C.S. v. J.Z.

Rel: June 27, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855
_________________________

C.S.

v.

J.Z.

Appeals from Calhoun Juvenile Court
(JU-24-876.01 and JU-24-877.01)

PER CURIAM.

C.S. ("the mother") appeals from judgments entered by the Calhoun

Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") terminating her parental rights to

K.Z. and E.Z. ("the children").1 We affirm the juvenile court's judgments.

1K.Z. was born in February 2015, and E.Z. was born in June 2017.
CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

Procedural History

On May 7, 2024, J.Z. ("the father") filed in the juvenile court

petitions seeking to terminate the parental rights of the mother to the

children. A trial on the petitions was held on October 17, 2024. On

October 22, 2024, the juvenile court entered separate but nearly identical

judgments terminating the parental rights of the mother to the children.

The juvenile court's judgments provided, in pertinent part:

"1. The [father] presented clear and convincing evidence,
competent, material and relevant in nature, that the mother
of the … child[ren] is unable or unwilling to discharge her
responsibilities to and for the child[ren], and that the conduct
and condition of the mother renders her unable to properly
care for the child[ren] and that this conduct and condition is
not likely to change in the foreseeable future.

"2. The mother's extensive, dangerous and ongoing drug
addiction is a danger to herself and to [the] children.

"3. The mother has failed to provide for the material
needs of the … child[ren].

"4. The mother has failed to adjust her circumstances to
meet the needs of the child[ren] in accordance with
agreements reached, and previous Court Orders.

"5. The child[ren are] stable in [the] father's home. The
child[ren]'s stepmother is stable, has a loving and meaningful
relationship with the child[ren] and is a willing adoptive
resource for the child[ren].

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"6. The best interest[s] of the … child[ren] [are] served
by the mother's rights being terminated.

"WHEREFORE, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED as follows:

"7. The Petition[s] for Termination of Parental Rights
[are] due to be and [are] hereby GRANTED. The parental
rights of the … mother … are terminated." 2

(Capitalization in original.) On October 25, 2024, the mother timely filed

her notices of appeal to this court.

Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, we note that the October 22, 2024, judgments

contain no final custodial disposition of the children. Although neither

party has raised the issue on appeal, this court has held that "an

appellate court must initially consider whether it has jurisdiction to hear

and decide an appeal: '[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude

that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero

motu.' Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987)." Alabama Dep't

2Although the juvenile court's judgments did not address whether

there were viable alternatives to termination of the mother's parental
rights, this court has held that a juvenile court is not "required to make
a specific finding with regard to whether it had considered and rejected
viable alternatives to termination. … Such a finding is implicit in the
juvenile court's judgment granting the petition to terminate parental
rights." D.L. v. E.L., 399 So. 3d 274, 276 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024).
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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

of Revenue v. WestPoint Home, LLC, 256 So. 3d 1197, 1199 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2018).

Section 12-15-320(b), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"If the juvenile court determines that the parents of a child
are unwilling or unable to act as parents and terminates their
parental rights, it may do the following:

"(1) Transfer or continue the permanent
legal custody of the child to the Department of
Human Resources or to any public or private
licensed child-placing agency able and willing to
assume the care and maintenance of the child. An
order of the juvenile court which terminates
parental rights and awards permanent legal
custody to the Department of Human Resources or
to a licensed child-placing agency shall mean that
the Department of Human Resources or the
licensed child-placing agency shall have authority
to make permanent plans for the child, including
the authority to place for adoption and consent to
adoption.

"(2) Transfer or continue the permanent
legal custody of the child to the petitioner who,
after study by the Department of Human
Resources, is found to be able to properly receive
and care for the child."

Based on § 12-15-320(b), this court has held that, generally, for a

judgment terminating parental rights to be a final judgment, it must

contain a permanent custodial disposition. See, e.g., D.L. v. E.L., 399 So.

3d 274 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024).

