Ex parte Devon McGuire and Spencer Collier PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Faya Rose Toure v. Spencer Collier) (Dallas Circuit Court: CV-19-900204).

Rel: June 27, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025

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SC-2024-0419
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Ex parte Devon McGuire and Spencer Collier

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Faya Rose Toure

v.

Spencer Collier et al.)

(Dallas Circuit Court: CV-19-900204)

STEWART, Chief Justice.
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Devon McGuire and Spencer Collier have petitioned this Court for

a writ of mandamus directing the Dallas Circuit Court ("the trial court")

to enter a summary judgment on the basis that the claims asserted

against them by Faya Rose Toure are barred by immunity. For the

following reasons, we grant the petition and issue a writ directing the

trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of McGuire and Collier.

Background

On July 2, 2019, Toure sued the City of Selma ("the City"); Collier,

the Chief of Police for the City; and McGuire, a police officer for the City,

in relation to her arrest for charges of fourth-degree theft of property and

attempting to elude. Toure asserted against McGuire and Collier

numerous claims, including assault and battery; false arrest; unlawful

imprisonment; invasion of privacy; "negligence, carelessness, and

unskillfulness"; wantonness; abuse of legal process; "unreasonable

seizure"; and "defamation/libel." Toure asserted against the City claims

of negligent, careless, and "unskillful" hiring, training, and/or

supervision and "custom of police abuse." Toure sought compensatory

damages in the amount of $1,000,000 and punitive damages in the

amount of $3,000,000.

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McGuire, Collier, and the City ("the defendants") filed an answer

and asserted numerous affirmative defenses, including peace-officer and

State-agent immunity. The defendants later filed a motion for a summary

judgment based on peace-officer immunity under § 6-5-338, Ala. Code

1975, and State-agent immunity, among other grounds. The defendants

submitted in support of their motion deposition testimony from McGuire,

Collier, and Toure, along with an incident report, an arrest report, and

video from McGuire's body camera of the incident underlying Toure's

claims.

The evidence submitted by the defendants showed the following: On

July 16, 2018, McGuire was employed as a police officer for the City and

was traveling in an unmarked patrol vehicle owned by the City. McGuire

observed Toure remove a campaign sign from property adjacent to

Tabernacle Baptist Church. McGuire witnessed Toure place the sign in

her vehicle and drive off. McGuire lost sight of Toure's vehicle, but when

he spotted her again later in her vehicle, he activated his patrol vehicle's

lights, pulled his patrol vehicle alongside Toure's vehicle, and asked her

to return the campaign sign she had removed. Toure told McGuire to "go

to hell" and drove off, running a red light in the process.

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According to McGuire, he then initiated a traffic stop. Toure exited

her vehicle and approached McGuire's patrol vehicle. McGuire exited his

patrol vehicle to retrieve his body camera from the backseat. At that

point, Toure reentered her vehicle and again drove off. McGuire activated

his patrol vehicle's siren and his body camera, requested additional

officers' assistance, and pursued Toure, who pulled her vehicle over after

driving approximately three and a half blocks.

The ensuing interaction was captured on the body-camera video

that was submitted with the defendants' summary-judgment motion and

is contained as an exhibit to McGuire and Collier's mandamus petition.

The video shows McGuire approach Toure, who was sitting in her vehicle.

A girl, identified as Toure's granddaughter, was sitting in the passenger

seat. McGuire asked Toure to provide him with her identification no less

than eight times before she provided it. Meanwhile, several more police

officers arrived on scene. Throughout the interaction, Toure can be seen

purportedly recording the surrounding scene with her cellular telephone,

and she made numerous statements indicating her dissatisfaction with

officers of the Selma Police Department choosing to detain her. McGuire

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stepped away to radio Toure's driver's license number in to dispatch, and

then he told a group of people on the sidewalk to back up.

