State of Alabama v. Thomas Craig Hadley (Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court: CV-23-901119).

Rel: December 13, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

CL-2024-0619
_________________________

State of Alabama

v.

Thomas Craig Hadley

_________________________

CL-2024-0620
_________________________

Huey "Hoss" Mack, as sheriff of Baldwin County

v.

Thomas Craig Hadley
CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

Appeals from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-23-901119)

LEWIS, Judge.

In appeal number CL-2024-0619, the State of Alabama appeals

from a judgment entered by the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the trial court")

in favor of Thomas Craig Hadley. In appeal number CL-2024-0620, Huey

"Hoss" Mack, as sheriff of Baldwin County ("Mack"), appeals from that

same judgment. We dismiss appeal number CL-2024-0619 with

instructions to the trial court to vacate its void judgment as to the State

of Alabama. With respect to appeal number CL-2024-0620, the judgment

as to Mack is reversed, and the cause is remanded.

Procedural History

On September 6, 2023, Hadley filed in the trial court an emergency

ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order preventing the seizure

of his Chevrolet Camaro automobile ("the automobile") and to quash a

search warrant. Hadley listed as defendants the State of Alabama, Mack,

and Robert E. Wilters, Jr., as the Baldwin District Attorney ("Wilters").

That same day, the trial court granted the temporary restraining order

and enjoined the defendants from seizing the automobile. Hadley also

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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

filed a motion for sanctions against Mack. On September 7, 2023, Mack

filed a motion to vacate the order granting the ex parte motion.

Also on September 7, 2023, Hadley filed an amended emergency ex

parte motion for a temporary restraining order and to quash a search

warrant. In the amended motion, Hadley requested, pursuant to Rule

3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P., a return of the automobile that had been seized.

Hadley alleged that the seizure was unlawful and in violation of his

rights to due process. On September 8, 2023, the trial court granted

Hadley's request for the return of the automobile. The trial court stated:

"…Hadley has a claim of title on the subject vehicle and
thus he is entitled to lawfully possess the subject vehicle until
a Circuit Court rules otherwise.

"State of Alabama is ORDERED [to] restore … Hadley
with the property they seized by extra-judicial action."

(Capitalization in original.) The trial court denied the motion for

sanctions in a separate order that same day. The trial court also granted

the request to vacate the September 6, 2023, order. The trial court stated

that the case was dismissed without prejudice. The trial court further

entered an order stating that the request for a temporary restraining

order was moot. Finally, the trial court entered an order stating:

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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

"Today's Order dismissing this matter is hereby amended as
follows:

"The TRO is dismissed, and this matter will be placed on the
administrative docket, as the Court desires to retain
jurisdiction over this matter until the State of Alabama
restores the property to … Hadley."

On September 14, 2023, Wilters and Mack filed a motion to alter,

amend, or vacate the orders entered on September 8, 2023. Mack also

filed a brief in support of that motion.

On November 14, 2023, the trial court entered an order stating:

"This case began approximately 20 years ago, when a 1968
Camaro sports car was reported stolen out of the State of
Kansas.

"On April 25, 2016, … Hadley … purchased a 1968 Camaro
sports car …. He registered this vehicle with the Baldwin
County Probate Office, and each year thereafter he purchased
a current tag for that vehicle. The Camaro was purchased
from Addison Godwin, who owned it for approximately 4-5
years, and testimony indicated he registered it and purchased
yearly tags from the Baldwin County Probate Office as well.

"In early September 2023, an investigation was initiated by
the Alabama Department of Revenue and agents appeared at
the residence of ... Hadley to inspect the vehicle that he was
registering. There was testimony that those agents were told
that certain parts of the vehicle had been replaced during the
pr[e]ceding 12 years including, but not limited to: the engine,
positive traction rear end, springs and shocks, tires and
wheels, clutch, shifter, water pumps, headers, fuel line and
pump and other items. All of these upgrades and / or
restoration items had been purchased by either ... Hadley or

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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

Mr. Addison[] and were not part of the original vehicle ...
stolen or otherwise. ... Hadley claimed ownership of the
vehicle and would not voluntarily allow the Alabama
Department of Revenue to seize the vehicle on that date.

"On September 5, 2023, a Baldwin County Sheriff's Deputy
arrived at ... Hadley's residence, and requested him to
voluntarily surrender the vehicle, as it had been reported
stolen out of Kansas. The Deputy did not have a search
warrant, and ... Hadley again made claim of legal ownership
of the vehicle and informed them that without a warrant he
would not be handing over his rightfully purchased vehicle.
He again explained that he purchased the vehicle for market
value, had put certain money and upgrades into it, and that
he had been registering it with the Baldwin County Probate
Office yearly. As such he would not be surrendering the
vehicle without a warrant.

