Ex parte Wendy L. Hudson PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Wendy Hudson v. Gary Hudson) (Madison Circuit Court: DR-25-3131)

Rel: October 31, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CL-2025-0669
_________________________

Ex parte Wendy L. Hudson

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Wendy Hudson

v.

Gary Hudson)

(Madison Circuit Court: DR-25-3131)

BOWDEN, Judge.

Wendy L. Hudson ("the mother") petitions this court for a writ of

mandamus directing the Madison Circuit Court ("the circuit court") to

vacate an order it entered on June 9, 2025 ("the June 9 order"), which
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purported to award Gary Hudson ("the father") visitation with the

parties' disabled 29-year-old adult son ("the adult son"). Because we

conclude that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter

the June 9 order, we grant the mother's petition and issue the writ.

Background

The materials before us establish the following facts and procedural

history. The parties were married on November 26, 1993, and were

divorced by a judgment adopting the parties' settlement agreement on

January 29, 2025. Two children were born during the marriage, both of

whom had reached the age of majority by the time the parties were

divorced. Although neither the parties' settlement agreement nor the

divorce judgment contemplated the adult son's care or living

arrangement, the adult son began living with the mother after the parties

divorced. The father has had little contact with the adult son after he

moved in with the mother. The father indicates in his answer that the

adult son's living with the mother meant that he did not see the adult

son and that he had never gone so long without seeing or communicating

with him and was worried for his safety.

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On March 18, 2025, the mother commenced an action ("the

underlying PFA action"), in the circuit court requesting a protection-

from-abuse order under the Alabama Protection from Abuse Act ("the

PFA Act"), Ala. Code 1975, § 30-5-1 et seq., and seeking relief against the

father for, among other things, allegedly stalking her and the adult son.

The circuit court subsequently entered an ex parte protection order that

enjoined the father from harassing, stalking, annoying, threatening, or

engaging in conduct that would place the mother or the adult son in

reasonable fear of bodily injury and from contacting the mother and the

adult son. The ex parte protection order also enjoined the father from

physical or violent contact with the mother and the adult son and

prohibited the father from being within 500 feet of the mother's residence

or school. The father was subsequently criminally charged in Madison

County with "electronic stalking 1st," which is a felony.

The circuit court appointed a guardian ad litem ("GAL") for the

adult son in the underlying PFA action on April 2, 2025. The GAL filed a

report on April 22, 2025, noting that the adult son is autistic and requires

"around the clock care and supervision." The GAL noted that he had no

concerns for the welfare of the adult son with the father and

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recommended that the circuit court enter an order allowing the father to

have supervised visitation with the adult son.

The circuit court stayed the underlying PFA action on May 23,

2025, pending resolution of the father's criminal case. The circuit court

concurrently ordered the mother to transport the adult son to a visitation

session with the father for the next day, May 24, 2025. The visitation

session was to be supervised by the GAL. Following the visitation session

that the GAL supervised on May 24, 2025, the GAL filed a report on May

29, 2025, noting that the adult son had hugged the father upon seeing

him and that the adult son had appeared to enjoy his time with the

father.

The circuit court subsequently entered the June 9 order in which it

purported to award the father unsupervised visitation with the adult son

every weekend. On June 11, 2025, the mother filed a motion to set aside

the June 9 order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The circuit court

has yet to rule on the mother's motion to set aside the June 9 order. The

mother's petition for the writ of mandamus was docketed on August 18,

2025.

Analysis

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I. Whether the mother's petition was timely filed

Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P., requires that "[t]he petition [for a writ

of mandamus] shall be filed within a reasonable time." The

presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition for a writ of

mandamus seeking review of an interlocutory order is 42 days from the

entry of the order. See, e.g., Ex parte Fiber Transp., L.L.C., 902 So. 2d

98, 100 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)("Fiber Transport filed its petition for a writ

of mandamus from [an] interlocutory order on July 1, 2004, well outside

the 'presumptively reasonable' 42-day period contemplated by Rule 21[,

Ala. R. App. P.].").

However, this court may consider the merits of a mandamus

petition not filed within the presumptively reasonable time of 42 days

from the entry of an interlocutory order if the mandamus petition

challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court to enter the

order. See Ex parte Kelley, 333 So. 3d 156, 159 (Ala. Civ. App.

2021)("Although the wife did not file her mandamus petition within the

presumptively reasonable period of 42 days after the entry of the July 2

order, … our supreme court has held that a petition for a writ of

mandamus that challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to enter the

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order sought to be vacated need not be filed within the presumptively

reasonable period prescribed by Rule 21[, Ala. R. App. P.]."); see also Ex

parte Flint Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 805, 808 (Ala. 2000)("[A] lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time ….").

