A.N.F. v. D.F.

Rel: May 1, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CL-2025-0736
_________________________

A.N.F.

v.

D.F.

Appeal from Lamar Juvenile Court
(JU-23-107.02)

EDWARDS, Judge.

A.N.F. ("the mother") appeals from a judgment entered by the

Lamar Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") that adjudicated her

daughter, K.R.F. ("the child"), whose date of birth is June 6, 2023,

dependent and awarded the child's maternal great-grandmother, D.F.
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("the maternal great-grandmother"), sole legal and physical custody of

the child.

Procedural Background

This is the second time these parties have been before this court.

In A.N.F. v. D.F., [Ms. CL-2024-0691, June 13, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala.

Civ. App. 2025), this court dismissed the mother's appeal from a

judgment entered by the juvenile court on the basis that that judgment

was a void judgment because it failed to adjudicate the child as a

dependent child and yet maintained the child's placement with the

maternal great-grandmother.

While A.N.F. was pending before this court, the maternal great-

grandmother, on December 12, 2024, filed in the juvenile court a new

petition, again alleging that the child was dependent and seeking ex

parte relief. On December 12, 2024, the juvenile court entered an ex

parte order that awarded the maternal great-grandmother pendente lite

custody of the child. That ex parte order further limited the mother's

visitation with the child to supervised visits every other Saturday from

12:00 p.m. until 4:00 p.m., appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the

interests of the child, and scheduled a hearing to occur on January 30,

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2025. Following a hearing, the juvenile court, on February 3, 2025,

entered an order that maintained the child's pendente lite placement

with the maternal great-grandmother, maintained the mother's

supervised visitation with the child, and scheduled a final hearing to

occur on March 31, 2025.

Following a continuance, the juvenile court, on August 15, 2025,

conducted a trial on the maternal great-grandmother's dependency

petition. On August 25, 2025, the juvenile court entered a judgment that

adjudicated the child dependent, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-

102(8), awarded the maternal great-grandmother legal and physical

custody of the child, and awarded the mother unsupervised visitation

with the child on alternating weekends, as well as certain extended

holiday visitation.

On September 2, 2025, the mother filed a postjudgment motion

seeking to alter, amend, or vacate that portion of the juvenile court's

judgment that adjudicated the child dependent because, she argued, that

adjudication was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. On

that same day, the mother also filed a notice of appeal to this court. The

mother's appeal was held in abeyance pending the denial of her

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postjudgment motion by the juvenile court on September 4, 2025. See

Rule 4(a)(5), Ala. R. App. P.; K.R.S. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,

236 So. 3d 910, 912 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017).

The Evidence

The maternal great-grandmother testified that the child, who was

two years old at the time of the second dependency trial, had been in her

physical custody since the child was one month old. At the time of the

trial in August 2025, the maternal great-grandmother was residing in

Millport in a home that she shared with A.F., her husband. Also, a couple

of months before the trial, the maternal great-grandmother's 42-year-old

son, C.F. ("the maternal grandfather"), and his wife, B.F., had relocated

from their apartment to temporarily reside in the maternal great-

grandmother's home while they sought other living arrangements. The

maternal great-grandmother was unaware of the whereabouts of the

child's father.

At the time the maternal great-grandmother filed her second

dependency petition in December 2024, the mother, who was residing in

Smithville, Mississippi, with her boyfriend, Z.G., and his two children,

was exercising unsupervised visitation with the child beginning on

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Friday of each week through the following Monday. According to the

maternal great-grandmother, she had observed several issues with the

child following her visitations with the mother, which, the maternal

great-grandmother said, had resulted in her filing the second dependency

petition. Those issues included the child's being unclean and thirsty, as

well as the child's clothing being dirty and ill-fitting. The maternal great-

grandmother said that the child would also return from her visits with

the mother covered with scrapes, ant bites, and other unidentified insect

whelps.

