Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Richard Terry Cole v. Tanner Medical Center, Inc.) (Randolph Circuit Court: CV-24-900013).

Rel: September 12, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2025

_________________________

SC-2025-0019
_________________________

Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Richard Terry Cole

v.

Tanner Medical Center, Inc.)

(Randolph Circuit Court: CV-24-900013)

STEWART, Chief Justice.
SC-2025-0019

Tanner Medical Center, Inc. ("Tanner"), petitions this Court for a

writ of mandamus directing the Randolph Circuit Court ("the circuit

court") to dismiss the medical-malpractice claims asserted against it by

Richard Terry Cole on the basis that the circuit court lacks personal

jurisdiction over it or, alternatively, because venue is improper. For the

following reasons, we deny the petition.

Background and Procedural History

Tanner is a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business

in Carrollton, Georgia. Tanner operates four hospitals in west Georgia

with 349 inpatient beds as well as several Georgia-based outpatient

medical facilities and clinics. Tanner's operations, however, are not

limited to west Georgia. In conjunction with an affiliated corporation,

Tanner Medical Center Alabama, Inc., Tanner operates a 15-bed

community hospital in Wedowee, Alabama ("the Wedowee hospital"), and

2 to 3 other medical clinics in east Alabama.

Cole is a resident of Randolph County. He alleges that during the

week of September 14, 2022, he presented himself to the Wedowee

hospital and was subsequently transferred via ambulance to the Tanner

Medical Center in Carrollton, Georgia, for a heart-catheterization

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procedure. The heart-catheterization procedure was performed by Dr.

Christopher Arant. Dr. Arant, an employee of Tanner, is a resident of

Georgia who practices medicine solely in Georgia and is not licensed to

practice medicine in Alabama and has never practiced medicine in

Alabama. Cole alleges that, because of Dr. Arant's medical negligence

during the heart-catheterization procedure, he suffered renal failure

necessitating further medical interventions, including kidney dialysis.

Specifically, Cole asserts that Dr. Arant used too much contrast dye

and/or blood thinner during the procedure and failed to properly monitor

and document the procedure's duration.

On February 7, 2024, Cole commenced a medical-malpractice action

against Tanner and Dr. Arant in the circuit court. As amended, Cole's

complaint alleged that Dr. Arant's actions were, alternatively, violations

of the Alabama Medical Liability Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-480 et seq.,

and the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-540

et seq. (collectively referred to as "the AMLA"), or the "Georgia Medical

Liability Act," Ga. Code Ann., § 51-1-27 et seq., and that Tanner, as Dr.

Arant's employer, was vicariously liable for Dr. Arant's medical

negligence.

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Dr. Arant and Tanner moved to dismiss the action, arguing, among

other things, that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over them

and that venue in the circuit court was improper. In support of their

motions to dismiss, Tanner and Dr. Arant submitted affidavits of Dr.

Arant and Carol Crews, Tanner's executive vice president and chief

financial officer. Dr. Arant testified that his treatment of Cole had

"occurred entirely and only in Georgia." He further stated that he is

licensed to practice medicine only in Georgia and that he had never

practiced medicine in Alabama. Crews testified that Tanner is

incorporated in the State of Georgia, that its principal place of business

is in Carrollton, Georgia, and that the vast majority of its operations are

in Georgia -- it operates a 181-bed acute-care hospital in Carrollton,

Georgia; a 53-bed acute-care hospital in Villa Rica, Georgia; a 23-bed

critical-access hospital in Bremen, Georgia; a 92-bed inpatient

behavioral-health center in Villa Rica, Georgia; and "various other

outpatient medical facilities, clinics, and practices throughout west

Georgia." Crews stated that Tanner is registered in Alabama as a foreign

nonprofit corporation and that it "is involved -- through and with its

affiliate entity Tanner Medical Center Alabama, Inc. -- in the operation

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of one 15-bed community hospital in Wedowee, Alabama, and 2-3 medical

clinics in the east Alabama area."

Cole filed a response opposing Tanner's and Dr. Arant's motions to

dismiss, and he submitted documents reflecting content contained on

Internet and social-media websites for "Tanner Health System,"

advertising the medical services and facilities offered by the Tanner

Health System serving east Alabama, including the Wedowee hospital.1

Tanner Health System's website also touted Dr. Arant's services as a

member of "Tanner Heart & Vascular Specialists" and indicated that

Tanner Heart & Vascular Specialists maintained an office in Wedowee.

Cole also submitted a brochure for "Tanner Medical Center/East

Alabama," which stated that, in addition to the Wedowee hospital,

Tanner Medical Center/East Alabama operated primary-care clinics in

Roanoke, Wedowee, and Woodland. That brochure advertised Tanner's

"commitment to East Alabama" and stated that "Tanner is no stranger

to east Alabama, with relationships in the community spanning the

years." The brochure noted that Tanner's east Alabama patients also had

1Although it is not clear from the materials before us, "Tanner
Health System" appears to include all Tanner-affiliated health-care
facilities and health-care practices.
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access to the Tanner Health System's "full range of additional specialized

services, including … [h]eart care." Finally, Cole submitted his own

affidavit in which he stated that, "[a]fter presenting myself to Tanner

Medical Center in Wedowee, Alabama, Tanner Medical Center

subsequently transferred me to another facility in Carrollton, Georgia,

for a Left Heart Catheter placement" and that he had been "transported

from Wedowee, Alabama to Carrollton, Georgia via ambulance per the

instructions of Defendant, Tanner Medical Center."

The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motions to dismiss on

July 30, 2024. On December 4, 2024, the circuit court entered an order

dismissing Cole's claims against Dr. Arant for lack of personal

jurisdiction. The circuit court, however, denied Tanner's motion to

dismiss. Thereafter, Tanner petitioned this Court for a writ of

mandamus directing the circuit court to grant its motion to dismiss.

Standard of Review

" ' "A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy, and is appropriate when the petitioner
can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the
properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex

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parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156
(Ala. 2000)." '

"Ex parte Gulf Health Hosps., Inc., 321 So. 3d 629, 632 (Ala.
2020)(quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272
(Ala. 2001)).

" ' "[A] petition for a writ of mandamus
is the proper device by which to
challenge the denial of a motion to
dismiss for lack of in personam
jurisdiction. See Ex parte McInnis, 820
So. 2d 795 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte Paul
Maclean Land Servs., Inc., 613 So. 2d
1284, 1286 (Ala. 1993). ' "An appellate
court considers de novo a trial court's
judgment on a party's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction." ' Ex parte Lagrone, 839
So. 2d 620, 623 (Ala. 2002)(quoting
Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729
(Ala. 2002)). Moreover, '[t]he plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the court's
personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.' Daynard v. Ness, Motley,
Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A.,
290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002)."

" 'Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker &
Hutchings, P.C., 866 So. 2d 519, 525 (Ala. 2003).

