Wilton Lee Triggs, II v. Brittany Denece Triggs (Appeal from Chilton Circuit Court: DR-20-900057.01).

Rel: October 18, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
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CL-2024-0129
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Wilton Lee Triggs, II

v.

Brittany Denece Triggs

Appeal from Chilton Circuit Court
(DR-20-900057.01)

FRIDY, Judge.

Wilton Lee Triggs, II ("the father"), appeals from a judgment of the

Chilton Circuit Court ("the trial court") increasing his child-support

obligation to $15,000 per month and making the increase retroactive to

the date of the filing of the petition to modify child support filed by
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Brittany Denece Triggs ("the mother"). For the reasons set forth herein,

we reverse the judgment and remand the case with instructions.

Background

The father and the mother divorced in January 2021. At time of the

divorce, the mother and the father had twin children, W.L.T. ("the son")

and W.C.T. ("the daughter") (collectively "the children"), who had been

born during the marriage; the children were four years old and attended

a childcare center that cost $1,599 per month. Also at the time of the

divorce, the father earned approximately $39,500 per month as a licensed

reconstructive surgeon in Ohio, and the mother earned approximately

$6,500 per month as an attorney for the Social Security Administration

in Montgomery. The trial court incorporated a settlement agreement into

the divorce judgment that provided that the mother and the father would

have joint legal custody of the children, that the mother would have sole

physical custody of the children subject to the father's visitation, and that

the father would pay $4,000 per month in child support. Both parties

were represented by counsel during the negotiation of the settlement

agreement.

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In September 2022, the mother filed a petition in the trial court to

increase the father's child-support obligation. The mother cited the

father's increased income and the children's increased needs as creating

a material change in circumstances that warranted an increase in the

father's child-support obligation. The mother filed two motions for

pendente lite relief prior to trial; one of these motions requested that the

trial court increase the father's child-support obligation to half of the

father's modified monthly gross income, or approximately $48,000. It

does not appear that the trial court made any express ruling on those

motions and instead proceeded to the final hearing.

At the time of the trial, the father resided in Miami, Florida, and

earned approximately $91,667 per month as a board-eligible plastic

surgeon. The mother testified that her gross income had recently

increased to $8,202 per month.

The mother testified that the children attended Prattville Christian

Academy ("PCA"), a private school. According to the mother, the cost for

both children to attend PCA was approximately $1,725.80 per month.

The daughter, based on her teacher's recommendation, also attended a

three-year dyslexia program that cost $3,800 for the first year and $4,750

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for the next two years. The mother testified that the father had already

paid the first year's cost directly to the school. The mother also testified

that the children were required to wear uniforms at PCA, which she

anticipated would cost approximately $1,700 annually. The mother

further testified that there were additional school costs, such as lunch

fees, that were approximately $300 per month.

The mother testified that she spent approximately $1,000 each

month at Target for clothing, groceries, and sundries; however, the

mother admitted that she could not separate any of the costs associated

with the children from costs that were for her alone. The mother also

testified that the children were involved with extracurricular activities

that created additional expenses. The mother said that she had incurred

a $20,000 credit-card bill from her first attorney, which she was still

paying off. The mother also provided the cost of her other monthly

expenses, including her mortgage payment, car payment, utilities

payments, and insurance payments. The mother testified that the

mortgage payment and car payment predated the divorce settlement. In

total, the mother testified that her monthly expenses, including the

children's school payments, equaled $9,937.58.

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The mother stated that she believed that 20% of the father's

approximately $91,000 per month income would be "a good number" to

establish as his child-support obligation. On cross-examination, the

mother stated that she believed that 25%, or $22,700, would be an

appropriate amount for the father to pay in child support. However, the

mother testified that the $4,000 in child support had been sufficient to

cover the reasonable needs and necessities of the children at the time of

the divorce. The mother further stated, on cross-examination, that the

expenses for the children were between $8,000 and $12,000 per month.

