Lorenzo Lamont Allen v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 552
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CR-23-791

Opinion Delivered November 6, 2024

LORENZO LAMONT ALLEN APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN
APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 18CR-23-108]
V.
HONORABLE RANDY F. PHILHOURS,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED; REMANDED TO
CORRECT SENTENCING ORDER

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

Appellant Lorenzo Lamont Allen appeals after he was convicted by a Crittenden

County Circuit Court jury of first-degree murder with a firearm employed during the

commission of the offense, terroristic act, and six counts of aggravated assault. He was

sentenced to serve an aggregate of 780 months’ incarceration. On appeal, appellant

contends that (1) the circuit court erred when it denied his motion for directed verdict; and

(2) the circuit court erred in allowing testimony in violation of Arkansas Rules of Evidence

404(b) and 403. We affirm appellant’s convictions but remand for the limited purpose of

correcting the sentencing order.

I. Relevant Facts

Late in the evening on October 29, 2022, appellant went to Donna Christley’s home

to insist that he be allowed to speak with Donna’s daughter, Tiara Christley. Appellant shot
and killed Donna underneath the carport of her home and fired a second shot into Donna’s

home with Donna’s two adult daughters and four minor grandchildren inside. Appellant

was arrested and charged by amended criminal information with first-degree murder in

violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-10-102 (Supp. 2023), a Class Y felony;

terroristic act in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-13-310 (Repl. 2013), a Class

B felony; and six counts of aggravated assault in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated

section 5-13-204 (Supp. 2023), a Class D felony. The State alleged that appellant’s sentence

should be enhanced pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-120 (Supp. 2023)

for having employed a firearm as a means of committing the felony offense and pursuant to

Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-702 (Supp. 2023) for having committed a felony

involving homicide in the presence of a child.

Prior to trial, on July 24, 2023, the State filed a motion in limine to admit evidence

of appellant’s prior bad acts against Tiara Christley that occurred on August 2, 2022, and

September 27, 2022. The State argued that the evidence showed that appellant had “a

history of carrying a firearm and firing at the victim’s family” and was therefore “relevant to

the issue of [appellant’s] mental state at the time of the shooting and also [to] indicate plan,

motive, opportunity and absence of mistake or accident” under Arkansas Rule of Evidence

404(b). Appellant opposed the State’s motion, arguing that evidence of the events that

occurred on August 2, 2022, and September 27, 2022, were not independently relevant

because the prior incidents “involve[ed] a third party and not the actual victim in this

matter,” and even if the evidence were relevant, its probative value was substantially

2
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. After a pretrial conference, the circuit court

ruled that it would take the matter under advisement and rule on it when the issue arose

during trial.

A jury trial was held on August 22–23, 2023, and the following evidence was

presented. Tiara testified that she and appellant met on a dating website in May 2022. They

dated until she broke up with him two or three months later. On October 29, 2022,

following her older sister’s funeral, and after working for Door Dash, Tiara went to her

mother’s home, where her twelve-year-old child was staying. Also at the home that evening

was Donna Christley, Tiara’s mother; Kiara Christley, Tiara’s twin sister; and Kiara’s three

minor children, ages ten, seven, and four.

Tiara testified that appellant started “calling and calling” late that evening. She

answered to tell him that she was unavailable and would call him back. At that time, Tiara

was in the living room with the children preparing them for bed, and Donna and Kiara were

in the bedrooms. Appellant called a few more times, and Tiara eventually answered, but she

refused appellant’s repeated demands that she “come outside.” Tiara testified that at that

point, the carport door “swung open” as she and the children were attempting to sleep in

the living room of the house. Appellant walked into the house, took hold of Tiara’s arms,

and pulled her toward the door. Tiara testified that he “was tugging pretty hard,” causing

her to fall into a table. The noise from the struggle between appellant and Tiara ultimately

caused Kiara and Donna to come out of their bedrooms, and the four of them walked into

the kitchen, where appellant was “steadily telling [Donna] that he wants to talk to [Tiara].”