After McGuire had walked away, Toure exited her vehicle and

walked around while recording and commenting to the officers and to the

crowd with statements like: "You would think I committed a murder" and

"Do y'all see all these cops?" Toure can also be heard telling her

granddaughter to go around the corner to an office to ask someone to call

Toure's husband. Approximately five minutes elapsed between Toure's

pulling her vehicle over and McGuire's advising her that she was under

arrest. While McGuire attempted to place handcuffs on Toure, she

continued to turn and resist the handcuffs, and she asked McGuire to

handcuff her with her wrists in the front of her body because her wrist

had previously been broken. McGuire refused, eventually got the

handcuffs secured behind Toure's back, and placed Toure in the back of

a police vehicle.

In Toure's deposition, she acknowledged that she had removed a

political sign that did not belong to her from public property. Toure also

acknowledged in her testimony that she had driven three blocks after

realizing McGuire was a police officer.

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Collier's deposition testimony indicated that Selma Police

Department policy requires officers to handcuff a person upon arrest

before transporting them and that there is no policy prohibiting

handcuffs behind the back, regardless of the circumstances. Collier also

testified that Selma Police Department policy requires officers to use

body cameras during traffic stops or calls for services and that McGuire

had complied with that policy by activating his body camera during his

pursuit of Toure. Collier specifically testified that he did "not disagree

with Detective McGuire's actions" and "did not see anything that

[McGuire] did that violated policy or a good practice of a law enforcement

officer." When Toure asked Collier if he really believed that a person

stopping in three and a half blocks was attempting to elude, Collier

replied that he had actually written that law in Alabama and that this

scenario was a "textbook case."

Collier testified that the Selma Police Department had held a press

conference relating to Toure's arrest in response to multiple inquiries

from different media outlets and to respond to a press conference that

Toure's husband had held regarding the incident. Collier testified that

both he and the detective division of the police department had authority

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to release mug shots to the media, and he could not recall who had

released Toure's mug shot.

In opposition to the defendants' summary-judgment motion, Toure

presented affidavit testimony from Samuel Coleman, a deacon at

Tabernacle Baptist Church, stating that he had observed Toure remove

the campaign sign from the street side of the sidewalk that was not on

church property. Toure also submitted a copy of Local Ordinance, § 6-83,

which prohibits the posting of political signs and posters to utility poles

or other structures on public property or rights-of-way.

Toure also submitted her own affidavit in which she explained that

she had removed the sign, which she believed had been illegally placed

on public property. She stated that, when McGuire initially spoke to her,

he was not in uniform and was in an unmarked police vehicle, she did not

know who he was, and had felt "intimidated" by him. She explained that

when he had later attempted to pull her over, she had not attempted to

elude, but had believed that she was facing possible harassment, and,

thus, had traveled several blocks to a location where witnesses were

present. Toure also submitted an affidavit of her husband, who had

appeared at the scene of her arrest. Toure also submitted a copy of an

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article from the Selma Times Journal regarding her arrest and a copy of

the front page of the Selma Times Journal with a headline regarding

Toure's theft charges and a picture of her mug shot.

The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the City

but denied the motion for a summary judgment as to McGuire and

Collier. Collier and McGuire then petitioned this Court for a writ of

mandamus.

Standard of Review

A petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate method by

which an appellate court may review the denial of a summary-judgment

motion that was premised on the defense of immunity. Ex parte Nall, 879

So. 2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003) (citing Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala.

2000)). To obtain the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, the

petitioner must demonstrate: " '(1) a clear legal right to the order sought;

(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by

a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the

properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' " Id. (quoting Ex parte BOC

Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).

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In reviewing the denial of a summary-judgment motion based on

peace-officer and State-agent immunity, this Court first considers the

evidence surrounding the activities of the defendant in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff. If the defendant presented evidence

demonstrating that he or she was engaged in conduct that would entitle

the defendant to immunity, we then consider whether the plaintiff met

his or her burden of demonstrating by substantial evidence the

applicability one of the exceptions to State-agent immunity set forth in

Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000)(plurality

opinion)(setting forth a restatement of State-agent immunity that was

adopted by a majority of the Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178

(Ala. 2000)). See Ex parte Utilities Bd. of Foley, 265 So. 3d 1273, 1281

(Ala. 2018); Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006);

and Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002).