" ' " 'In considering a Rule 12(b)(2),
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for
want of personal jurisdiction, a court
must consider as true the allegations of
the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco &
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Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996),
and Cable/Home Communication Corp.
v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d
829 (11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict, the ...
court must construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff."
Robinson, 74 F.3d at 255 (quoting
Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514
(11th Cir. 1990)).' "

" 'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc.,
853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002)(quoting Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).
However, if the defendant makes a prima facie
evidentiary showing that the Court has no
personal jurisdiction, "the plaintiff is then
required to substantiate the jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other
competent proof, and he may not merely reiterate
the factual allegations in the complaint."
Mercantile Capital, LP v. Federal Transtel, Inc.,
193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002)(citing
Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See also
Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D. 471,
474-75 (D. Del. 1995)("When a defendant files a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2), and supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those affidavits
with his own affidavits or other competent
evidence in order to survive the motion.")(citing
Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts,
Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984)).'

"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229-30
(Ala. 2004)."
8
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Ex parte Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., [Ms. SC-2024-0608, Mar.

21, 2025] ____ So. 3d ____, ____ (Ala. 2025). The denial of a motion to

change venue is also reviewable by a mandamus petition. Ex parte

Kennedy, 656 So. 2d 365, 367 (Ala. 1995); see also Ex parte Chin, 385 So.

3d 525, 530 (Ala. 2023) (plurality opinion) (noting that the standard for

challenging venue is analogous to the standard for challenging personal

jurisdiction).

Analysis

Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., extends the personal jurisdiction of

Alabama courts " ' "to the limit of due process under the United States

and Alabama Constitutions." ' " Ex parte Bradshaw, 328 So. 3d 236, 240

(Ala. 2020) (quoting Ex parte McNeese Title, LLC, 82 So. 3d 670, 673

(Ala. 2011), quoting in turn Hiller Invs. Inc. v. Insultech Grp., Inc., 957

So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006)). The United States Supreme Court has

recognized that, for a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a

defendant, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

requires that the defendant have "minimum contacts with [that state]

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice.' " International Shoe Co. v. State of
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Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). Two types of

personal jurisdiction have been recognized by the United States Supreme

Court: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.

"Since our seminal decision in International Shoe, our
decisions have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction:
'general' (sometimes called 'all-purpose') jurisdiction and
'specific' (sometimes called 'case-linked') jurisdiction.
Goodyear[ Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown], 564 U.S.
[915,] 919 [(2011)]. 'For an individual, the paradigm forum
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's
domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in
which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.' Id., at
924. A court with general jurisdiction may hear any claim
against that defendant, even if all the incidents underlying
the claim occurred in a different State. Id., at 919. But 'only
a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a
defendant amenable to' general jurisdiction in that State.
Daimler [AG v. Bauman], 571 U.S. [117,] 137 [(2014)].

"Specific jurisdiction is very different. In order for a
state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, 'the suit' must
'aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts with the
forum.' Id., at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted;
emphasis added); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 472-473 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). In other
words, there must be 'an affiliation between the forum and
underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or
occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore
subject to the State's regulation.' Goodyear, 564 U.S., at 919
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). For this
reason, 'specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of
issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy
that establishes jurisdiction.' Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted)."
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Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco

Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017).

Tanner argues that the circuit court has neither general nor specific

personal jurisdiction over it. Turning first to general jurisdiction, Cole

argues that Tanner is "at home" in Alabama because Tanner is involved

in the operation of the Wedowee hospital in Alabama, along with two to

three other medical clinics in Randolph County, and that Tanner

advertises its services within Alabama. However, as the United States

Supreme Court has made clear, conducting business in a forum -- even a

substantial amount of business -- does not necessarily subject a

corporation to general personal jurisdiction within that forum.

For example, in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402 (2017),

railroad employees sued their employer, BNSF Railway Co. ("BNSF"), a

railroad incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in

Texas, in Montana state courts, seeking recovery for injuries that had

occurred outside Montana. The Montana Supreme Court concluded that

personal jurisdiction was proper over BNSF given its extensive

operations in the state -- BNSF had over 2,000 miles of railroad track and

employed over 2,000 workers in Montana. The United States Supreme
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Court reversed that judgment, noting that " 'the general jurisdiction

inquiry does not focus solely on the magnitude of the defendant's in-state

contacts.' " Id. at 414 (citation omitted). The Court explained:

"Goodyear[ Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915 (2011),] and Daimler[ AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117
(2014),] clarified that '[a] court may assert general jurisdiction
over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations
with the State are so "continuous and systematic" as to render
them essentially at home in the forum State.' Daimler, 571
U.S., at 127 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S., at 919). The
'paradigm' forums in which a corporate defendant is 'at home,'
we have explained, are the corporation's place of incorporation
and its principal place of business. Daimler, 571 U.S., at 137;
Goodyear, 564 U.S., at 924. The exercise of general
jurisdiction is not limited to these forums; in an 'exceptional
case,' a corporate defendant's operations in another forum
'may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the
corporation at home in that State.' Daimler, 571 U.S., at 139,
n. 19. We suggested that Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), exemplified such a case. Daimler,
571 U.S., at 139, n. 19. In Perkins, war had forced the
defendant corporation's owner to temporarily relocate the
enterprise from the Philippines to Ohio. 342 U.S., at 447-448.
Because Ohio then became 'the center of the corporation's
wartime activities,' Daimler, 571 U.S., at 130, n. 8, suit was
proper there, Perkins, 342 U.S., at 448.

"….

"BNSF, we repeat, is not incorporated in Montana and
does not maintain its principal place of business there. Nor is
BNSF so heavily engaged in activity in Montana 'as to render
[it] essentially at home' in that State. See Daimler, 571 U.S.,
at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted). As earlier noted,
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BNSF has over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than
2,000 employees in Montana. But, as we observed in Daimler,
'the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus solely on the
magnitude of the defendant's in-state contacts.' Id., at 139, n.
20 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Rather, the inquiry 'calls for an appraisal of a corporation's
activities in their entirety'; '[a] corporation that operates in
many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.'
Id., at 140, n. 20. In short, the business BNSF does in
Montana is sufficient to subject the railroad to specific
personal jurisdiction in that State on claims related to the
business it does in Montana. But in-state business, we
clarified in Daimler and Goodyear, does not suffice to permit
the assertion of general jurisdiction over claims … that are
unrelated to any activity occurring in Montana."

BNSF, 581 U.S. at 413-14.

Applying the reasoning in BNSF to this case, we conclude that there

is no general jurisdiction over Tanner in Alabama. Tanner is not

incorporated in Alabama, and it does not maintain its principal place of

business in this state. Although Tanner operates a 15-bed hospital and

2-3 clinics in Alabama, the totality of its operations confirms that it is not

"at home" in Alabama so as to permit the exercise of general jurisdiction

over Cole's claims against it in this case.

