Lonnie Allen Reed v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 49
Digitally signed by Elizabeth
Perry
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Date: 2022.08.10 13:04:46 DIVISION III
-05'00' No. CR-19-330
Adobe Acrobat version:
2022.001.20169
Opinion Delivered January 29, 2020
LONNIE ALLEN REED
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST
DIVISION
STATE OF ARKANSAS [NO. 60CR-16-2841]
APPELLEE
HONORABLE LEON N. JOHNSON,
JUDGE

AFFIRMED

BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge

The issue here is whether we should judicially notice information obtained from the

internet. The information Lonnie Reed asks us to accept as a so-called “adjudicative fact”

is the time that Google Maps estimates it takes a car to travel from one place to another.

Specifically, Reed asked the circuit court to instruct the jury on the typical route and

estimated driving time it takes a person to travel by car from his alibi location (a tire shop)

to the crime scene (a pharmacy). The obvious point of the request was to challenge the

State’s timeline of events. The court declined to do so. Reed appeals that decision.

I.

In 2016, the State of Arkansas charged Reed with several crimes related to an armed

robbery of Express RX Pharmacy, which is located near the intersection of Mississippi Street

and Cantrell Road in Little Rock. Around 6:52 p.m. on 6 July 2016, a white male who
was approximately 5’8” tall and wearing a black bandana across the bridge of his nose entered

the pharmacy, pulled out a gun, and demanded all the Dilaudid and Oxycodone 1 the

pharmacist had. The pharmacist put the bottles of Dilaudid and Oxycodone in a green

plastic basket on the pharmacy counter. The gunman picked up the basket, walked toward

the exit of the store, dumped the contents of the basket into the front of his shirt, and “threw

the green basket in the floor right inside the building before he left.” A partial latent

fingerprint recovered from the green basket was recovered at the crime scene, and it

matched a print of Lonnie Reed’s right middle finger. Surveillance video captured the

events.

During his jury trial, Reed presented an alibi defense: he was buying tires at Tire

Market, on 16717 MacArthur Drive, in North Little Rock when the robbery occurred.

Tire Market owner Jerry Ford testified that he sold Reed $376.90 in new tires on 6 July

2016 (the day of the robbery). According to Ford, his typical business hours are 8:00 a.m.

to 5:00 p.m., but he had stayed open late, and Reed “was in the process of leaving” the tire

store around 6:40 p.m. When defense counsel stated, “So he [Reed] was leaving your shop

at 6:40[?]” Ford replied, “Yes.” As evidence, Reed presented Ford’s handwritten receipt

containing Reed’s name, address, dated “7-6-16,” and time-stamped “6:40.” On redirect

and recross-examination, Ford said that it may have been “a little after” 6:40 p.m. when

Reed left the tire shop.

Reed proffered two jury instructions to the Pulaski County Circuit Court that related

to his alibi defense. The first proffer was a map and directions printed from Google Maps,

1
Dilaudid and Oxycodone are branded names of prescription narcotics.

2
which showed a route starting at the tire shop (16717 MacArthur Drive, North Little Rock)

and ended at Express RX Pharmacy (7612 Cantrell Road, Little Rock). The document

states: “Drive 12.5 miles, 14–18 min.” A disclaimer appears on the document that was

printed from Google Maps. It states:

These directions are for planning purposes only. You may find that
construction projects, traffic, weather, or other events may cause conditions
to differ from the map results, and you should plan your route accordingly.

The second proffered jury instruction stated:

A.R.E. Rule 201
Jural Notice

You must accept as conclusive the following facts:

The typical route by car from 16717 MacArthur Drive in North Little Rock
to 7612 Cantrell Road in Little Rock is 12½ miles long and takes 14–18
minutes.

(Emphasis added). Over Reed’s objection, the circuit court instructed the jury exactly as

we have quoted above, with the sole exception that the court omitted the italicized words

“and takes 14–18 minutes.” In other words, the court told the jury to accept the distance in

miles between the two points at issue (12.5 miles) but not how long it “usually” takes to

drive between them (14–18 minutes).