The father testified that he rarely missed his visitation with the

children. The father agreed that, as the children age, their financial

needs would increase. The father also testified that he had no issues with

the children participating in extracurricular activities and that he would

be willing to pay the costs associated with their participation, although

he admitted that he was not aware of the actual costs of the

extracurricular activities that the children were participating in at that

time. The mother testified that the father told her that he was not going

to make any changes in his child-support payments unless the court

ordered the change. The father testified that although he approves of the

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children attending PCA, the mother informed him that she had enrolled

the children at PCA after the process was completed. The father further

testified that he would be willing to pay the tuition for the children to

attend any private school provided that the mother and the father

reached a mutual agreement about the school.

In its final judgment, the trial court increased the father's child-

support obligation from $4,000 per month to $15,000 per month and

made the increase retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition for

modification. The trial court gave the father credit for the child support

he had paid during the pendency of the action. The trial court found that

the father's income had increased from $39,500 per month to $91,000 per

month and that the mother had additional expenses related to the

education and care of the children. The trial court noted that the

increased award did not comply with the Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.,

child-support guidelines because the incomes listed by the mother and

the father exceeded the amounts listed on the child-support-guideline

tables. The father filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment,

arguing that the trial court's judgment was contrary to the evidence and

that the trial court abused its discretion in making the child-support

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award retroactive. The trial court denied the father's motion. The father

appeals.

Standard of Review

The modification of an award of child support is a matter within the

sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a

showing that the trial court's findings are plainly and palpably wrong or

that the trial court abused its discretion. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 843 So.

2d 759, 764 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002). It is also within the discretion of the

trial court to make any modification retroactive to the date of the filing

of the modification petition. Brown v. Brown, 719 So. 2d 228, 232 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1998). This court will not reweigh evidence that was presented

ore tenus; we are limited to determining whether there was sufficient

evidence to support the trial court's judgment. Cochran v. Cochran, 5 So.

3d 1220, 1227 (Ala. 2008). We review questions of law de novo. Williams

v. Williams, 75 So. 3d 132, 138 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).

Analysis

On appeal, the father presents two arguments. First, the father

contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the child-

support modification and increasing his child-support obligation to

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$15,000 per month. Second, the father argues that the trial court abused

its discretion by making the award retroactive to the date of the filing of

the modification petition. We address each in turn.

A child-support award may be modified only upon a showing that

there is a material change in circumstances that is substantial and

continuing. Browning v. Browning, 626 So. 2d 649, 650 (Ala. Civ. App.

1993). " ' "The standard for determining changed circumstances is the

increased needs of the child and the ability of the parent to respond to

those needs." ' " Jones v. Jones, 101 So. 3d 798, 803 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012)

(quoting Allen v. Allen, 966 So. 2d 929, 932 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), quoting

in turn Coleman v. Coleman, 648 So. 2d 605, 606 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)).

In child-support-modification cases that fall outside of the Rule 32

guidelines, this court has stated that the trial court's discretion is not

unbridled and that "the amount of support awarded must be related to

the reasonable and necessary needs of the children." Grimsley v.

Grimsley, 887 So. 2d 910, 914 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004). While "a modification

is particularly disfavored in the case of a [judgment] based on an

agreement between the parties when so short a time … separates the

[judgment] and the hearing for modification," the trial court is not strictly

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bound by that agreement. Tucker v. Tucker, 588 So. 2d 495, 497 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1991); Love v. Love, 623 So. 2d 315, 317 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).

However, when a divorce judgment establishing the amount of child

support is based on an agreement between the parties, the judgment

"should not be modified except for clear and sufficient reasons and after

thorough consideration and investigation." Tucker, 588 So. 2d at 497.

We note at the outset that the father does not argue that he lacks

the ability to pay the increased child-support award. Instead, he argues

that the children's circumstances have not changed so substantially as to

warrant an $11,000 per month increase in his child-support payment. We

agree.

