Ex parte GBC International Bank PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Michael Straus v. GBC International Bank) (Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-24-901877).

Rel: June 27, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

SC-2024-0778
_________________________

Ex parte GBC International Bank

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Michael Straus

v.

GBC International Bank)

(Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-24-901877)

BRYAN, Justice.

GBC International Bank ("GBC"), a California corporation,

petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Jefferson
SC-2024-0778

Circuit Court ("the circuit court") to dismiss, for lack of personal

jurisdiction, a complaint filed by Michael Straus. For the reasons

explained below, we grant GBC's petition and issue the writ.

Background

On May 10, 2023, Straus wired $60,000 to a bank account

maintained by GBC and owned by Apex Oil and Gas Trading, LLC

("Apex"). According to Straus, Apex failed to provide the services Straus

had paid for and then "withdrew the funds from its account with GBC

and disappeared, absconding with Straus'[s] money." In November 2023,

GBC informed Apex that it had closed the account at issue and had

severed its relationship with Apex.

Straus commenced this action against GBC in May 2024, asserting

claims of negligence and wantonness. Straus alleged that GBC had

closed Apex's account because "it knew that Apex was engaged in fraud

or other criminal activities facilitated by GBC." According to Straus,

"[o]n its own website, GBC [had] recognize[d] its obligations under the

Patriot Act to undertake such due diligence and investigation as might

be needed in order to prevent exactly the kind of theft that occurred here."

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GBC filed a motion to dismiss Straus's complaint, arguing that the

circuit court lacked either general or specific personal jurisdiction over it.

GBC attached to its motion an affidavit executed by Richard Holmes, its

executive vice president and chief financial officer. Straus submitted a

response to GBC's motion to dismiss, along with a "declaration" that

Straus had executed. GBC submitted a reply to Straus's response. On

October 17, 2024, the circuit court entered an order denying GBC's

motion to dismiss. GBC's mandamus petition followed.

Standard of Review

" ' "A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy, and is appropriate when the petitioner
can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought;
(2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the
lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the
properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex
parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 153, 156
(Ala. 2000)." '

"Ex parte Gulf Health Hosps., Inc., 321 So. 3d 629, 632 (Ala.
2020)(quoting Ex parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272
(Ala. 2001)).

" ' "[A] petition for a writ of mandamus
is the proper device by which to
challenge the denial of a motion to
dismiss for lack of in personam
jurisdiction. See Ex parte McInnis, 820
So. 2d 795 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte Paul
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Maclean Land Servs., Inc., 613 So. 2d
1284, 1286 (Ala. 1993). ' "An appellate
court considers de novo a trial court's
judgment on a party's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction." ' Ex parte Lagrone, 839
So. 2d 620, 623 (Ala. 2002)(quoting
Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729
(Ala. 2002)). Moreover, '[t]he plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the court's
personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.' Daynard v. Ness, Motley,
Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A.,
290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002)."

" 'Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker &
Hutchings, P.C., 866 So. 2d 519, 525 (Ala. 2003).

" ' " 'In considering a Rule 12(b)(2),
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for
want of personal jurisdiction, a court
must consider as true the allegations of
the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco &
Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996),
and Cable/Home Communication Corp.
v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d
829 (11th Cir. 1990), and "where the
plaintiff's complaint and the
defendant's affidavits conflict, the ...
court must construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff."
Robinson, 74 F.3d at 255 (quoting
Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514
(11th Cir. 1990)).' "

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" 'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc.,
853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002)(quoting Ex parte
McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).
However, if the defendant makes a prima facie
evidentiary showing that the Court has no
personal jurisdiction, "the plaintiff is then
required to substantiate the jurisdictional
allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other
competent proof, and he may not merely reiterate
the factual allegations in the complaint."
Mercantile Capital, LP v. Federal Transtel, Inc.,
193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002)(citing
Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See also
Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D. 471,
474-75 (D. Del. 1995)("When a defendant files a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2), and supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those affidavits
with his own affidavits or other competent
evidence in order to survive the motion.")(citing
Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts,
Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984)).'

"Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229-30
(Ala. 2004)."