3
Donna responded that Tiara did not want to talk to him, and then she took appellant outside

to talk.

Tiara and Kiara later followed them outside. Tiara said that she had planned to “get

in [her] car and leave” because “[appellant] came there for [her] and [her] mom was trying . .

. [to] talk him down and tell him that he was to go, and he [was] still there.” Appellant,

however, prevented Tiara from driving away by holding her car door open. After Tiara and

Kiara went back into the house, they watched and listened to the conversation between

appellant and Donna on a monitor showing live views from the surveillance cameras “set up

around the house,” including the carport. According to Tiara, the monitor was located next

to the door leading to the carport, and they could see and hear “everything . . . going on.”

Tiara described the conversation between Donna and appellant as initially “calm,”

but frustrations became high when Donna stood in front of the carport door and told

appellant he could not go back into the house. According to Tiara, her mother “was getting

frustrated,” and appellant “was already frustrated trying to get a point across, and [her] mom

kept telling him to leave[.]” Then, as Donna continued to stand at the carport door with

appellant, Tiara saw appellant pull a “black handgun with [an] extended clip” from the

waistband of his pants and fire two shots “right behind one another.” The first shot was

fired in Donna’s direction, causing her to fall. The second shot went in “the window under

the carport [to the living room] where the kids sleep.”

Tiara testified that she and her sister then braced themselves against the carport door

as appellant attempted to kick his way inside. When he failed to gain entry through the

4
carport door, appellant went to the back deck door and started trying to kick that in. Tiara

stated that she, her sister, and their children ran to the back of the house and hid in

bedrooms until the police arrived.

State’s exhibit 32, video-surveillance footage from the house next door, was played for

the jury as Tiara testified. The neighbor’s camera was directed toward Donna’s carport.

Although it did not clearly show appellant shoot Donna since they had moved further

underneath the carport by that point, it depicted several of the other events that Tiara

described in her testimony, including appellant holding Tiara’s car door open and

preventing her from leaving. Tiara identified appellant as the man in the video that was

played for the jury, and she told the jury that she could identify appellant “because [she]

dated him” and knew “exactly what he looked like.”

Over appellant’s objection, Tiara further testified about the two previous incidents

involving appellant that occurred on August 2, 2022, and September 27, 2022. Appellant

and the State repeated their same arguments about the issue as they did at the pretrial

conference, and the circuit court overruled appellant’s objection. Tiara testified that on

August 2, 2022, after she broke up with appellant, appellant unexpectedly appeared at her

house. She said that she immediately “called the [police] and told them that [her] ex-

boyfriend was trying to break into [her] house, and that he had a gun.” Tiara testified that

appellant appeared again at her house on September 27, 2022. This time, he broke her back

window and entered her house. Tiara testified that appellant was armed with a black gun

“with an extended clip” and refused her numerous requests to leave. Tiara testified that she

5
was able to finally leave when she took her children to school. When she was driving back

and stopped at a stop sign, she saw appellant pull out his gun and shoot at her. She “pulled

off,” and none of appellant’s shots ended up hitting her or her vehicle.

Detective Chad Davis, the lead detective from the West Memphis Police Department,

testified that when he first arrived, he saw Donna on her back underneath the carport. There

was blood on her head and on the ground next to her head. Detective Davis explained that

he found two 9mm shell casings next to Donna’s body. He also found bullet fragments

located behind the couch inside the house. Detective Davis was subsequently able to review

and download the surveillance video from the residence next door that had been played for

the jury.

Detective Nicholas Anderson, also a detective with the West Memphis Police

Department, testified that he interviewed Tiara and Kiara. He confirmed that Tiara and

Kiara both identified appellant as the individual who had shot Donna after the photographic

lineups.

Dr. Jennifer Forsyth, a forensic pathologist and the medical examiner who examined

Donna’s body, confirmed that she was killed by a single gunshot wound to her head and that

the manner of death was homicide. She opined that Donna was shot from within one to

three feet away.