II.

Reed contends that the circuit court should have taken judicial notice of the

estimated driving time, instructed the jury on the fact, and the refusal to do so was an abuse

of discretion and therefore reversible error.

3
Our standard of review regarding the use of jury instructions and evidentiary rulings

is an abuse of discretion. Collins v. State, 2019 Ark. 110, 571 S.W.3d 469 (evidentiary

rulings); Pokatilov v. State, 2017 Ark. 264, 526 S.W.3d 849 (jury instructions).

A rule of evidence governs judicial notice of “adjudicative facts.” 2 Arkansas Rule of

Evidence 201 states:

(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts.

(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.

(c) When Discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether
requested or not.

(d) When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a
party and supplied with the necessary information.

(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to
an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and
the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.

(f) Time of Taking Notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of
the proceeding.

(g) Instructing Jury. The court shall instruct the jury to accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed.

2
Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “adjudicative fact” as “[a] controlling or operative
fact, rather than a background fact; a fact that is particularly related to the parties to a
proceeding and that helps the tribunal determine how the law applies to those parties. • For
example, adjudicative facts include those that the jury weighs.” Black’s Law Dictionary 735
(11th ed. 2019).

4
A circuit court must instruct the jury on the applicable law. Whitlock v. Smith, 297

Ark. 399, 402, 762 S.W.2d 782, 783 (1989). To this end, our supreme court has adopted

model jury instructions for circuit courts to use in civil and criminal cases. In re Comm. on

Jury Instructions, April 19, 1965 (per curiam); In re Standard Jury Instructions for Crim. Cases,

264 Ark. App’x 967 (1979) (per curiam). These model instructions must be used unless the

court finds they are not an accurate statement of the law. Harmon v. State, 2019 Ark. App.

572, 591 S.W.3d 347. We find no model jury instruction—civil or criminal—on judicially

noticing adjudicative facts pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 201. See Ark. Model Jury Instr.–Civil

(West) (Nov. 2018 update); Ark. Model Jury Instr.–Crim. (Matthew Bender 2018).

Arkansas common law has been flexible and deferential on the issue of judicial notice.

See, e.g., Hollis v. Erwin, 237 Ark. 605, 374 S.W.2d 828 (1964) (court knew population and

location of cities within Desha County); Lewis v. Tate, 210 Ark. 594, 197 S.W.2d 23 (1946)

(taking judicial notice that Van Buren and Mulberry are both in Crawford County a few

miles apart). Only a handful of Arkansas cases concern measurements and values. E.g.,

Sinkhorn v. Meredith, 250 Ark. 711, 466 S.W.2d 927 (1971) (court may take judicial notice

of diminished purchasing power of dollar); Deaner v. Gwaltney, 194 Ark. 332, 108 S.W.2d

600 (1937) (taking judicial notice that from 1928 to 1935 land values almost disappeared).

As the parties have acknowledged in their briefs, no Arkansas case has asked and answered

whether an average or estimated driving time, as shown by Google Maps, is a fact “not

subject to reasonable dispute” and “from a source whose accuracy cannot be reasonably

questioned.” Ark. R. Evid. 201 (2019).

5
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 is almost identical to the Arkansas rule. One

difference, however, arises in criminal cases. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 201(f)

states that in a civil case, a court must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as

conclusive; but in a criminal case, the court must instruct the jury that it may or may not

accept the noticed fact as conclusive. Fed. R. Evid. 201(f). Arkansas Rule of Evidence

201(g) does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases. It simply states that “[t]he

court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.” Ark. R.

Evid. 201(g).