Of particular concern for the maternal great-grandmother was an

abrasion to the child's face that had occurred when the child was visiting

the mother. According to the maternal great-grandmother, during

discussions with the mother about the child's injury, the mother had

informed the maternal great-grandmother that the child had scuffed her

face when the child had tripped and fallen. The maternal great-

grandmother said that, because of that injury, she had had the child

examined at the emergency room. During that visit to the emergency

room, hospital personnel contacted the local Department of Human

Resources ("DHR"), which, according to the maternal great-

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grandmother, had opined that it was not child abuse for a child to trip

and fall.

Regarding the injury to the child's face, the mother explained that

the child had tripped on a step and had fallen to the ground. She said

that she had picked up the child and applied medicine to the scrape on

her face. The mother denied that she had been contacted by DHR

regarding any investigation into the injury to the child's face.

The maternal great-grandmother also expressed concerns

regarding the stability of the mother's relationship with Z.G. According

to the maternal great-grandmother, on one occasion, the mother had

phoned the maternal great-grandmother and reported that she and Z.G.

had gotten into an argument and that the mother had been forced to leave

her job to take Z.G.'s automobile, which she had been driving, to him.

The following day, the mother had appeared at the maternal great-

grandmother's house to visit the child, but, the maternal great-

grandmother said, Z.G. had not accompanied the mother to that visit.

According to the maternal great-grandmother, Z.G. had not been back to

her house.

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The maternal grandfather said that he too had concerns about the

mother's relationship with Z.G. According to the maternal grandfather,

on December 2, 2024, the mother had contacted him by telephone and

informed him that she could not yet go to work but that she could not

stay at her house because she and Z.G. had been arguing. The maternal

grandfather said that he had sent B.F. to pick up the mother at the

mother's house in Smithville because the mother had no transportation

because she had lost access to Z.G.'s automobile, which was the mother's

only form of transportation. At that time, the maternal grandfather and

his wife were still residing in an apartment as they had not yet moved

into the maternal great-grandmother's home.

B.F. testified that, at the maternal grandfather's request, she had

traveled to the mother's house in Smithville on December 2, 2024, and

had brought the mother back to their apartment. She said that, when

she arrived at the mother's house, which she described as "filthy," the

mother and Z.G. were both present. B.F. said that she observed old food

on the stove and blankets hung in each doorway, which she had presumed

were being used to keep the heat in. B.F. also expressed concern

regarding the car seat that the mother used for the child, which B.F.

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described as moldy, as well as the child's sippy cups, which she described

as having rubber parts that were mildewed. B.F. said that she and the

mother cleaned the car seat and the sippy cups. The mother informed

B.F. that she was moving out of the house because of an argument that

she had had with Z.G., but, B.F. said, the mother had not disclosed the

specifics of that argument to her.

The mother stayed at the maternal grandfather's apartment for a

week before she returned to her house in Smithville. The maternal

grandfather said that he had supervised some of the mother's visits with

the child, and he expressed concerns regarding the mother's

attentiveness to the child during those visits as well as the mother's

lengthy bathroom breaks. According to B.F., during the visits between

the mother and the child that she and the maternal grandfather had

supervised, the child had not responded positively to the mother and had

cried every time the mother attempted to interact with her. The

maternal great-grandmother testified that she did not see a bond

between the child and the mother. The maternal great-grandmother said

that, when the child was tired or injured, she would run to her and not to

the mother. Regarding her relationship with the child, the mother said

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that she had attempted to develop a bond with the child but admitted

that she had not been able to do so despite her efforts.

When the mother returned to her house in Smithville in December

2024, she left two notebooks at the maternal grandfather's apartment.

The maternal grandfather testified that he had reviewed those notebooks

and that they had contained examples of the mother's playing

"hangman," which he described as a word game. According to the

maternal grandfather, included in that section of the notebook were

phrases such as "daddy is so handsome," as well as more explicit phrases

such as "daddy likes to suck toes" and "f*** me hard." The maternal

grandfather stated that he had given the notebooks to the maternal

great-grandmother because "my granddaughter does not need to be

around that, nothing like that." The child was two years old at that time.