Steve Hargis, employed as an expert in firearms and toolmarks by the Arkansas State

Crime Laboratory, testified that he examined a copper jacket from a bullet, a lead core from

a bullet, a damaged copper jacket fragment from a bullet, a damaged lead core fragment, and

6
two expended cartridge cases. Hargis testified that the lead core and the lead core fragment

were of no value for microscopic comparison examination. However, he determined that

the damaged jacket from the victim, the damaged copper jacket fragment, and the two

expended cartridge cases were all fired from the same firearm.

After the State rested, appellant moved for a directed verdict on all counts. Relevant

to the issues on appeal, appellant argued that the State failed to prove that appellant’s actions

were purposeful as required to commit the offenses of first-degree murder, terroristic act,

and aggravated assault. The circuit court denied the motion, and appellant then rested

without introducing any further evidence. Appellant renewed his motion for directed

verdict, which the circuit court also denied.

The jury found appellant guilty of first-degree murder, terroristic act, and six counts

of aggravated assault; the jury also found that appellant had employed a firearm during the

commission of the offense. He was sentenced to serve an aggregate of 780 months’

incarceration. This appeal followed.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491. In reviewing a sufficiency

challenge, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only

the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. We will affirm a judgment of conviction if

substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of

sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one

7
way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence

may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s

guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Collins v. State, 2021 Ark. 35,

617 S.W.3d 701. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to

decide. Id. Further, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the

trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions

of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Armstrong, supra.

This court has noted that a criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is seldom

apparent. Benton v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 223, 599 S.W.3d 353. One’s intent or purpose,

being a state of mind, can seldom be positively known to others, so it ordinarily cannot be

shown by direct evidence but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Id. Because

intent cannot be proved by direct evidence, the fact-finder is allowed to draw on common

knowledge and experience to infer it from the circumstances. Id. Because of the difficulty

in ascertaining a defendant’s intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person

intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id.

In relevant part, a person commits the crime of first-degree murder if “[w]ith a purpose

of causing the death of another person, the person causes the death of another person[.]”

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-103(a)(2) (Repl. 2013). “A person commits a terroristic act if, while

not in the commission of a lawful act, the person . . . [s]hoots at an occupiable structure with

the purpose to cause injury to a person or damage to property.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-

310(a). “A person acts purposely with respect to his or her conduct or a result of his or her

8
conduct when it is the person’s conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to

cause the result[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2013).

On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

convictions for first-degree murder and terroristic act. He argues as he did below that he

lacked the purposeful intent to harm anyone and states that Tiara even testified at trial that

he said that he was on the property because he wanted to talk to her. However, appellant’s

argument ignores the other testimony presented from which the jury could infer his intent.

Tiara testified that she watched appellant on the monitor pull a black handgun from his

waistband and fire the first shot at her mother and the second shot into the window under

the carport into the living room where the children were sleeping. Appellant knew that

Tiara, Kiara, and children were in the house when he fired the second shot into the house.

Further, the medical examiner opined that Donna had been shot from within one to three

feet away. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that

substantial evidence supports the verdict and affirm.

III. Prior Bad Acts

Next, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in allowing Tiara to testify regarding

the August 2, 2022, and September 27, 2022, incidents in violation of Arkansas Rules of

Evidence 404(b) and 403. He more specifically argues that the prior bad acts were not

independently relevant to the main issue but were introduced to merely prove that he was a

criminal. Appellant explains that the prior incidents related to Tiara and therefore were not

relevant to prove his intent to shoot Donna. Moreover, he argues that the incidents were

9
“more confusing and prejudicial than probative.” Appellant finally argues that any error

could not be held harmless because the evidence was prejudicial and confused the jury

regarding who the victim was in this case and because the evidence against him was not

overwhelming. We disagree.

The admission or rejection of testimony is a matter within the circuit court’s sound

discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of that discretion and

a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Gonzales v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 600, 589 S.W.3d

505. An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the

circuit court’s decision but requires that the circuit court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly,

or without due consideration. Id.