Whether the circuit court may exercise specific personal

jurisdiction over Tanner, however, is a closer question. Tanner argues

that the alleged negligent acts -- Dr. Arant's failure to monitor the length

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of Cole's heart-catheterization procedure or his overuse of blood thinner

or contrast dye -- occurred in Georgia and were unrelated to Cole's initial

treatment at the Wedowee hospital. Cole responds that, although the

specific acts of alleged negligence ultimately occurred in a Tanner facility

in Georgia, his medical treatment, which culminated in the heart-

catheterization procedure, was initiated at the Wedowee hospital, a

Tanner-operated facility, in Alabama. Thus, Cole contends that his

treatment, and ultimately his injury, in Georgia arose out of and was

related to Tanner's activities in Alabama, which, he says, is sufficient for

the circuit court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Tanner in

this case.

"Specific jurisdiction is different [from general
jurisdiction]: It covers defendants less intimately connected
with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims. The
contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the
name 'purposeful availment.' Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). The defendant, we have
said, must take 'some act by which [it] purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State.' Hanson v. Denckla¸357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The
contacts must be the defendant's own choice and not 'random,
isolated, or fortuitous.' Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770, 774 (1984). They must show that the defendant
deliberately 'reached out beyond' its home -- by, for example,
'exploi[ting] a market' in the forum State or entering a
contractual relationship centered there. Walden v. Fiore, 571
U.S. 277, 285 (2014) (internal quotation marks and
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alterations omitted). Yet even then -- because the defendant
is not 'at home' -- the forum State may exercise jurisdiction in
only certain cases. The plaintiff's claims, we have often
stated, 'must arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts'
with the forum. Bristol-Myers[ Squibb Co. v. Superior Court
of Cal., San Francisco Cnty.], 582 U.S. [255,] 262 [(2017)]
(quoting Daimler[ AG v. Bauman], 571 U.S. [117,] 127
[(2014)]; alterations omitted); see, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S.,
at 472; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 414 (1984); International Shoe[ Co. v. State of
Washington], 326 U.S. [310,] 319 [(1945)]. Or put just a bit
differently, 'there must be "an affiliation between the forum
and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or
an occurrence that takes place in the forum state and is
therefore subject to the State's regulation." ' Bristol-Myers,
582 U.S., at 262 (quoting Goodyear[ Dunlop Tire Operations,
S.A. v. Brown], 564 U.S. [915,] 919 [(2011]).

"These rules derive from and reflect two sets of values
-- treating defendants fairly and protecting 'interstate
federalism.' World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 293 (1980); see id., at 297-298. Our decision in
International Shoe founded specific jurisdiction on an idea of
reciprocity between a defendant and a State: When (but only
when) a company 'exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state' -- thus 'enjoy[ing] the benefits and
protection of [its] laws' -- the State may hold the company to
account for related misconduct. 326 U.S., at 319; see Burger
King, 471 U.S., at 475-476. Later decisions have added that
our doctrine similarly provides defendants with 'fair warning'
-- knowledge that 'a particular activity may subject [it] to the
jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.' Id., at 472 (internal
quotation marks omitted); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.,
at 297 (likewise referring to 'clear notice'). A defendant can
thus 'structure [its] primary conduct' to lessen or avoid
exposure to a given State's courts. Id., at 297. And this Court
has considered alongside defendants' interests those of the
States in relation to each other. One State's 'sovereign power
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to try' a suit, we have recognized, may prevent 'sister States'
from exercising their like authority. Id., at 293. The law of
specific jurisdiction thus seeks to ensure that States with
'little legitimate interest' in a suit do not encroach on States
more affected by the controversy. Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S., at
263."

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. CA., 592 U.S. 351, 359-60

(2021).

In this case, Tanner does not dispute that it "purposefully avail[ed]

itself of the privilege of conducting activities within [Alabama]." Hanson

v. Denckla¸357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Indeed, Tanner operates the

Wedowee hospital and two to three clinics in Alabama, through which it

seeks to serve the medical needs of the communities in and around

Randolph County, Alabama. Rather, Tanner focuses on the relatedness

of its Alabama contacts to the claims made by Cole. Tanner argues that

the acts of alleged negligence made the basis of Cole's claims (the alleged

overuse of contrast dye or blood thinner during Cole's procedure and/or

the failure to monitor the length of the procedure) all occurred in Georgia.

In addressing whether Cole's claims arise out of or relate to

Tanner's Alabama contacts, the United States Supreme Court's recent

decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court is

instructive. In Ford, the Court considered two cases in which injured
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motorists had sued Ford Motor Company ("Ford") in the state courts of

Montana and Minnesota alleging product-liability, design-defect, and

other claims relating to Ford's design and manufacturing of the vehicles

operated by the motorists. In each case the accident occurred in the state

in which the suit was brought, and each of the plaintiffs was a resident

of the forum state. Furthermore, Ford did substantial business in each

forum -- it sold, advertised, and serviced vehicles in the forum states.

However, in each case, the vehicle made the basis of the claims had

originally been purchased outside the forum. Ford moved to dismiss the

cases, arguing that jurisdiction was improper because the vehicles at

issue were not designed, manufactured, or originally sold in the forum

states -- in other words, that the plaintiffs' accidents were not caused by

Ford's forum contacts. The United States Supreme Court rejected Ford's

argument. That Court explained:

"Ford contends that our jurisdictional rules prevent
Montana's and Minnesota's courts from deciding these two
suits. … Ford's claim is … that [its] activities [in Montana
and Minnesota] do not sufficiently connect to the suits, even
though the resident-plaintiffs allege that Ford cars
malfunctioned in the forum States. In Ford's view, the needed
link must be causal in nature: Jurisdiction attaches 'only if
the defendant's forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff's
claims.' Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis in original). And
that rule reduces, Ford thinks, to locating specific jurisdiction
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in the State where Ford sold the car in question, or else the
States where Ford designed and manufactured the vehicle. …
On that view, the place of accident and injury is immaterial.
So (Ford says) Montana's and Minnesota's courts have no
power over these cases.

"But Ford's causation-only approach finds no support in
this Court's requirement of a 'connection' between a plaintiff's
suit and a defendant's activities. Bristol-Myers[ Squibb Co. v.
Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S.
[255,] 260 [(2017)]. That rule indeed serves to narrow the
class of claims over which a state court may exercise specific
jurisdiction. But not quite so far as Ford wants. None of our
precedents has suggested that only a strict causal
relationship between the defendant's in-state activity and the
litigation will do. As just noted, our most common
formulation of the rule demands that the suit 'arise out of or
relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum.' Id., at 262
(quoting Daimler[ AG v. Bauman], 571 U.S. [117,] 127
[(2014)]; emphasis added; alterations omitted); see supra, at
359. The first half of that standard asks about causation; but
the back half, after the 'or,' contemplates that some
relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal
showing. That does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of
specific jurisdiction, the phrase 'relate to' incorporates real
limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to
a forum. But again, we have never framed the specific
jurisdiction inquiry as always requiring proof of causation --
i.e., proof that the plaintiff's claim came about because of the
defendant's in-state conduct. See also Bristol-Myers, 582
U.S., at 262, 264 (quoting Goodyear[ Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown], 564 U.S. [915,] 919 [(2011)] (asking whether
there is 'an affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy,' without demanding that the inquiry focus on
cause). So the case is not over even if, as Ford argues, a causal
test would put jurisdiction in only the States of first sale,
manufacture, and design. A different State's courts may yet
have jurisdiction, because of another 'activity [or] occurrence'
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involving the defendant that takes place in the State. Bristol-
Myers, 582 U.S., at 262, 264 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S., at
919)."