The mother's petition challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction of

the circuit court to enter the June 9 order. Therefore, we may consider

the mandamus petition regardless of whether the mother failed to file it

within the presumptively reasonable period of 42 days after the entry of

the June 9 order.

II. Whether the mother has demonstrated a clear legal right to
an order vacating the June 9 order

The mother argues that a writ should issue because the circuit court

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the June 9 order that purports

to award the father visitation with the adult son.

"It is well settled under Alabama law that

" ' " [a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy available only when the petitioner can
demonstrate: ' " (1) a clear legal right to the order
sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal
to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court." ' " ' "

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Ex parte Avery, [Ms. CL-2025-0404, Aug. 1, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.

Civ. App. 2025). "[T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction is

reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Flint Constr.

Co., 775 So. 2d at 808.

The mother's "clear legal right to the order sought" is the only

element of mandamus review that is in dispute. The circuit court has an

imperative duty to vacate an order that is void for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, and the mother filed a motion to vacate the June 9 order on

that basis. See Person v. Person, 236 So. 3d 90, 100 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)

("A void order is a complete nullity, and it is the duty of the court on

application of an interested party to vacate the void order at any time

subsequent to its rendition."). We note that the circuit court has not ruled

on the mother's motion to set aside the June 9 order, and, ordinarily, that

failure would render the mother's mandamus petition premature. See Ex

parte Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 294 So. 3d 811, 816 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2019)("[U]nder Alabama law, mandamus relief will not issue

from a supervisory court unless it is shown both that a respondent has a

clear duty to perform and that the respondent has refused to perform

it."); see, e.g., Ex parte Fancher, 272 So. 3d 654, 657 (Ala. Civ. App.

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2018)("The former wife filed her petition for the writ of mandamus before

the trial court had ruled on her pending motions [to dismiss and vacate].

… Therefore, the former wife's petition for the writ of mandamus seeking

to compel the trial court to dismiss the action based on a lack of subject

matter jurisdiction is premature because the trial court has not yet ruled

on the motions."). Nonetheless, we have considered petitions challenging

the propriety of orders involving the change of custody of children, even

when the trial court has not yet denied a motion requesting relief from

such an order. Ex parte Fancher, 272 So. 3d at 657 (listing cases).

Because the circuit court has determined that the adult son requires a

GAL and has purported to order visitation regarding the adult son, see

Denney v. Forbus, 656 So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Ala. Civ. App.

1995)("[V]isitation rights are a part of custody determinations."), we will,

in this case, consider the mother's mandamus petition in the absence of

an adverse ruling. The mother does not have another adequate remedy

by appeal to address whether the June 9 order is void -- the underlying

PFA action is stayed pending the outcome of the father's criminal case,

and the mother must otherwise continue to facilitate the visitation

between the adult son and the father. The mother properly invoked the

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jurisdiction of this court. See Section I, supra. Therefore, whether the

mother is entitled to mandamus relief depends on whether she has

demonstrated a clear legal right to an order directing the circuit court to

vacate the June 9 order as void for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

" ' "Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to hear and

determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question

belong. The principle of subject matter jurisdiction relates to a court's

inherent authority to deal with the case or matter before it." ' " Ex parte

Lester, 297 So. 3d 477, 482 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019) (quoting Ex parte

Safeway Ins. Co. of Alabama, Inc., 148 So. 3d 39, 42 (Ala. 2013)).

" 'Problems with subject-matter jurisdiction arise if, for
example, a party files a probate action in a juvenile court, a
divorce action in a probate court, or a bankruptcy petition in
a circuit court, because the nature or class of those actions is
limited to a particular forum with the authority to handle
them.' "

Id. (quoting Ex parte Safeway, 148 So. 3d at 43). "In determining a trial

court's subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court asks ' " only whether the

trial court had the constitutional and statutory authority" to hear the

case.' " Ex parte Safeway, 148 So. 3d at 43 (quoting Russell v. State, 51

So. 3d 1026, 1028 (Ala. 2010), quoting in turn Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.

2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006)) (emphasis added).

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It is well established that, under Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-1, and

Alabama's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq. , a circuit court has

subject-matter jurisdiction to award visitation to a noncustodial parent

if that visitation is in the best interests of the minor child. See Wilson-

Hinson v. Hinson, 401 So. 3d 1161, 1163-64 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (" 'The

trial court has broad discretion in determining the visitation rights of a

noncustodial parent ….' "; "Alabama law provides a noncustodial parent

with reasonable visitation rights if that visitation is in the best interests

of his or her child." (quoting Carr v. Broyles, 652 So. 2d 299, 303 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1994)); see also Ex parte Thompson, 51 So. 3d 265, 272 (Ala.

