Jotavion Jatar Ross v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 204
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-24-500

JOTAVION JATAR ROSS Opinion Delivered April 9, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 18CR-23-38]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE RANDY PHILHOURS,
APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

Jotavion Jatar Ross appeals his conviction by a Crittenden County Circuit Court jury

of first-degree murder, arguing that the circuit court erroneously denied his motion to

suppress his custodial statements, refused to give jury instructions for manslaughter and

justification, and excluded the victim’s toxicology report. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

On December 29, 2022, Ross was celebrating his birthday with friends and his

girlfriend at the Motel 6 in West Memphis. Ross’s friend, “TJ,” wanted to purchase

marijuana, and Ross arranged to buy the marijuana from Samuel Johnson, Jr., at a nearby

gas station. Ross accompanied TJ to buy the drugs; however, the sale did not go as planned,

and Ross shot and killed Johnson.
On November 28, 2023, Ross was charged by amended information with one count

of first-degree murder in connection with Johnson’s death. The information included the

State’s request for enhancement of Ross’s sentence due to his use of a firearm to commit a

felony.

There were two pretrial motion hearings. At the first one, Ross moved to suppress

certain statements he made during his two custodial interviews, including his confession.

Ross alleged that the statements were tainted because they were coerced by the detectives,

who used threats and his unfamiliarity with the justice system to obtain the statements. The

court reviewed the custodial statements and ruled they were admissible. At the second

hearing, Ross submitted his proposed jury instructions, including justification and the lesser-

included offense of manslaughter. There was discussion regarding jury instructions in light

of Arkansas’s passage of the “Stand Your Ground” law. The court withheld a ruling and

stated that the State could object to the instructions after all the evidence had been

presented. The State also moved to exclude information from Johnson’s toxicology report

showing that he was positive for THC and alcohol on the evening he was killed. The State

asserted that such evidence should be excluded because it tends to be prejudicial to the

victim. Additionally, the State argued that the toxicology report was qualitative, not

quantitative, and only showed the presence of marijuana and alcohol in Johnson’s

bloodstream, not whether he was intoxicated. Ross responded that the report should be

admitted because the drugs and alcohol in Johnson’s system were indicative of his state of

mind at the time of his death and explained why Ross felt the need to defend himself. Ross

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contended that even though the results did not prove that Johnson was intoxicated, any

amount of THC could make someone paranoid, angsty, and more combative, which

dovetailed with the justification defense. The court ruled that the potential prejudice

outweighed the probative value and granted the State’s motion to suppress.

On January 9, 2024, the trial was held. The State presented video evidence from

various surveillance cameras in West Memphis. The videos showed that at 10:55 p.m., two

individuals chased a third, followed by gunshots and screaming. Different angles of these

events were provided by the Maddux Elementary School’s cameras. SkyCop video from the

intersection of Ingram and Barton Streets, also taken at 10:55 p.m., provided a closer view

of Johnson fleeing from Ross and TJ. The video clearly showed the clothes Johnson and Ross

were wearing. Patrol vehicle dash-camera footage from shortly after the murder showed the

interaction between West Memphis police officers, Ross, and TJ. Surveillance footage from

the Motel 6 lobby showed Ross checking in on the night of the murder at 10:19 p.m. wearing

the same clothes as in the SkyCop video. Motel 6 surveillance video also captured Ross and

TJ leaving the motel room at 10:35 p.m., wearing those same clothes as in the SkyCop video,

and returning to their room at 11:32 p.m. wearing different clothes.