Ford, 592 U.S. at 361-62.

The Court in Ford concluded that, although the vehicles at issue

had not been designed, manufactured, or originally sold in the forum

states, its activities in those states -- advertising, selling, and servicing

Ford vehicles -- created a demand for Ford vehicles in the forum states

and fostered an active resale market for its older models.

"In other words, Ford has systematically served a market in
Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the
plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those
states. So there is a strong 'relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation' -- the 'essential
foundation' of specific jurisdiction. Helicopteros[ Nacionales
de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall], 466 U.S. [408,] 414 [(1984)]
(internal quotation marks omitted)."

Ford, 592 U.S. at 365-66. Accordingly, the Court in Ford concluded that

"the 'relationship among the defendant, the forum[s], and the litigation'

… is close enough to support specific jurisdiction," Id. at 371 (quoting

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014)). The Court, therefore,

affirmed the Montana and Minnesota state-court judgments entered

against Ford. See also Sawyer v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 412 So. 3d

603 (Ala. 2024) (applying Ford and holding that Alabama court had
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specific jurisdiction over tire manufacturer with in-state dealer network

in action involving Alabama accident caused by defective tire).

In contrast with Ford, in Walden v. Fiore, a Georgia police officer

working in the Atlanta airport searched two airline passengers traveling

from Puerto Rico to Nevada, where they lived, as they were attempting

to board a connecting flight in Atlanta. The officer seized a large sum of

money from the passengers. The passengers later sued the Georgia police

officer in Nevada, arguing that Nevada had specific jurisdiction over the

officer because their injury (the inability to use their money) had occurred

in Nevada. The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that,

notwithstanding the effects of the officer's conduct in Nevada, the lack of

any contacts with Nevada precluded the exercise of specific jurisdiction

over the officer: "[The officer] never traveled to, conducted activities

within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada. In

short, when viewed through the proper lens -- whether the defendant's

actions connect him to the forum -- [the officer] formed no jurisdictionally

relevant contacts with Nevada." 571 U.S. at 289.

Applying the reasoning of Ford, Walden, and other relevant

authorities to the facts of this case, we cannot say that Tanner has

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established a clear legal right to an order dismissing Cole's claims

against it based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Tanner argues that

the alleged acts of medical negligence occurred in Georgia and that those

specific acts have no relationship to its activities in Alabama. That

argument, however, sounds very much like the causation argument

rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Ford. As the Court in

Ford explained, the doctrine of specific jurisdiction is not so narrow as to

require the directly causative conduct -- in Ford, the design,

manufacture, and sale of vehicles -- to have occurred within the forum

state. Rather, "the rule demands that the suit 'arise out of or relate to

the defendant's contacts in the forum.' " Ford, 592 U.S. at 362 (quoting

Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 262); see also Sawyer, 412 So. 3d at 616

(holding that jurisdiction may exist "even if there is no direct causal link

between the defendant's conduct in the forum state and the plaintiff's

claims" so long as the claims are sufficiently related). In Ford, Ford's

marketing, selling, and servicing a specific model vehicle in the forum

state was sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction when a forum

resident was injured in an in-state crash involving the same type of

vehicle. Here, the connection is more direct. Tanner's marketing

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materials make clear that Tanner has positioned itself as a regional

health-care provider serving east Alabama and west Georgia and that

patients at Tanner's east Alabama medical facilities have "access to

Tanner's full range of additional specialized services," which are, by and

large, located in Georgia. In line with that model, Cole, an Alabama

resident, sought medical treatment at a Tanner-operated facility in

Alabama and was then transferred by ambulance to a Tanner-operated

facility in Georgia for more specialized care -- a heart-catheterization

procedure. For Cole, the heart-catheterization procedure was in

continuity with the medical care he had sought at Tanner's Alabama

facility. Accordingly, even though the particular acts of negligence

forming the basis of Cole's claims occurred in Georgia, "the 'relationship

among the defendant, the forum[], and the litigation' … is close enough

to support specific jurisdiction." Ford, 592 U.S. at 371 (quoting Walden,

571 U.S. at 284). Therefore, Tanner has not demonstrated a clear legal

right to a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to grant its motion

to dismiss the claims against it based on a lack of personal jurisdiction.

Finally, Tanner argues that even if it is subject to the circuit court's

jurisdiction, Cole's claims must still be dismissed because venue is

22
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improper in the circuit court. Tanner contends that § 6-5-546, Ala. Code

1975, a provision of the AMLA, applies. That statute provides, in

pertinent part:

"In any action for injury or damages or wrongful death
whether in contract or in tort against a health care provider
based on a breach of the standard of care, the action must be
brought in the county wherein the act or omission constituting
the alleged breach of the standard of care by the defendant
actually occurred. … If at any time prior to the
commencement of the trial of the action it is shown that the
plaintiff's injuries … did not result from acts or omissions
which took place in more than one county, on motion of any
defendant the court shall transfer the action to such county
wherein the alleged acts or omissions actually occurred."

Tanner posits that, because the relevant acts or omissions in this case all

occurred in Georgia, there is no county in Alabama in which venue is

proper, and, therefore, it contends, the action must be dismissed. Cole,

on the other hand, contends that Alabama's general venue statutes apply

to this case. See, e.g., § 6-3-7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975 (providing that, in a

civil action against corporation, venue is proper in county where plaintiff

resides and the corporation does business by agent).

Here, to the extent that Cole's claims fall within the AMLA, there

is no question that § 6-5-546 is the operative venue provision. See

Kennedy, 656 So. 2d at 368. However, Cole's claims are alternatively

23
SC-2025-0019

made pursuant to Georgia's medical-malpractice law. See Ga. Code Ann.,

§ 51-1-27 et seq. Indeed, Cole's claims are based on a Georgia physician's

alleged breach of a standard of medical care during a procedure that

occurred in Georgia. Although Alabama will generally apply its own

procedural rules even when applying the substantive law of another

state, see Middleton v. Caterpillar Indus., Inc., 979 So. 2d 53, 57 (Ala.

2007) ("Although lex loci delicti governs substantive law, lex fori -- the

law of the forum -- governs procedural matters."), it is not so clear that

the AMLA's venue provision applies to claims of medical malpractice

brought under another state's substantive law for events occurring

outside Alabama.2 If not, Alabama's default venue provisions apply, and

venue would appear to be appropriate in the circuit court. We need not

2Tanner argued below that Cole's claims under the AMLA were due

to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., because the AMLA
does not apply to medical-negligence claims arising outside Alabama.
For instance, it argued that Dr. Arant does not fall within the AMLA's
definition of a "health care provider," see § 6-5-542(1), Ala. Code 1975,
because he is not licensed to practice medicine in Alabama, see § 6-5-
481(1), Ala. Code 1975, and it further posited that the standard of care
would be governed by Georgia law, not the AMLA. It appears to be a
question of first impression whether the AMLA's venue provision would
apply to and preclude claims based on out-of-state medical negligence not
otherwise governed by the AMLA.

