Sharon Parrish v. Pat Ratliff; U.S. Bank National Association (Inc.); Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; Federal National Mortgage Association; PennyMac Loan Services, LLC; Hopper Telecommunications, LLC; Alabama Power Company; Blount County; Town of Snead; Jennifer Walker; and First American Title Insurance Company (Appeal from Blount Circuit Court: CV-21-135).

Rel: February 28, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2024-0552
_________________________

Sharon Parrish

v.

Pat Ratliff; U.S. Bank National Association (Inc.); Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; Federal National
Mortgage Association; PennyMac Loan Services, LLC; Hopper
Telecommunications, LLC; Alabama Power Company; Blount
County; Town of Snead; Jennifer Walker; and First American
Title Insurance Company

Appeal from Blount Circuit Court
(CV-21-135)

On Application for Rehearing
CL-2024-0552

LEWIS, Judge.

Sharon Parrish appealed from a summary judgment entered by the

Blount Circuit Court ("the trial court") in favor of, among other parties,

Pat Ratliff; U.S. Bank National Association (Inc.); Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc.; Federal National Mortgage Association;

PennyMac Loan Services, LLC; Hopper Telecommunications, LLC;

Alabama Power Company; Blount County; Town of Snead; Jennifer

Walker; and First American Title Insurance Company. We reversed the

judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings. This court

specifically noted that the trial court had also entered a summary

judgment in favor of Dennis Oldham and Brock Haynes. However,

Parrish did not name Oldham and Haynes as appellees on her notice of

appeal. Therefore, this court did not decide any issue with respect to

Oldham and Haynes. See Alabama Plating Tech., LLC v. Georgia Plating

Tech., LLC, [Ms. SC-2023-0250, June 21, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ n.5

(Ala. 2024).

On application for rehearing, Parrish argues that, because she

included Haynes as an appellee on the certificate of service attached to

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CL-2024-0552

her notice of appeal, this court should reverse the judgment as to Haynes.

In Alabama Plating, our supreme court explained:

"Under Rule 3(c), Ala. R. App. P., '[t]he notice of appeal shall
specify all parties taking the appeal and each adverse party
against whom the appeal is taken.' (Emphasis added.) The
Committee Comment to the Amendment to Rule 3(c) Effective
January 1, 2017, makes clear that an appellant is 'require[d]'
to 'specify by name all appellants and all appellees who are
parties to the appeal' because the notice of appeal 'is designed
to eliminate any confusion as to the actual participants to the
appeal and to ensure that a party's ability to file a cross-
appeal is not impaired due to uncertainty or a lack of notice.'
(Emphasis added.)"

___ So. 3d at ___ n.5.

In this case, Parrish listed as appellees on the notice of appeal the

following parties: Pat Ratliff; U.S. Bank National Association (Inc.);

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; Federal National

Mortgage Association; PennyMac Loan Services, LLC; Hopper

Telecommunications, LLC; Alabama Power Company; Blount County;

Town of Snead; Jennifer Walker; and First American Title Insurance

Company. We note that our supreme court has permitted the inclusion

of parties as appellees, despite an appellant's failure to designate them

as such, when the parties have joined the appellees' brief and no party

has disputed that those parties were appellees. Progressive Direct Ins.

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CL-2024-0552

v. Keen, 376 So. 3d 482, 484 n.2 (Ala. 2022). Here, however, Haynes did

not submit any filings in this appeal. Therefore, we cannot assume that

no confusion (that the amendment to Rule 3(c) was designed to eliminate)

resulted from Parrish's noncompliance with Rule 3(c).

Based on the foregoing, the application for a rehearing is overruled.

APPLICATION OVERRULED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

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