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

However, by its plain language, § 12-15-320(b) applies only when a

juvenile court determines that the "parents" of the child are unable or

unwilling to act as "parents." When the words in a statute are clear and

unambiguous, this court must apply the statute according to its plain

language. See Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 132 (Ala. 2005). By

using the plural term, "parents," the statute obviously refers to a

situation in which a juvenile court determines that both parents of a child

cannot or will not properly parent the child. When a custodial parent

petitions a juvenile court to terminate the parental rights of a

noncustodial parent and the juvenile court determines only that the

noncustodial parent is unable or unwilling to act as a parent, § 12-15-

320(b) does not apply. Thus, we hold that the October 22, 2024,

judgments conclusively adjudicated the only claim before the juvenile

court despite the absence of a permanent award of custody to the father.

Therefore, the juvenile court's judgments are final judgments that will

support these appeals. See Bean v. Craig, 557 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala.

1990) (defining a final judgment as "one that conclusively determines the

issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the

parties involved").

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

Evidence
The mother, who was 30 years old at the time of trial, testified that

she began smoking marijuana when she was 17 years old and developed

an addiction to opiate pain medication in 2017 after having a tubal-

ligation procedure. According to the mother, the Department of Human

Resources ("DHR") became involved with her and the children in 2018

after her first husband reported to DHR that she was taking Suboxone

while breastfeeding. She testified that she told DHR that she had been

abusing her medication and was breastfeeding her youngest daughter;

however, she testified that she was not taking Suboxone at that time.

The mother testified that her youngest daughter tested negative for all

drugs. According to the mother, DHR closed the case without indicating

her for any wrongdoing.

The mother testified that she and the father divorced in January

2019. She testified that, pursuant to an agreement, the father was

awarded "primary placement"3 of the children and she was awarded

unsupervised visitation with the children on the first, third, and fifth

3We interpret this provision as awarding the father sole physical

custody of the children. See L.B. v. V.T.W., 387 So. 3d 1157, 1158 n.1
(Ala. Civ. App. 2023).
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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

weekends of each month, as well as other times. The mother testified

that, at the time of that agreement, she was addicted to opiates. On June

13, 2022, the Calhoun Circuit Court entered a judgment modifying the

divorce judgment; the modification judgment was admitted as an exhibit

in the termination-of-parental-rights trial and provided, in pertinent

part:

"1. The [mother] has a long history of abusing illegal
drugs and/or unprescribed controlled substances.

"2. The January 9, 2019[,] divorce agreement entered
into between the [mother] and the [father] at the time of the
parties' divorce specifically provided for the [mother] to
submit to drug screens upon the request of the [father]. Said
agreement further provided that should the [mother] test
positive for illegal or non-prescribed controlled substances
that the [mother]'s visitation with the … children would be
suspended.

"3. On March 20, 2019[,] the [mother] tested positive for
controlled substances which resulted in the suspension of her
visitation with the children.

"4. The [father] agreed for the [mother] to resume
supervised visitations with the children effective with the
weekend of May 31, 2019.

"5. On June 28, 2019[,] this Court ordered the [mother]
to enroll in and successfully complete a 90 day drug
rehabilitation program and awarded the [mother] supervised
visitation pending said completion and unsupervised
visitation upon completion of said drug rehabilitation
program.

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"6. On August 7, 2019, the [mother] again failed a drug
screen for controlled substances which resulted in the
suspension of her visitation pursuant to the January 9, 2019,
divorce agreement.

"7. On May 13, 2020[,] the [mother] filed a Petition to
Reinstate her visitation in which she alleged that she had
engaged in and completed counseling with Edith Couch in
March of 2020 and had completed an intensive drug
rehabilitation program with Bradford in April of 2020.

"8. This Court again awarded the [mother] supervised
visitation with the … children with said supervision lifting on
December 4, 2020.

"9. On or about November of 2021[,] the [mother] again
relapsed on drugs with said relapse being the use of fentanyl
and heroin.

"10. The [mother] detoxed at Bradford on November 30,
2021[,] for a period of 6 days with plans that she would enter
into the outpatient Beacon program until she could enroll in
an inpatient drug rehabilitation program.

"11. The [mother] enrolled in the Beacon program in
which she was prescribed [S]uboxone but voluntarily left the
Program prior to completion.