Arkansas Rules of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs,

or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident.” Therefore, evidence is not admissible under Rule 404(b) simply to show a prior

bad act. Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 243, 383 S.W.3d 325. Rather, the test for admissibility

under Rule 404(b) is whether the evidence is independently relevant, which means it must

have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Id. Any

circumstance that links a defendant to the crime or raises a possible motive for the crime is

independently relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b). Id.

10
The analysis of whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) is not resolved in a

vacuum. Gonzales, supra. While evidence of other crimes or bad acts may be independently

relevant and therefore admissible under Rule 404(b), that evidence must also be probative

and satisfy Rule 403. This court gives considerable leeway to the circuit court to determine

whether the circumstances of the prior crimes and the crimes at hand are sufficiently similar

to warrant admission under Rule 404(b). See Vance, supra; Sasser v. State, 321 Ark. 438, 902

S.W.2d 773 (1995). When offered as Rule 404(b) evidence, the prior bad act need not have

the degree of similarity that is required for evidence of modus operandi. Fells v. State, 362

Ark. 77, 207 S.W.3d 498 (2005).

Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403 provides that “evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or

needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Our supreme court has noted that evidence

offered by the State in a criminal trial is likely to be prejudicial to the defendant to some

degree, otherwise it would not be offered. Vance, supra; Rounsaville v. State, 2009 Ark. 479,

346 S.W.3d 289. Nevertheless, the evidence should not be excluded under Rule 403 unless

the defendant can show that the evidence lacks probative value in view of the risk of unfair

prejudice. Vance, supra. This court reviews a circuit court’s ruling under Rule 403 for an

abuse of discretion. Id. While the Rule 404(b) evidence here may have been prejudicial, as

most 404(b) evidence is, the question under Rule 403 is whether its probative value was

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

11
We agree with the State that the evidence here was independently relevant under

Rule 404(b) and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice. Contrary to his argument, appellant’s previous conduct toward Tiara was

directly related to his conduct on October 29, 2022. Appellant was charged with and

convicted of first-degree murder, terroristic act, and six counts of aggravated assault against

Tiara, Kiara, and the four children inside the house. In other words, Donna was not the

only victim as appellant attempts to allege. The evidence of appellant’s previous two attempts

to force contact with Tiara and his attempt to shoot at Tiara’s vehicle when he failed to

succeed were independently relevant to prove his motive and intent in Donna’s murder as

well as his lack of mistake or accident in the commission of the terroristic act and aggravated

assaults. On October 29, 2022, just like before, appellant insisted on talking to Tiara.

However, after Donna stood in his way and repeatedly told him to leave, appellant shot her

and then shot into the house when he knew Tiara, Kiara, and the children were inside.

Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting this

evidence.

Moreover, we agree with the State that any error was harmless. We have held that

even if a circuit court errs in admitting evidence, when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming

and the error is slight, we can declare that the error was harmless and affirm the conviction.

Williams v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 507, 505 S.W.3d 234. Here, overwhelming evidence

supported appellant’s convictions. Tiara positively identified appellant as the man whom

she saw shoot her mother and fire a second shot into the living room of the house. The jury

12
also saw the surveillance video from the neighbor’s house that corroborated Tiara’s

testimony. As such, even if there was any error in admitting the evidence about the incidents

that occurred on August 2, 2022, and September 27, 2022, the error was harmless, and we

affirm.

IV. Sentencing Order

Finally, we note that appellant’s sentencing order contains a clerical error that must

be corrected. Although it is undisputed that appellant was sentenced to serve an aggregate

of 780 months’ imprisonment and the sentencing order accurately reflects his sentences for

each conviction, the sentencing order erroneously calculates that appellant was sentenced to

serve an aggregate of 1212 months’ imprisonment. We therefore remand for the circuit

court to correct the amended sentencing order. See Palmer v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 178, 663

S.W.3d 436 (remanding the case to the circuit court for the limited purpose of entering an

amended sentencing order that corrects a clerical error).

Affirmed; remanded to correct sentencing order.

ABRAMSON and VIRDEN, JJ., agree.

Dusti Standridge, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Lauren Elizabeth Heil, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

13