2010) ("A trial court in establishing visitation privileges for a

noncustodial parent must consider the best interests and welfare of the

minor child and, where appropriate, … set conditions on visitation that

protect the child." (emphasis added)).

Although it is undisputed that a circuit court has subject-matter

jurisdiction concerning visitation between a noncustodial parent and a

minor child, we are unaware of any statutory or common-law authority

that would support the proposition that that jurisdiction extends to

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visitation between a parent and an adult child. The father appears to

recognize this because he argues instead that the circuit court had

jurisdiction under the PFA Act to award him visitation with the adult

son.1 However, the father's argument is unpersuasive.

1We note that the purposes and plain language of the PFA Act do

not tend to support the father's underlying premise that an alleged
perpetrator of domestic violence or abuse in a PFA action can be awarded
relief under the PFA Act. See Ala. Code 1975, § 30-5-1(b)("[The PFA Act]
shall be liberally construed and applied to promote all of the following
purposes: (1) To assure victims of domestic violence the maximum
protection from abuse that the law can provide. (2) To create a flexible
and speedy remedy to discourage violence and harassment against family
members or others with whom the perpetrator has continuing contact. (3)
To expand the ability of law enforcement officers to assist victims, to
enforce the law effectively in cases of domestic violence, and to prevent
further incidents of abuse. (4) To facilitate equal enforcement of criminal
law by deterring and punishing violence against family members and
others who are personally involved with the perpetrators. (5) To
recognize that domestic violence is a crime that will not be excused or
tolerated. (6) To provide for protection orders to prevent domestic
violence and provide for court jurisdiction and venue; to provide for court
hearing for petitions for relief; and to provide for the contents and the
issuance of protection orders." (emphasis added)); see also Ala. Code 1975
§ 30-5-2(5)(defining a "protection order" as "[a]ny order of protection from
abuse issued under [the PFA Act] for the purpose of preventing acts of
abuse as defined in [the PFA Act]" (emphasis added)); Ala. Code 1975 §
30-5-4("The plaintiff's right to relief under [the PFA Act] shall not be
affected by his or her leaving the residence or household to avoid further
abuse. … Plaintiffs shall not be barred from relief under [the PFA Act]
because of other proceedings or judgments involving the parties in a court
of this state or any other state." (emphasis added)); and Ala. Code 1975,
§ 30-5-5(d)("The court shall issue separate orders that specifically and
independently state the prohibited behavior and relief granted in order
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The father cites § 30-5-7(4) of the PFA Act, which states that a

circuit court may "[a]ward temporary custody of any children of the

parties." Even if we accept the father's premise that the word "child"

under the PFA Act includes adult children, which we do not, the circuit

court purported to award visitation -- not temporary custody -- of the

adult son to the father. There was no prior custody determination

regarding the adult son, and the June 9 order also did not make a custody

determination from which the circuit court could have awarded

visitation. See Denney, 656 So. 2d at 1206 ("[V]isitation rights are a part

of custody determinations." ; "the court makes visitation determinations

as part of custody determinations …."); cf. Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-151(5)

(defining "sole physical custody" as custody in which "[o]ne parent has

sole physical custody and the other parent has rights of visitation except

as otherwise provided by the court"). Although a circuit court may award

to protect the victim and the victim's immediate family …." (emphasis
added)).

Even if we agreed with the father that he could have been awarded
relief under the PFA Act as the defendant and alleged perpetrator of
domestic abuse in the underlying PFA action, which we do not, the circuit
court did not have jurisdiction under the PFA Act to award the father
visitation with the adult son for the additional reasons stated in this
opinion.
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temporary custody of children under the PFA Act, the circuit court did

not do so here; rather, in the absence of a custody determination, the

circuit court purported to award the father visitation with the adult son.

Furthermore, as noted supra, at note 1, the father's contention that the

circuit court could have awarded him temporary custody of the adult son

under the PFA Act is severely undermined by the fact that he is the

defendant and alleged perpetrator of domestic abuse against the mother

and the adult son in the underlying PFA action.