"12. The [mother] allegedly reenrolled in the Beacon
program in the Spring of 2022.

"13. Notwithstanding the [mother's] knowing that she
has a substantial and ongoing addiction to drugs, the [mother]
has failed to completely and appropriately address her
substance abuse [issues] by undergoing continuing intensive
inpatient treatment that would hopefully allow her to obtain
and maintain sobriety.

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

"14. The outpatient program that the [mother] [chose] to
enter resulted in the [mother's] being prescribed [S]uboxone
legally notwithstanding being treated for addiction to
[S]uboxone previously.

"15. The [mother]'s substance abuse has progressed
from opiates and [S]uboxone to methamphetamine to heroin
to heroin mixed [with] fentanyl.

"….

"It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and
DECREED as follows:

"….

"3. VISITATION: The [mother]'s Petition to Reinstate
her previously ordered visitation privileges is DENIED. The
[mother]'s visitation privileges are hereby MODIFIED as
follows:

"A. The [mother] is awarded SUPERVISED
visitation with the … children the first and third
Sundays of the month from 2:00 p.m. until 4:00
p.m. as well as any other visitation that is agreed
upon between the [mother] and the [father].

"B. The [mother]'s visitation shall be strictly
supervised by the [mother]'s Father …, the
[mother]'s Mother …, or the [mother]'s
Grandmother….

"C. Supervision is defined as eyes on (within
sight of) and ears on (within hearing of) at all
times. The [mother]'s Mother, Father or
Grandmother shall have an affirmative duty to
notify the [father] within twelve (12) hours should
they learn or suspect that the [mother] has

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

relapsed on drugs or within twelve (12) hours of
the [mother's] exhibiting any signs indicating a
possible relapse on drugs. Failure of the supervisor
to timely notify the [father] of the [mother]'s
relapse or the [mother's] showing signs of relapse
could result in said individual being removed as a
supervisor.

"D. The [mother]'s visitation with the …
children shall not occur at the [mother]'s residence
nor any residence in which the [mother] resides,
unless the [father] agrees in writing for the
[mother]'s visitations to occur at her residence or a
residence or location where the [mother] is staying
overnight or residing."

(Capitalization in original.)

The mother testified that she again tested positive for fentanyl on

February 6, 2024, and she stated that the most recent time she used

fentanyl was on July 30, 2024. The mother testified that she entered into

drug treatment at a facility operated by Quest 2 Recovery in California

the next day and remained in treatment for 27 days before returning to

Alabama; she testified that she had been to a facility operated by

Bradford Health Services earlier that month as well. According to the

mother, she did not want to complete drug rehabilitation at the beginning

of July 2024 because she "wanted to keep spiraling" and "didn't decide to

go to treatment … [her]self until July 30[, 2024]." The mother testified

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

that she had been injecting fentanyl into herself on the tops of her hands

and in her arms. She testified that she had developed cellulitis, which

had turned to gangrene on the tops of her hands; however, she testified

that the area that became infected was not where she was injecting

herself with fentanyl.

According to the mother, at the time she completed her intake at

the Bradford facility, she was using approximately two grams of fentanyl

per day, which cost $100. She further testified that she has ingested

illegal drugs by snorting them and via "booty bumps."4 The mother

testified that she knew fentanyl was dangerous even if touched and that

she had used fentanyl in her bathroom at her home. She testified that

she is blind in her left eye because a drug dealer "stomped" on her face.

The mother, who had resided at The Zoe Behavioral and

Rehabilitation House, a sober-living facility in California, since

September 21, 2024, testified that she had never resided in a sober-living

facility before her current stay in California and that she had continued

to relapse after every time she had gotten help. According to the mother,

4The mother testified that "booty bumps" are a method of ingesting

drugs involving "the behind."
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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

she relapsed in February 2024 because she had a miscarriage. The

mother further testified that she had been diagnosed with bipolar

disorder in November 2021 and was under the care of a physician in

California; she testified that she had been prescribed lithium,

risperidone, and buspirone for bipolar disorder and had been taking those

medications since July 31, 2024.

