Ronnie Odell Parker v. State of Alabama (Appeal from Clarke Circuit Court: CC-91-68 and CC-91-68.90)

Rel: November 8, 2024

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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
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CR-2024-0300
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Ronnie Odell Parker

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Clarke Circuit Court
(CC-91-68 and CC-91-68.90)

MINOR, Judge.

In this appeal, we consider Ronnie Odell Parker's claim that the

Clarke Circuit Court erred in summarily dismissing his 10th petition for

postconviction relief under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., in which Parker—

again—challenged the sentence for his 1991 guilty-plea conviction for

first-degree sexual abuse. For the reasons below, we affirm the judgment
CR-2024-0300

of the circuit court, and we encourage that court to consider adopting

sanctions against Parker to prevent him from submitting further

frivolous filings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Parker pleaded guilty in 1991 to first-degree sexual abuse and was

sentenced as a habitual offender to 35 years' imprisonment. He did not

appeal his conviction or sentence. In the more than three decades since

his conviction and sentence became final, Parker has filed at least 10

Rule 32 petitions challenging his conviction and sentence.1

Parker filed this petition in June 2023.2 In the petition, Parker

1This Court's records include affirmances of judgments denying
several of Parker's petitions. See, e.g., Parker v. State (No. CR-17-0445),
279 So. 3d 44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018) (table); Parker v. State (No. CR-13-
1729), 207 So. 3d 816 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015) (table); Parker v. State (No.
CR-10-1521), 130 So. 3d 585 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (table); Parker v.
State (No. CR-06-1942), 21 So. 3d 801 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (table);
Parker v. State (No. CR-05-0856), 978 So. 2d 82 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006)
(table); and Parker v. State (No. CR-98-1353), 778 So. 2d 878 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1999) (table). See also Nettles v. State, 731 So. 2d 626, 629 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1998) ("[T]his Court may take judicial notice of its own
records." (citing Hull v. State, 607 So. 2d 369, 371 n.1 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992)).

2In case no. CR-2023-0653, this Court dismissed Parker's appeal

from the circuit court's order purporting to dismiss this petition. The
record on return to remand showed that the circuit court had no
jurisdiction over the petition because Parker had not paid the filing fee,
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alleged (1) that the State did not offer certified copies of the prior

convictions used to enhance his sentence under the Habitual Felony

Offender Act ("HFOA"), see § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, and did not prove

that he had been represented by counsel for those convictions, and (2)

that the presumptive sentencing standards apply retroactively to his

conviction for first-degree sexual abuse. (C. 27.) In its motion to dismiss

the petition, the State argued that the claims (1) were precluded because

Parker could have raised them at trial but did not, (2) were successive,

(3) were untimely, and (4) lacked merit. (C. 36.) The circuit court

summarily dismissed the petition. (C. 38.) Parker's motion for

reconsideration was denied by operation of law. See Matthews v. State,

and the circuit court had not granted a request to proceed in forma
pauperis.

After our dismissal, the circuit court granted Parker's in forma
pauperis request. (C. 34.) The record shows, however, that Parker had
deposits of $3,590.34 in his inmate account in the 12 months before he
filed his in forma pauperis request. Although the record does not show
the amount of the filing fee in the Clarke Circuit Court, the circuit court
likely had discretion to deny Parker's in forma pauperis request. See Ex
parte Wyre, 74 So. 3d 479, 483 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) ("[A]n inmate who
has appreciably more than the amount necessary to pay a filing fee
deposited in his inmate account in the 12 months preceding the filing of
an [in forma pauperis] request is not indigent as that term is defined in
Rule 6.3(a), Ala. R. Crim. P.").
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363 So. 3d 1028, 1031 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021). Parker timely appealed.

(C. 45.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P., permits a circuit court to
summarily dismiss a Rule 32 petition if the claims in the
petition are insufficiently pleaded, precluded, or without
merit. This Court reviews a circuit court's summary dismissal
of a Rule 32 petition for an abuse of discretion. Lee v. State,
44 So. 3d 1145, 1149 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). Under most
circumstances, 'we may affirm a ruling if it is correct for any
reason.' Bush v. State, 92 So. 3d 121, 134 (Ala. Crim. App.
2009)."