Detective Nick Anderson testified that shortly after the murder, Ross agreed to talk

to the police. He was informed of his Miranda rights and signed the Miranda waiver. Video

of Ross’s interview by Detective Anderson and Officer Mallory Manning was played for the

jury. In the video, Ross explained that on the night of Johnson’s murder he was at the Motel

6 with his girlfriend, TJ, and some others celebrating his birthday. Around 10:00 p.m., he

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and TJ went to the gas station. Ross denied that he knew who Johnson was or that they saw

him that evening. Ross stated that a white woman came to the motel room and told them

that the police were looking for them. She gave Ross a backpack right before he left the motel

room, and he did not think to look in it.1 The video shows Officer Manning informing Ross

that the police had several videos of him and TJ chasing Johnson and shooting him. Ross

denied that he was involved. Detective Anderson stated,

It’s your ass on the line, and you’re looking at life. You need to do more than sit up
here and tell us what you didn’t do because we don’t want to hear that shit. The
camera sees it.

....

[Y]ou fixing to sit up here and talk to us now and tell us what the hell happened
because it’s clear as day on video or you fixing to sit your ass in jail the rest of your
fucking life until you an old-ass man and die and people carry your ass out of there
in a wooden fucking box.

At this time, Ross changed his story, stating that TJ wanted to buy marijuana from Johnson,

and when they met up at the gas station, TJ grabbed Johnson and tried to steal the drugs.

Johnson pulled a knife on TJ, then threw it at him (Ross). Ross stated that TJ chased Johnson

down the street, and TJ shot Johnson with the gun that had been found in the backpack

given to him by the white woman.

Detective Chad Davis testified that Ross initiated the second interview, which he

conducted. The video was played for the jury. In it, Ross was Mirandized, and he agreed to

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At the time of his arrest, Ross was carrying a small backpack containing a .45
semiautomatic pistol that was later determined to be the murder weapon.

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conduct the interview without an attorney. Ross explained that he had taken a charge for

stealing a car earlier that year, and now a group of young men who also had been involved

in the theft were trying to pin this murder on him as well. Ross tried to explain that later in

the evening, he never technically changed clothes, he just put new clothes over the clothes

that he was already wearing. Detective Davis told Ross that the police had several videos of

the evening in question, and it was clear that he changed clothes after the shooting. Detective

Anderson joined the interview and told Ross to “[s]top this bullshitting before you get a

needle stuck in your arm[.]” Detective Davis then described the video evidence to Ross that

depicted him committing the crime:

I’m going to go to the courtroom, and I’m going to play the videos that I have, and
I’m going to lay out the clothes. I’m going to show the video of [TJ] telling me
everything. I’m going to show the video of Cierra telling me everything, with the
clothes that you were wearing along with what clothes [TJ] was wearing that matches
the same clothing in the video when Samuel was murdered and the same clothing
that I recovered in the same spot that [TJ] told me they would be at. [TJ] ain’t lied to
me so far, and I know [TJ] didn’t squeeze that trigger. You did because I can see [TJ]’s
pants in the video. It wasn’t [TJ]. It was you.

Detective Davis explained to Ross that Johnson did not die immediately and gave the

police “names.” After more discussion of video evidence, Ross confessed. He explained that

during the drug buy, TJ grabbed Johnson, and he (Ross) thought that Johnson had stabbed

TJ. When Johnson ran, Ross feared for his life. Ross explained that Johnson knew where he

lived, and he thought Johnson was going to get a gun. When Johnson reached into his jacket,

Ross thought he had a gun, and he shot Johnson.

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In addition to the video evidence, the medical examiner testified that Johnson died

from the gunshot wounds, and there was testimony that Ross’s clothes had gunshot residue

on them. Ross moved for a directed verdict, and it was denied.

Ross testified that during his interview, he felt threatened by investigators. He

explained that he shot Johnson in self-defense, explaining that he saw TJ and Johnson get

into a fight, and he went to investigate. Johnson pulled a knife on TJ and then threw it at

him. Ross recounted that he chased Johnson, and when Johnson reached into his jacket, he

shot Johnson in self-defense. Ross explained that he was afraid of Johnson and the police, so

he left the scene. Ross wrote a letter of apology to Johnson’s mother, and it was admitted

into evidence. In the letter, Ross confessed to shooting Johnson, explaining that he feared

for his life.

Before the case was submitted to the jury for deliberation, Ross requested four jury

instructions—manslaughter, use of deadly force, right to possess a handgun, and

justification—which were all denied. Ross proffered the instructions. He renewed his

directed-verdict motion, and it was denied.