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SC-2025-0019

reach that question today, however, because Tanner has not directly

addressed it in its mandamus petition. Although Tanner argues in its

petition that § 6-5-546 applies to Cole's action because it is a medical-

malpractice action, it has not addressed or briefed whether § 6-5-546

applies to an action like Cole's, which is brought under another state's

substantive law for conduct occurring outside Alabama; nor has it cited

any authority indicating that § 6-5-546 requires the outright dismissal of

such an action.

" ' "When an appellant [or petitioner] fails to properly argue an
issue, that issue is waived and will not be considered." "An
appeals court will consider only those issues properly
delineated as such, and no matter will be considered on appeal
[or mandamus review] unless presented and argued in brief." '
Tucker v. Cullman-Jefferson Counties Gas Dist., 862 So. 2d
317, 319 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Asam v. Devereaux, 686 So. 2d
1222, 1224 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996), and Braxton v. Stewart¸539
So. 2d 284, 286 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988), respectively (emphasis
omitted). ' " It is well established that it is not the function of
an appellate court to create, research, or argue an issue on
behalf of the [petitioner]." ' Mottershaw v. Ledbetter, 148 So.
3d 45, 54 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Gonzalez v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Alabama, 760 So. 2d 878, 883 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)).
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ that will be
issued only when the petitioner establishes a 'clear legal right'
to relief. Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d [497,] 499 [(Ala. 2005)]."

25
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Ex parte Drury Hotels Co., 303 So. 3d 1188, 1193 (Ala. 2020).

Accordingly, Tanner has not demonstrated a clear legal right to an order

dismissing Cole's action based on improper venue.

Conclusion

As explained above, we conclude that Tanner has not established a

clear legal right to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny the petition

for a writ of mandamus.

PETITION DENIED.

Bryan, J., concurs.

Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion, which McCool, J., joins.

Mendheim and Lewis, JJ., concur in the result.

Shaw and Sellers, JJ., dissent, with opinions.

Wise, J., dissents.

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SC-2025-0019

COOK, Justice (concurring specially).

Because the Randolph Circuit Court has specific personal

jurisdiction over Tanner Medical Center, Inc. ("Tanner"), and because

Tanner has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to an order

dismissing the action against it based on improper venue, I concur fully

with this Court's decision to deny Tanner's petition for a writ of

mandamus. I write specially, however, to address issues I believe the

bench and bar should note for future cases.

First, there is a significant debate between the parties about

whether the Alabama Medical Liability Act ("the AMLA"), which

contains the venue provision at issue here, even applies to the claims

made in this action. The AMLA's venue provision provides, in relevant

part:

"In any action for injury or damages … against a health
care provider based on a breach of the standard of care, the
action must be brought in the county wherein the act or
omission constituting the alleged breach of the standard of
care by the defendant actually occurred."

§ 6-5-546, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added).

A "health care provider" is defined in the AMLA as "[a] medical

practitioner, dental practitioner, medical institution, physician, dentist,

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SC-2025-0019

hospital, or other health care provider as those terms are defined in [Ala.

Code 1975, §] 6-5-481." § 6-5-542(1), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added).

Under § 6-5-481(1), Ala. Code 1975, a "medical practitioner" is "[a]nyone

licensed to practice medicine or osteopathy in the State of Alabama,

engaged in such practice, including medical professional corporations,

associations, and partnerships." (Emphasis added.) That Code section

defines a "physician" as "[a]ny person licensed to practice medicine in

Alabama." § 6-5-481(5) (emphasis added).

The materials before us indicate -- and the parties do not dispute --

that "Dr. Arant[, a physician employed by Tanner who is alleged to have

committed medical negligence,] does not practice medicine in Alabama,

is not licensed to practice medicine in Alabama, and has never practiced

or been licensed to practice in Alabama." Petition at 10. Thus, he does not

appear to be a "health care provider" under the AMLA. This would

necessarily call into question whether any of the AMLA's provisions,

including its venue provision, could apply here.

As noted in the main opinion, if the AMLA does not apply, then

Alabama's default venue provisions apply, and venue would appear to be

appropriate in the circuit court. This seems logical. Stated simply, if

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SC-2025-0019

personal jurisdiction exists in Alabama and there is no express statutory

provision to the contrary, there should normally be venue somewhere in

Alabama.

While I believe this is the correct answer to the legal issues

presented to us in this case, I am very concerned about the problems

identified in Justice Sellers's special writing. His arguments lead me to

believe that this is a case in which we should be considering the doctrine

of forum non conveniens.

That doctrine is codified in § 6-5-430, Ala. Code 1975, which

provides, in pertinent part:

"Whenever … a claim … has arisen outside of this state
against any person or corporation, such claim may be
enforceable in the courts of this state in any county in which
jurisdiction of the defendant can be legally obtained in the
same manner in which jurisdiction could have been obtained
if the claim had arisen in this state; provided, however, the
courts of this state shall apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in determining whether to accept or decline to
take jurisdiction of an action based upon such claim
originating outside this state; and provided further that, if
upon motion of any defendant it is shown that there exists a
more appropriate forum outside this state, taking into account
the location where the acts giving rise to the action occurred,
the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the
interests of justice, the court must dismiss the action without
prejudice."

(Emphasis added.) Our Court has also previously explained that that
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SC-2025-0019

doctrine

" ' " allows a court, which has jurisdiction and which is located
where venue is proper, to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction
when, in the interest of the parties and witnesses, and in the
interest of justice and judicial economy, the case could be more
appropriately tried in another forum." ' "

Ex parte Preston Hood Chevrolet, Inc., 638 So. 2d 842, 844 (Ala. 1994)

(quoting Ex parte Employers Ins. of Wausau, 590 So. 2d 888, 892 (Ala.

1991)).

Here, the materials before us provide several bases for why this

case might be tried more conveniently in Georgia rather than in Alabama

and indicate that the "interest of justice" also favors a Georgia venue. In

particular, the materials before us undisputedly indicate that the

medical treatment occurred in a Georgia medical facility by a Georgia

physician who is licensed and regulated by Georgia's medical boards and

that the records of such services and the witnesses regarding such

services are almost certainly in Georgia. While I need not decide the

question, there is also a significant argument to be made that Georgia

law should apply to the provision of these medical services in Georgia.

However, as § 6-5-430 makes clear, for the trial court to dismiss an

action without prejudice under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the

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SC-2025-0019

defendant must make a motion to show that there exists a more

appropriate forum outside the state. Given that no such motion was made

in this case, we cannot reach this question even if we believe there are

significant reasons for why this action should not be in an Alabama court.

In sum, it is far from clear that the AMLA governs this case, and, if

it does not, it would appear that Alabama's default venue statute applies.

