Jessica Layne Chapman v. Frederick Kyle Chapman (Appeal from Chilton Circuit Court: DR-14-900112.01).

Rel: March 28, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619
_________________________

Jessica Layne Chapman

v.

Frederick Kyle Chapman

Appeals from Chilton Circuit Court
(DR-14-900112.01 and DR-14-900112.02)

FRIDY, Judge.

Jessica Layne Chapman ("the mother") appeals from two

judgments entered by the Chilton Circuit Court ("the trial court"); in the

first judgment, the trial court modified the custody of the two children of

the mother and Frederick Kyle Chapman ("the father"), and, in the
CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

second judgment, the trial court found the mother in contempt and

suspended her visitation with the children. We affirm the judgments.

Procedural History

The parties are the natural and legal parents of two children, a son

born in 2010 and a daughter born in 2013 ("the children"). The parties

divorced in 2016. The judgment of divorce, as last amended, vested the

parties with joint legal custody of the children and awarded the mother

sole physical custody of the children subject to the visitation rights of the

father, which included the right to telephone contact each night with the

children. The divorce judgment further required the parties to notify one

another of any change in address.

On March 2, 2018, the father filed a petition requesting that the

trial court find the mother in contempt for violating the telephone-contact

and relocation provisions of the divorce judgment and award him sole

physical custody of the children, along with child support; that petition

was assigned case number DR-14-900112.01.

On May 1, 2019, after a bench trial, the trial court entered an order

that, among other things, awarded the father sole physical custody of the

children, required the father to keep the mother informed of any medical
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or educational issues involving the children, ordered the mother to pay

the father monthly child support in the amount of $382, ordered the

father to provide health insurance for the children, provided that the

parties were to equally split the costs of the children's health-care

expenses not covered by insurance, awarded the mother specified

visitation rights, and specified the manner in which the parties would

exchange the children's prescription medications for visits. Based upon

the mother's motion to reconsider, the trial court amended the order to,

among other things, apply the custody-modification standard established

in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984), but, nevertheless,

sustained the change of custody. The trial court did not address the

contempt claims raised by the father in the order or the amended order.

See Decker v. Decker, 984 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (holding that

the failure to adjudicate all pending contempt claims renders a judgment

nonfinal).

On June 25, 2020, the father filed a petition alleging that the

mother was in contempt of court for violating the terms of the May 1,

2019, order; that petition was assigned case number DR-14-900112.02.

While that case was pending, the trial court entered several pendente lite
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CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

orders suspending or restricting the mother's visitation with the children.

On June 6, 2022, the trial court consolidated the two cases for trial

purposes. Although the trial court purported to set aside the

consolidation order, the trial court continued to enter orders in both cases

until May 30, 2023. On that date, the trial court entered a judgment in

case number DR-14-900112.01 that denied all unadjudicated claims. On

July 10, 2023, the mother timely filed a notice of appeal from the May 30,

2023, judgment, and this court docketed her appeal as appeal number

CL-2023-0485.

On July 24, 2023, the trial court entered a final judgment in case

number DR-14-900112.02. In that judgment, the trial court determined

that the mother was in contempt of court for failing to pay child support,

for failing to pay her portion of the noncovered health-care expenses for

the children, for keeping funds that had been received due to the COVID-

19 pandemic ("the COVID-19 stimulus funds") and were intended for the

benefit of the children, and for placing the children on "government

insurance." The trial court ordered the mother to pay the father $11,500

in attorney's fees and to pay the father the entire amount of the COVID-

19 stimulus funds that she had received on behalf of the children.
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Additionally, the trial court modified the visitation provisions of the May

1, 2019, order that had been entered in case number DR-14-900112.01 as

follows:

"[The m]other's visitation as stated in the Order of
Modification dated May 1, 2019[,] is modified and limited to
visits, when they can be scheduled, through The Wellness
Group, at the expense of the mother, until the mother is
evaluated and it is recommended to this Court that the
mother[']s supervision should be lifted, for the benefit of the
children. Upon [the] mother[']s evaluation through The
Wellness Group, and [when] it is reported to the Court that
[it] is of no danger ... for the mother to have unsupervised
visitation, then the visitation shall be re-evaluated by this
Court."

