Kayla Dykes v. Joshua Dykes

Rel: May 15, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CL-2025-0536
_________________________

Kayla Dykes

v.

Joshua Dykes

Appeal from Dallas Circuit Court
(DR-24-900056)

BOWDEN, Judge.

Kayla Dykes ("the wife") appeals from the February 25, 2025,

judgment of the Dallas Circuit Court ("the circuit court") divorcing her

from Joshua Dykes ("the husband") and, among other things, awarding

the husband sole physical custody of their minor child, K.E.D. ("the
CL-2025-0536

child"). The wife raises several issues on appeal, including that the circuit

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody

determination regarding the child under Alabama's version of the

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the

UCCJEA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq.

We do not reach the merits of the wife's arguments, however,

because she failed to timely invoke this court's appellate jurisdiction by

filing a notice of appeal within 42 days of the entry of the February 25,

2025, divorce judgment. The wife did send an e-mail to an employee in

the circuit court clerk's office after the entry of the February 25, 2025,

divorce judgment, and the circuit court construed that e-mail as a

postjudgment motion. But, under the existing rules and orders of the

Supreme Court of Alabama, a document cannot be "filed" by e-mailing it

to a trial-court clerk's office. Thus, the wife's e-mail did not suspend the

time to file a notice of appeal, and the wife had until April 8, 2025, to file

a notice of appeal from the February 25, 2025, divorce judgment. The wife

filed her notice of appeal on July 9, 2025. Therefore, we dismiss the wife's

appeal as untimely.

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Procedural History

The husband, acting pro se, filed a complaint for a divorce on April

8, 2024. The husband simultaneously filed, among other things, a

handwritten settlement agreement providing, in part, that the wife

would have "sole primary custody" of the child and that the husband

would have visitation "when able to do so based on work schedule."

After the husband had commenced the underlying divorce action,

the wife filed a child-custody action concerning the child in North

Carolina. The respective testimony of the parties indicates that the North

Carolina court dismissed the wife's child-custody action in deference to

the underlying divorce action.

On July 30, 2024, the husband, represented by an attorney, filed a

"notice of recission of handwritten agreement." That same day, the

husband filed a "motion for pendente lite relief," requesting, among other

things, sole physical custody of the child.

On October 2, 2024, the husband filed an amended complaint,

requesting, among other things, sole physical custody of the child. Later

that same day, the circuit court held a hearing and entered a pendente

lite order awarding the parties joint legal and joint physical custody of

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the child, with physical custody of the child alternating between the

parties from month to month.

The circuit court held a hearing on February 12, 2025. The parties

were instructed at the conclusion of that hearing to file proposed orders.

The husband filed a proposed order, and the wife filed what appear to be

screenshot images of a rental agreement for a house located in Virginia.

The circuit court subsequently entered the divorce judgment on

February 25, 2025, essentially adopting the husband's proposed order in

its entirety. Among other things, the circuit court awarded the husband

sole physical custody of the child.

Later that same day, February 25, 2025, the wife sent an e-mail to

Betty Lewis, an employee in the circuit-court clerk's office. The wife's e-

mail to Lewis was "written in response to the [husband's] proposed

order." The wife objected to the husband's proposed order on several

grounds and asked the circuit court to "please consider all findings of this

case be reviewed accuracy [sic] before making a ruling," even though the

circuit court had already entered the February 25, 2025, divorce

judgment.

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Lewis forwarded a copy of the wife's e-mail to the circuit-court

judge, noting that the wife's e-mail concerned the husband's proposed

order and that the divorce judgment had already been entered. The

circuit-court judge instructed Lewis to "have the case set for Motion to

Set Aside Decree/[New] Trial." The case-action summary indicates that

Lewis entered a "Motion to Reconsider" into the record on February 28,

2025. A copy of the wife's e-mail to Lewis was included in the record on

appeal; however, the copy of the wife's e-mail lacks an electronic-filing

stamp that would indicate that it was electronically filed using the

AlaFile electronic-filing system or a physical stamp that would indicate

that it was filed in person at the circuit-court clerk's office.

The circuit court entered an order on March 5, 2025, stating that

the wife's "motion to reconsider … is hereby pending" and set a hearing

for May 14, 2025. (Capitalization in original removed.) The wife

subsequently sent another e-mail to Lewis on March 12, 2025, suggesting

that the circuit court had set aside the divorce judgment when it entered

the March 5, 2025, order. The wife requested that the circuit court

"consider entering this motion until [the May 14, 2025, hearing]" so that

the parties could continue the month-to-month joint-custody

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arrangement under the pendente lite order. The circuit court entered an

order on March 18, 2025, noting that it had treated the wife's March 12,

2025, e-mail to Lewis as a request to stay the enforcement of the divorce

judgment, and it stayed the enforcement of the divorce judgment pending

the May 14, 2025, hearing. That same day, for the first time in the

matter, an attorney filed a notice of appearance on behalf of the wife.