Additionally, while the doctrine of forum non conveniens likely could

apply here, the parties made no argument to the trial court that the

doctrine should apply. In any event, because Tanner failed to sufficiently

establish that it has a clear legal right to the dismissal of Richard Terry

Cole's claims against it, I agree with the main opinion that its petition

must be denied.

McCool, J., concurs.

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SHAW, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

I do not believe that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over

the defendant in this action, Tanner Medical Center, Inc. ("Tanner").

Tanner did not have the specific contacts with this state necessary for

establishing specific personal jurisdiction. The United States Supreme

Court's decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District

Court, 592 U.S. 351, 355 (2021), which involved allegedly defective

tangible products that injured persons in the states where suits were

filed, does not require the conclusion that specific jurisdiction exists in

this case, which involves medical services performed outside this state.

Specifically, the Supreme Court's analysis in Ford of whether a plaintiff's

claims "relate" to the defendant's contacts with a forum relied

significantly on whether a defendant's wrongful conduct has an impact,

such as an injury, in the forum state, even if the conduct causing that

impact or injury does not occur there. That factor does not exist in the

case before us. Thus, under the analysis of Ford, the specific contacts in

this case were insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction.

Because our courts lack personal jurisdiction over Tanner, I would grant

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the petition for a writ of mandamus. I thus respectfully dissent to

denying it.

As noted in the main opinion, the plaintiff, Richard Terry Cole,

went to a medical facility affiliated with Tanner that was located in

Alabama. Cole was then transported to a Tanner facility in Georgia to

undergo a medical procedure. There is no allegation that any services,

treatment, or conduct that occurred in Alabama was wrongful or tortious.

Instead, Cole alleges that the care he received in Georgia by Tanner and

its agents, including a Georgia licensed physician, was, essentially,

medical malpractice and caused him injury. The complaint does not

suggest that the procedure inflicted Cole with a latent, noninjurious

condition that later caused or manifested into an injury (if that is

possible); rather, the complaint suggests that Cole was immediately

injured during the procedure in Georgia, although the extent of his

injuries may have later increased when he returned to Alabama. 3

3The first amended complaint alleges that, "[s]hortly after
undergoing the Left Heart Catheterization, Mr. Cole began to experience
symptoms of renal damage/failure" and that "[i]t was later determined
that Mr. Cole's subsequent medical treatment was necessary or was
otherwise required as a result of the initial treatment and care he
received."

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Further, because everything relating to the alleged medical malpractice

occurred in Georgia, it would appear to me that Georgia law would govern

Cole's substantive claims. 4

Nevertheless, Cole commenced an action against Tanner in

Alabama. The issue is whether a court in Alabama, the forum state, has

personal jurisdiction to hear a claim against Tanner, which is a Georgia

corporation with its principle place of business located in Georgia.

"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
permits a forum state to subject a nonresident defendant to
its courts only when that defendant has sufficient 'minimum
contacts' with the forum state. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95
(1945). The critical question with regard to the nonresident
defendant's contacts is whether the contacts are such that the
nonresident defendant ' "should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court" ' in the forum state. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, [486], 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d
528 (1985), quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490
(1980)."

Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 730-31 (Ala. 2002).

4To the extent that Alabama law might apply to Cole's claims, it

would appear to have only the most limited application, if at all;
everything Cole alleges went wrong occurred in Georgia. Therefore, for
purposes of this writing, I will assume that Georgia law applies to Cole's
claims.
34
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There are "two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes

called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-

linked) jurisdiction." Ford, 592 U.S. at 358. I agree with the main

opinion that there is no general personal jurisdiction in this case.

Regarding specific personal jurisdiction, this Court has stated:

"The touchstone of specific jurisdiction is whether the
defendant has ' "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State." ' Ford Motor
Co., 592 U.S. at 359, 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283
(1958)). 'This purposeful-availment requirement assures that
a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction as a result of
" 'the unilateral activity of another person or a third person.' " '
Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 731 (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d
528 (1985)). Crucially, specific jurisdiction must be based on
' "the defendant's contacts with the forum state that are
related to the cause of action" ' in the suit at hand, and, though
these contacts ' "need not be continuous and systematic," ' they
must be substantial enough that the defendant could fairly
anticipate a suit in the forum state. Id. at 730 (quoting Ex
parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Ala. 1998)
(Lyons, J., concurring in the result)); see also Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277, 284, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 188 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2014)
(stressing that 'the defendant's suit-related conduct must
create a substantial connection with the forum State'
(emphasis added))."

Pruitt v. AAA Interstate Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1149-50 (Ala.

2022).

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SC-2025-0019

Contacts that can give rise to specific personal jurisdiction are

extensively addressed in the Ford decision. In that case, plaintiffs in two

different states filed defective-product actions related to vehicles

manufactured by Ford Motor Company ("Ford"). Those vehicles had been

designed and built by Ford, and originally purchased, outside the forum

states where the actions were commenced. The plaintiffs were later

injured by alleged defects in the vehicles, and they filed lawsuits in the

forum states. Notably, their injuries occurred in the forum states. Ford

argued that personal jurisdiction was proper in the states where the

vehicles were purchased or designed and manufactured, but not in the

forum states. Before beginning its analysis, the Supreme Court appeared

to summarize its holding as follows: "When a company like Ford serves

a market for a product in a State and that product causes injury in the

State to one of its residents, the State's courts may entertain the

resulting suit." Ford, 592 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added).

As to specific contacts, the Court in Ford stated that, even when a

defendant has taken " 'some act by which [it] purposefully avails itself of

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,' " " 'there

must be "an affiliation between the forum and the underlying

36
SC-2025-0019

controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in

the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's regulation." ' "

Ford, 592 U.S. at 359-60 (citations omitted). The Court also noted that

its decisions "have added that our doctrine similarly provides defendants

with 'fair warning' -- knowledge that 'a particular activity may subject

[it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.' " Ford, 592 U.S. at 360

(citation omitted). Further, the Court stated:

"And this Court has considered alongside defendants'
interests those of the States in relation to each other. One
State's 'sovereign power to try' a suit, we have recognized,
may prevent 'sister States' from exercising their like
authority. The law of specific jurisdiction thus seeks to ensure
that States with 'little legitimate interest' in a suit do not
encroach on States more affected by the controversy."

592 U.S. at 360 (citations omitted).

As to these general issues addressed in Ford, clearly Tanner's

affiliated facilities and operations in Alabama are subject to Alabama

law; however, the medical services it provides in Georgia generally are

not. Further, I question whether Tanner and its agents, while

performing a medical procedure on, and providing treatment to, Cole in

Georgia and while being regulated by Georgia law, had "fair warning"

that they were subject to the jurisdiction of some other state. While it

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SC-2025-0019

would not appear that a simple balancing test as to which state is "more

affected by the controversy" is determinative, clearly the State of Georgia

has the greater interest in hearing a tort action under its law concerning

acts that wholly occurred, and allegedly harmed a person, within its

jurisdiction.