The mother admitted that the notebooks that the maternal great-

grandmother and the maternal grandfather had mentioned in their

testimony were hers. She, however, denied that any child had been

exposed to the "sexual things" that she had written in the notebooks. She

also denied that any child had witnessed any sexual act between her and

any other individual.

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According to the maternal great-grandmother, the mother suffers

from various mental-health issues, including bipolar disorder, borderline

personality disorder, and depression. She said that the mother's mental-

health issues make it difficult to communicate with the mother without

saying the wrong thing and upsetting her. The maternal great-

grandmother, the maternal grandfather, and B.F. all testified that they

did not think that the mother takes her mental-health medication as

prescribed. B.F. said that she had asked the mother if she was taking

her medication and that the mother had responded: "[S]ometimes." The

maternal great-grandmother also said that she could tell when the

mother was not taking her medication as prescribed because the mother

would become defiant and yell during conversations.

The mother admitted that she had been diagnosed with bipolar

disorder, depression, and anxiety, but she denied that she had been

diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. She said that she had

been prescribed the medications Celexa and Latuda by her "medicine

doctor," who she identified as Dr. Ashley Davis. The mother said that

she had last seen Dr. Davis approximately three months before the trial.

The mother also testified that she was in counseling.

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The mother admitted that she had informed the maternal

grandfather that she took her medicine "sometimes." She clarified that

she would not take her medicine when she did not eat or when she was

sick because it made her nauseated. According to the mother, she had

been compliant with her medication regimen in the month leading up to

the trial.

At the time of the trial, the mother and Z.G. had been dating for

two years. He had maintained his employment at Holman Forestry for

five years and was earning $1,000 per week. Z.G.'s children were ages

six and eight and were in the first and third grades. The mother testified

that she had been employed at two different jobs but that she had quit

those jobs when Z.G. had purchased a new four-bedroom, two-bath house

in Golden, Mississippi. That house was a 40-minute commute to the

mother's former places of employment, which, she said, made keeping

those jobs untenable. The mother said that she was scheduled to begin a

new job at a local fast-food restaurant at 10:00 a.m. on the Monday

following the trial. She said that she would be earning $11 per hour at

that job.

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The mother requested that the juvenile court allow the child to

come home. She said that she loved and missed the child and admitted

that, because the child was her first child, she had not known how to

parent. She, however, opined that she had gained parenting skills

through caring for Z.G.'s children. The mother said that she had

everything that she needed to care for the child and that she was ready

for the child to be returned to her care.

Standard of Review

A judgment adjudicating a child as dependent must be supported

by clear and convincing evidence, which is " ' "[e]vidence that, when

weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the

trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim

and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." ' " C.O. v.

Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala. Civ. App.

2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002),

quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)).

" '[T]he evidence necessary for appellate
affirmance of a judgment based on a factual
finding in the context of a case in which the
ultimate standard for a factual decision by the
trial court is clear and convincing evidence is
evidence that a fact-finder reasonably could find to

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clearly and convincingly … establish the fact
sought to be proved.'

"KGS Steel, [Inc. v. McInish,] 47 So. 3d [749,] 761 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2006).

"… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases to which a
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard of proof applies, 'the
judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of
the substantive evidentiary burden[,]' [Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)]; thus, the appellate
court must also look through a prism to determine whether
there was substantial evidence before the trial court to
support a factual finding, based upon the trial court's
weighing of the evidence, that would 'produce in the mind [of
the trial court] a firm conviction as to each element of the
claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the
conclusion.' [Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-81(c).]"

Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court does not

reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact

made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile

court could have found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971

So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus evidence,

this court presumes their correctness. Id. We review the legal

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence without a presumption of

correctness. J.W. v. C.B., 68 So. 3d 878, 879 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

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Discussion

In the present case, the juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent, pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-102(8), which defines a

dependent child as "[a] child who ha[s] been adjudicated dependent by a

juvenile court and is in need of care or supervision" and meets any of the

following enumerated circumstances:

"1. Whose parent, legal guardian, legal custodian, or
other custodian subjects the child or any other child in the
household to abuse, as defined in Section 12-15-301[, Ala.
Code 1975,] or neglect as defined in Section 12-15-301, or
allows the child to be so subjected.

