Jerry M. Blevins v. Alabama State Bar

Rel: December 19, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

SC-2024-0693
_________________________

Jerry M. Blevins

v.

Alabama State Bar

Appeal from Disciplinary Board of Alabama State Bar
(ASB No. 2017-927)

PER CURIAM.

Jerry M. Blevins appeals from an order of a panel of the

Disciplinary Board of the Alabama State Bar ("the Board") imposing a
SC-2024-0693

public reprimand, without publication, and suspending him from the

practice of law for 180 days. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

This disciplinary action arose from a fee dispute that occurred

between Elizabeth A. Citrin and the law firm Beasley, Allen, Crow,

Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C. ("Beasley Allen"), after Citrin engaged

Beasley Allen to participate as cocounsel in an underlying action she had

been litigating. Citrin hired Blevins to represent her in that fee dispute.

Blevins drafted a "Fee Agreement," providing that he would receive a

contingent fee of 40% of all sums that Citrin recovered from Beasley Allen

in excess of $222,750, "which is the sum [Beasley Allen] …

acknowledge[d] owing [Citrin] for attorney fees in the underlying action."

On July 12, 2017, the fee dispute between Citrin and Beasley Allen

was mediated. According to Blevins, he discovered during the mediation

that Citrin had misrepresented her fee-split agreement with Beasley

Allen, which, he claims, caused him to become "infuriated, irate, revolted,

pissed off, disappointed, and extremely angry." Blevins's brief at 22.

Specifically, Blevins claims that Citrin had told him that she was entitled

to 60% of the attorneys' fees in the underlying action when, in fact, she

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was entitled to only 30%. Nevertheless, Blevins never said anything to

Citrin during the mediation about being upset over the alleged

misrepresentation. As a result of the mediation, Beasley Allen agreed to

pay Citrin $300,712.50 ("the settlement funds"). On August 9, 2017,

nearly a month after the formal mediation settlement agreement was

executed and Blevins had received and deposited the settlement funds

into his trust account, he sent Citrin a letter stating, in relevant part:

"Because the amount [owed] to you was actually disputed by
[Beasley Allen], I believe the 40% contingent fee should apply
to the entire recovery. This would result in you receiving
$180,427.50, and me receiving $120,285.00 of the settlement
funds. …

"….

"In closing, I would appreciate you advising as to
whether you consent to the distribution of the settlement
funds as set forth herein. Absent an agreement, I shall intend
on holding the funds in my trust account until such time as
the dispute is finally resolved."

Thus, Blevins proposed that he was entitled to 40% of the entire

amount of the settlement funds, which was $89,100 more than the

$31,185 he would have been entitled to under the fee agreement. Citrin

thereafter filed a complaint against Blevins with the Alabama State Bar

("the Bar"). She also hired another attorney who, on August 11, 2017,

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commenced an action against Blevins in the Baldwin Circuit Court,

seeking to enforce the fee agreement between Blevins and Citrin. The

Baldwin Circuit Court entered an order requiring Blevins to disburse

$180,427.50 to Citrin, to pay himself $31,185, and to deposit the

remaining $89,100 ("the disputed funds") with the clerk of the court. The

case was subsequently transferred to the Montgomery Circuit Court. On

September 5, 2018, the Montgomery Circuit Court entered a summary

judgment in favor of Citrin and ordered Blevins to release the disputed

funds to her. This Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of

Citrin, without an opinion. See Blevins v. Citrin (No. 1180288, Aug. 9,

2019), 312 So. 3d 4 (Ala. 2019) (table).

On March 9, 2022, the Bar formally charged Blevins with 10

violations of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct in connection

with his representation of Citrin. The Bar later amended its charges to

include only three violations, including violations of Rules 1.4

("Communication"), 1.5 ("Fees"), and 8.4 ("Misconduct"), Ala. R. Prof'l

Cond. Following a hearing on the charges, the Board entered an order

finding that Blevins had violated Rules 1.4 and 1.5, but not Rule 8.4. The

Board imposed a public reprimand, without publication, for Blevins's

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violation of Rule 1.4(b) and suspended him from the practice of law for

180 days for his violation of Rule 1.5(a). In its written "Report and

Order," the Board stated the following:

"Jerry Michael Blevins ('Blevins') was admitted to
practice law in the State of Alabama on April 29, 1994. On
April 24, 2017, attorney Elizabeth Citrin ('Citrin') retained
Blevins to represent her in a fee dispute with the law firm of
[Beasley Allen]. Blevins drafted a written contingency fee
agreement, on his letterhead, that provided that Blevins was
to be paid a contingent fee of 40% of all sums recovered in
excess of $222,750.00, which was the sum that Beasley Allen
acknowledged owing Citrin as her portion of a case they had
jointly settled. Citrin believed she was entitled to more than
Beasley Allen was offering. On July 12, 2017, with Blevins
representing her, Citrin mediated the case with Beasley Allen
and arrived at a negotiated settlement whereby Citrin would
receive a total of $300,712.50 and Beasley Allen would receive
$367,527.50. This amount was $77,962.50 ($300,712.50 -
$222,750.00) more than what Beasley Allen had originally
offered Citrin. Under the written contingency fee agreement
with Blevins, he would receive $31,185.00, which was 40% of
$77,962.50.