Ford suggested that it could not be sued in the forum states, despite

the fact that it actively sought to serve a market in those states:

"Ford's claim is instead that those activities do not sufficiently
connect to the suits, even though the resident-plaintiffs allege
that Ford cars malfunctioned in the forum States. In Ford's
view, the needed link must be causal in nature: Jurisdiction
attaches 'only if the defendant's forum conduct gave rise to the
plaintiff's claims.' Brief for Petitioner 13 (emphasis in
original). And that rule reduces, Ford thinks, to locating
specific jurisdiction in the State where Ford sold the car in
question, or else the States where Ford designed and
manufactured the vehicle."

Ford, 592 U.S. at 361 (first emphasis added).

In more specifically discussing the required "connection" between a

suit and the forum state for purposes of specific jurisdiction, the Court

rejected the "causation-only" approach suggested by Ford:

"None of our precedents has suggested that only a strict
causal relationship between the defendant's in-state activity
and the litigation will do. As just noted, our most common
formulation of the rule demands that the suit 'arise out of or
relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum.' The first
38
SC-2025-0019

half of that standard asks about causation; but the back half,
after the 'or,' contemplates that some relationships will
support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not
mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the
phrase 'relate to' incorporates real limits, as it must to
adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum. But again,
we have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as
always requiring proof of causation -- i.e., proof that the
plaintiff's claim came about because of the defendant's in-
state conduct. So the case is not over even if, as Ford argues,
a causal test would put jurisdiction in only the States of first
sale, manufacture, and design. A different State's courts may
yet have jurisdiction, because of 'another activity [or]
occurrence' involving the defendant that takes place in the
State."

Ford, 592 U.S. at 362 (citations omitted; last emphasis added).

In illustrating " 'another activity [or] occurrence' involving the

defendant that takes place in the forum State," the Court in Ford noted

caselaw examining defendants' acts of serving the markets in forum

states, but it was careful to note that, in such cases, injuries occurred in

the forum states: "And indeed, this Court has stated that specific

jurisdiction attaches in cases identical to the ones here -- when a company

like Ford serves a market for a product in the forum State and the

product malfunctions there." Ford, 592 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added). It

cited as an example what occurred in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980):

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SC-2025-0019

"In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court held that an
Oklahoma court could not assert jurisdiction over a New York
car dealer just because a car it sold later caught fire in
Oklahoma. 444 U.S., at 295. But in so doing, we contrasted
the dealer's position to that of two other defendants -- Audi,
the car's manufacturer, and Volkswagen, the car's nationwide
importer (neither of which contested jurisdiction):

" '[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or
distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not
simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the
efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve,
directly or indirectly, the market for its product in
[several or all] other States, it is not unreasonable
to subject it to suit in one of those States if its
allegedly defective merchandise has there been the
source of injury to its owner or to others.' Id., at
297.'

"Or said another way, if Audi and Volkswagen's business
deliberately extended into Oklahoma (among other States),
then Oklahoma's courts could hold the companies accountable
for a car's catching fire there -- even though the vehicle had
been designed and made overseas and sold in New York. For,
the Court explained, a company thus 'purposefully avail[ing]
itself' of the Oklahoma auto market 'has clear notice' of its
exposure in that State to suits arising from local accidents
involving its cars. …

"Our conclusion in World-Wide Volkswagen ... has
appeared and reappeared in many cases since. So, for
example, the Court in Keeton[ v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1984),] invoked that part of World-Wide
Volkswagen to show that when a corporation has
'continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it
must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's]
court[s]' to defend actions 'based on' products causing injury
there. ... And in Daimler[ AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014)],
40
SC-2025-0019

we used the Audi/Volkswagen scenario as a paradigm case of
specific jurisdiction (though now naming Daimler, the maker
of Mercedes Benzes). Said the Court, to 'illustrate[]' specific
jurisdiction's 'province[]': A California court would exercise
specific jurisdiction 'if a California plaintiff, injured in a
California accident involving a Daimler-manufactured
vehicle, sued Daimler [in that court] alleging that the vehicle
was defectively designed.' 571 U.S., at 127, n. 5."

Ford, 592 U.S. at 363-64 (emphasis added).

In its examples, the Court looked not only to the defendants' forum-

state conduct in marketing and serving its product, but also to the fact

that the injuries from the alleged out-of-state wrongful conduct by the

defendants actually occurred in the forum state. Its "illustrat[ion]" of

specific jurisdiction's "province" includes the fact that an accident and

injury occurred in the state where the lawsuit was filed. That is readily

possible in a defective-product action -- the product is designed,

manufactured, or sold in one place and then is transferred to another,

where it had been actively marketed, and can then cause an injury

"there." See Sawyer v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 412 So. 3d 603 (Ala.

2024) (holding, under Ford, that there was specific jurisdiction over a tire

company in an action commenced in Alabama when, among other things,

an allegedly defective tire had been purchased in Alabama and had

allegedly caused an accident in Alabama).
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In this case, Tanner's alleged wrongful conduct and Cole's injury

occurred in Georgia, not in Alabama. Under the Supreme Court's

explanation in Ford, while Tanner "serves a market" for medical services

in Alabama, the medical service at issue, the alleged medical malpractice

that occurred during that service, and the resulting injury did not occur

"there." While it is " 'not unreasonable to subject [Tanner] to suit in' " a

state where its alleged malpractice " 'has there been the source of injury,' "

the alleged malpractice and injury in this case occurred in Georgia. Ford,

592 U.S. at 363 (citation omitted). A company purposefully availing itself

of the market for medical services in Alabama " 'has clear notice' of its

exposure in" Alabama "to suits arising from local accidents," but there

was no accident -- misconduct or injury -- that occurred in Alabama in

this case; thus, there was no "clear notice." Id. If Tanner " 'continuously

and deliberately exploited [Alabama's] market,' " it could " 'reasonably

anticipate being haled into' " a court in Alabama only if its actions caused

"injury there," which is not the case. Id. at 364 (citation omitted).

In explaining "why Ford is subject" to the jurisdiction of the forum-

state courts in that case, the Supreme Court first pointed to the business

Ford regularly conducted in those states -- advertising, fostering

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connections to its vehicles' owners, providing the vehicles for sale,

offering services to maintain and repair the vehicles it manufactured, etc.

592 U.S. at 364. It then stated:

"Now turn to how all this [forum-State] conduct relates
to the claims in these cases, brought by state residents in [the
forum States'] courts. Each plaintiff's suit, of course, arises
from a car accident in one of those States. In each complaint,
the resident-plaintiff alleges that a defective Ford vehicle …
caused the crash and resulting harm. And as just described,
Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models
in both States for many years. … In other words, Ford had
systematically served a market in [the forum States] for the
very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and
injured them in those States. So there is a strong 'relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' -- the
'essential foundation' of specific jurisdiction."

Ford, 592 U.S. at 365 (citation omitted; emphasis added). The Court

looked not only to Ford's business conduct related to the forum states,

but also to the fact that the plaintiffs' claims arose from the fact that

accidents and resulting injuries occurred in the forum states. But the

case before us does not arise from misconduct or injury in Alabama.