"2. Who is without a parent, legal guardian, or legal
custodian willing and able to provide for the care, support, or
education of the child.

"….

"6. Whose parent, legal guardian, legal custodian, or
other custodian is unable or unwilling to discharge his or her
responsibilities to and for the child.

"….

"8. Who, for any other cause, is in need of the care and
protection of the state."

In her brief to this court, the mother contends that the juvenile

court's adjudication of dependency is not supported by clear and

convincing evidence. She primarily relies on E.W. v. D.H., [Ms. CL-2024-

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0202, Feb. 21, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025) ("E.W. II"), to

support her contention. For a full understanding of E.W. II, it is

necessary to discuss E.W. v. Limestone County Department of Human

Resources, 390 So. 3d 1103 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023) ("E.W. I"). On April 16,

2021, the Limestone County Department of Human Resources ("the

Limestone County DHR") filed a petition alleging that C.N.H. was a

dependent child based on a report that it had received indicating that

there had been domestic-violence episodes in the home shared by

C.N.H.'s mother and father, E.W. and P.H., respectively; that C.N.H.'s

medication for an illness was not being properly administered by E.W.

and P.H.; that the house in which E.W., P.H., and C.N.H. lived was

inadequate and unclean; and that E.W. and P.H. were not properly

supervising C.N.H.

Following ore tenus proceedings, on October 12, 2021, the

Limestone Juvenile Court entered a judgment that adjudicated C.N.H.

dependent, awarded legal and physical custody of C.N.H. to E.W.,

ordered E.W. to have no contact with P.H., awarded P.H. supervised

visits with C.N.H., and ordered that C.N.H.'s paternal grandfather, D.H.

("the paternal grandfather"), and his wife, N.S., who had intervened in

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the action, be allowed meaningful visitation with C.N.H. Subsequent to

the entry of the October 12, 2021, dependency judgment, the paternal

grandfather and N.S. and C.N.H.'s guardian ad litem filed motions

seeking to have C.N.H. removed from the physical custody of E.W. for

various reasons. After a hearing in December 2021, the Limestone

Juvenile Court placed C.N.H. in the temporary custody of the paternal

grandfather and N.S. The Limestone Juvenile Court conducted a review

hearing on May 31, 2022, after which it entered a permanency order on

June 7, 2022, determining that C.N.H. remained a dependent child and

awarding custody of C.N.H. to the paternal grandfather and N.S., subject

to specified visitation with E.W. E.W. appealed the June 7, 2022,

permanency order to this court.

On September 1, 2023, this court reversed the Limestone Juvenile

Court's June 7, 2022, permanency order because we found that the

evidence that was presented at the May 31, 2022, permanency hearing

was insufficient to support the finding that C.N.H. remained dependent.

As we summarized in E.W. II, we concluded in E.W. I that

"the Limestone County Department of Human Resources
('DHR') had become involved with the family based upon
indicated domestic violence by P.H. ('the father'), some
indication of neglect, and the need for parenting skills. At the

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time of the permanency hearing in 2022, the mother had
separated from the father. The mother had also completed
classes on domestic-violence awareness, budgeting, and
parenting as required by DHR. The mother had continued to
take classes after completing the required courses. Also, the
mother had secured employment as required by the juvenile
court. The mother had never tested positive for any illegal
drugs. The paternal grandfather and N.S. had complained
that the mother had provided them with only $200 in child
support. Even so, the mother essentially had had physical and
legal custody of the child until December 7, 2021, and,
following that, the mother had had unsupervised visitation
every weekend during which she provided for the child's
needs. Although counsel for the paternal grandfather and
N.S. had made the point during cross-examination of the
mother during the 2022 permanency hearing that the
mother's prospects for higher-paying jobs were limited
because of her having only a high-school diploma, we observed
that poverty, in the absence of abuse or lack of caring, should
not be the criteria for taking a child away from a parent. 390
So. 3d at 1117. The DHR social worker who testified at the
permanency hearing stated that she had no concerns about
the mother's ability to care for the child, and the juvenile court
had awarded the mother unsupervised visitation with the
child. E.W., 390 So. 3d at 1118."