"Blevins testified at his disciplinary hearing that during
the mediation, he concluded that Citrin had lied to him about
what she was really entitled to under her agreement with
Beasley Allen and that this made him very angry at Citrin.
He testified that he told Citrin that he was angry at her
during the mediation. Citrin testified that Blevins never said
anything about being angry at her, in mediation or otherwise.
What is clear is that the written contingency fee agreement
between Blevins and Citrin was not modified during or
shortly after mediation. Blevins did not mention any alleged
misrepresentations (alleged 'lies') during mediation, nor did

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he mention amending the contingency fee agreement. As a
result, Citrin signed the mediation settlement agreement
without receiving critical information from her attorney.
Blevins'[s] failure to disclose this significant information
influenced Citrin's decision to execute the mediation
settlement agreement.

"After the settlement funds were received from Beasley
Allen and deposited into Blevins'[s] trust account, Citrin
received a letter from Blevins dated August 9, 2017.
Blevins'[s] letter confirmed the terms of the written
contingency fee agreement between he and Citrin but stated
that Blevins did not believe that the written contingency fee
agreement should be followed because the $222,750.00[ ] sum
listed in the letter was, in his opinion, a disputed issue. For
the first time in the representation of Citrin, and contrary to
the written contingency fee agreement, Blevins stated that
the 40% contingent fee should apply to the full sum awarded
Citrin ($300,712.50) in mediation, rather than the agreed
amount in excess of $222,750.00. Specifically, Blevins alleged
that he should receive $120,285.00 ($300,712.50 x 40%) rather
than $31,185.00, which was the amount due under the
written contingent fee agreement ($300,712.50 - $222,750 =
[$77,962.50] x 40%) and Citrin should receive [$180,427.50]
([$300,712.50] x 60%). Blevins concluded his August 9, 2017,
letter by stating, '[i]n closing, I would appreciate you advising
as to whether you consent to the distribution of the settlement
funds as set forth herein. Absent an agreement, I shall intend
on holding the funds in my trust account until the dispute is
finally resolved.' In response to this letter, Citrin called and
emailed Blevins several times. Blevins did not return her call
and chose to communicate only via letters and emails. Blevins
characterizes the August 9, 2017, letter as an invitation to
Citrin to discuss the proper calculation of his contingency fee.
In fact, the letter was a unilateral, post-settlement attempt to
impose a substantially higher contingency fee after
settlement, coupled with a refusal to disburse settlement

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funds unless Citrin agreed to this post-settlement
contingency fee increase.

"Citrin ultimately retained new counsel, at an
additional expense, and sued Blevins in state court. On
[September 5, 2018], Citrin received a judgment against
Blevins in an amount that mirrored the monies owed under
the original written contingency fee agreement. On August 9,
2019, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, without opinion,
the trial court's order."

The Board found three aggravating circumstances: (1) that Blevins

had prior disciplinary offenses, (2) that he had dishonest or selfish

motives, and (3) that he had substantial experience in the practice of law.

The Board also found two mitigating circumstances: (1) that Blevins

made full and free disclosure to the Board or had a cooperative attitude

toward the proceedings and (2) the remoteness of his prior offenses. The

Board specifically found that the mitigating circumstance of delay in the

disciplinary proceedings did not exist. Blevins appealed.

II. Standard of Review

"In reviewing a disciplinary order of the Board, this
Court 'will presume that the Board's decision on the facts is
correct; and the disciplinary order will be affirmed unless the
decision on the facts is unsupported by clear and convincing
evidence, or the order misapplies the law to the facts.' Hunt v.
Disciplinary Bd. of the Alabama State Bar, 381 So. 2d 52, 54
(Ala. 1980). All legal conclusions by the Board, however, are

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reviewed de novo. Tipler v. Alabama State Bar, 866 So. 2d
1126, 1137 (Ala. 2003)."

May v. Alabama State Bar, 311 So. 3d 758, 759 (Ala. 2020). See also

Tipler v. Alabama State Bar, 866 So. 2d 1126, 1137 (Ala. 2003) (noting

that this Court will accord the Board's findings based on oral testimony

the benefit of the ore tenus presumption).