The mother testified that she had spoken to the children on the

telephone the night before the termination-of-parental-rights trial, that

she talks to them on the telephone almost daily, and that they ask her all

the time when they are going to be able to see her again. According to

the mother, she has a relationship with the children but has not seen

them since April 2024. She testified that, although she has not paid

court-ordered child support, she has provided the children with gifts. The

mother testified that she is trying to change and that she does not think

that it is in the children's best interests to be separated from her.

Although the mother testified that the children had never been injured

while visiting her, she testified that she took the children with her once

to buy hydrocodone from a drug dealer.

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

The mother testified that it would not be in the children's best

interests to be around her if she continued to use heroin and fentanyl.

She testified that she knows she has caused the children emotional

damage; however, the mother testified that she has not caused the

children physical harm and that the children should not be taken away

from her when they have such a strong bond. The mother testified that,

"[a]s long as I'm not using, I should be allowed to see my children." The

mother further testified that she does not call the children while she is

"high."

The father testified that he lives with A.Z. ("the stepmother") and 3

children, including the 2 children in this case and his 14-year-old son,

who is not related to the mother. According to the father, he and the

stepmother have been married for almost five years. When asked how

the children have been affected by the mother over the years, the father

stated:

"I've slowly watched a progression of the [children] becoming
more and more distant, more nonchalant of their phone calls.
A lot of sighing. More so it's interrupting whatever they're
having fun doing, whether it be us going to the card shop to
play cards with all of the other kids or having a family game
night, stuff like that."

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

Further, when asked about the bond between the children and the

mother, the father stated:

"I would say it's become a more unhealthy bond. It's -- we tried
to foster a very healthy bond at the very beginning, but as it's
progressed, [the children have] started to show a lot of signs
of disappointment and, kind of, crassness to the situation,
almost a disregard for a lot of the stuff. And it's been very
upsetting for them."

According to the father, the stepmother is willing to be an adoptive

resource for the children, and he believes that the children deserve

stability and permanency, which, he testified, he and the stepmother

could provide. Further, the father testified that, if there is any emotional

turmoil or fallout as a result of the juvenile court's terminating the

mother's parental rights to the children, he would reach out to House

Counseling "and ask them what they think would be the best steps to

move forward … and what would be best for the [children] to move

forward."

The father testified that, when the mother called the children, they

made bargains to get off the telephone quickly so that they could get back

to what they were doing and agreed to talk to the mother longer the next

day. According to the father, when the mother lost visitation at the end

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

of the school year, "there was a lot of emotional upset for [E.Z.], and her

grades started to have a little bit of an impact."

The father testified that he is concerned about the safety of the

children if they were allowed to visit the mother and worries about

whether they will come back to him and the stepmother "safe and sound."

He testified that the children enjoy playing with makeup and would often

go through the mother's purse, which causes him concern because he is

fearful that the mother would keep her drugs in her purse; he testified

that he would still have those concerns if the mother was producing

negative drug tests because the mother has "tested negative in the past

for periods of time, and then all of a sudden, it's escalated."

The father testified that the mother's visitation with the children

has been suspended between five to seven times based on her drug use.

(R. 119). He testified that, during the periods between visitation ceasing

and resuming, he has observed changes in the children's behavior. The

father stated:

"We've noticed some behavioral changes, especially in [E.Z.]
When she's at our house, she has some structure, a bit of
discipline, you know, chores to do, school work to do, the
structure that we provide for her. When she goes [to the
mother's], she tends to throw a lot of temper tantrums and get
very emotional and, kind of, out of hand."

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

Further, when the mother's visitation was suspended in April 2024, the

father testified that "[K.Z.] was very flippant about it. She almost could

[not] care less. And then [E.Z.] had a very -- almost visceral[] reaction in

sadness to her, and she cried a good bit. But it was rather short lived

once she got back to her daily life." The father testified that the children

call the stepmother "mom." According to the father, the children have

asked once or twice when they would see the mother again, to which the

father has responded: "Hopefully when she gets better"; he testified that

he has not told the children about the mother's drug use and instead

explains to them that the mother is sick and getting herself better.

