Nathan Wayne Jones v. Martha Dale Jones (Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court: DR-23-900039).

Rel: August 2, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2024
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CL-2024-0048
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Nathan Wayne Jones

v.

Martha Dale Jones

Appeal from Etowah Circuit Court
(DR-23-900039)

MOORE, Presiding Judge.

Nathan Wayne Jones ("the husband") appeals from a judgment

entered by the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing him

from Martha Dale Jones ("the wife"). We reverse the trial court's

judgment and remand the case for the trial court to make those findings

necessary to comply with Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(b).
CL-2024-0048

The parties married on February 22, 2010. The husband filed a

complaint for a divorce on February 16, 2023. The wife filed an answer

and a counterclaim for a divorce on March 8, 2023. On October 4, 2023,

the trial court conducted a bench trial, and, on December 7, 2023, the

trial court entered a judgment of divorce. In the divorce judgment, the

trial court, among other things, awarded the wife $1,250 per month in

periodic alimony. The divorce judgment provides, in pertinent part:

"After considering the length of the parties' marriage, the age
and the health of each party, the ability of each party to be
self-supporting, the income of both parties, and the standard
of living during the marriage, the [c]ourt hereby Orders [the
husband] to pay to [the wife] the amount of $1,250.00 each
month as periodic alimony."

On December 22, 2023, the husband filed a postjudgment motion in

which he argued, among other things, that the periodic-alimony award

violated Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57. On January 3, 2024, the trial court

denied the husband's postjudgment motion. The husband timely

appealed the divorce judgment to this court on January 19, 2024.

On appeal, the husband reiterates the arguments that he made in

his postjudgment motion. He first maintains that, pursuant to § 30-2-

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57(b)(1), the trial court could not have properly awarded the wife periodic

alimony without expressly determining that rehabilitative alimony was

not feasible. Alternatively, the husband contends that, if the trial court

properly awarded the wife periodic alimony, it erroneously failed to limit

the duration of the award in compliance with Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(g)

("Except upon a finding by the court that a deviation from the time limits

of this section is equitably required, a person shall be eligible for periodic

alimony for a period not to exceed the length of the marriage, as of the

date of the filing of the complaint, with the exception that if a party is

married for 20 years or longer, there shall be no time limit as to his or

her eligibility."). We consider the first issue to be dispositive of this

appeal.

Section 30-2-57(a) provides:

"Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the court shall
award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as provided in
subsection (b), if the court expressly finds all of the following:

"(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or
her separate estate is insufficient to enable the
party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the
extent possible, the economic status quo of the
parties as it existed during the marriage.

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"(2) The other party has the ability to supply
those means without undue economic hardship.

"(3) The circumstances of the case make it
equitable." 1

Section 30-2-57(b) provides:

"If a party has met the requirements of subsection (a) [of § 30-
2-57], the court shall award alimony in the following priority:

"(1) Unless the court expressly finds that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court
shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for
a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent
extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to
enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve,
to the extent possible, the economic status quo of
the parties as it existed during the marriage.

"(2) In cases in which the court expressly
finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a good-
faith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith
rehabilitation only enables the party to partially

1In his appellate brief, the husband argues that the evidence would

not support a determination that the wife proved a need for alimony as
required by Ala. Code 1975, § 30-2-57(a)(1) however, that issue was not
raised to the trial court and has not been properly preserved for appellate
review. See Rieger v. Rieger, 147 So. 3d 421, 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013).
In his postjudgment motion, the husband did not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence proving that the wife lacked a sufficient estate
to maintain the marital standard of living, which would have allowed this
court to raise the noncompliance with § 30-2-57(a)(1) ex mero motu. See
Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So. 3d 770, 775 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021).
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acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent
possible, the economic status quo of the parties as
it existed during the marriage, the court shall
award the party periodic installments of alimony
for a duration and an amount to allow the party to
preserve, to the extent possible, the economic
status quo of the parties as it existed during the
marriage ...."

Section 30-2-57(b)(1) provides that, after making those findings

required by § 30-2-57(a), a trial court should award the recipient spouse

rehabilitative alimony "[u]nless the court expressly finds that

rehabilitative alimony is not feasible." "Rehabilitative alimony" refers to

" 'temporary financial support for a former spouse while the former

spouse undergoes vocational rehabilitation in order to restore or improve

his or her earning capacity and become self-supporting.' " Prakash v.

Pandey, 331 So. 3d 1158, 1172 n.15 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (quoting

Seymour v. Seymour, 241 So. 3d 733, 741 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)). An

award of rehabilitative alimony may not be feasible when the former

spouse cannot be rehabilitated, a good-faith attempt at rehabilitation has

failed, or vocational rehabilitation cannot fully enable the former spouse

to maintain the marital standard of living. See § 30-2-57(b)(2). A trial

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court may award periodic alimony only if it expressly finds that

rehabilitative alimony is not feasible for one or more of those reasons. Id.

As this court recently explained in White v. Jones, [Ms. CL-2023-

0511, Feb. 16, 2024] ___ So. 3d___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), when a court

violates § 30-2-57(b) by awarding periodic alimony without making an

express finding that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the judgment

must be reversed. "The general purpose of making specific findings of

fact is to allow the trial court 'to carefully review the evidence and to

perfect the issues for review on appeal.' " Id. at ___ (quoting Ex parte

Vaughn, 495 So. 2d 83, 87 (Ala. 1986)). The legislature enacted § 30-2-

57(b) to assure that a trial court would not award periodic alimony

without carefully considering and rejecting rehabilitative alimony as a

feasible remedy and to clearly apprise the appellate courts of its decision.

When a trial court fails to comply with § 30-2-57(b), this court cannot

assume that it considered and rejected the feasibility of rehabilitative

alimony; instead, this court must reverse the judgment and remand the

case to the trial court for it to make the necessary written

determinations.

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In this case, the trial court violated § 30-2-57(b). In the judgment

of divorce, the trial court stated that it had considered the length of the

parties' marriage, the age and health of the parties, the ability of each

party to be self-supporting, the incomes of both parties, and the standard

of living of the parties during the marriage, which are some of the

statutory factors relevant to an alimony determination, see § 30-2-57(d)

and (f), but the trial court did not specifically find that rehabilitative

alimony was not feasible, as required by § 30-2-57(b). By omitting that

finding, we can conclude only that the trial court improperly failed to

consider awarding the wife rehabilitative alimony.

We therefore reverse the judgment insofar as it awarded the wife

periodic alimony and remand the case to the trial court to fulfill its

statutory duty under § 30-2-57(b). On remand, the trial court shall

determine from its weighing of the evidence in the record the appropriate

form of alimony that the wife shall be awarded, shall make the required

findings of fact in support of its determination, and shall take any and

all other actions and conduct such further proceedings as are necessary

to comply with this opinion Because the trial court may determine on

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remand that the wife should be awarded rehabilitative alimony for a

limited duration, it would be premature for this court to address the

husband's alternative argument that the trial court erred in awarding

the wife periodic alimony for an indefinite period.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Edwards, Hanson, Fridy, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

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