E.W. II, ___ So. 3d at ___.

While E.W. I was pending on appeal before this court, the paternal

grandfather and N.S. filed a petition in the Limestone Juvenile Court on

May 3, 2023, seeking to terminate E.W.'s parental rights to C.N.H. In

their petition, they alleged:

" '(1) that [E.W.] suffered from a mental illness and was
unable to care for the child; (2) that [E.W.] had failed to

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provide for the material needs of [C.N.H.]; (3) that [C.N.H.]
did not have bowel movements on weekend visits with [E.W.];
(4) that [C.N.H.] would hide snacks in her overnight bag when
packing for weekend visitation with [E.W.]; (5) that [C.N.H.]
would use inappropriate language following her weekend
visits with [E.W.] [and] that on one occasion [C.N.H.] had
bruises, a swollen eye, and a bite mark that [E.W.] claimed
were from [C.N.H.]'s younger sibling; (6) that on another
occasion, [C.N.H.] had a handprint on her leg due to [E.W.'s]
having spanked [her]; (7) that occasionally, [C.N.H.] had
returned from visits with excrement on her clothing; (8) that
[C.N.H.] would have tantrums before leaving to visit [E.W.];
(9) that [C.N.H.]'s pediatrician threatened to notify DHR if
[C.N.H.] continued weekend visitation with [E.W.]; and (10)
that [E.W.] had moved five times since [C.N.H.] was born and
would likely never have consistent housing.' "

E.W. II, ___ So. 3d ___.

On September 7, 2023, after the issuance of our opinion in E.W. I,

the paternal grandfather and N.S. filed a motion in the Limestone

Juvenile Court seeking to temporarily retain custody of C.N.H. during

the pendency of the termination-of-parental-rights action, based on the

fact that C.N.H. had been in their custody for approximately one year.

On September 13, 2023, the Limestone Juvenile Court awarded the

paternal grandfather and N.S. temporary custody of C.N.H., subject to

an award of supervised visitation to E.W. On September 27, 2023, after

this court's certificate of judgment was issued and in compliance with our

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decision in E.W. I, the Limestone Juvenile Court entered an order

dismissing the original dependency petition.

A trial on the paternal grandfather and N.S.'s termination-of-

parental-rights petition was scheduled to occur on January 11, 2024;

however, on December 11, 2023, the paternal grandfather and N.S. filed

an amendment to their petition. In their amended petition, the paternal

grandfather and N.S. no longer sought to terminate E.W.'s parental

rights; instead, they alleged that C.N.H. was dependent as to E.W. and

P.H. Following a trial, the Limestone Juvenile Court entered a judgment

on February 29, 2024, that again declared C.N.H. to be a dependent child

and awarded custody to the paternal grandfather and N.S. subject to an

award of supervised visitation to E.W. E.W. again appealed.

On appeal in E.W. II, this court agreed with E.W. and determined

that the Limestone Juvenile Court's February 2024 judgment was not

supported by clear and convincing evidence. In reversing the judgment

and remanding the case for the entry of a judgment of dismissal, this

court noted:

" 'In a dependency proceeding, the evidence must clearly and
convincingly establish that the child is dependent at the time
of the disposition.' J.P. v. D.P., 260 So. 3d 862, 871 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2018) (emphasis added). The mother had stable housing

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and employment. The mother had sole custody of another
child, the youngest child. The mother continued to seek a
relationship with the child. While the mother does not have
the financial resources that the paternal grandfather and N.S.
have, there was insufficient evidence that the mother could
not provide for the child. Cf. B.O. v. C.T., 416 So. 3d 1101,
1105 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (concluding, in a dependency case,
that the grandparents' limited financial means had not
prevented them from adequately parenting the child).