The stepmother testified that the children have lived with her and

the father continuously since they married approximately five years ago.

According to the stepmother, their home is stable, structured, peaceful,

and safe. When asked to describe her relationship with the children, the

stepmother stated:

"Well, I've been a stay-at-home mom for three years now with
the exception of working … with [the father]. I get [the
children] ready for school every morning. I do homework with
[the children] when they are home. More often than not, I do
bedtime routine just because it's easier with our schedules.
We're really close. We spend so much time together."

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

According to the stepmother, neither she nor the father say anything

negative about the mother in the presence of the children. The

stepmother testified that she would be honored to be an adoptive resource

for the children.

Standard of Review

"A judgment terminating parental rights must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence, which is
' " '[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in
opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high
probability as to the correctness of the conclusion . ' " ' C.O. v.
Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 206 So. 3d 621, 627 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2016) (quoting L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179
(Ala. Civ. App. 2002), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-
20(b)(4)).

" ' "[T]he evidence necessary for
appellate affirmance of a judgment
based on a factual finding in the
context of a case in which the ultimate
standard for a factual decision by the
trial court is clear and convincing
evidence is evidence that a fact-finder
reasonably could find to clearly and
convincingly … establish the fact
sought to be proved."

" 'KGS Steel, Inc. [v. McInish], 47 So. 3d [749,] 761
[(Ala. Civ. App. 2006)].

" '… [F]or trial courts ruling … in civil cases
to which a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard
of proof applies, "the judge must view the evidence

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden[,]" [Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed.
2d 202 (1986)]; thus, the appellate court must also
look through a prism to determine whether there
was substantial evidence before the trial court to
support a factual finding, based upon the trial
court's weighing of the evidence, that would
"produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm
conviction as to each element of the claim and a
high probability as to the correctness of the
conclusion ." '

"Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778 (Ala. 2008). This court
does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines
whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile court are
supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have
found to be clear and convincing. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So.
2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007). When those findings rest on ore tenus
evidence, this court presumes their correctness. Id."

M.W. v. Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 399 So. 3d 287, 290-91 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2024).

Discussion

On appeal, the mother argues (1) that the juvenile court erred by

finding that grounds for termination of her parental rights existed; (2)

that the juvenile court erred by terminating her parental rights despite

the existence of a viable alternative; and (3) that termination of her

parental rights was not in the best interests of the children. We address

each argument in turn.

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I. Grounds for Termination

Section 12-15-319, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing
evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature, that
the parent[] of [the] child[ren] [is] unable or unwilling to
discharge [her] responsibilities to and for the child[ren], or
that the conduct or condition of the parent[] renders [her]
unable to properly care for the child[ren] and that the conduct
or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, it
may terminate the parental rights of the parent[]. In a
hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights, the
court shall consider the best interests of the child[ren]. In
determining whether or not the parent[] [is] unable or
unwilling to discharge [her] responsibilities to and for the
child[ren] and to terminate the parental rights, the juvenile
court shall consider the following factors including, but not
limited to, the following:

"….

"(2) Emotional illness, mental illness, or
mental deficiency of the parent, or excessive use of
alcohol or controlled substances, of a duration or
nature as to render the parent unable to care for
the needs of the child[ren].

"….

"(12) Lack of effort by the parent to adjust …
her circumstances to meet the needs of the
child[ren] in accordance with agreements reached,
including agreements reached with local
departments of human resources or licensed child-
placing agencies, in an administrative review or a
judicial review."

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In these cases, the evidence indicated that the mother had an

ongoing substance-abuse problem. The mother testified that she began

smoking marijuana when she was 17 years old and developed an

addiction to opiate pain medication in 2017. Further, the father testified

that the mother's visitation with the children had been suspended

between five to seven times because of her drug use. The mother testified

that the most recent time she had used fentanyl was in July 2024. She

testified that she had been using approximately two grams of fentanyl

per day. Further, the mother testified that she had taken the children

with her to purchase hydrocodone from a drug dealer.