On September 5, 2023, the mother timely filed a notice of appeal from of

the July 24, 2023, judgment, and this court docketed her appeal as appeal

number CL-2023-0619. On September 19, 2023, this court consolidated

appeal number CL-2023-0485 and appeal number CL-2023-0619.

Issues

In appeal number CL-2023-0485, the mother argues that the trial

court erred by applying the wrong custody-modification standard and by

modifying custody of the children without sufficient evidence. In appeal

number CL-2023-0619, the mother argues that the trial court erred by

modifying her visitation rights, by finding her in contempt of court for
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CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

actions that did not violate a previous court order, by ordering her to pay

attorney's fees to the father, and by failing to order the father to pay her

attorney's fees.

Analysis

I. Appeal Number CL-2023-0485

When a judgment awards one party sole physical custody of a child,

that custody provision may be modified only according to the standard

set forth in Ex parte McLendon, supra, which requires the petitioner to

demonstrate "(1) 'that he or she is a fit custodian'; (2) 'that material

changes which affect the child's welfare have occurred'; and (3) 'that the

positive good brought about by the change in custody will more than

offset the disruptive effect of uprooting the child.' " Marshall v. Marshall,

346 So. 3d 1008, 1018 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (quoting Kunkel v. Kunkel,

547 So. 2d 555, 560 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989)). In this case, the 2016 divorce

judgment awarded the mother sole physical custody of the children, so

the father had to meet the Ex parte McLendon standard to obtain a

change of custody.

In its May 1, 2019, order granting the father's custody-modification

petition, the trial court found that it was in the best interests of the
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CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

children to modify the custody provisions of the divorce judgment. In her

motion to reconsider, the mother pointed out that the Ex parte McLendon

standard requires more than just a showing of best interests, which is

the standard to be applied when a court modifies a joint-physical-custody

arrangement. See Ex parte Couch, 521 So. 2d 987, 989 (Ala. 1988). The

trial court subsequently amended the order to provide, in pertinent part:

"1. The May 1, 2019[,] order is adopted in full.

"2. That the custody of the ... children is placed with the
father, in that the benefit of the father having custody of the[]
children over the mother wi[ll] greatly benefit them and any
disruptive effect of the change of the residence is outweighed
by the benefit to the children. With the father, the stability of
the household is improved. Their medication is metered more
regular and there are fewer disturbances surrounding the
family unit."

The mother argues that the trial court failed to apply the Ex parte

McLendon standard because it adopted the May 1, 2019, order "in full,"

which, she says, indicates that the trial court reapplied the best-

interests-of-the-child standard when deciding the custody dispute. The

mother has engaged in a strained interpretation of the order. From the

context of the proceedings, and the wording of the amended order, it is

apparent that the trial court adopted the May 1, 2019, order except to the

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CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

extent that it amended the order to apply the Ex parte McLendon

standard as the mother requested. When any alleged ambiguity in a

judgment is dispelled by a reference to the record, " 'the judgment will be

upheld and carried into effect in the same manner as though its meaning

and intent were made clear and manifest by its own terms.' " Coffey v.

Cross, 185 Ala. 86, 91-92, 64 So. 95, 96 (1913) (quoting 1 Black on

Judgments § 123).

The mother also argues that the trial court failed to expressly find

in the amended order that there had been a material change of

circumstances since the entry of the divorce judgment, which is a

component of the Ex parte McLendon standard. "It is ... well established

that in the absence of specific findings of fact, appellate courts will

assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its

judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous." Ex parte

Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. 1996). Because that implied

finding is not clearly erroneous, as we will explain, the trial court did not

commit reversible error by failing to expressly find that a material

change of circumstances had occurred.

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CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

In the context of child custody, a material change of circumstances

is a change in the circumstances of the parties since the entry of the last

custody judgment " 'such as to affect the welfare and best interest of the

child or children involved.' " Watters v. Watters, 918 So. 2d 913, 916 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2005) (quoting Ponder v. Ponder, 50 Ala. App. 27, 30, 276 So.

