Stanley Maina v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 38
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-24-167

STANLEY MAINA Opinion Delivered January 29, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
V. SEVENTH DIVISION

[NO. 60CR-21-2902]
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE HONORABLE KAREN D. WHATLEY,
JUDGE

AFFIRMED

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

Stanley Maina appeals his conviction by a Pulaski County Circuit Court jury of

aggravated residential burglary and aggravated assault. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

On September 21, 2021, Mania was charge by an amended felony information with

aggravated residential burglary, first-degree domestic battering, aggravated assault, and

violation of an order of protection. On August 8, 2023, his trial was held. At the trial,

Tabitha Kamau testified that Maina is her ex-husband, and they had lived in the apartment

together from September 2018 until they separated on June 20, 2021, after Maina’s drinking

had strained the marriage. On June 24, Maina returned to the apartment, but Kamau would

not let him inside. On June 27, she received a call from Maina’s mother, and on the basis of
that conversation, she obtained a temporary order of protection against Maina. Kamau

testified that she told Maina the sheriff would serve him with the order. After receiving the

order of protection on June 29, Kamau returned to the apartment and saw Maina in the

parking lot. She called the sheriff’s office and asked for the order of protection to be served

on him there. The next day, around 10:30 a.m., Kamau met her friend, Queen Kibwana, for

tea at the apartment. While they were chatting at the dining table, they noticed Maina sitting

on the balcony. Maina entered the apartment through the window and threw the protective

order in Kamau’s face and said, “What is this?” Maina slapped Kamau’s face and pushed her

toward the stove and then to the kitchen counter. Holding Kamau down, Maina reached

over her to the top of the refrigerator where the knife block was kept. Kamau grabbed the

knife block first and threw it toward the living room. She told Kibwana to get the knives and

“put them out.” Maina ran toward the knives, and Kibwana ran back to Kamau. Kamau

testified that she was afraid that Maina was going to attack Kibwana because he grabbed a

knife and ran toward her. Kamau picked up a dining chair and shielded Kibwana from him.

Kamau testified that as she was shielding her friend with the chair, Maina stabbed her

[Kamau] shoulder, pulled the blade out, and stabbed her again on or near the back of her

right arm. Kibwana struck his hand with a lamp, and he dropped the knife. Kamau pushed

him with the chair toward the couch and then the wall while Kibwana unsuccessfully tried

to unlock the door. Kamau grabbed a knife that was near Maina, and she unlocked the door.

As they left, Kamau called 911. Neighbors responded to the women’s screams for help, and

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Kibwana applied pressure to Kamau’s wounds until the ambulance arrived. Kamau testified

that she has scars from both wounds and weakness and limited movement in her arms.

Officer Juan Velez with the Little Rock Police Department testified that on June 29,

he served Maina with the order of protection and explained its contents to him, including

that he was not allowed to be at the apartment or contact Kamau in any way.

Kibwana testified that when Maina entered the apartment through the window, he

threw the order of protection in Kamau’s face and angrily asked, “What is this?” Kibwana

stated that Maina told her, “You, get out of here.” Maina then punched Kamau’s face,

pushed her toward the kitchen, and grabbed a knife from the block on top of the refrigerator.

Kibwana ran to the window and screamed for help, calling out, “Help me. Someone is trying

to kill us.” Kamau then told Kibwana to hide the knives and threw the block, though

Kibwana could not remember exactly where Kamau threw it. At that point, Maina stabbed

Kamau, and Kibwana saw blood on Kamau’s shoulder. Maina pushed Kamau toward the

dining table and “was coming after [Kibwana] with a knife.” Kamau grabbed a dining chair,

“held [it] towards [Kibwana] and then held the chair against Maina’s chest and pushed him

toward the wall.” Kibwana stated that she grabbed the lamp and hit Maina’s hand with it.

Maina dropped the knife, and she and Kamau were able to escape.