Discussion

Collier and McGuire argue, as they did in support of their

summary-judgment motion, that Toure's claims against them are barred

by the immunity afforded to municipal peace officers by § 6-5-338(a), Ala.

Code 1975, and by the doctrine of State-agent immunity, as restated in

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Ex parte Cranman. Section 6-5-338(a) provides peace officers with

"immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in

performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his

or her law enforcement duties." See also Ex parte Tucker, 303 So. 3d 467,

472 (Ala. 2019)(explaining that immunity extends " 'to employees of

municipalities in the same manner that immunity applies to employees

of the State' " (citation omitted)). "The restatement of State-agent

immunity as set out by this Court in Ex parte Cranman, supra, governs

the determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity

under § 6-5-338(a)." Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 292

(Ala. 2012)(citing Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d 895, 904 (Ala.

2005)).

As relevant here, " '[a] State agent shall be immune from civil

liability in his or her personal capacity' " if his or her conduct involved,

among other things, " '(2) exercising his or her judgment in the

administration of a department or agency of government, including, but

not limited to … (d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising

personnel' " or " ' "(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the

criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement

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officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace

officers under circumstances entitling such officers to immunity

pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975." ' " Ex parte City of

Montgomery, 99 So. 3d at 292 (quoting Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at

405, and Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala.

2006))(emphasis omitted).1

As mentioned above, after the defendant successfully demonstrates

engagement in conduct that would entitle the defendant to immunity, the

burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate by substantial evidence

the applicability of one of the two following exceptions to State-agent

immunity:

" '(1) … the Constitution or laws of the United States, or
the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations of
this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of
regulating the activities of a governmental agency require
otherwise; or

" '(2) … the State agent acts willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the law.' "

1In Hollis, this Court expanded category 4 of the Cranman
restatement to encompass the peace-officer immunity set forth in § 6-5-
338(a).
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Suttles v. Roy, 75 So. 3d 90, 94 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Ex parte Cranman,

792 So. 2d at 405).

McGuire and Collier (insofar as his liability is premised upon

McGuire's actions), undisputedly both qualify as peace officers

performing law-enforcement duties at the time of the conduct underlying

Toure's claims against them. McGuire and Collier presented undisputed

evidence indicating that McGuire witnessed Toure remove a campaign

sign that did not belong to her, from property that, likewise, did not

belong to her, and that, when McGuire attempted to conduct a traffic

stop, Toure drove approximately three and a half blocks despite knowing

that McGuire was a police officer. McGuire arrested Toure for fourth-

degree theft of property and attempting to elude a police officer. 2 Without

question, by investigating Toure and attempting to arrest her for

potential crimes he had witnessed, McGuire was performing a

2See § 13A-8-5(a), Ala. Code 1975 (defining fourth-degree theft of

property as: "The theft of property which does not exceed five hundred
dollars ($500) in value and which is not taken from the person of another
…."); and § 13A-10-52(b), Ala. Code 1975 ("It shall be unlawful for a
person while operating a motor vehicle on a street, road, alley, or highway
in this state, to intentionally flee or attempt to elude a law enforcement
officer after having received a signal from the officer to bring the vehicle
to a stop.").
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"discretionary function within the line and scope of his … law

enforcement duties," § 6-5-338(a), and was " ' "exercising judgment in the

enforcement of the criminal laws of the State." ' " Ex parte City of

Montgomery, 99 So. 3d at 292 (citations omitted). See Downing v. City of

Dothan, 59 So. 3d 16, 20 (Ala. 2010)(holding that police officers met

initial burden of showing application of immunity to their actions

because, in deciding whether to arrest someone, they "were engaged in a

law-enforcement function for which State-agent immunity would be

available"); Ex parte City of Tuskegee, 932 So. 2d at 906 (holding that

officers were "entitled to immunity because they were engaged in an

'arrest or attempted arrest,' which is a discretionary function requiring

the exercise of judgment"); Swan v. City of Hueytown, 920 So. 2d 1075,

1079 (Ala. 2005) (explaining that "arrests and attempted arrests," which

require officers to exercise judgment, "clothe[] the officer in State-agent

immunity"); Telfare v. City of Huntsville, 841 So. 2d 1222, 1228 (Ala.