III. Discussion

A. Section 34-3-62, Ala. Code 1975 -- Procedure for Disputed
Compensation

Blevins first presents an issue regarding § 34-3-62, Ala. Code 1975,

which he frames as jurisdictional. Blevins contends that, pursuant to §

34-3-62, the Board lacked "jurisdiction" over the formal charges brought

against him by the Bar and that the Board's order is, therefore, void.

That statute provides:

"Whenever any disagreement or controversy arises
between an attorney-at-law and any other person respecting
the amount of the compensation to which he or she is entitled
by contract or otherwise and his or her retention of the same
out of any funds in his or her hands, such attorney may by
motion in the circuit court or court of like jurisdiction, of the
county of his or her residence, of which such other person shall
have notice, obtain an order of the court that a certain amount
is due under such contract or would be reasonable
compensation for his or her services; and, when such motion
is made and order obtained, such attorney shall not be subject

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to prosecution, suspension, or removal under [Ala. Code 1975,
Title 34, Chapter 3] or other penalty therefor; but nothing
herein contained shall affect or destroy any civil action to
which any person would be entitled against such attorney
respecting the same, or any criminal prosecution to which the
accused would be otherwise liable."

§ 34-3-62 (emphasis added).

Blevins specifically contends that, because the Montgomery Circuit

Court resolved the fee dispute in this case, § 34-3-62 mandates that he

"shall not be subject to prosecution, suspension, or removal under [Ala.

Code 1975, Title 34, Chapter 3] or other penalty therefor." This Court has

never interpreted that portion of § 34-3-62, which Blevins claims affords

him blanket immunity for any and all charges brought against him by

the Bar. However, it is clear that, § 34-3-62 provides a court-supervised

procedure, like mediation or arbitration, for resolving disputes regarding

the amount of legal compensation owed an attorney under a contract

when, as in this case, the attorney retains a client's funds. The statute

requires an attorney to file a motion in the circuit court in the county of

"his or her residence," and it requires notice to the "other person." The

statute contemplates that, once a motion is made, the circuit court will

enter an order determining "that a certain amount is due under such

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contract or would be reasonable compensation for … services." The

statute then states that, "when such motion is made and order obtained,

such attorney shall not be subject to prosecution, suspension, or removal

under [Ala. Code 1975, Title 34, Chapter 3] or other penalty therefor."

When reading § 34-3-62 in its entirety, it is logical to conclude that, once

"such motion is made and order obtained," the attorney shall not be

subjected to prosecution, suspension, removal or other penalty for the

wrongful retention of disputed funds. Importantly, however, the statute

does not provide a safe harbor for an attorney who fails to meet his or her

general ethical obligation to act diligently and resolve fee disputes in a

timely and professional manner. See, e.g., Comment to Rule 1.5, Ala. R.

Prof'l Cond. ("Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which

the lawyers' fees will be paid. If there is risk that the client may divert

the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the

portion from which the fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold

funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The

disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer

should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as

arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly

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distributed."). Thus, an attorney who diligently seeks the aid of the

circuit court to resolve a fee dispute over retained funds cannot be subject

to prosecution, suspension, or removal or other penalty for an alleged

wrongful retention of those funds during the time when a motion under

§ 34-2-62 is pending and before an order is obtained. In this case, the

Bar did not prosecute Blevins based on any alleged wrongful retention of

funds under Rule 1.15. Rather, the Bar prosecuted Blevins for his alleged

violation of Rule 1.4, regarding communication, and his alleged violation

of Rule 1.5, regarding excessive fees. Thus, § 34-3-62 is inapplicable here,

and Blevins's reliance on it is without merit.

Blevins also argues in the alternative that, if § 34-3-62 is invalid (or

if his interpretation of that statute is invalid), the disciplinary

proceedings against him are still barred because, he says, he acted in

reliance on, and pursuant to, the mandates of the statute in filing his

counterclaim for a declaratory judgment concerning the fee dispute.

Blevins relies solely on Brooks v. Alabama State Bar, 574 So. 2d 33 (Ala.

1990), which we find distinguishable. In Brooks, the district attorney was

charged by the Bar with violating the former Alabama Code of

Professional Responsibility regarding extrajudicial statements that she

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had made while prosecuting a criminal action. This Court explained that,

at the time she made those statements, the district attorney could have

reasonably relied on caselaw holding that such statements by a district

attorney were not subject to discipline by the former Disciplinary

Commission. Thus, this Court held that the district attorney was not

subject to discipline for the conduct at issue. Unlike in Brooks, in this

case Blevins did not rely on any caselaw regarding § 34-3-62 that would

have led him to reasonably believe that, if the circuit court resolved the

fee dispute, he would have blanket immunity from any and all charges

brought against him by the Bar. In addition, it does not appear that

Blevins specifically invoked the protections afforded by § 34-3-62 now or

in the initial fee dispute between Beasley Allen and Citrin; rather, he

seeks to use the statute after the fact to shield him from any discipline

unrelated to his underlying fee dispute. Contrary to Blevins's argument,

the disciplinary proceedings against him are not barred merely because

Blevins filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment pursuant to § 34-

3-62.