Spain v. State, 336 So. 3d 1167, 1171 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Parker reiterates only his claim that the State did not

properly prove the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence under

the HFOA.3 This claim is nonjurisdictional and thus subject to the

procedural bars. See, e.g., Ex parte Batey, 958 So. 2d 339, 343 (Ala. 2006)

("Alabama courts have repeatedly held that an argument about the

3Parker abandons his presumptive-sentencing-standards claim.
Thus, we will not review it. See Jones v. State, 104 So. 3d 296, 297 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2012) ("Other claims raised in [the] petition were not pursued
on appeal and, therefore, those claims are deemed abandoned. See, e.g.,
Brownlee v. State, 666 So. 2d 91, 93 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) ('We will not
review issues not listed and argued in brief.').").
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adequacy of the State's evidence is not jurisdictional and is therefore

barred by Rule 32.2. Thus, we hold that Batey's argument concerning

the 'sufficiency ... of the State's evidence' of his prior felony convictions

for enhancement purposes is procedurally barred."). The circuit court

properly dismissed the claim as untimely under Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.

Crim. P., because it was filed more than two years4 after Parker's

conviction became final, and as precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3), Ala. R.

Crim. P., because Parker could have raised it at trial but did not.

The circuit court also properly dismissed the claim as successive

under Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.:

"If a petitioner has previously filed a petition that challenges
any judgment, all subsequent petitions by that petitioner
challenging any judgment arising out of that same trial or
guilty-plea proceeding shall be treated as successive petitions
under this rule. The court shall not grant relief on a successive
petition on the same or similar grounds on behalf of the same
petitioner. A successive petition on different grounds shall be
denied unless (1) the petitioner is entitled to relief on the
ground that the court was without jurisdiction to render a
judgment or to impose sentence or (2) the petitioner shows
both that good cause exists why the new ground or grounds
were not known or could not have been ascertained through

4Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., was amended effective August 1,

2002, to reduce the limitations period from two years to one year. The
two-year limitations period applies, however, to cases like Parker's that
became final before August 1, 2001. See Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344
(Ala. Crim. App. 2006).
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reasonable diligence when the first petition was heard, and
that failure to entertain the petition will result in a
miscarriage of justice."

Rule 32.2(b). This Court's records in the appeal of the judgment denying

Parker's 10th petition show that he has already raised the claim that the

State did not prove he was represented by counsel in the proceedings

resulting in the prior convictions that were used to enhance his sentence.

(Record in CR-17-0445, 279 So. 3d 44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018) (table), C.

16-17.) Our records in CR-13-1729, 207 So. 3d 816 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015)

(table), show that there he challenged the State's proof of his prior felony

convictions. (Record in CR-13-1729, C. 83 ("There was no proof of the

priors which was shown to the trial court ….").) As the State asserted in

July 2016, Parker's claims "have been addressed ad nauseam and have

been found meritless." (Record in CR-17-0445, C. 44.)

The circuit court did not err in summarily dismissing the petition.

Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P.

As noted, Parker has filed multiple petitions challenging his 1991

conviction and sentence.

"[A]llowing [Parker] to file multiple petitions for
postconviction relief in which his claims are either precluded
or without merit wastes scarce judicial resources. Therefore,
[we] would encourage the circuit court to consider adopting

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sanctions like those proposed in Peoples v. State, 531 So. 2d
323 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), and Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d
1069 (11th Cir. 1986), to prevent future frivolous litigation on
the part of [Parker] and other similarly situated inmates. See
Ex parte Thompson, 38 So. 3d 119 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)."

Bennett v. State, 77 So. 3d 174, 174 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (Kellum, J.,

concurring specially). See also Ex parte Marbury, 293 So. 3d 867, 867

(Ala. 2019) (Sellers, J., concurring specially) ("Trial courts, as the

gatekeepers of postconviction relief, should carefully consider adopting

appropriate measures to prevent the repeated filing of frivolous petitions

for postconviction relief that, even if viewed in a light most favorable to

the defendant, have no chance of success. ... [T]his case serves as an

example of the type of case in which trial courts throughout Alabama

should adopt sanctions against 'frequent filers' to prevent frivolous filings

that serve only to needlessly increase the workload of courts that have

significant and more meritorious cases to consider."). The circuit court in

2017 adopted measures to prevent Parker from continuing to burden the

system with the same meritless claims. (Record in CR-17-0445, C. 119.)

We urge the circuit court to enforce those measures and, if necessary, to

adopt new measures to stop Parker from burdening the system with

meritless claims. Enough is enough.

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CR-2024-0300

CONCLUSION

The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum, McCool, and Cole, JJ., concur.

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