Evidence at trial indicated that the mother was ordered by a court

to complete a 90-day drug-rehabilitation program in June of 2019. She

completed an intensive drug-rehabilitation program at the Bradford

facility in April 2020; she again attended a program at the Bradford

facility in November 2021 after relapsing and using fentanyl and heroin;

she enrolled in "the Beacon program" in the spring of 2022; and she again

attended a program at the Bradford facility in July 2024. Before her most

recent enrollment in a sober-living facility, she had continued to relapse

after every time she had gotten help. Thus, given the mother's long

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history of drug use and continued relapse after enrollment in multiple

drug-rehabilitation facilities, "the juvenile court could have reasonably

concluded that clear and convincing evidence had been presented proving

that it was unlikely that the mother would be able to properly care for

the children in the foreseeable future," Ex Parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051,

1061 (Ala. 2022), due to her use of controlled substances and that the

mother had failed to adjust her circumstances to meet the needs of the

children in accordance with agreements reached and previous court

orders. See § 12-15-319(a)(2) and (12).

II. Viable Alternatives

The mother also argues that the juvenile court erred by terminating

her parental rights despite the existence of a viable alternative.

Specifically, the mother argues that maintaining the status quo was a

viable alternative to the termination of her parental rights.

"It is well settled that a noncustodial parent continues
to maintain a fundamental right to a legal relationship with
his or her child. See McQuinn v. McQuinn, 866 So. 2d 570,
572 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). A juvenile court may only interfere
with that fundamental right using the most narrowly tailored
means to achieve the State's compelling interests. See Roe v.
Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Only two interests
have been identified as sufficiently compelling to justify a
termination of parental rights: the protection of children from
parental abuse or neglect and the advancement of the

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children's need for a permanent custodial arrangement. See
Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d 1051, 1065 (Ala. 2022) (Parker,
C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)."

R.D. v. G.A.W., [Ms. CL-2024-0344, Nov. 1, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.

Civ. App. 2024).

"Once the court determines that termination of the
parent's parental rights advances a compelling governmental
interest, the court then must consider whether the
government seeks to advance its interest in a manner that
infringes the parent's parental rights in the narrowest
manner possible. See Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.
v. N.B., 196 So. 3d 1205, 1214 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (' " A state
may only interfere with [parental rights] to achieve a
compelling governmental objective using the most narrowly
tailored means available. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D.
Ala. 1976)." ' (quoting J.B. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,
12 So. 3d [100,] 115 [(Ala. Civ. App. 2008)] (plurality
opinion))); § 26-1-6(b)[, Ala. Code 1975]. '[I]f a court may
achieve the compelling governmental objective at stake
through a means other than the drastic action of permanently
revoking the custodial rights of the parent, a juvenile court
cannot terminate parental rights.' J.G. v. Lauderdale Cnty.
Dep't of Hum. Res., 379 So. 3d 444, 447 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023).
A juvenile court applies this 'narrowly tailored' analysis by
considering whether there exists any viable alternative to
termination of parental rights to achieve the government's
compelling interest. See Ex parte Bodie, 377 So. 3d [1051,]
1064 [(Ala. 2022)] (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and
concurring in the result); S.P. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum.
Res., 315 So. 3d 1126, 1131 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020); J.B. v.
DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 12 So. 3d at 115 (plurality
opinion)."

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M.P. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 394 So. 3d 1080, 1086-87 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2023). "[I]f some less drastic alternative to termination of

parental rights can be used that will simultaneously protect the children

from parental harm and preserve the beneficial aspects of the family

relationship, then a juvenile court must explore whether that alternative

can be successfully employed instead of terminating parental rights."

T.D.K. v. L.A.W., 78 So. 3d 1006, 1011 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

The mother testified that, although she has not seen the children

since April 2024, she speaks to the children on the telephone almost daily

and has a relationship with the children. However, the father testified

that the children had been affected by the mother's actions over the years

and that he had noticed the "progression of the [children] becoming more

and more distant, more nonchalant of their telephone calls" with the

mother. Although the mother testified that she and the children have a

strong bond, she also recognized that she had caused the children

emotional damage. When asked about the bond between the children

and the mother, the father stated:

"I would say it's become a more unhealthy bond. It's -- we tried
to foster a very healthy bond at the very beginning, but as it's
progressed, [the children have] started to show a lot of signs
of disappointment and, kind of, crassness to the situation,

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almost a disregard for a lot of the stuff. And it's been very
upsetting for them."