The father also cites § 30-5-7(b)(6) of the PFA Act, which states that

a circuit court may "[e]njoin the defendant from removing any children

from the individual having legal custody of the children, except as

subsequently authorized by a custody or visitation order issued by a court

of competent jurisdiction." The father is the defendant in the underlying

PFA action, and, as stated supra, there has been no custody

determination regarding the adult son. The circuit court could not have

awarded visitation to the father under this provision of the PFA Act.

Finally, the father cites § 30-5-7(b)(9) of the PFA Act, which states

that a circuit court may "[o]rder other relief as it deems necessary to

provide for the safety and welfare of the plaintiff or any children and any

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person designated by the court." (Emphasis added.) After supervising the

May 24, 2025, visit, the GAL reported that he "has absolutely no

concerns" for the adult son's welfare while in the father's care. However,

there is nothing in the materials before us that suggests that the circuit

court deemed visitation with the father necessary to provide for the

safety and welfare of the adult son. We note that the underlying PFA

action contained allegations that the father had stalked the mother and

the adult son and that the circuit court had initially issued an ex parte

protection order enjoining the father from committing further abuse

against the mother and the adult son. Even though the GAL reported

that he did not have any concerns for the adult son's welfare while the

adult son was with the father, we cannot conclude that the circuit court

deemed visitation with the father necessary to provide for the adult son's

safety and welfare -- especially in the context of the underlying PFA

action.

Based on the materials before us, it appears that the circuit court

concluded that it could order visitation in this matter based on the adult

son's disability. Both parties agree that the adult son has a disability,

and the circuit court implicitly acknowledged the adult son's lack of

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capacity when it appointed a GAL to represent him. See Ala. R. Civ. P.

17(c) ("The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem (1) for a minor

defendant, or (2) for an incompetent person not otherwise represented in

an action …." (emphasis added)). However, the adult son's disability or

lack of capacity does not in and of itself provide the father with a right to

visitation.2 See Underwood v. Underwood, 816 So. 2d 58, 60-61 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2001) ("[W]e find no caselaw to support the father's argument that

the trial court had authority to order visitation for a self-supporting

handicapped adult."); see also Seymour v. Seymour, 241 So. 3d 733, 745

(Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (citing Underwood, 816 So. 3d at 60, favorably for

the rule that "visitation may not be awarded to the parent of an adult

2We also recognize that a circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction

with a probate court to order protective services for a disabled or
incapacitated adult in need of care and protection because of danger to
his or her health or safety under the Adult Protective Services Act of 1976
("the APSA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 38-9-1 et seq. Under the APSA, a circuit
court or a probate court may appoint a guardian for a person in need of
protective services, but doing so is not required. Ala. Code 1975, § 38-9-
6(g).

According to the materials before us, neither party petitioned the
circuit court for protective services or protective placement of the adult
son in the underlying PFA action, so the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction under the APSA to enter the June 9 order.
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child when the parent is not providing any court-ordered postminority

support").

The nature of the visitation that the circuit court purported to

award in the June 9 order -- i.e., visitation between a disabled adult and

a parent who is isolated from the disabled adult -- is the type of visitation

made available by Alabama's Uniform Guardianship and Protective

Proceedings Act ("the AUGPPA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 26-2A-1 et seq.3

Under the AUGPPA, "[a] relative may file a petition with the court to

compel visitation with a ward from whom he or she has been isolated."

Ala. Code 1975, § 26-2A-113(a). "The petition shall be filed in the court

having jurisdiction over the guardianship of the ward." § 26-2A-113(b).

3The mother did not specifically argue that the circuit court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the June 9 order because the
AUGPPA vests jurisdiction in the probate courts to award visitation
between a relative and a disabled adult from whom the relative is
isolated. However, because the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is
before us, we are not limited to considering the specific grounds raised by
the mother in her petition. See Ex parte T.M., [Ms. CL-2024-0492, Nov.
15, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)("[W]hen there is an
apparent issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, 'our review … is not limited
to grounds specifically raised in a mandamus petition.' … This court has
a 'duty to consider a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ex mero motu.' "
(quoting Ex parte T.C., 63 So. 3d 627, 630 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010),
superseded on other grounds by statute, as recognized in Ex parte F.T.G.,
199 So. 3d 82, 86 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015)).

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The AUGPPA provides the following definitions:

"(3) Court. A probate court of this state.

"….

"(7) Guardian. A person who has qualified as a
guardian of a minor or incapacitated person ….

"(8) Incapacitated person. Any person who is impaired
by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness
or disability, physical or mental infirmities accompanying
advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or
other cause (except minority) to the extent of lacking
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
responsible decisions.

"…

"(22) Ward. A person for whom a guardian has been
appointed."