"The Deputy left the scene and secured a search warrant, but
before he could seize the vehicle, it was moved to another
location. … Hadley's son, a local attorney, had taken
possession of the vehicle and secured it across the street, in
his garage. At some point, he informed the investigating
officer and/or the Baldwin County District Attorney's Office
that he had possession of the vehicle, and he would keep it
secure until they could sort the matter out in court. As an
officer of the court, Mr. Hadley's intention was to discuss this
with the Deputy or to pursue his father's legal options, but in
any event[,] he would not dispose of the vehicle. This was not
acceptable to either the Baldwin County Sheriff's Office nor
the Baldwin County District Attorney's Office, because
another warrant was secured for his residence.

"Sometime thereafter, this Court was presented with a
Temporary Restraining Order attempting to enjoin the
Baldwin County Sheriff's Office from seizing the vehicle. This
Court signed an Order stopping the seizure, but the Deputy
with possession of the vehicle had previously called the

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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

original owner of a 1968 Cam[a]ro from Kansas, told him to
come to Baldwin County to retrieve same, and delivered ...
Hadley's car to him within 20 minutes of seizure. At which
time, he immediately departed back to Kansas with ...
Hadley's vehicle.

"The Court notes that at the time the TRO was filed the
subject vehicle was in Baldwin County, and the fact that the
Sheriff's Office delivered it to a 3rd party, within 20 minutes
of seizure, does not deny this Court from In Rem Jurisdiction.
When the TRO was filed in Circuit Court this Court had both
the jurisdictional authority to adjudicate the class of cases to
which the case belongs and jurisdictional authority over the
property which is the subject matter of the complaint. There
was no clear testimony that the subject vehicle was outside
the jurisdictional limits of Baldwin County when the Court
signed the Order stopping the seizure.

"Furthermore, there was testimony that upon learning of the
Order stopping the seizure the Baldwin County Sheriff's
Office did nothing to retrieve or recover the vehicle from the
gentleman from Kansas and there was testimony that they
never contacted him to this date.

"On September 7, 2023[,] ... Hadley filed a Motion for Return
of Unlawfully Seized Property, and the Court set that motion
for a hearing. After all parties had the opportunity to present
testimony and evidence the Court ruled in favor of ... Hadley[]
and Ordered the State of Alabama to restore the vehicle to …
Hadley.

"The Court was intentionally vague on that Order, as the
matter was emotionally charged[,] and the Court tried to give
the State of Alabama the opportunity to return the vehicle
without further fanfare.

"Thereafter, all parties moved for the Court to Alter, Amend
or Vacate that Order. The Court set that matter for a hearing

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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

on October 30, 2023, and after further arguments of the
parties this Court Vacates that Order and alters it as follows:

"By agreement of the parties, … Wilters … is hereby
dismissed. This is with prejudice, each party to bear their
own costs.

"This Court finds that the subject 1968 Camaro was illegally
seized by the Baldwin County Sheriff's Office. Each and every
Baldwin County Sheriff Deputy testified that they were not
investigating a crime. They never considered ... Hadley under
criminal investigation, and they had no intention of making
an arrest in this case. Their sole purpose for attaining both
search warrants was to return the vehicle to the alleged
original owner from Kansas. This information was never
given specifically to the judges who signed the warrants,
according to the testimony.

"As such, it was illegal to use the criminal process to help
facilitate a civil remedy.

"This Court has repeatedly opined during the course of these
hearings that the proper course of action should have been for
the gentleman from Kansas to file a Declaratory Judgment
Action in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County. This would
allow both parties the right and opportunity to due process.
They would be allowed to call witnesses, testify and present
evidence as to their claim of ownership to the vehicle. The
Court could take that evidence and decide the rightful owner
of the vehicle, and to deny this civil remedy to ... Hadley
denies him of his right to property without a hearing.

"Procuring a search warrant to side step a Circuit Court
Judge was thus improper and illegal.

"This Court makes no specific finding as to whether the
vehicle in question is the one stolen from Kansas some 20
years ago. This issue should be decided in the proper venue,

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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

at the appropriate time, with sworn testimony from those
claiming ownership. As such the Court does not address
whether ... Hadley could or could not possess an altered
vehicle. The original owner never testified as to the VIN of his
stolen car, and he never testified that this vehicle was altered
and was his. The Court was not provided sufficient testimony,
first hand, that this vehicle was in fact altered at all from its
origins.

"As an ancillary matter, the Court finds that the State of
Alabama was represented by the Assistant District Attorney
who appeared in court. The initial hearing was called
quickly[,] and the attorneys never entered a formal, written
notice of appearance. That said, Assistant District Attorneys
regularly appear in Circuit Court on criminal cases with no
formal notice of appearance. And the fact that this Assistant
defend[ed] the State of Alabama on the return of illegally
seized property was an indication that unless stated
otherwise, that Assistant was there on behalf of the State.
Thus[,] the State of Alabama waived service, and was
properly represented. The fact that the Assistant, at a
subsequent hearing, informed the Court that the only client
was the Baldwin County District Attorney's Office doesn't
affect the original representation or waiver of service.

"Based on the preceding, the Baldwin County Sheriff's Office
and the State of Alabama are Ordered to restore ... Hadley
with the illegally seized vehicle within 43 days from the date
of this Order. The Baldwin County Sheriff's Office and the
State of Alabama will share the cost of retrieving the vehicle.