B. Unreasonable Delay

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Blevins contends that the Board committed reversible error in

denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him based on the Bar's

alleged unreasonable delay in prosecuting those charges. Blevins points

out that, although the Bar filed formal charges against him on March 9,

2022, it took no further action on the matter until August 7, 2023, when

it filed its motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law ("JML").

According to Blevins, this Court's holdings in Noojin v. Alabama State

Bar, 577 So. 2d 420 (Ala. 1990), and Hayes v. Alabama State Bar, 719 So.

2d 787 (Ala. 1998), mandate that, if the Bar delays disciplinary

proceedings for over a year in prosecuting formal charges and cannot

offer "good cause" for the delay, the disciplinary charges must be

dismissed. Blevins's reliance on Noojin and Hayes is misplaced because

both of those cases implicate Rule 14, Ala. R. Disc. P., concerning

"Matters Involving Related Pending Civil or Criminal Litigation." Rule

14 provides: "Disciplinary proceedings shall not be deferred or abated

because of substantial similarity to the material allegations of pending

criminal or civil litigation involving the respondent, unless authorized by

the Disciplinary Board, in its discretion, for good cause shown."

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In Noojin, the Bar delayed or deferred the disciplinary proceedings

against Noojin for nearly a year because of a pending federal criminal

matter against Noojin that ultimately affected his license to practice law.

The Noojin Court concluded that the record was sufficient to conclude

that the spirit of Rule 14 had been violated and that awaiting the

culmination of a federal criminal matter was not "good cause" for

delaying disciplinary proceedings for nearly a year. 1 Thus, the Noojin

Court set aside the order of suspension entered by the Board. Likewise,

in Hayes, three attorneys were indicted by a grand jury for conduct

related to their practice of law. The Board granted the Bar's motion to

stay the attorneys' disciplinary proceedings pending the trial of their

criminal cases. The attorneys contended that the Bar's delay in

prosecuting the formal charges following resolution of their criminal

cases violated Rule 14. In response, the Bar asserted that it had stayed

the proceedings on the formal charges based on the attorneys' alleged

attempts to obtain discovery for their criminal cases. The Hayes Court

concluded that the Bar's asserted excuse did not amount to "good cause"

1The Noojin decision dealt with former Rule 11, Ala. R. Disc. Enf't;

former Rule 11 read substantially the same as Rule 14, Ala. R. Disc. P.
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for delaying the disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of the

criminal cases. Thus, the Hayes Court reversed the Board's disciplinary

order and directed that the charges against the attorneys be dismissed.

Here, Rule 14 is not implicated because, during the time frame at issue

-- from March 9, 2022, when the Bar filed its charges against Blevins,

until August 7, 2023, when the Bar filed its motion for a JML -- there

were no civil or criminal charges pending against Blevins in another

tribunal. Because Blevins has not cited any case in which this Court has

applied the "good cause" analysis in Noojin and Hayes outside the context

of Rule 14, he has not demonstrated that the Board's order is due to be

set aside based on an unreasonable delay in prosecuting the charges

against him. We further add that the record on appeal is sufficient to

conclude that any delay in prosecuting the charges against Blevins was

attributable, in part, to Blevins himself. As indicated, the Bar filed its

formal charges against Blevins on March 9, 2022. Blevins did not file a

timely answer to those charges. Rather, on April 7, 2022, Blevins filed

complaints with the Bar against its General Counsel, Roman Shaul, and

Assistant General Counsel, Mark Moody, alleging violations of the

Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with their

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prosecution of this case. On April 11, 2022, Blevins himself moved the

Board to stay the disciplinary proceedings against him pending "final

disposition of the Report filed" with this Court regarding "suspected

misconduct" of Shaul and Moody. The Board never ruled on that motion.

Although the Bar did not file its motion for a JML on the charges until

August 7, 2023, it is undisputed that Blevins had not yet answered the

charges filed by the Bar by that date, and, in fact, it does not appear that

he did so until January 10, 2024.2 Because the caselaw relied upon by

Blevins to demonstrate an unreasonable delay is inapplicable under the

facts presented, Blevins has failed to demonstrate any unreasonable

delay on the part of the Bar in prosecuting the charges against him.