Ex parte Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., [Ms. SC-2024-0608, Mar.

21, 2025] ____ So. 3d ____, ____ (Ala. 2025).

Analysis

The parties agree that Alabama courts do not have general personal

jurisdiction over GBC. Thus, the only issue presented is whether the

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circuit court has specific personal jurisdiction over GBC. In Ex parte

Alamo Title Co., 128 So. 3d 700, 709-10 (Ala. 2013), this Court stated:

"Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., permits Alabama courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

" '(b) Basis for Out-of-State Service. An
appropriate basis exists for service of process
outside of this state upon a person or entity in any
action in this state when the person or entity has
such contacts with this state that the prosecution
of the action against the person or entity in this
state is not inconsistent with the constitution of
this state or the Constitution of the United States
....'

"Regarding Rule 4.2(b), this Court has said:

" 'In accordance with the plain language of
Rule 4.2, both before and after the 2004
amendment, Alabama's long-arm rule consistently
has been interpreted by this Court to extend the
jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the permissible
limits of due process. Duke v. Young, 496 So. 2d
37 (Ala. 1986); DeSotacho, Inc. v. Valnit Indus.,
Inc., 350 So. 2d 447 (Ala. 1977). As this Court
reiterated in Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 802
(Ala. 2001)(quoting Sudduth v. Howard, 646 So. 2d
664, 667 (Ala. 1994)), and even more recently in
Hiller Investments Inc. v. Insultech Group, Inc.,
957 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006): "Rule 4.2, Ala.
R. Civ. P., extends the personal jurisdiction of the
Alabama courts to the limit of due process under
the federal and state constitutions." (Emphasis
added.)'

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"Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So. 3d 635, 643 (Ala. 2009). See also
Ex parte McNeese Title[, LLC], 82 So. 3d [670,] 673 [(Ala.
2001)].

" ' "Two types of contacts can form
a basis for personal jurisdiction:
general contacts and specific contacts.
General contacts, which give rise to
general personal jurisdiction, consist of
the defendant's contacts with the
forum state that are unrelated to the
cause of action and that are both
'continuous and systematic.'
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9, 415,
104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984);
[citations omitted]. Specific contacts,
which give rise to specific jurisdiction,
consist of the defendant's contacts with
the forum state that are related to the
cause of action. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-75, 105
S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985).
Although the related contacts need not
be continuous and systematic, they
must rise to such a level as to cause the
defendant to anticipate being haled
into court in the forum state. Id."

" 'Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263,
1266 (Ala. 1998)(Lyons, J., concurring in the
result). Furthermore, this Court has held that, for
specific in personam jurisdiction, there must exist
"a clear, firm nexus between the acts of the
defendant and the consequences complained of."
Duke v. Young, 496 So. 2d 37, 39 (Ala. 1986). See
also Ex parte Kamilewicz, 700 So. 2d 340, 345 n.2
(Ala. 1997).
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SC-2024-0778

" 'In the case of either general in personam
jurisdiction or specific in personam jurisdiction,
"[t]he 'substantial connection' between the
defendant and the forum state necessary for a
finding of minimum contacts must come about by
an action of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State." Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112,
107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987). This
purposeful-availment requirement assures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction as a
result of " 'the unilateral activity of another person
or a third person.' " Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475,
105 S. Ct. 2174, quoting Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417, 104
S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984).

" 'Only after such minimum contacts have
been established does a court then consider those
contacts in the light of other factors -- such as the
burden on the defendant of litigating in the forum
state and the forum state's interest in adjudicating
the dispute, Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77, 105
S. Ct. 2174 -- to determine whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant comports with " 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.' " Brooks v.
Inlow, 453 So. 2d 349, 351 (Ala. 1984), quoting
International Shoe [Co. v. Washington], 326 U.S.
[310] at 316, 66 S. Ct. 154 [(1945)]. See also
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77, 105 S. Ct. 2174.'

"Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d [726,] 730-31 [(Ala. 2002)].