Maina moved for a directed verdict regarding the aggravated-residential-burglary

charge, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he entered the

apartment intending to commit domestic battery or that he intended to cause serious

physical injury or death to Kamau. Maina also contended that there was no evidence that he

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committed aggravated assault on Kibwana because there was no testimony that he touched

her at all. He pointed out an inconsistency in the women’s testimony, arguing that Kibwana

testified that he was holding a knife when he went toward her, but Kamau had not stated

that he had knife in his hand until after he ran in Kibwana’s direction. At the close of all

the evidence, Maina renewed his motion for directed verdict, which was again denied. The

jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges, and Maina was sentenced to an aggregate term of

thirty-six years’ incarceration in the Arkansas Division of Correction.

Maina timely filed his notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Motions for directed verdict are treated as challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence. Burmingham v. State, 342 Ark. 95, 27 S.W.3d 351 (2000). In a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State

and consider only the evidence that supports the conviction. Cluck v. State, 365 Ark. 166,

226 S.W.3d 780 (2006). The appellate courts determine whether the evidence was

substantial. Wyles v. State, 368 Ark. 646, 249 S.W.3d 782 (2007). Evidence is sufficient if it

is of such character and force that it, with reasonable certainty, compels a conclusion one

way or the other without resort to speculation or conjecture. Id. The credibility of witnesses

is an issue for the jury. Kinsey v. State, 2016 Ark. 393, 503 S.W.3d 772. The trier of fact is

free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting

testimony and inconsistent evidence. Id.

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1. Aggravated residential burglary

Maina argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence that he had the

requisite intent to commit domestic battery when he entered the apartment. His argument

is not well taken.1

A person commits aggravated residential burglary if he or she commits residential

burglary, as defined in section 5-39-201, of a residential occupiable structure occupied by any

person, and he or she (1) is armed with a deadly weapon or represents by word or conduct

that he or she is armed with a deadly weapon; or (2) inflicts or attempts to inflict death or

serious physical injury upon another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-204(a) (Supp. 2023). A

person commits residential burglary if he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a residential

occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing in the structure any

offense punishable by imprisonment. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201(a)(1) (Supp. 2023). Serious

physical injury is defined as a physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that

causes protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted

impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(21)

(Supp. 2023).

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For clarification of his point on appeal, we note that Maina concedes in his brief that
he committed residential burglary by violating the protective order, stating that “[i]t was clear
from the evidence that Appellant had been served with an order of protection and was
neither invited to nor had permission to be at the home of the alleged victim.” Instead,
Maina focuses on the aggravated-residential-battery statutory requirement that he had the
intent to cause serious physical injury or death, which is addressed in our discussion of the
jury’s decision that Maina had the intent to commit domestic battery when he entered the
apartment.

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A criminal defendant’s state of mind is seldom capable of proof by direct evidence

and must usually be inferred from the circumstances. Hooks v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 728, at

5, 431 S.W.3d 333, 335. A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable

consequences of his or her actions. Coggin v. State, 356 Ark. 424, 156 S.W.3d 712 (2004).

Intent also can be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner of use, and the nature,

extent, and location of the trauma suffered by the victim. Wyles, supra. The existence of

criminal intent or purpose is a matter for the jury to determine when criminal intent may be

reasonably inferred from the evidence. Hooks, supra. The fact-finder does not view each fact

in isolation but rather may consider the evidence as a whole. Harjo v. State, 2017 Ark. App.

337, 522 S.W.3d 839. The facts proved incident to an unlawful entry must show

circumstances of such probative force as to reasonably warrant the inference of the purpose

on the part of the accused to commit the underlying crime, other than the entry itself. Id.

Maina contends the instant case is analogous to Whitworth v. State, 2017 Ark. App.

462, at 1, 531 S.W.3d 407, 409; however, Whitworth is distinguishable. In Whitworth, the

appellant was either climbing in or out of a window of his ex-girlfriend’s house when the

woman’s daughter, who was in the home, saw him and screamed. At the time, Whitworth

was carrying a small bag, about six inches long. He was charged with residential burglary, and

the State alleged that he intended to commit theft of property when he entered the home.