"This court has reviewed the record to determine
whether the juvenile court could properly have determined
from the evidence presented to it that the child was
dependent. Even indulging the presumption in favor of the
juvenile court's findings, we conclude that clear and
convincing evidence to support a finding of dependency is
absent. Parents and children have a fundamental right to
maintain their relationship that does not evaporate simply
because the parents 'have lost temporary custody of their
child.' Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388,
71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982). This is especially true where the
parent's initial loss of custody was based on judicial error."

E.W. II, ___ So. 3d at ___.

In the present case, the juvenile court failed to make findings of fact

in support of its judgment adjudicating the child dependent; thus, this

court assumes that the juvenile court made those findings that were

necessary to support its judgment, unless those findings would be clearly

erroneous. Ex parte Walters, 580 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Ala. 1991). In her

brief to this court, the maternal great-grandmother directs this court to

evidence that she says supports the juvenile court's adjudication of

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dependency. That evidence includes: the mother's alleged housing and

transportation instability; the mother's having quit two jobs and her

reliance on Z.G. for financial support; the mother's failing to consistently

take her mental-health medication; the mother's allegedly "defiant"

behavior; the mother's allegedly "filthy" home; mold on the child's car

seat and mildew on the child's sippy cups; and the mother's lack of a bond

with the child.

Evidence in the record on appeal supports the maternal great-

grandmother's assertion that the child, who was two years old at the time

of the trial, had been in her primary care since the child was one month

old. However, as previously noted, this court dismissed the mother's

appeal in A.N.F. based on a determination that the appeal had been

taken from a void judgment because the juvenile court had maintained

the child's placement with the maternal great-grandmother despite the

juvenile court's having failed to adjudicate the child as a dependent child.

We reiterate that, as this court stated in E.W. II:

"Parents and children have a fundamental right to maintain
their relationship that does not evaporate simply because the
parents 'have lost temporary custody of their child.' Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d
599 (1982). This is especially true where the parent's initial
loss of custody was based on judicial error."

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___ So. 3d at ___.

Regarding the mother's alleged housing and transportation

instability, evidence established that the mother lived with her

boyfriend, Z.G., and that they shared an automobile. The maternal great-

grandmother points to testimony indicating that the mother and Z.G. had

had an argument in December 2024 and that the mother had left the

rental house that she had shared with Z.G. as the result of that

argument. Testimony further indicated that, after staying one week at

the maternal grandfather's apartment, the mother had returned to the

rental house she shared with Z.G. Regardless of whether the mother's

one-week absence from the rental house on that occasion represented a

breakup, as characterized by the maternal great-grandmother, or a brief

separation, as characterized by the mother, that event occurred eight

months before the August 15, 2025, trial. "In a dependency proceeding,

the evidence must clearly and convincingly establish that the child is

dependent at the time of the disposition." J.P. v. D.P., 260 So. 3d 862,

871 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). No evidence was presented indicating that the

December 2024 argument between the mother and Z.G. continued to

negatively impact the mother's housing stability or access to an

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automobile at the time of the trial. To the contrary, the mother testified

that she and Z.G. had maintained their relationship, that Z.G. had

purchased a home they shared, and that she continued to have access to

the automobile they shared.

Regarding the mother's employment, the mother testified that she

had maintained two separate jobs but that she had quit both of those jobs

when Z.G. had purchased a home and they had relocated, resulting in the

mother's having a 40-minute commute to work, which she said was

untenable. The mother further testified that she had secured

employment at a fast-food restaurant, where, she said, she would be

earning $11 per hour. No evidence was presented to refute the mother's

testimony regarding her employment status. The mother may not have

the financial resources that the maternal great-grandmother and her

husband have; however, as in E.W. II, the record in the present case

contains insufficient evidence indicating that the mother could not

provide for the child.