The parties have cited some federal cases that address Google Maps and judicial

notice. But in our view the law is far from settled on whether and how Google—or any

other internet-information source—can serve as a reservoir of adjudicative facts. See

Kenneth S. Broun et al., 2 McCormick on Evidence § 330 (8th ed.) (Jan. 2020 update)

(“[N]owhere can there be found a definition of what constitutes competent or authoritative

sources for purposes of verifying judicially noticed facts.”) (internal citations omitted). That

said, there seems to be an emerging consensus that courts can use Google Maps to establish

the distance between two geographic points. Here are some examples:

• United States v. Burroughs, 810 F.3d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Google Maps
was a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned for the
purpose of identifying the area where the defendant was arrested);

• McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1008 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (taking
judicial notice of Google Maps to determine the distance from an Idaho
location to a Utah location);

• United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1182 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (taking
judicial notice for the purpose of determining the general location of a home
and that the distance between it and the border was approximately one mile

6
“as the crow flies,” relying on a Google map and satellite image as a “source[]
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”);

• United States v. Proch, 637 F.3d 1262, 1266 n.1 (11th Cir. 2011) (taking
judicial notice of a map);

• Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1219 n.2
(10th Cir. 2007) (taking judicial notice of distance calculated using Google
Maps).

But no consensus exists among federal or state courts on whether Google’s (or any

other internet source’s) estimated driving times may be judicially noticed. At least one court

has used Google Maps to establish distance and estimated driving time. Rindfleisch v. Gentiva

Health Sys., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 n.13 (E.D. N.Y. 2010) (noting estimated driving

time from Auburn, New York, to Central Islip, New York, was approximately five and

one-half hours, not three and one-half hours). The Eighth Circuit has, however, affirmed

a district court’s decision to reject a request to judicially notice that drive-time estimates

from Google Maps are so accurate that they cannot reasonably be questioned. Jackson v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 785 F.3d 1193, 1204 (8th Cir. 2015); see also Cobb Theatres III, LLC v.

AMC Entm’t Holdings, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (expressing

skepticism whether driving times using Google Maps are facts that “can be accurately and

readily determined” under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2)).

Given the persuasive authority the parties have provided and the facts of this case,

we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Reed’s proffered

jury instruction. The Google Maps information that Reed proffered about a fourteen-to-

eighteen-minute estimated driving time between his alibi location (tire store) and the crime

scene (pharmacy) does not tend to show the basis or foundation for this information, how

7
this information was independently obtained, or whether there was any incentive to ensure

the accuracy of Google’s posted estimated driving times.

Reed has not shown that his proffered estimated driving time is a fact that can be

accurately and readily determined using Google Maps. No testimony or documentary

evidence established how Google Maps develops the estimated driving times, what level of

accuracy the estimated time of travel has, whether the estimated Google drive times are

verifiable (or falsifiable) using parallel sources (like Apple Maps or even just a witness driving

the route and timing it). In fact, Reed’s Google Maps proffered estimated driving-time

reliability is undermined by its own disclaimer:

These directions are for planning purposes only. You may find that
construction projects, traffic, weather, or other events may cause conditions
to differ from the map results, and you should plan your route accordingly.

As the disclaimer either expressly states or intimates, driving times can differ

depending on personal speeding habits, weather, traffic, collisions, construction, or other

road conditions—including time of day (rush hour or not). Because the estimated driving

time could be reasonably disputed, we agree that it was not a fact that could be judicially

noticed in this criminal case. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing

to instruct the jury that it must conclusively accept Reed’s proffered estimated driving time.

The jury was tasked to weigh the evidence, including the testimony that Reed left

the tire shop after 6:40 p.m., and the reasonable inference that he would not have had time

to drive to the pharmacy at the intersection of Cantrell and Mississippi and rob it at 6:52

p.m. The jury heard Reed’s alibi witness state that Reed was in the tire store until at least

6:40 p.m. The jury heard the pharmacist’s testimony (and viewed surveillance video) that

8
the robbery occurred around 6:52 p.m. The jury was permitted to credit the witnesses’

testimony and draw on its own knowledge of the area. Worsham v. State, 2017 Ark. App.

702, 537 S.W.3d 789 (the jury is entitled to draw on common sense and experience in

reaching its verdict.). The jury was not required to believe Reed’s alibi defense, and the

court was not required to instruct the jury on estimated driving times as an adjudicative fact.

We therefore affirm Reed’s convictions and the resulting fifty-five-year sentence.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.

William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender,

for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Rachel Kemp, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

9