This court held that the facts did not support his conviction for residential burglary because

there was no evidence that he had the intent to deprive anyone of his or her property. In the

instant case, from the evidence discussed above, the jury did not have to resort to speculation

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or conjecture to determine that the purpose of Maina’s illegal entry into the home was to

commit domestic battery. The State presented evidence that Kamau obtained the protective

order after a discussion with Maina’s mother, and Kamau became worried for her safety.

Officer Velez testified that he explained the terms of the protective order to Maina the day

before the attack. In light of this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that when

Maina illegally entered the apartment and threw the protective order in Kamau’s face, asking

her, “What is this?,” he was not merely seeking information, as he contends. Moreover, the

State presented evidence that Maina had lived in the apartment, he knew where the knives

were kept, and he proceeded toward the knives immediately after he had struck and pushed

Kamau. Eventually, Maina was able to grab a knife and stab Kumau twice, seriously injuring

her. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Maina entered the apartment

intending to commit domestic battery, and we affirm his conviction for aggravated

residential burglary.

2. Aggravated assault

Maina also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he created a

substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to Kibwana because there was no

evidence that he “actually went toward Kibwana with a knife or engaged in any conduct that

created any danger to Kibwana.” His argument is not well taken.

A person commits aggravated assault if, under circumstances manifesting extreme

indifference to the value of human life, he or she purposely engages in conduct that creates

a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person. Ark. Code Ann.

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§ 5-13-204(a)(1) (Supp. 2023). A person acts purposely when it is his conscious object to

engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1)

(Repl. 2013). As discussed above, intent “may be inferred from the facts and circumstances

shown in evidence.” Stuart v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 131, at 4, 596 S.W.3d 552, 554. The

aggravated-assault statute does not require that a weapon actually be used or that the victim

actually fear for his or her safety but requires a “substantial danger of death or injury to

another person.” Id. (quoting Schwede v. State, 49 Ark. App. 87, 89, 896 S.W.2d 454, 455

(1995)).

Maina argues that the evidence proves that he never wielded a knife toward Kibwana

or made any verbal threats to her, and Kamau’s testimony that he obtained a knife after she

threw the block across the room outweighs Kibwana’s testimony that he had a knife in his

hand when he ran toward her. Maina contends that this court should interpret the testimony

to mean that he was running toward the knife block, not Kibwana, and she was able to move

away from him. We hold that substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion. See Wyles,

supra.

Kibwana stated that Maina ran toward her wielding a knife, and he had already

stabbed Kamau once; thus, the jury could have reasonably inferred that he ran toward

Kibwana with a knife in hand intending to cause her serious injury or death. Maina likens

the instant case to Swaim v. State, 78 Ark. App. 176, 79 S.W.3d 853 (2002), claiming that

“merely holding a knife did not create a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury

to Kibwana, especially considering none of his actions were directed towards Kibwana.”

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Swaim is distinguishable. In Swaim, this court reversed Swaim’s conviction of aggravated

assault against a police officer because, although Swaim was holding a gun, he did not

threaten or point it at anyone. Here, there was testimony Maina was not simply holding a

knife. He hit Kamau, stabbed her, and ran toward Kibwana with the knife. The jury was free

to believe all or part of Kamau’s and Kibwana’s testimony and may resolve any conflicts or

inconsistencies in their testimony. See Kinsey, supra. The facts and circumstances in evidence

support the jury’s conclusion that Maina consciously engaged in conduct that placed

Kibwana in danger of death or serious injury. See Stuart, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and HARRISON, J., agree.

Law Offices of John Wesley Hall, by: Samantha J. Carpenter, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Walker K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen.; and Michael Frost,

Law Student Admitted to Practice Pursuant to Rule XV of the Rules Governing Admission

to the Bar of the Supreme Court under the Supervision of Darnisa Evans Johnson, Deputy

Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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