2d 613, 615 (Civ. 1973)). In her brief to this court, the mother claims that,

in the 2016 divorce proceedings, the trial court considered the same

circumstances that led the father to file his custody-modification petition

in 2018. To prove her point, the mother attaches to her appellate brief

documents from the record of the 2016 divorce proceedings, some of which

were not made part of the record in these appeals; however, this court

cannot consider attachments to appellate briefs that are not contained in

the appellate record. Jackson v. Davis, 153 So. 3d 820, 829 (Ala. Civ. App.

2014).

During the 2019 trial of the custody-modification petition, the

father's attorney indicated that he would question the mother only

regarding events occurring after May 2, 2016, the date of the divorce

judgment. The record shows that the trial court conducted postjudgment

proceedings in the divorce case after May 2, 2016, that led to an amended
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CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

divorce judgment being entered on July 18, 2016. However, during the

postjudgment hearing, the mother did not object to the introduction of

evidence relating to events occurring between May 2, 2016, and July 18,

2016. The mother cannot now argue on appeal that the trial court should

have limited its inquiry to events occurring after July 18, 2016. See

Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992) ("[An

appellate court] cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on

appeal; rather, our review is restricted to the evidence and arguments

considered by the trial court.").

The trial court heard evidence indicating that, between May 2,

2016, and March 8, 2019, the mother had moved with the children four

times and had temporarily stayed with her mother on one occasion and

with a friend on another occasion. During that period, the mother also

allowed two different men to stay overnight with her when the children

were present, which the amended divorce judgment prohibited. Although

the father was to have telephone contact with the children between 7:00

p.m. and 8:00 p.m. each night when they were with the mother, the

mother only rarely would answer his calls. By May 1, 2019, the mother

was involved in a relationship with a third man. The mother appeared to
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CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

have an active social life, and she had allowed a friend, who had lost

custody of all seven of her children and who was subjected to random

drug testing by the Department of Human Resources, to babysit the

children on one occasion. The mother earned approximately $1,200 per

month in gross income from cleaning houses, which was largely

consumed by ordinary household expenses. Meanwhile, the father had

remarried in January 2018 to a medical assistant, and he had moved into

her three-bedroom house; together, they earned approximately $5,600 a

month.

The children were both diagnosed with behavioral problems for

which they were prescribed medication. The mother did not communicate

with the father regarding the precise dosage of the medications that were

to be administered to the children during visitations. While in the

mother's care, the younger child did not perform well in kindergarten.

After the father obtained pendente lite custody of the children, the

mother did not turn over the children's medications, and she would not

respond to telephone calls or text messages about the medications. The

father would have to ask the school nurse to give the children the

medications that they needed in the mornings. The father's wife soon
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CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

discovered at a doctor's visit that the older child had been prescribed an

evening dose of medication about which the mother had not informed the

father. Through the intervention of the father's wife, the older child's

added evening dosage was eventually eliminated by the child's doctor.

The prescription for the younger child was also changed in February

2019. At first, the behavior of the younger child worsened due to the

change, but, by the end of March 2019, the younger child was consistently

behaving well and was receiving positive reports from her kindergarten

teacher. Nevertheless, the younger child's kindergarten teacher, who

testified at trial, believed that the younger child should repeat

kindergarten primarily due to her poor progress before February 2019.

When the father informed the mother of that development, the mother

did not ask to meet with the teacher or to discuss the matter with the

father.

From that evidence, the trial court could have reasonably

determined that there had been a material change of circumstances.

Furthermore, the trial court reasonably could have also determined that

the positive good from transferring custody of the children to the father

would outweigh any disruptive effects to the children. The mother argues
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CL-2023-0485 and CL-2023-0619

that the trial court modified custody solely to resolve visitation disputes

between the parties and based solely on evidence indicating that he had

remarried and had improved his personal circumstances, none of which,

she maintains, is sufficient to meet the Ex parte McLendon standard. See

Cochran v. Cochran, 5 So. 3d 1220 (2008); Watters v. Watters, 918 So. 2d

913 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Evans v. Evans, 978 So. 2d 42 (Ala. Civ. App.