Regarding the condition of the mother's house, B.F., the maternal

grandfather's wife, said that, when she had visited the mother's house in

December 2024, the mother's house was filthy and needed to be swept

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and mopped. She also had observed old food on the stove. The mother

admitted that there had been dirty dishes in her kitchen, but she

explained that it was her routine to eat dinner after work and to wash

dishes the following morning. Moreover, the mother testified that she

and Z.G. had relocated and no longer resided in that house. Considering

the scant evidence regarding the cleanliness of the mother's former house

and the lack of evidence regarding the condition of her new house at the

time of the trial, we find insufficient evidence to establish that the child

was dependent because of the condition of the mother's house.

Regarding the child's alleged moldy car seat and mildewed sippy

cups that B.F. had discovered in December 2024, the record lacks

evidence suggesting that the child had been exposed to those items.

Moreover, B.F. testified that the car seat, as well as the sippy cups, had

been cleaned in December 2024. There was no evidence to suggest that

the car seat or the sippy cups continued to be an issue at the time of the

trial. J.P., 260 So. 3d at 871.

The mother testified that she had been prescribed the medications

Celexa and Latuda to treat her bipolar disorder, depression, and anxiety.

She admitted that, when she did not eat, she would not take her

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medications because they made her nauseated. The maternal great-

grandmother said that, when the mother had not taken her medications,

she would be difficult to communicate with and would yell. Likewise, the

maternal grandfather said that he also had concerns that the mother did

not take her medications as prescribed. He, however, failed to provide

testimony regarding any perceived negative effect on the mother's

behavior that he attributed to her failure to take her medications.

Moreover, the mother testified that she was compliant with her

medication regimen at the time of the trial. Obviously, the juvenile court

could disbelieve the mother's testimony on that point; however, the

record lacks evidence from which the juvenile court could have been

clearly convinced that the mother's failure to take her medications

negatively affected her ability to parent the child.

Lastly, the maternal great-grandmother argues that the child was

dependent because of the mother's lack of a bond with the child. The

maternal great-grandmother initially received temporary custody of the

child in July 2023, when the child was less than one month old. Since

that time, the maternal great-grandmother had maintained custody of

the child and the mother's contact with the child had been limited by the

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juvenile court. On August 16, 2024, the juvenile court entered a final

judgment in A.N.F., which provided a transitional schedule to revert

custody of the child back to the mother. However, while operating under

the terms of that judgment, the maternal great-grandmother filed the

current dependency petition, and, on December 12, 2024, she secured an

ex parte order that again limited the mother's contact with the child to

supervised visitation every other Saturday, from 12:00 p.m. until 4:00

p.m.

The mother admitted that, despite her efforts and her wishes, she

did not have a bond with the child. Regardless of the limitations the

juvenile court placed on the mother's visitation, the mother bears some

responsibility in her failure to bond with the child. Testimony suggested

that, on occasion, the mother had failed to take full advantage of the

visitation that she was afforded by remaining in the bathroom for

extended periods during her visits. The extent to which the mother's

actions contributed to her admitted lack of a bond with the child are

uncertain. What is certain to this court, however, is that, considering the

cumulative effect of this court's dismissal of the appeal in A.N.F., the

procedural posture of this case, and the limitations the juvenile court

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placed on the contact between the mother and the child during the initial

dependency action and the current dependency action, it is not surprising

that the mother has failed to develop a bond with the child.

In E.W. II, this court rejected the mother's failure to develop a bond

with her child as the basis for her child's dependency, in part, because

the mother and the child's relationship had been interrupted as a direct

result of the juvenile court's having acted outside its discretion in finding

the child to be dependent. ___ So. 3d at ___. Again, as we noted in E.W.

II, "[p]arents and children have a fundamental right to maintain their

relationship that does not evaporate simply because the parents 'have

lost temporary custody of their child.' " ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)). We find that reasoning

applicable in the present case.

Conclusion

This court has reviewed the record to determine whether the

juvenile court had sufficient evidence to support its determination that

the child is dependent. Even indulging the presumption in favor of the

juvenile court's determination, we conclude that the record does not

contain clear and convincing evidence to support a finding of dependency.

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Thus, the juvenile court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded

for the entry of a judgment dismissing the maternal great-grandmother's

dependency petition.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

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