§ 26-2A-20, Ala. Code 1975.

The mother has alleged that "[t]here is a pending proceeding in

probate court to address conservatorship or guardianship over [the adult

son]." 4 Petition at 15. Although the mother does not identify which

probate court, under the AUGPPA that probate court has jurisdiction

over the guardianship proceeding concerning the adult son. Ala. Code

1975, § 26-2A-31(c). Because a probate court has jurisdiction over the

4The father does not dispute this allegation in his answer; therefore,

we must consider that averment of fact as true. See Ex parte Turner, 840
So. 2d 132, 134 (Ala. 2002).
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adult son's guardianship proceeding, that probate court -- not the circuit

court -- currently has jurisdiction to compel visitation between the adult

son and the father. § 26-2A-113(b) ("The petition [to compel visitation

with a disabled adult for whom a guardian has been appointed] shall be

filed [by the relative from whom the disabled adult has been isolated] in

the court having jurisdiction over the guardianship of the ward.").

Therefore, because the probate court has jurisdiction to award the

type of visitation that the circuit court purported to award the father --

i.e., visitation between a relative and a disabled adult from whom the

relative is isolated -- we conclude that the circuit court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction to enter the June 9 order. See Ex parte Lester, 297

So. 3d at 482 (" 'Subject-matter jurisdiction is a simple concept: … "The

term means not simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying

the attention of the court but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which

the particular case belongs." ' " (quoting Ex parte Safeway, 148 So. 3d at

42-43)).

Conclusion

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The mother has demonstrated that she has a clear legal right to an

order from this court directing the circuit court to vacate the June 9 order

as void for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

We recognize that the circuit court's intention was likely to

facilitate and encourage a parent-child relationship between the father

and the adult son. However, the circuit court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to enter the June 9 order. Under the AUGPPA, the probate

court currently has jurisdiction to award the type of visitation that the

circuit court purported to award in the June 9 order -- visitation between

a disabled adult and a relative who is isolated from the disabled adult.

We note that our decision does not foreclose the father from seeking

court-ordered visitation with the adult son. Under the AUGPPA, the

father may petition the probate court for visitation if he believes that he

has been isolated from the adult son.

For the aforementioned reasons, we grant the mother's petition and

issue a writ directing the circuit court to vacate the June 9 order as void

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Hanson and Fridy, JJ., concur.

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Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, with writing.

Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without writing.

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MOORE, Presiding Judge, concurring in the result.

Article VI, § 142(b), of the Alabama Constitution of 2022 provides

that "[t]he circuit court shall exercise general jurisdiction in all cases

except as may otherwise be provided by law." In 1917, the legislature

conferred upon the circuit courts the jurisdiction of the chancery courts,

which were abolished. See Coprich v. Jones, 406 So. 3d 58, 64 (Ala. 2024).

At common law, the chancery courts exercised jurisdiction to address the

custody of infant children, but not adult children. Id. at 65. Accordingly,

this court has held that a circuit court generally has no jurisdiction to

award visitation between a parent and his or her adult child, even if the

child is disabled or incompetent. See Underwood v. Underwood, 816 So.

2d 58 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (affirming the dismissal of a visitation petition

relating to an adult disabled child but suggesting, in dicta, that, if a

parent was paying postminority child support, the parent could maintain

an action for visitation).

Section 30-5-7(b)(4), Ala. Code 1975, authorizes a circuit court to

award temporary custody of "any children of the parties" in an ex parte

protection order, and § 30-5-7(c)(2) permits a circuit court to "[s]pecify

arrangements for visitation of any children by the defendant" in a final

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protection order. (Emphasis added.) However, the term "children," when

used in a statute relating to custody matters, refers solely to minor

children unless the context clearly provides otherwise. See Ex parte

Christopher, 145 So. 3d 60 (Ala. 2013). Nothing in the Protection from

Abuse Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 30-5-1 et seq., indicates that the legislature

intended for the term "children" to include adult disabled children. The

legislature knows how to clearly empower a circuit court to enter a

visitation order regarding an adult disabled child, see Ala. Code 1975, §

26-2A-113 (providing that, in guardianship proceedings, a probate court

may transfer to a circuit court a visitation petition relating to a ward who

is an incapacitated person), and it elected not do so in the Protection from

Abuse Act.

Thus, whether the Madison Circuit Court based the June 9, 2025,

visitation order on the Protection from Abuse Act or its "general

jurisdiction," the court acted without subject-matter jurisdiction. The

visitation order is void. Therefore, I concur that the writ of mandamus

should be issued to compel that the visitation order be vacated.

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