2002)("Generally, arrests and attempted arrests are classified as

discretionary functions."); and Ex parte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244, 248 (Ala.

2000)(plurality opinion)(holding that arresting a driver "for refusing to

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comply with a lawful order or direction of a police officer" is "clearly a

discretionary function").

Furthermore, to the extent that Toure's claims against Collier are

based on his own conduct as chief of police, Collier is shielded by category

(2) of the Cranman restatement -- exercising judgment in the

administration of the police department in allocating resources and in

hiring, firing, and supervising police officers.

Because McGuire and Collier presented evidence in support of their

summary-judgment motion demonstrating that McGuire and Collier

were engaged in conduct that would entitle them to peace-officer and

State-agent immunity, the burden shifted to Toure to demonstrate, by

substantial evidence, that one of the two exceptions to that immunity

applied to McGuire's and Collier's conduct underlying any of the claims

that she asserted against them.

Toure argues the applicability of both exceptions. Toure first

asserts that McGuire's and Collier's actions violated her constitutional

right to free speech because, she says, she "had a First Amendment right

to remove the sign." Toure's brief at 12. Toure, however, did not identify

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any authority indicating that their conduct violated the United States

Constitution.

Toure also argues that McGuire and Collier " 'act[ed] willfully,

maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond [their] ... authority, or

under a mistaken interpretation of the law.' " Suttles, 75 So. 3d at 94

(citation omitted). Toure contends that they "failed to discharge their

duties pursuant to detail[ed] rules and regulations. The officers failed to

follow clear departmental protocol in investigating an[d] arresting

[Toure]." Toure's brief at 29-30. Toure does not identify what "clear

departmental protocol" McGuire or Collier failed to follow, but she

asserts that there was no investigation and that McGuire failed to timely

activate his body camera.

This Court has explained that if an arrest is made with at least

arguable probable cause, "we cannot say that [the officer] acted 'willfully,

maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith' so as to remove him from the

umbrella of State-agent immunity afforded him under Ex parte

Cranman." Ex parte Harris, 216 So. 3d 1201, 1214 (Ala. 2016).

" '[P]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the

officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonable trustworthy

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information are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the

belief that an offense has been or is being committed.' " Harris, 216 So.

3d at 1213 (quoting Walker v. City of Huntsville, 62 So. 3d 474, 492 (Ala.

2010))(discussing false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims). "Arguable

probable cause exists 'when an officer makes an arrest lacking probable

cause if officers of reasonable competence in the same circumstances and

with the same knowledge would disagree as to whether probable cause

existed.' " Id. (quoting Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So. 2d 1168, 1179

(Ala. 2003)).

As explained above, the evidence McGuire and Collier presented

established that McGuire had witnessed Toure take a sign that did not

belong to her, which, they testified, constituted fourth-degree theft of

property. After Toure ignored McGuire's request that Toure return the

sign, McGuire attempted to initiate a traffic stop, which devolved into an

arrest after Toure continued driving her vehicle for over three blocks

before pulling her vehicle cover -- circumstances that Collier testified

constituted a "textbook case" of attempting to elude. Collier further

testified that he did "not disagree with Detective McGuire's actions" and

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"did not see anything that [McGuire] did that violated policy or a good

practice of a law enforcement officer."