The mother asserts that the children's basic needs have increased

as they have grown older. This court has recognized that "an increase in

the age of a minor child and the correlative need for support, coupled with

an increase in the cost of living due to inflation," is sufficient to constitute

a material change in circumstances that supports a modification of child

support. Burson v. Burson, 608 So. 2d 739, 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). The

mother cites Berryhill v. Reeves, 705 So. 2d 505 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997), as

an example of a child-support modification based on the increased age of

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a child. However, the child in Berryhill was three years old at the time of

the divorce and fifteen when the petition for modification of child support

was filed. In contrast, the children in the present case were four years old

at the time of the divorce and six years old when the petition was filed.

While the two-year increase in the age of the children and their

participation in extracurricular activities may warrant an increase in the

father's child support, it does not warrant an $11,000 increase in child

support.

The mother testified that $4,000 was sufficient to cover the

reasonable needs of the children when the trial court entered the divorce

judgment. The mother has the same car payment and mortgage payment

that she had at the time of the divorce. At the time of the divorce, the

children attended a childcare facility that cost $1,599 per month. At the

time of the trial on the modification petition, the mother paid $1,725 per

month for both children to attend PCA, an approximately $125 increase

per month. The children wear uniforms at school that cost an estimated

$1,700 annually. The daughter also attends a reading course that cost

$3,800 for the first year, which the father has already paid. That course

will cost $4,750 for each of the next two years, and the father has offered

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to pay those costs as well. The children also participate in extracurricular

activities that have various monthly costs. While the mother asserts that

she spends $1,000 each month for groceries and clothing at Target, when

asked how much of that $1,000 was spent on the children, she testified

that it was "impossible to separate herself from the children."

Based on the record before us, the trial court could have reasonably

believed that the children's increased age and resulting school and

extracurricular expenses created a material change in circumstances

that would support a modification of the father's child-support

obligations. While the father asserts that a modification so soon after the

divorce settlement should be disfavored, the trial court could have

believed that the children's needs have changed sufficiently to warrant a

modification. However, based on the record before us, we cannot say that

those changes support an $11,000 per month increase in child support.

Even if we considered the mother's total monthly listed expenses of

nearly $10,000 per month, and we disregarded her own gross earnings of

$8,208 per month, the trial court's modification would obligate the father

to pay $5,000 per month more than the mother's total listed expenses.

Such an increase is not related to the reasonable and necessary needs of

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the children. See Grimsley, 887 So. 2d at 914. Accordingly, we reverse

the judgment of the trial court with respect to the amount of the child

support that it ordered the father to pay, and we remand the case for the

trial court to recalculate the father's child-support obligation.

Having reversed the child-support award, we need not reach the

issue of the retroactive award of child support. However, out of an

abundance of caution, we will briefly address the issue. The decision to

make a modification of child support retroactive to the date of the filing

of the petition is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Brown,

719 So. 2d at 232. However, "in Brown, we specifically instructed trial

courts to include in any retroactive child-support award a statement of

the reasons for the award and the manner in which the award was

calculated." Bittick v. Bittick, 297 So. 3d 397, 406 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019)

(citing Brown, 719 So. 2d at 232). In the present case, the trial court did

not state its reasons for making the award retroactive and it did not

specify how the award was calculated. Nor is it readily apparent from the

record how the trial court decided that $15,000 per month, less the credit

the father was given for the child support he had paid during the

pendency of the petition, was the appropriate figure to award as

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retroactive child support. Accordingly, the trial court's retroactive child-

support award did not comply with the requirements described in Brown.

Therefore, should the trial court exercise its discretion and award child

support retroactive to the date of the filing of the petition on entering the

judgment on remand, it should comply with the requirements described

in Brown.

Conclusion

Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court

abused its discretion in finding that there has been a material change in

the needs of the children that would support a modification of the father's

child-support obligation. However, the evidence does not support an

increase of $11,000 per month. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's

judgment and remand the cause for the entry of a new judgment

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, J., concur.

Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

Lewis, J., recuses himself.

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