Further, the father testified that, if emotional turmoil resulted from

terminating telephone calls between the mother and the children, he

would reach out to House Counseling to obtain advice. According to the

father, the children call the stepmother "mom" and she is willing to be an

adoptive resource for the children; the stepmother testified that she

would be honored to be an adoptive resource for the children. Further,

the father testified that he believes that the children deserve stability

and permanency, which, he testified, he and the stepmother could

provide.

This court has held that "maintaining the status quo is a viable

option to terminating parental rights when the parent and the child enjoy

a relationship with some beneficial aspects that should be preserved such

that it would be in the child's best interests to continue that relationship."

S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H., 127 So. 3d 1225, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).

Preserving the status quo would not be in the best interests of the

children if it would prevent them "from accessing benefits available to

[them] if [they are] allowed to be adopted by the step[parent]." Id.

Further, when reviewing a termination-of-parental-rights judgment,

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CL-2024-0854 and CL-2024-0855

"an appellate court will review factual findings of the juvenile
court based on ore tenus evidence with a 'presumption of
correctness' because the trial court had the benefit of
'observing witnesses … as they testified, and, therefore, [the
juvenile court] was able to assess their demeanor and
credibility.' "

P.G. v. J.H., [Ms. CL-2023-0828, Aug. 9, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.

Civ. App. 2024) (quoting J.C. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 986 So. 2d 1172,

1195 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)).

Here, although the mother testified that she and the children have

a strong bond, the juvenile court, which was in the best position to

determine the credibility of the witnesses, could have determined that,

as the father testified, that bond had become unhealthy and upsetting to

the children such that it no longer had a beneficial aspect that should be

preserved. See S.N.W., 127 So. 3d at 1230. Further, the juvenile court

could have determined that preserving the status quo was not a viable

alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights because it

would prevent the children from the benefit of having the stepmother

adopt them. Moreover, as this court has stated, "[a]t some point, … the

child[ren]'s need for permanency and stability must overcome the

parent's good-faith but unsuccessful attempts to become a suitable

parent." M.W. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 773 So. 2d 484, 487

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(Ala. Civ. App. 2000). Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court

could have found that maintaining the status quo was not a viable

alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights.

III. Best Interests

The mother finally argues that termination of her parental rights

was not in the best interests of the children. This court has held that

"a parent has a prima facie right to custody of his or her child,
Moore v. State Dep't of Pensions and Sec., 470 So. 2d 1269
(Ala. Civ. App. 1985), and this right can be overcome only by
clear and convincing evidence that the child's best interests
would be served by permanently removing the child from the
parent's custody."

R.C.M. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 601 So. 2d 100, 101 (Ala. Civ. App.

1991). As explained above, although the mother testified that she and

the children have a strong bond, she also recognized that she had caused

the children emotional damage. Additionally, the father testified that

the bond between the mother and the children had become unhealthy and

upsetting to the children. The juvenile court found that "[t]he child[ren

are] stable in [the] father's home. The child[ren]'s stepmother is stable,

has a loving and meaningful relationship with the child[ren] and is a

willing adoptive resource for the child[ren]." The stepmother testified

that their home is stable, structured, peaceful, and safe. Further, the

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stepmother testified that she and the children are "really close," that they

"spend so much time together," and that she would be honored to be an

adoptive resource for the children. Therefore, the juvenile court could

have reasonably concluded that termination of the mother's parental

rights was in the children's best interests because it enabled the

stepmother to adopt them, providing stability and permanency for the

children.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the judgments of the juvenile court

terminating the parental rights of the mother to the children are

affirmed.

CL-2024-0854 -- AFFIRMED.

CL-2024-0855 -- AFFIRMED.

All the judges concur.

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