Tanner "served a market" in Alabama,5 but its services did not go wrong

5The allegations in this case in no way show that Tanner's business

conduct in Alabama was as extensive as Ford's activities recounted in the
Ford decision.

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or injure Cole in that market. Thus, under the analysis in Ford, there is

no "strong relationship" between Tanner, the litigation, and Alabama.

Further, in stressing that "allowing jurisdiction" in the forum states

"treats Ford fairly," the Court noted that Ford enjoyed the benefits and

protections of those forum states' laws, which created "reciprocal

obligations" that the vehicles Ford produced "be safe for [the forum

States'] citizens to use there." 592 U.S. at 367-68 (emphasis added). "An

automaker regularly marketing a vehicle in a State … has 'clear notice'

that it will be subject to jurisdiction in the State's courts when the

product malfunctions there." Id. at 368 (citation omitted; emphasis

added).

In this case, Tanner's affiliate advertised and performed medical

services in Alabama. There may have been a "reciprocal obligation" that

those services in Alabama "be safe" for Alabama citizens "there." But the

medical service in this case did not occur in Alabama, was not made

available to Cole there, did not allegedly go awry there, and did not injure

Cole there. Thus, under these factors, at least under the Ford decision's

analysis, "allowing jurisdiction" of this case in Alabama does not treat

Tanner "fairly."

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The Court in Ford concluded its analysis by discussing that

"principles of 'interstate federalism' " supported the forum states having

jurisdiction over the suits because they had "significant interests at stake

-- 'providing [their] residents with a convenient forum for redressing

injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors,' as well as enforcing their own

safety regulations." Id. at 368 (citations omitted; emphasis added). In

contrast, litigating each action in the state where the vehicle was sold,

that is, where Ford argued that each action should have been

commenced, would involve "all out-of-state parties, an out-of-state

accident, and out-of-state injuries; the suit's only connection with the

State is that a former owner once (many years earlier) bought the car

there. In other words, there is a less significant 'relationship among the

defendant, the forum, and the litigation.' " Id. (citations omitted). In this

case, Alabama's interest in its own regulation of medical services has

little bearing on what occurred in Georgia. This case, commenced in

Alabama, itself involves "an out-of-state" tort, "out-of-state injuries," and

out-of-state law. 6 Principles of interstate federalism do not support

6In Sawyer, this Court, in applying the decision in Ford, noted that

"Alabama has a strong sovereign interest in providing a forum to people
who are injured on its roads and in enforcing its own safety regulations
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maintaining this action in Alabama. Cf. Sawyer, 412 So. 3d at 625

(applying the analysis in Ford and holding that "Alabama has a strong

sovereign interest in providing a forum to people who are injured on its

roads and in enforcing its own safety regulations within its borders"

(emphasis added)).

Ford involves a factually distinguishable scenario, and a key factor

-- that the parties were injured in the forum states -- does not exist here.

It does not appear to me that the Supreme Court was prepared to say

that extensive marketing activity and the servicing of products is alone

sufficient to create specific personal jurisdiction. Instead, the Supreme

Court also pointed to other things that occur in the forum states

indicating that specific jurisdiction exists -- accidents, malfunctions, and

injuries. While Tanner's affiliated facility in Alabama sent Cole to

Georgia for treatment, that was not alleged to be part of the alleged

medical malpractice; there was no wrongdoing in that act. Instead, the

issue is how the subsequent medical procedure in Georgia was

performed. All issues related to that occurred in Georgia. Thus, Tanner's

within its borders." 412 So. 3d at 625 (emphasis added). No such
sovereign interest exists in this case.

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contacts with Alabama were not "substantial enough" that it could fairly

anticipate that the medical services provided directly to Cole in Georgia

would subject it to a suit in Alabama.

I would grant the petition and issue the writ directing the trial

court to dismiss Tanner for lack of personal jurisdiction. 7 I thus

respectfully dissent to denying the petition.

7This pretermits discussion of the remaining issues raised in the

petition.
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. Tanner Medical Center, Inc. ("Tanner"),

petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Randolph

Circuit Court ("the circuit court") to dismiss the medical-malpractice

claims asserted against it by Richard Terry Cole on the basis that the

circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over it or, alternatively, because

venue is improper. Even assuming that the circuit court has jurisdiction

over Tanner, 8 it is my opinion that this medical-malpractice action should

not be tried in Alabama using Georgia's substantive law. The alleged

negligence here is based on the failure to "accurately monitor the

administration of contrast dye and blood thinner" during an

"unnecessarily prolonged" medical procedure that occurred in Georgia.

The alleged malpractice was not a continuing event that started in

Alabama and concluded in Georgia. Rather, it was a one-time, limited

event. The complaint fails to allege how this singular event has any

8I have grave concerns that the actions of an Alabama subsidiary of

Tanner, albeit one with a similar name, which made an initial decision
to transport Cole to Georgia, could create jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation not registered, licensed, or doing business in Alabama,
requiring it to defend a medical-malpractice action in which the alleged
negligence occurred exclusively in Georgia.
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relationship, much less a connection, to Alabama. Further, once the

Georgia physician who allegedly caused the injury was dismissed with

prejudice from this case pursuant to Alabama law, and Tanner remained

the only defendant, proving vicarious liability became difficult, if not

impossible. See University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C. v.

Bush, 638 So. 2d 794, 799 (Ala. 1994) ("Under the doctrine of respondeat

superior, the master cannot be liable unless one of the master's servants

has been found to be negligent."). Medical-malpractice statutes are

highly specific laws, incorporating a distinct legal framework to impose

liability for malpractice actions, including distinct provisions regarding

venue, standards of care, expert requirements, the types and amounts of

damages that can be awarded, and statutes of limitations. To prevail

under these specific statutes, medical negligence must be proven by

similarly situated expert witnesses providing specific testimony to

explain how each defendant failed to comply with the standard of care

applicable to each of them in their respective capacity. Thus, proceeding

in this case by allowing Alabama courts to interpret or apply Georgia's

unique medical-liability act could lead to inconsistent or conflicting

rulings by the circuit court, and even this Court in the event of an appeal.

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Accordingly, I would issue the writ of mandamus directing the circuit

court to dismiss this action. It seems clear from the briefs in this case

that the matter must ultimately be tried in Georgia. That is where the

malpractice is alleged to have occurred, where the attending physician is

licensed and resides, where records and witnesses are located, and where

any alleged vicarious liability on the part of Tanner transpired. Thus, to

burden Alabama with the litigation of this case will be a waste of judicial

resources. At this stage of the litigation, we have a chance to fix the legal

and administrative problems with this case while the applicable statute-

of-limitations period is presumably still open, witnesses are available,

and the incident is still fresh. Delaying the ultimate disposition of this

case fails to appropriately serve the ends of justice to allow the injured

party his day in a court of competent jurisdiction. Rather than untangle

it, I would cut the Gordian knot, admit the inevitable, and direct the

circuit court to dismiss the case.

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