The Board also denied Blevins's motion to dismiss the charges

brought against him based on the Bar's alleged unreasonable delay in

prosecuting those charges. Blevins argues that, in denying his motion to

dismiss, the Board intentionally treated him differently from the

2It appears from the record that the Bar and Blevins entered into

an agreement whereby the Bar agreed to withdraw its motion for a JML
and proceed to a formal hearing on the charges against Blevins if, in
relevant part, Blevins was willing to stipulate that his motion to stay the
proceedings constituted his answer.
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attorneys in Noojin and Hayes with no rational basis for doing so,

therefore violating his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because we conclude that

there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the Bar in prosecuting

the charges against him, Blevins has failed to demonstrate any error on

the part of the Board in denying his motion to dismiss those charges. For

the same reason, we pretermit discussion of Blevins's argument that the

Board erred in failing to consider "delay in disciplinary proceedings" as a

mitigating factor under Standard 9.3(i) of the Alabama Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Discipline.

C. Rule 1.4, Ala. R. Prof'l Cond. ("Communication")

The Board found Blevins guilty of violating Rule 1.4(b), which

provides that "[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably

necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the

representation." Blevins argues that the Bar failed to present clear and

convincing evidence that he violated Rule 1.4(b) and/or that the Board

misapplied the law to the facts. In its report and order, the Board stated,

in pertinent part:

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"Blevins testified at his disciplinary hearing that during the
mediation, he concluded that Citrin had lied to him about
what she was really entitled to under her agreement with
Beasley Allen and that this made him very angry at Citrin.
He testified that he told Citrin that he was angry at her
during the mediation. Citrin testified that Blevins never said
anything about being angry at her, in mediation or otherwise.
What is clear is that the written contingency fee agreement
between Blevins and Citrin was not modified during or
shortly after mediation. Blevins did not mention any alleged
misrepresentations (alleged 'lies') during mediation, nor did
he mention amending the contingency fee agreement. As a
result, Citrin signed the mediation settlement agreement
without receiving critical information from her attorney.
Blevins'[s] failure to disclose this significant information
influenced Citrin's decision to execute the mediation
settlement agreement."

Thus, the Board concluded, in relevant part, that Blevins's failure

to disclose his anger to Citrin before she executed the final mediation

settlement agreement resulted in Citrin's executing the agreement

without receiving critical information from Blevins. Blevins contends

that, even assuming that Citrin was unaware during the mediation that

he was angered by what he asserts were her lies, the Bar offered no

evidence to establish that Citrin would have done anything different at

mediation had he told her he was angry. As previously indicated, Blevins

claimed that, during the mediation, he discovered that Citrin had lied to

him about the fee-split arrangement she had with Beasley Allen, which,

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he says, caused him to become very angry and irate. Although Blevins

contends that Citrin knew he was mad during the mediation, Citrin

repeatedly testified during the disciplinary hearing that Blevins never

mentioned anything about being mad or upset:

"Q. [Blevins:] Well, let me ask it this way. If you knew
at mediation before you settled the case that I was going to
later inquire as to whether my fees should apply to the entire
recovery, would you have done anything different at
mediation?

"….

"A. [Citrin:] If I had gone into mediation thinking that
you were wanting 40 percent of everything, I wouldn't have
done it. Why would I?

"….

"A. [Citrin:] I was already getting [$222,750]. That
makes no sense, Mr. Blevins, and you know it.

"….

"Q. [Blevins:] Okay. If I had told you at mediation that
because of whatever reason I thought my contingent fee
should apply to your entire recovery, is [it your testimony] you
would've just ended mediation and left and not settled the
case?

"A. [Citrin:] Yes.

"….

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"Q. [Blevins]: I had to contact you [after mediation] to
get you to sign to conclude the settlement, didn't I?

"A. [Citrin]: But you did not tell me you were going to
be taking another [$]89,100 when you did that. Yes, you did
contact me.

"Q. [Blevins:] When did I take the [$89,100] from you?

"A. [Citrin:] You waited until you got the money into
your account, and then you told me you were going to take --
not just [$]31,185, but you were entitled to another [$89,100]."

The evidence also indicates that, during the mediation, Blevins

marked through that portion of the settlement agreement providing that

Citrin would receive the settlement funds and, with Citrin's approval,

inserted his name because, he testified, he did not think Citrin would pay

him the money owed under the fee agreement. Blevins also testified that

he did not discuss his feeling of anger or disgust with Citrin during the

mediation because, he said, it was not the appropriate time to do so.