During the May 14, 2025, hearing, the circuit-court judge noted

that he had treated the wife's February 25, 2025, e-mail to Lewis as a

"motion to reconsider." The wife's attorney argued during that hearing

that, when the divorce action was commenced, Alabama was not the

child's "home state" and that the circuit court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination regarding the

child under Alabama's version of the UCCJEA. The circuit court

disagreed, stating that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to award

custody of the child.1

1Although we do not reach the merits of the wife's arguments about

the UCCJEA on appeal, we note that Alabama's version of the UCCJEA
applies to a "child custody proceeding," which includes, but is not limited
to, a child-custody action. See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-102(4) (defining a
"child custody proceeding" as: "A proceeding in a court in which legal
custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.
The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse,
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The circuit court subsequently entered an order "reset[ting]" the

case for a hearing on August 18, 2025, and instructing the wife "to

properly plead and file her claim."2

dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and
protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear."
(emphasis added)). Thus, an Alabama trial court must have jurisdiction
under Alabama's version of the UCCJEA to make a child-custody
determination in a divorce action involving interstate issues, such as the
underlying divorce action. See, e.g., Ex parte Cate, 303 So. 3d 142, 149
(Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (granting, in part, the mother's petition for a writ
of mandamus so that the trial court could determine the issue of its
jurisdiction to make a child-custody determination in a divorce action
under Alabama's version of the UCCJEA ("The trial court's comments …
indicate that it did not consider the various grounds under § 30-3B-201[,
Ala. Code 1975,] in determining that it had jurisdiction over custody
issues [in a divorce action]. Rather, those comments and the arguments
of the parties indicate that the trial court relied solely on the father's
apparent residence in Alabama for the six months preceding his
commencement [of the divorce action when it concluded that it had
jurisdiction over custody issues under § 30-2-5, Ala. Code 1975].")).

2The record indicates that the circuit court "reset" the case to allow

the wife to file either a petition to modify the child's custody based on the
custody-modification standard set forth in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So.
2d 863 (Ala. 1984), or a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
regarding newly discovered evidence. Although the case was "reset" for
another hearing, neither the filing of a petition to modify child custody
nor a Rule 60(b) motion would affect the finality of the underlying
judgment. Cf. T.J.H. v. S.N.F., 960 So. 2d 669, 673 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)
(holding that the trial court's order denying the father's petition to modify
custody was a final judgment even though the trial court purported to
grant the parties the right to move for a modification in the future
without having to pay a civil docket fee); see Rule 60(b) ("A motion under
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The wife filed a notice of appeal from the divorce judgment on July

9, 2025.

Analysis

Although neither party has raised the issue, we can take notice of

whether the wife's notice of appeal was timely filed because it implicates

this court's appellate jurisdiction. Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. ("An

appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of appeal was not timely filed to

invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court."). See Gunnison-Mack v.

Alabama State Pers. Bd., 923 So. 2d 319, 320 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005)

(" ' "[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we take notice of

them at any time and do so even ex mero motu ." ' " (citations omitted)).

this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation.").

The divorce judgment included the following provision indicating
that it is a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken: "To the
extent other relief has been requested by either party and not addressed
or disposed of herein, such relief is denied. It is the intent of [the circuit
court] that this Decree constitutes a full and final disposition of this
litigation." Thus, the divorce judgment is a final judgment that would
support an appeal because it adjudicated all disputed issues between the
parties. See Quintana v. Quiroz, 313 So. 3d 1134, 1137 (Ala. Civ. App.
2020) (" ' " '[A] final judgment is a "terminal decision which demonstrates
there has been a complete adjudication of all matters in controversy
between the litigants." ' " ' " (citations omitted)).
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Generally, the first step in determining whether a notice of appeal

was timely filed is to determine whether either party filed a

postjudgment motion that suspended the running of the time to file a

notice of appeal. Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P. Under the unique facts and

circumstances of this case, however, we must first address whether the

wife's e-mail to Lewis satisfied the procedural requirements for the filing

of a postjudgment motion and suspended the running of the time to file

a notice of appeal. See SMM Gulf Coast, LLC v. Dade Cap. Corp., 311 So.

3d 736, 741 (Ala. 2020) ("[Q]uestions about the trial court's jurisdiction

or the proper interpretation of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure are

also questions of law subject to de novo review ….").

I. Whether the wife "filed" a postjudgment motion by sending an e-
mail to Lewis

Except as otherwise provided in the Alabama Rules of Civil

Procedure, every written motion, including a postjudgment motion, must

be served upon each of the parties and must be filed with the trial court.

Ala. R. Civ. P. 5(a) and (d). Parties may "file" papers with the trial court

by using one of several methods authorized by Rule 5:

"The filing of papers with the court as required by these rules
shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court, except
that the judge may permit the papers to be filed with the

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judge, in which event, the judge shall note thereon the filing
date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk. A
pleading, motion, order, or other document filed by electronic
means in accordance with an order or rules of the Supreme
Court of Alabama constitutes filing with the court for the
purpose of applying these rules."

(Emphasis added.)

Naturally, a document sent to a trial-court clerk's office by e-mail

is sent "by electronic means," but the current orders and rules of our

supreme court that govern the electronic filing of documents in our trial-

court system are clear: the only authorized method for electronically

filing a document is to upload that document using the AlaFile electronic-

filing system.