2007). However, as the trial court specifically found, the children would

tangibly benefit from residing in the father's home where "the stability of

the household is improved" and the children's "medication is metered

more regular[ly] and there are fewer disturbances surrounding the

family unit." The evidence showed that, only a few months after the

pendente lite change of custody, the children's behavior had already

improved because their medications were being regularly controlled, and

the trial court could have been convinced that it was in their best

interests to more permanently modify custody to ensure their continued

progress, with the father acting as their sole physical custodian.

The mother contested the evidence that the father presented and

directly disputed most of his contentions, requiring the trial court to

assess the credibility of the parties and their witnesses and to weigh the
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conflicting evidence. On appeal of a judgment entered in a child-custody

case in which a trial court heard ore tenus evidence, the judgment is

accorded a presumption of correctness, and we will not reverse the

judgment unless the evidence is so lacking that we conclude that the trial

court was plainly and palpably wrong or committed an abuse of

discretion. Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d at 1324 (Ala. 1996). Applying

this standard, we do not find any grounds for reversing the judgment

entered in case number DR-14-900112.01, and we affirm that judgment.

II. Appeal Number CL-2023-0619

A. Supervised Visitation

Although there were some allegations that the mother had

physically harmed the father and the children, in the May 1, 2019, order

entered in case number DR-14-900112.01, the trial court ordered that the

mother was to have unsupervised visitation with the children. On

September 14, 2021, based on an allegation that the mother had

physically abused the older child during two visits in August and

September 2021, the trial court suspended the mother's unsupervised

visitation and ordered that further visitations were to be supervised and

to take place biweekly. On January 3, 2022, the trial court modified the
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September 14, 2021, order to reduce the mother's supervised visitation to

once a month while the older child attended counseling at The Wellness

Center to work toward increased visitation.

On March 18, 2022, the trial court granted the mother's motion to

allow the children's guardian ad litem to establish the visitation

restrictions and schedule for the mother. The guardian ad litem

apparently approved of weekly visitation to be supervised by employees

of The Wellness Center. After a supervised visit on April 19, 2022, the

father reported that the younger child had accused the mother of

improperly touching her. The trial court suspended visitation between

the mother and the children pending a forensic interview of the younger

child. After an investigation, no criminal charges were made against the

mother, and the Chilton County Department of Human Resources found

the allegation of sexual abuse to be "not indicated." After a hearing, the

trial court entered an order on July 18, 2022, restoring the mother's

supervised visitation with the children.

On November 9, 2022, the mother filed a verified motion to request

that her visitations be unsupervised. On February 26, 2023, the mother

filed a request for a hearing on her motion. Ultimately, the trial court
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determined that it would hear the visitation issue during the trial that

was scheduled to take place on May 30, 2023. After the May 30, 2023,

trial, the trial court entered the final judgment in case number DR-14-

900112.02 on July 24, 2023. In that judgment, the trial court continued

the mother's supervised visitation, subject to reconsideration following

an evaluation by employees of The Wellness Center showing that the

mother was not a danger to the children.

The mother contends that the trial court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to modify her visitation rights because the father failed to

pay the appropriate filing fee. See Farmer v. Farmer, 842 So. 2d 679, 680

(Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (holding that the failure to pay the docket fee as

required by Ala. Code 1975, § 12-19-70, is a jurisdictional defect). The

mother admits that the father paid a filing fee when he filed his contempt

petition on June 25, 2020, but she argues that the father was required to

pay another filing fee to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court to modify

her visitation. The record shows that the father did not include in his

June 25, 2020, petition a claim requesting that the trial court suspend

the mother's visitation. On September 13, 2021, the father filed a motion

to suspend the mother's visitation. Treating that motion as an
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amendment to the petition, see Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 562-63 (Ala. 2005) ("[An appellate court] will look at

the substance of a motion, rather than its title, to determine how that

motion is to be considered under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure."),

the father was not required to file an additional filing fee to invoke the

jurisdiction of the trial court over his visitation-modification claim.