"All issues not specifically addressed herein are hereby
Denied. This shall be construed as a Final Order on this
matter."

All three remaining parties filed postjudgment motions, which

were denied by the trial court on November 21, 2023. The State and

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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

Mack filed separate notices of appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court on

December 1, 2023. On July 19, 2024, the Alabama Supreme Court

transferred the appeal to this court.

Discussion

Appeal Number CL-2024-0619

On appeal, the State first argues that it is absolutely immune from

suit.

"It is well established that the State and its agencies have
absolute immunity from suit, not simply immunity from
certain claims. That is the plain meaning of [Article 1,] § 14[,
Ala. Const. 2022] ('the State of Alabama shall never be made
a defendant in any court'). See also Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.
2d 801, 806 (Ala. 1992) ('The State and its agencies have
absolute immunity from suit in any court under [§ 14].').
Thus, the exceptions [to State immunity] are relevant only as
they relate to claims against State officials in their official
capacities, not as they relate to the State agency or the State
itself. For actions against the State or one of its agencies,
there are no exceptions …."

Alabama Dep't of Corr. v. Montgomery Cnty. Comm'n, 11 So. 3d 189, 194

(Ala. 2008). Because Hadley purported to sue the State, a violation of

Article 1, § 14, Ala. Const. 2022, the only action the trial court could have

taken was to dismiss the State as a defendant. See id. at 192 ("Any action

taken by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction -- other than

dismissing the action -- is void."). Therefore, to the extent that the trial
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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

court purported to enter a judgment against the State, its judgment is

void. See id. at 194. Therefore, we dismiss appeal number CL-2024-0619

and instruct the trial court to vacate its judgment with respect to the

State.1

Appeal Number CL-2024-0620

On appeal, Mack, like the State, argues, among other things, that

the suit against him was barred by State immunity under § 14.

Moreover, Mack argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order a

state official to perform actions outside of the State of Alabama. It

appears that Hadley sought to sue Mack in his official capacity as sheriff.

Indeed, " 'a suit for injunctive relief against a State official in his or her

individual capacity would be meaningless. This is so because State

officials act for and represent the State only in their official capacities.' "

Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Ex parte

Dickson, 46 So. 3d 468, 474 (Ala. 2010)).

Although §14 bars certain actions against sheriffs as constitutional

officers of the state, because Hadley sought injunctive relief against Mack

1Because the issue of State immunity under Article 1, § 14, Ala.

Const. 2022, is dispositive, we pretermit discussion of the State's
remaining arguments.
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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

in his official capacity and alleged that Mack had unlawfully seized the

automobile, the action was not prohibited under §14. See Alabama State

Univ. v. Danley, 212 So. 3d 112, 123 (Ala. 2016). Therefore, we proceed

to address Mack's arguments with respect to the merits of the judgment.

Hadley's motion for a return of the automobile was filed pursuant

to Rule 3.13, Ala. R. Crim. P.,2 which provides in part:

"A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may
move the court for the return of the property seized on the
ground that he or she is entitled to lawful possession of the
property which was illegally seized. The judge shall receive
evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the
motion. If the motion is granted, the property shall be
restored. If a motion of return of property is made or comes on
for hearing after an indictment or information is filed, it shall
be treated also as a motion to suppress evidence."

(Emphasis added.) Mack argues that the trial court improperly ruled in

Hadley's favor without finding that Hadley was entitled to lawful

possession of the automobile. "As the federal courts have explained in

applying the analogous federal rule, to succeed in obtaining a return of

property under the rule, the movant must prove not only that the seizure

of the property was illegal but also that the movant is entitled to 'lawful

2A party may file a Rule 3.13 motion, outside of the context of a

criminal case, as an independent action. See State v. Greenetrack, Inc.,
154 So. 3d 940, 950-51 (Ala. 2014).
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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

possession' of the property." State v. Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So. 3d 940,

953 (Ala. 2014).

In the trial court's judgment, it specifically declined to find

"whether the vehicle in question is the one stolen from Kansas some 20

years ago." The trial court noted that that "issue should be decided in

the proper venue, at the appropriate time, with sworn testimony from

those claiming ownership." The trial court further stated that it would

not "address whether ... Hadley could or could not possess an altered

vehicle." It stated that "[t]he original owner never testified as to the VIN

of his stolen car, and he never testified that this vehicle was altered and

was his [ and that t]he Court was not provided sufficient testimony, first

hand, that this vehicle was in fact altered at all from its origins." Based

on the express language of the judgment, it is clear that the trial court

did not make a finding of whether Hadley was entitled to lawful

possession of the automobile. Therefore, the trial court erred in directing

Mack to return the automobile to Hadley, and the trial court's judgment

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CL-2024-0619 and CL-2024-0620

with respect to Mack is reversed, and the cause is remanded. 3 See

Greenetrack, 154 So. 3d at 953.

CL-2024-0619 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2024-0620 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

3Because the judgment's noncompliance with Rule 3.13 is
dispositive, we pretermit discussion of Mack's remaining arguments.
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