Rather, he said, he pondered what action, if any, he would take. Blevins

then stated that when the deadline came, i.e., the date he received the

settlement funds, he made the decision that he could not let Citrin get

away with her deceit. As the Board noted, what is clear is that Blevins

had every opportunity to discuss his anger with Citrin before she signed

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the final settlement agreement and that the fee agreement between the

parties was not modified during or shortly after the mediation. Rather,

Blevins waited until after he received the settlement funds -- nearly a

month after mediation -- to send the August 9, 2017, letter expressing his

disappointment with Citrin and suggesting that the fee agreement be

modified. On that same day, Citrin sent an email to Blevins that reads,

in pertinent part:

"Since you are not responding to my phone calls, this is
written notice that I do not agree to your reneging on our
written contract, I do not agree to the disbursement of this
money in any other [form] than our written agreement … and
I would not have agreed to change the Settlement Release to
include your firm had I known that you were going to try and
steal this money out from under me."

As previously indicated, Citrin had to hire another attorney to

commence a civil action against Blevins to enforce the parties' fee

agreement. Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates

that Blevins violated Rule 1.4(b) by failing to "explain a matter [, i.e., his

anger,] to the extent reasonably necessary to permit [Citrin] to make

informed decisions regarding the representation." As Citrin indicated,

she would not have signed the mediation settlement agreement had

Blevins communicated to her that he intended to take 40% of all the

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settlement funds. Although Blevins offers several reasons that he says

justified his failure to disclose his anger toward Citrin before sending the

August 9, 2017, letter, the Comment to Rule 1.4 clearly states: "The

guiding principle under this Rule is that the lawyer should fulfill the

reasonable expectation of the client for information. In determining what

is reasonable, the lawyer must consider that the lawyer has a duty to act

in the client's best interests." Here, the evidence regarding Blevins's

violation of Rule 1.4(b) more than met the clear-and-convincing

evidentiary standard; thus, the Board did not err in finding that Blevins

had violated that rule.

D. Rule 1.5, Ala. R. Prof'l Cond. ("Fees")

The Board found Blevins guilty of violating Rule 1.5(a), which

provides, in relevant part, that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into an

agreement for, or charge, or collect a clearly excessive fee." In

determining whether a fee is excessive, the rule sets out nine factors to

be considered, including "whether there is a written fee agreement signed

by the client." Relying on the fact that there was a written fee agreement

between Blevins and Citrin, the Board concluded that Blevins's August

9, 2017, letter was a "unilateral, post-settlement attempt to impose a

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substantially higher contingency fee after settlement, coupled with a

refusal to disburse settlement funds until Citrin agreed to this post-

settlement contingency fee increase."

Blevins offers several arguments that we conclude distract from the

real issue, specifically whether the Bar presented clear and convincing

evidence to indicate that Blevins had violated Rule 1.5(a) concerning

excessive fees. For example, in the concluding paragraph, as to this issue

in his appellate brief, Blevins argues:

"Because the mere 'charging' of a fee more than what
was agreed upon is not a per se violation of Rule 1.5(a);
because the Bar did not prove, and the Board did not find, the
'charged' fee was excessive; and because a legitimate issue
existed as to the fee owed Blevins under the terms of his
written fee agreement, Blevins contends the Board's finding
of a violation of Rule 1.5(a) is not supported by the evidence
and is due to be vacated."

Blevins's brief at 59. In support of his argument that merely charging a

fee that is more than what was agreed upon is not a per se violation of

Rule 1.5(a), Blevins relies heavily on In re Disciplinary Action Against

Lee, 835 N.W.2d 836 (N.D. 2013). In Lee, the disciplinary counsel argued

that an attorney violates Rule 1.5(a), N.D. R. Prof'l Cond., as a matter of

law if the attorney charges more than what was agreed the attorney was

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entitled to take. 3 The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of North

Dakota found that the cases cited by the disciplinary counsel did "not

support the general proposition that an attorney who is ultimately found

to have charged more than the agreed amount has automatically violated

the rule and charged an unreasonable fee." 835 N.W.2d at 841. The

problem with Blevins's reliance on Lee is that, unlike in this case, in Lee

there was no written fee agreement between the parties. Rather, in Lee,

although the parties had orally agreed upon a 10% contingent fee, that

agreement had not been reduced to writing. Cf. In re Disciplinary Action

Against Moe, 594 N.W.2d 317 (N.D. 1999) (concluding that an attorney's

attempt to bill the client for fees in violation of the standard attorney

agreement constituted an unreasonable fee under Rule 1.5(a)). Blevins

also contends that the Board did not find that the fee he sought to charge

was excessive and that, in doing so, the Board was required to consider

all the factors stated in Rule 1.5(a). However, Blevins cites no authority

indicating that the Board is required to consider all the factors, especially

if the factors are not relevant under the facts presented. Blevins also

3Rule 1.5(a), N.D. R. Prof'l Cond., provides that "[a] lawyer shall not

make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee …."
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contends that he was justified in seeking to recover the additional