The jury found Ross guilty of first-degree murder. The jury recommended a sentence

of thirty years’ imprisonment with a five-year enhancement for committing the felony with a

firearm and six years for committing the felony in the presence of a child, for an aggregate

sentence of forty-one years’ incarceration in the Arkansas Division of Correction.

Ross timely filed his notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.

II. Discussion

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A. Motion to Suppress

For his first point on appeal, Ross asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his

motion to suppress statements he made during the two police interviews, arguing that the

statements were involuntary because (1) he was threatened with life in prison and the death

penalty, (2) Detective Anderson made false promises of leniency, and (3) he clearly lacked

experience with the justice system at the time of the interviews. We disagree and affirm.

Ross’s argument regarding the promise of leniency is not preserved for appeal. When

an appellant has raised multiple arguments in his motion to suppress, we will refuse to reach

the merits of those arguments that were not specifically ruled on by the circuit court in

denying the motion. See Lewis v. State, 2017 Ark. 211, at 15, 521 S.W.3d 466, 476; Eastin v.

State, 370 Ark. 10, 257 S.W.3d 58 (2007). Ross did not raise the issue of offers of leniency

below; thus, it is not preserved for appeal.

Turning to Ross’s remaining arguments regarding his motion to suppress, we find no

error in the court’s decision to deny the motion and affirm.

A statement made while in custody is presumptively involuntary, and the burden is

on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a custodial statement was

given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Flanagan v. State, 368 Ark. 143,

155, 243 S.W.3d 866, 875 (2006). In cases involving a ruling on the voluntariness of a

confession, this court makes an independent determination based on the totality of the

circumstances. Boyd v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 407, at 10–11, 500 S.W.3d 772, 779. The

totality of the circumstances may include the age, education, and intelligence of the accused;

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the lack of advice as to his constitutional rights; the length of the detention; the repeated

and prolonged nature of the questioning; the use of mental or physical punishment; and

statements made by the interrogating officers and the vulnerability of the defendant. Id. We

review the circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error, and the ultimate question of whether

the confession was voluntary is subject to an independent, or de novo, determination by this

court. Id. Any conflicts in testimony are for the circuit court to resolve because it is in a

superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Id. We look to see if the

confession was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than coercion, intimidation,

or deception. Id. For a defendant’s statement to be the involuntary product of coercion, there

must be an essential link between coercive activity of the State and a resulting confession by

a defendant. U.S. Const. amend. V. The proper inquiry is whether defendant’s will has been

overborne or his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. Id.

Here, the circuit court did not err in finding that Ross’s statement was not coerced.

The videos of Ross’s interviews show that before both interviews, the detectives informed

Ross of his Miranda rights, and he stated several times that he understood his rights and did

not want to have a lawyer present. Ross initiated the second interview, and both interviews

lasted less than an hour. During the first and second interview, detectives told Ross that he

could be sentenced to life in prison and the death penalty, respectively; however, our court

has held that informing a defendant of the penalty for a murder charge is not considered

coercion. Lanes v. State, 53 Ark. App. 266, 922 S.W.2d 266 (1996). Regarding Anderson’s

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harsh tone and loud voice, the court found that it was not Anderson’s harsh words but the

overwhelming evidence presented to Ross that led to his confession.

The instant case is distinguishable from caselaw in which we have held that the

confession was coerced. In Osburn v. State, 2009 Ark. 390, 326 S.W.3d 771, our supreme

court held that Osburn’s confessions to police while in custody were the result of coercion

because officers continually referenced Osburn’s concern for his family, a tactic the

interviewers used to keep Osburn talking. When Osburn informed the officers that he was

tired, they told him they could not help him if he stopped talking. Officers also repeatedly

suggested that Osburn might never see his family again and that his daughter might be

arrested if he did not confess. Our court held that Osburn’s will was overborne by the police

interrogation. The facts in Osburn are vastly different from the facts in the instant case, and

the circuit court correctly found that Ross’s will was not overborne by the detectives’ harsh

tone during questioning.

