

other than reasonably or that the police department had experienced systemic problems with

their dispatch system in the past. Moreover, Bogard was decided before the United States

Supreme Court decided Herring, which we hold is persuasive here.

The Court made it clear in Herring that the “exclusionary rule serves to deter

deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or

systemic negligence.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 147. The record in this case does not suggest

8
that such conduct occurred here. Officer Ray pulled Ashby’s vehicle over for a defective

tail light. He ran a routine check of her license resulting in a report that she had a search

waiver on file. When he questioned her about it, she told him she was not on probation

but on a suspended sentence. She did not indicate that the suspension had expired. Although

the information provided to Officer Ray by dispatch appears to have been incorrect, there

is no evidence that this was due to deliberate, reckless, grossly negligent conduct or recurring

or systemic negligence by anyone. When Officer Ray informed Ashby about the search

waiver and that he wanted to search her car, she did not object or alert him that his

information was incorrect. Rather, she replied “yeah,” adding, “I mean, there’s nothing I

can do to stop it so . . . .” Giving due weight to the inferences drawn by the circuit court,

we hold that its denial of Ashby’s motion to suppress is not clearly against the preponderance

of the evidence.

Affirmed.

HARRISON, C.J., agrees.

VIRDEN, J., concurs.

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge, concurring. I agree that the outcome of this case is

controlled by the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Herring v. United States, 555

U.S. 135 (2009). I write separately only to express concern that the good-faith exception is

inching toward becoming the rule instead of the “exception.” By requiring some sort of

showing of systemic recklessness or intentional misleading in obtaining the information

relied on, I feel we are getting dangerously close to shifting the burden of proof regarding

warrantless searches to the defendant. This results in a violation of the long-standing

9
principle that, generally, when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,

the judicially developed exclusionary rule precludes its use in a criminal proceeding. Weeks

v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

Accordingly, I concur.

Omar Greene, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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