"Under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of an amended

complaint is not the institution of a new action separate and apart from

the institution of the initial complaint, requiring the payment of a new

filing fee ...." Ex parte Jefferson Smurfit Corp. (U.S.), 951 So. 2d 659, 665

(Ala. 2006).

The mother next contends that the trial court erred in entering the

September 14, 2021, and April 28, 2022, pendente lite visitation orders.

We cannot consider that argument, however, because the pendente lite

orders were eventually supplanted by the final judgment entered on July

24, 2023, awarding the mother supervised visitation. Thus, the propriety

of the September 14, 2021, and the April 28, 2022, pendente lite orders

is moot. See F.M. v. B.S., 170 So. 3d 663, 668 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).

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The mother next contends that the trial court erred in ordering that

her visitation with the children be supervised. A trial court may order

supervised visitation if it receives sufficient evidence indicating that the

restriction is necessary to protect the children from conduct of the

noncustodial parent that endangers the children's health, safety, or well-

being. See Ex parte Thompson, 51 So. 3d 265, 272 (Ala. 2010). When a

trial court does not make specific findings of fact regarding the reasons

it imposed a restriction on custody or visitation, the noncustodial parent

must file a postjudgment motion to challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence. See Batchelor v. Batchelor, 188 So. 3d 704, 707 (Ala. Civ. App.

2015). In this case, the mother did not file a postjudgment motion, and

she thereby waived any challenge to the supervised-visitation restriction

based on the insufficiency of the evidence. See Pratt v. Pratt, 56 So. 3d

638, 645 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).

For a similar reason, this court cannot consider the mother's

arguments that the trial court improperly delegated its judicial authority

over visitation to employees of The Wellness Center and that the

visitation provision is not sufficiently detailed. The mother did not raise

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those arguments to the trial court, and we cannot consider them for the

first time on appeal. See Pratt, supra.

B. Contempt

In the July 24, 2023, judgment, the trial court found the mother in

contempt for failing to pay child support and for "failing to pay medicals

and non-covered medical expenses, [for] keeping [the COVID-19 stimulus

funds] while [the] children [were] in [the] father[']s custody, [for] placing

[the] children on government insurance while [the] father ha[d] [the]

children covered on BC/BS...." 1 The mother contends that she could not

be held in contempt for those actions or omissions because the trial court

had not entered any order addressing those subjects. Under Rule 70A,

Ala. R. Civ. P., a party can be held in civil contempt only for willfully

violating a lawful order of reasonable specificity. See Nave v. Nave, 942

So. 2d 372, 377 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). She also contends that the trial

court erred in ordering her to pay the father the COVID-19 stimulus

1The mother asserts that the trial court also found her in contempt

for claiming the children as dependents on her income-tax returns and in
applying for food stamps in the name of the children, but, on a close
reading of the judgment, we conclude that the trial court did not base its
contempt finding on those grounds, although it did prohibit her from
engaging in such conduct in the future.
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funds that she had retained and in requiring her to pay attorney's fees as

a sanction for her contempt. Once again, however, the mother did not

raise any of those arguments to the trial court, and we cannot consider

them for the first time on appeal. See Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So.

2d at 410.

C. Attorney's Fees

Finally, the mother requests attorney's fees for the allegedly

oppressive conduct committed by the father during the underlying

litigation, specifically his alleged false allegation of sexual abuse. The

trial court denied the mother's claim for attorney's fees in the proceedings

below, and the mother makes no legal argument as to why the trial court

erred by refusing to order the father to pay her attorney's fees on account

of his alleged misconduct. See Rule 28, Ala. R. App. P. The mother does

assert that a trial court can consider the superior financial condition of a

party when assessing attorney's fees in a domestic-relations case, but the

assertion of a general proposition of law is not sufficient to command

reversal of a judgment. Ezell v. Ezell, 394 So. 3d 608, 612 (Ala. Civ. App.

2024).

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment entered in case

number DR-14-900112.01; we also affirm the judgment entered in case

number DR-14-900112.02.

CL-2023-0485 -- AFFIRMED.

CL-2023-0619 -- AFFIRMED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards and Hanson, JJ., concur.

Lewis, J., recuses himself.

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