$89,100 because, he says, a "subsequent event" occurred that resulted in

a legitimate fee dispute between him and Citrin. Specifically, he claims

that his discovery during mediation that Citrin had lied to him about the

amount she was entitled to under her fee-split agreement with Beasley

Allen resulted in a legitimate dispute regarding the amount he was

actually owed under the fee agreement. However, Blevins's allegations of

fraud were considered and rejected by the Montgomery Circuit Court

when that court entered a summary judgment in favor of Citrin based

on the written fee agreement; this Court affirmed that summary

judgment. Thus, Blevins's argument, alleging that Citrin's fraudulent

lies caused a legitimate dispute concerning the amount he was owed

under the fee agreement, is without merit. After reviewing the

disciplinary-hearing transcript, we conclude that there was clear and

convincing evidence that Blevins violated Rule 1.5(a). To emphasize,

Blevins had plenty of time to express his feelings of dissatisfaction with

Citrin before Citrin signed the final mediation agreement. However, he

waited until after receiving the settlement funds to unilaterally propose

a modification of the fee agreement. The fee agreement, as drafted,

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provided that Blevins agreed to a certain fee and that, had he abided by

the fee agreement, he would have received $31,185 of the settlement

funds, which, as the Bar points out, was a good fee for the approximately

four months that he represented Citrin. However, based on his hostility

toward Citrin, Blevins sought to unilaterally modify the written fee

agreement in an effort to collect an additional $89,100. Clearly, under the

circumstances presented, such a fee would be excessive and in violation

of Rule 1.5(a). Because Citrin disagreed with Blevins's attempt to modify

the fee agreement, she was then forced to hire new counsel to represent

her in enforcing the agreement. In light of the facts presented, we cannot

say that the Board erred in finding that Blevins violated Rule 1.5(a).

Blevins also contends that his suspension from the practice of law

for a period of 180 days for his violation of Rule 1.5(a) bears no relation

to his conduct, is manifestly excessive, or is arbitrary and capricious. In

support of that argument, Blevins cites Alabama State Bar v. Hallett, 26

So. 3d 1127 (Ala. 2009), and In re Conduct of Paulson, 335 Or. 436, 71 P.

3d 60 (2003), as well as other cases he collected from the Bar's website in

which discipline was imposed on attorneys, in part, for violations of Rule

1.5. According to Blevins, those cases demonstrate that he should have

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been suspended from the practice of law for only 90 days instead of 180

days. Blevins, however, cites no authority indicating that the Board, in

imposing discipline, is required to consider other comparative cases.

Thus, Blevins has not established that his 180-day suspension from the

practice of law bears no relationship to his conduct, is manifestly

excessive, or is arbitrary and capricious.

Blevins also requests other relief from the Court regarding his 180-

day suspension. In arriving at an appropriate disciplinary sanction, the

Board considered the various categories of aggravating factors and

mitigating factors prescribed by the applicable Alabama Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Discipline. With respect to the 180-day suspension for

violating Rule 1.5(a), Blevins requests that this Court (1) reduce his

discipline to a private or public reprimand, (2) reduce his suspension to

90 days or less, or (3) omit the requirement that he apply for

reinstatement after the 180-day suspension. In requesting a private or

public reprimand and/or a reduction of his suspension, Blevins contends

that based on the unique facts of this case -- specifically, the fact that he

addressed Citrin's alleged lies and the fee issue arising from those lies in

the way he thought was most appropriate -- his conduct was at most

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"negligent" and not "knowing." However, under the circumstances

presented, we cannot say that Blevins's conduct was merely negligent.

The facts presented clearly and convincingly indicate that Blevins

contemplated his actions in a retaliatory manner. In his own words,

Blevins was very angry at Citrin, he pondered what to do, and he

ultimately decided that he was not going to let Citrin get away with her

alleged lies and deceit. Blevins intentionally sought to unilaterally

modify the parties' written fee agreement, causing Citrin to seek court

intervention to enforce that agreement. Thus, we reject Blevins's request

to reduce the discipline imposed by the Board. Because the discipline

imposed by the Board was justified, we also reject Blevins's request that

this Court exercise its discretion to omit the requirement that, at the end

of the 180-day suspension, he apply for reinstatement. See Rule 8(b),

Ala. R. Disc. P. (providing, in pertinent part: "A lawyer who has been

suspended for more than (90) days must apply for reinstatement

pursuant to Rule 28, [Ala. R. Disc. P.,] unless the order of suspension

expressly provides otherwise, and will remain suspended until

reinstated.").