Additionally, Ross argues that he did not understand the events around his arrest and

interviews and refers to the following comment he made to the police:

I thought y’all was going to say something about that the first time when I went to my
bond hearing, I thought y’all was going to go on and sentence me, bro, after I said
that. That’s why I like why haven’t they sentenced me yet. That’s why I feel like I
could come in here and lie. That’s what I feel like. Is they fixing to send me a lawyer.
Ask them to give me the death penalty.

Ross contends that this comment shows his inexperience with the justice system and

that he clearly did not understand what was happening to him. We do not agree. Ross was

adequately informed of his Miranda rights, he understood them, and his statements were

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voluntary and not coerced, as discussed above. Moreover, Ross requested the second

interview with the detectives, demonstrating his understanding of the legal process and

willingness to participate. The circuit court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress was

not clearly in error, and we affirm.

B. Manslaughter and Justification Jury Instructions

On appeal, Ross argues that this is a case of first impression because it involves the

interpretation of new jury instructions regarding the Stand Your Ground Law adopted by

the Arkansas legislature, Act 250 of 2021, § 1, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-607 (Supp.

2023). He asserts that no model instruction existed when this case was tried; thus, the jury

should have been instructed on manslaughter and justification because there was evidence

demonstrating that Ross reasonably feared for his safety at the time of the shooting. His

argument is not well taken.

There must be a rational basis in the evidence to warrant the giving of a jury

instruction. Bridges v. State, 2023 Ark. 157, at 7, 676 S.W.3d 275, 279. When the defendant

has offered sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact concerning a defense, the

instructions must fully and fairly declare the law applicable to that defense; however, there

is no error in refusing to give a jury instruction when there is no basis in the evidence to

support the giving of the instruction. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 279. Our appellate courts have

affirmed a circuit court’s refusal to submit a proffered jury instruction when the only basis

for the instruction was the defendant’s self-serving statements or testimony, contradicted by

other witnesses. Id., 676 S.W.3d at 279. We will not reverse the circuit court’s refusal to

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submit an instruction to the jury absent an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion is

a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit court’s decision but requires

that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Collins

v. State, 2019 Ark. 110, at 5, 571 S.W.3d 469, 472.

Arkansas Code Annotated § 5-2-607 provides:

(a) A person is justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if the
person reasonably believes that the other person is:

(1) Committing or about to commit a felony involving physical force or violence;

(2) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force.

A reasonable belief is the belief that an ordinary and prudent person would form

under the circumstances, not one that is recklessly or negligently formed. Ark. Code Ann. §

5-1-102 (Repl. 2013). A person commits manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of

another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-104(a)(3) (Repl. 2013).

Ross argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his request for jury

instructions on manslaughter and justification. He argues that the evidence was sufficient to

raise a question of fact concerning the instructions. To support his argument Ross cites

Harshaw v. State, 344 Ark. 129, 39 S.W.3d 753 (2001), in which our supreme court reversed

the circuit court’s decision denying the request for a manslaughter instruction, holding that

Harshaw was entitled to a manslaughter instruction as a lesser-included offense to second-

degree murder because he acted on the basis of an unreasonable or recklessly formed belief

that he needed to use deadly force to protect himself. Testimony at the trial showed that

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Harshaw, who was in an argument with the victim at the time of the shooting, believed that

he was being threatened with violence when the victim talked about using a gun.

Eyewitnesses corroborated that the victim made several statements insinuating that if there

was a problem, he would settle it with a gun:

I. “Oh, that’s all right. I'll just go get my gun and shoot it up.”

II. “It’ll be some pistol play out here.”

III. “I’ll get my nine and shoot this MF up.”

IV. “If there was a problem, I’d have a gun.”

V. “Well, you know, if it was a problem, I’d have my gun and I’d shoot—be shooting
it up out here, you know.”

VI. “K-3 [Casey Cunningham] ain’t no punk. If I got a problem, I just boom boom
boom like that.”

Harshaw, 344 Ark. at 131, 39 S.W.3d at 755.