Electronically "filing" a document by e-mail is specifically

prohibited by the "Administrative Policies and Procedures for Electronic

Filing in the Civil Divisions of the Alabama Unified Judicial System"

(Feb. 27, 2026) ("the electronic-filing policy manual"),

https://efile.alacourt.gov/media/1118/administrative-policies-and-

procedures-02-27-2026.pdf (https://perma.cc/CUS8-9YVF) (last visited

May 14, 2026), see Ala. R. Jud. Admin. 44, which is considered an order

of our supreme court. Premier Choice Realty & Invs., Inc. v. Lumpkin,

[Ms. CL-2025-0749, Feb. 27, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App.

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2026); Seibert v. Fields, 386 So. 3d 776, 780 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023);

Alabama Dep't of Revenue v. Frederick, 166 So. 3d 123, 124 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2014). The electronic-filing policy manual defines the term

"electronic filing" to mean "uploading a document directly from the

registered user's computer, using the court's internet-based system[,

commonly referred to as AlaFile,] … to file that document in the court's

case file. Sending a document to the court via e-mail does not constitute

'electronic filing .' " (Emphasis added.) Although not binding, the

Committee Comments to Amendments to Rule 5, Ala. R. Civ. P., Effective

October 24, 2008, also specifically proscribe "filing" documents by e-mail:

"Electronic filing must be accomplished within the electronic-filing

system established by order and rules of the Supreme Court of Alabama,

[i.e., AlaFile,] not merely by e-mail communication." (Emphasis added.)

This court has also noted that "in Alabama's court system … sending e-

mail transmissions does not constitute filing." Matthews v. City of

Mobile, 182 So. 3d 547, 550 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)(comparing the method

for electronically filing documents in the trial-court system to the lack of

an electronic-filing system for disputes before the Mobile County

Personnel Board).

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Although we recognize that the wife was acting pro se when she

sent the February 25, 2025, e-mail to Lewis, "it is well settled that '[r]ules

governing the operation of the courts of this state are no more forgiving

to a pro se litigant than to one represented by counsel.' Lockett v. A.L.

Sandlin Lumber Co., 588 So. 2d 889, 890 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)." L.M. v.

Shelby Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 999 So. 2d 505, 507-08 (Ala. Civ. App.

2008) (dismissing appeal for failing to timely invoke this court's

jurisdiction because the document purporting to be a notice of appeal

from the juvenile court's judgment terminating the mother's parental

rights was not "filed" when the mother, acting pro se, sent it to the

juvenile-court clerk by facsimile transmission).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the existing rules and

orders of our supreme court do not specifically authorize the electronic

filing of a document by sending it to a trial-court clerk via e-mail. Cf. Ex

parte Tuck, 622 So. 2d 929, 930 (Ala. 1993)(holding that documents sent

to a trial-court clerk by facsimile transmission are not "filed" because

"[t]he Alabama rules of court do not presently specifically authorize any

'filings,' either of notices of appeal or any other documents, by facsimile

transmissions"). Thus, the wife did not effectively "file" a Rule 59(e), Ala.

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R. Civ. P., postjudgment motion by sending an e-mail to the circuit-court

clerk's office on February 25, 2025.

II. Whether the wife's notice of appeal was timely filed

Except in circumstances that are inapplicable here, "the notice of

appeal … shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 42 days (6

weeks) of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from,"

Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), but the filing of a Rule 59(e) postjudgment motion

suspends the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. Ala. R. App.

P. 4(a)(3).

Because we have concluded in Section I, supra, that the wife did not

electronically "file" a Rule 59(e) postjudgment motion by sending an e-

mail to the circuit-court clerk's office on February 25, 2025, that e-mail

did not suspend the time to file a notice of appeal from the divorce

judgment.3 Thus, the wife had 42 days from the date of the divorce

judgment, or until April 8, 2025, to file a notice of appeal. The wife did

3The wife's March 12, 2025, e-mail to the circuit-court clerk's office,

construed by the circuit court as a motion to stay the enforcement of the
divorce judgment, also did not affect the timeliness of the wife's notice of
appeal. See Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(3) (providing that certain postjudgment
motions suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal but
not including among such motions a motion to stay the enforcement of a
judgment pursuant to Rule 62(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.).
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not file the notice of appeal until July 9, 2025, or 134 days from the date

of the divorce judgment. Therefore, the wife failed to timely invoke this

court's appellate jurisdiction, and her appeal is due to be dismissed. See

Ala. R. App. P. 2(a)(1) ("An appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of

appeal was not timely filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate

court.").

Conclusion

Under the existing rules and orders of the Supreme Court of

Alabama, a document cannot be "filed" by e-mailing it to a trial-court

clerk's office. Thus, the mother's February 25, 2025, e-mail to the circuit-

court clerk's office did not constitute the filing of a postjudgment motion

and did not suspend the running of the time to file a notice of appeal from

the divorce judgment. Therefore, the mother's notice of appeal was

untimely and failed to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of this court.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

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