E. Equal Protection

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After the Board issued its report and order, Blevins filed a

postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order. In his motion,

Blevins argued that the discipline imposed for charging an excessive fee

in violation of Rule 1.5(a), violated his right to equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Grider v.

City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1263-64 (M.D. Ala. 2010), it was stated:

"To prevail on a 'class of one' equal protection claim, Plaintiffs
must show they were intentionally treated differently from
others who were 'similarly situated' and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment. [Village of
Willowbrook v.] Olech, 528 U.S. [562,] 564, 120 S.Ct. [1073] at
1074 [(2000)]; Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1202
(11th Cir. 2007). To be 'similarly situated,' the comparators
must be ' "prima facie identical in all relevant respects." '
Griffin, 496 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Campbell v. Rainbow City,
434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2006))."

(Footnote omitted.)

Thus, to implicate a "class-of-one" equal-protection claim, Blevins

was required to show (1) that he was "intentionally" treated differently

from others who were similarly situated, (2) that the persons to whom he

is comparing himself are prima facie identical to him in all relevant

respects, and (3) that there was no rational basis for the difference in

treatment. Grider, supra. Blevins argues that his discipline was more

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severe than the discipline imposed on the attorney in Hallett, supra, who

received a 90-day suspension from the practice of law.4 Thus, he says,

his 180-day suspension from the practice of law establishes a class-of-one

equal-protection violation. We disagree. First, Blevins points to no

authority involving a class-of-one equal-protection claim in the context of

a Bar disciplinary proceeding. Next, he makes no attempt to explain how

the Board "intentionally" treated him differently from the attorney in

Hallett. Most notably, Hallett and Blevins were not similarly situated in

all relevant respects. The major difference that separates Hallett and

Blevins is that Blevins was disciplined because he sought to unilaterally

modify an existing written agreement in an attempt to receive an

additional $89,100 from his client, who did not agree to the modification,

thus causing the client to sue in circuit court to enforce the fee agreement.

4Blevins also lists as comparators other attorneys whose names he

extracted from the Bar's website; those attorneys' cases involved, in part,
violations of Rule 1.5. However, it is unnecessary to discuss those
comparators. As the Bar argues, and we agree, Blevins fails to mention
that each case he cites from the website involves a plea agreement
entered into between the Bar and the attorney in question; the
punishments listed were not issued by the Board. We also reject Blevins's
reliance on In re Conduct of Paulson, 335 Or. 436, 71 P. 3d 60 (2003),
because, among other things, that case is not binding on this Court.
30
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Hallett, however, did not involve such an attempt at modification, and,

in fact, Hallett's client consented to the terms of the fee agreement that

formed the basis of the disciplinary charges against Hallett. Notably, the

number of charges, the number of aggravating circumstances, and the

number of mitigating factors are also different in the two cases. As the

Grider Court explained, civil actions by their very nature involve a multi-

dimensional decision-making process, as opposed to a one-dimensional

inquiry. Thus, proving that a comparator is prima facie identical in all

relevant respects is a difficult standard to meet. As explained in Section

I of the Alabama Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline:

"While there may be particular cases of lawyer
misconduct that are not easily categorized, the standards are
not designed to propose specific discipline for each of the
myriad of fact patterns in cases of lawyer misconduct. Rather,
the standards are guidelines that provide a theoretical
framework to guide the Disciplinary Board in imposing
discipline. The ultimate discipline imposed will depend on the
presence of any aggravating or mitigating factors in that
particular situation. The standards thus are not analogous to
criminal determinate sentences, but are guidelines that give
Disciplinary Boards the flexibility to select the appropriate
discipline in each particular case of lawyer misconduct."

See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (recognizing

that states have a "compelling interest in the practice of professions

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within their boundaries" and that states therefore have "broad power to

establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the

practice of professions"). Finally, Alabama has an indisputable interest

in regulating attorneys in order to protect the public, the legal system,

and the legal profession. See Standard 1.1, Alabama Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Discipline ("The purpose of lawyer discipline

proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice from

lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely

properly to discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, the

legal system, and the legal profession."). Thus, enforcing the application

of the Rules of Professional Conduct is, on its face, rationally related to

achieving this legitimate state interest. Accordingly, the Board did not

err in denying Blevins's motion for a postjudgment motion to alter,

amend, or vacate based on Blevins's equal-protection claim or in denying

his request for an evidentiary hearing based on that claim.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the order of the Board was

supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the Board

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appropriately applied the law to the facts. The order of the Board is,

therefore, affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Sellers and Parker, JJ., concur

Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and McCool, JJ.,

concur in the result.

Wise and Cook, JJ., recuse themselves.

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