Toure argues that Local Ordinance, § 6-83, implicitly

decriminalized her conduct because, she says, she removed what she

claims was an illegally placed campaign sign from public property and

had no intent to keep the sign. 3 However, whether Toure believed that

she was permitted to remove the sign, whether anyone else has been

arrested for such an offense, and whether Toure is ultimately found

guilty of the crimes for which she was arrested are irrelevant to the

inquiry here: whether McGuire had arguable probable cause to arrest

her. See Harris, 216 So. 3d at 1213 (citing Dixon v. State, 588 So. 2d 903

(Ala. 1991))("[A] showing of probable cause does not require evidence or

information sufficient to support a conviction."). Because McGuire and

3The ordinance, by its title, applies to "[s]igns and posters attached

to utility poles and structures on public property or right-of-way," and
the ordinance makes it "unlawful for any person to affix, post, paint, tack,
attach or support" certain signs "to any telephone or utility pole, tree,
pipe, or other structure, support, or object on, within, upon or over any
public street, sidewalk, right-of-way or public property in the City of
Selma." It is not clear that the ordinance even applies to signs simply
placed in grass and not affixed to objects. Furthermore, it specifically
authorizes only the police chief, his staff, the code-enforcement
department, and the city council to remove an unlawful sign.
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Collier presented evidence demonstrating that McGuire had probable

cause, or at least arguable probable cause, to arrest Toure, and because

Toure failed to present substantial evidence establishing otherwise, "we

cannot say that he acted 'willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad

faith' so as to remove him from the umbrella of State-agent immunity

afforded him under Ex parte Cranman." Harris, 216 So. 3d at 1214.

Accordingly, McGuire and Collier are entitled to immunity on Toure's

claims of negligence, wantonness, assault and battery, false arrest,

unlawful imprisonment, invasion of privacy, abuse of process, and

"unreasonable seizure" -- all of which are based on alleged conduct that

occurred during the course of Toure's arrest. 4

4Toure also presents allegations and arguments in her response
brief relating to malicious prosecution, but she did not assert that claim
in her complaint. Instead, Toure asserted abuse-of-process claims, and
such a claim is distinct from a malicious-prosecution claim. See Willis v.
Parker, 814 So. 2d 857, 865 (Ala. 2001) (quoting C.C. & J., Inc. v. Hagood,
711 So. 2d 947, 950 (Ala. 1998))(emphasis omitted)(" 'Malicious
prosecution concerns the wrongful issuance of process; abuse of process
concerns the wrongful use of process after it has been issued.' "). Toure
does not address her abuse-of-process claims against McGuire and
Collier, and, in any event, Toure did not present substantial evidence
establishing that McGuire's or Collier's conduct fell within an exception
to immunity. Thus, McGuire and Collier are also immune from Toure's
abuse-of-process claims.
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Toure also asserted defamation and libel claims against McGuire

and Collier. It appears that Toure bases those claims on Collier's decision

to call "a press conference to defame and portray [Toure] as a 'criminal'

to the public" and on his alleged decision to provide a mug shot to the

local press. Toure's brief at 16. Toure alleges, for instance, that Collier

incorrectly informed the press that she had reached speeds of 50 miles

per hour while attempting to elude McGuire -- a claim she denies. Toure

asserts that McGuire's and Collier's "actions were clearly personally and

politically motivated." Toure's brief at 26. Collier, however, testified that

his decision to call a press conference was because of the public interest

in the case, which included numerous requests for information from

various media outlets. The decision to call a press conference and release

information about the case concerned Collier's judgment as police chief

regarding the administration of his department. Toure, however, did not

provide substantial evidence demonstrating that Collier's decision to call

a press conference or that any of the statements made by Collier or

McGuire concerning the incident were made willfully, maliciously,

fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority. Accordingly, Toure did

not present substantial evidence demonstrating that McGuire's and

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Collier's conduct fell within an exception to immunity, and the trial court

should have entered a summary judgment on Toure's claims of

defamation and libel as well.

Conclusion

McGuire and Collier presented evidence in support of their

summary-judgment motion demonstrating that they were engaged in

conduct that would entitle them to peace-officer and State-agent

immunity in relation to Toure's claims against them. Because Toure

failed to present substantial evidence establishing that McGuire's or

Collier's conduct fell within one of the exceptions to that immunity, the

trial court should have entered a summary judgment in McGuire's and

Collier's favor. Accordingly, we grant McGuire and Collier's petition and

issue a writ directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment on the

basis of immunity in favor of McGuire and Collier. See § 6-5-338.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, Cook, McCool, and Lewis,

JJ., concur.

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