There was testimony that Harshaw thought the victim was reaching for a weapon in

his car, even though the victim was unarmed when he was shot. The instant case is

distinguishable. Unlike Harshaw, there were no eyewitnesses that corroborated Ross’s

statements that he felt he was in danger. In denying Ross’s request, the court noted that Ross

chased Johnson, and it disagreed that the video showed Johnson appearing to reach into his

jacket.

The instant case is more akin to Morris v. State, 351 Ark. 426, 94 S.W.3d 913 (2003),

in which our supreme court affirmed the circuit court’s decision that Morris, who was

charged with first-degree murder, was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included

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offense of manslaughter. In reviewing whether slight evidence or a rational basis existed for

giving the manslaughter instruction, the court considered the evidence that Morris “could

conceivably” have relied on for forming a belief that he needed to defend himself with deadly

force. 351 Ark. at 432, 94 S.W.3d at 917. Our supreme court listed the evidence as follows:

I. In an earlier incident in a nightclub parking lot, the Sharp car almost hit Morris.

II. Occupants in the Sharp car and Morris’s car began arguing after that.

III. Later in the evening while Morris’s car and Sharp’s car were side-by-side at a stop
light, an occupant in the victim’s car either started to roll down his window or
had partially done so already. Morris thought he saw a gun, panicked, and shot
Chris Sharp.

IV. Only one person, Daniel Fells, other than Morris testified that threats came from
Sharp’s car, but Fells admitted on cross-examination that he probably had told the
police officers following the shooting that no threats were made.

Id.

Ross’s statement that he thought Johnson was reaching into his jacket for a gun is

very similar to Morris’s statement that he thought he saw a gun in Sharp’s vehicle. Here, as

in Morris, the circuit court correctly concluded that a previous incident of conflict between

the shooter and the victim did not merit a manslaughter instruction. Accordingly, the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion in deciding there was neither slight evidence that Ross

reasonably believed Johnson was using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force nor

evidence that he reasonably believed his life was in imminent danger. We affirm the circuit

court’s decision that no rational basis existed for giving the proffered instructions.

C. Toxicology Report

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Ross contends that the circuit court erred by not admitting Johnson’s toxicology

report showing that he tested positive for alcohol and marijuana at the time of his death.

Ross argues that the toxicology report is relevant to his manslaughter defense because the

drugs in Johnson’s system could have influenced his actions on the night of the shooting.

We disagree and affirm.

Evidence of a victim’s intoxication or drug use at the time of death is generally

irrelevant to the defendant’s claim of justification. Walton v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 409, 677

S.W.3d 216. The evidence may be relevant only if the defendant knew the victim was using

drugs or alcohol or if the victim’s behavior was such that the defendant could have reasonably

inferred that the victim was under the influence. Id. Our supreme court has held that when

there is no “quantification” of the drugs in the victim’s system the appellant failed to

establish that the victim was under the influence at the time of the shooting. See Drennan v.

State, 2018 Ark. 328, at 12–13, 559 S.W.3d 262, 268–69; Jones v. State, 340 Ark. 390, 396–

97, 10 S.W.3d 449, 453 (2000) (“Because the defense was unable to show that the cocaine

use prompted the killing, the trial court did not err in ruling that the probative value of the

evidence was far outweighed by its prejudicial nature.”).

In the instant case, there was no evidence that Ross knew or could have reasonably

believed Johnson was intoxicated. Additionally, the toxicology report was not quantitative,

and Johnson’s behavior as shown on the video did not suggest that he was under the

influence of a substance. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

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ABRAMSON and BARRETT, JJ., agree.

Dowden, Worley, Jewell & Olswing, PLLC, by: J. Conner Ray; and Stroud, Flechas & Dalton,

by: Matthew G. Dalton, pro hac vice, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt and A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’ys Gen.,

for appellee.

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