"A defendant is constitutionally amenable to a forum's
specific jurisdiction if it possesses sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum to satisfy due-process requirements
and if the forum's exercise of jurisdiction comports with
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' "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." '
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66
S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278 (1940)). See Ex
parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 78 So. 3d 959, 972 (Ala.
2011)(quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 802-03
(2001)). This two-part test embodies the controlling due-
process principle that a defendant must have 'fair warning'
that a particular activity may subject it to the jurisdiction of
a foreign sovereign. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). See Ex
parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 78 So. 3d at 970."

In its order denying GBC's motion to dismiss, the circuit court

concluded that, in viewing Straus's factual allegations as true, GBC had

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in

Alabama through "affirmative communications concerning a federal

statute of nationwide coverage, [namely, the USA PATRIOT ACT,] the

violation of which[,] by definition[,] would give rise to a claim in

Alabama."1 Specifically, the circuit court noted Straus's allegations that,

when choosing to wire money to Apex's account, he had relied on the

following statement appearing on GBC's website:

1In deciding this mandamus petition, we do not intimate that a
private right of action may exist for alleged violations of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001), also known as the "USA PATRIOT Act."
9
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"Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT ACT requires all
financial institutions to obtain, verify, and record information
that identifies each person who opens an account or changes
an existing account. This federal requirement applies to all
new customers and current customers. This information is
used to assist the United States government in the fight
against the funding of terrorism and money-laundering
activities."

The circuit court determined that, "[o]n its face, this meets the due

process tests for specific jurisdiction under both the U.S. and Alabama

Constitutions."

Among other cases, GBC cites Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler

Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 876 So. 2d 459 (Ala. 2003), in support of its

argument that the circuit court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over

it. In Ex parte Troncalli, a plaintiff wanted to purchase a certain type of

truck from an Alabama dealer, but the Alabama dealer did not have one.

Through a computer database maintained by the truck manufacturer,

the Alabama dealer located a Georgia dealer with that type of truck, and

the plaintiff paid the Alabama dealer for the truck. In turn, the Alabama

dealer paid the Georgia dealer. After the purchase of the truck, the

plaintiff discovered that the truck had been wrecked and sued both

dealers in Alabama.

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The Georgia dealer argued that the trial court did not have personal

jurisdiction over it; the trial court denied the Georgia dealer's motion to

dismiss. In considering the issue of specific personal jurisdiction raised

in the Georgia dealer's mandamus petition to this Court, we stated, in

relevant part:

"Of particular relevance is whether the plaintiff
initiated the sale or contact. See Madison Consulting Group
v. South Carolina, 752 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1985); CBP Res.,
Inc. v. Ingredient Res. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1106 (M.D.N.C.
1996); Regent Lighting Corp. v. American Lighting Concept,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 705 (M.D.N.C. 1997)('the contacts to be
considered for purposes of personal jurisdiction are those
actually generated by Defendants, not those created by the
unilateral acts of Plaintiff'); Wells American Corp. v.
Sunshine Electronics, 717 F. Supp. 1121, 1123 (D.S.C. 1989);
American Stair Corp. v. Renata Constr. Co., 625 F. Supp. 136
(N.D. Ill. 1985).

"Thus, something more than an isolated contact
initiated by an in-state plaintiff is required to satisfy the
'purposeful-availment' prong of the due-process analysis.
'Something more' might involve 'prior negotiations and
contemplated future consequences, along with ... the parties'
actual course of dealing.' Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 463, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528
(1985)(emphasis added). 'Something more' might be found
'where the defendant "deliberately" has engaged in significant
activities within [Alabama] ... or has created "continuing
obligations" between himself and residents of [Alabama].' 471
U.S. at 475-76, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (emphasis added).

"[The plaintiff] argues that the 'something more' in this
action is the use of the 'computer database locator,' which,
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[the plaintiff] contends, 'allows other Chrysler dealers to know
[the Georgia dealer's] inventory for the purposes of making a
sale to [their] customers.' [The plaintiff]'s brief, at 19. Use of
this database, [the plaintiff] contends, was an 'act[] made by
[the Georgia dealer] purposefully directed to Alabama
entities.' Id. at 20. We disagree.

"This Court has stated that ' "evidence of mere
placement of advertisements in nationally distributed
paper[s] or journals does not rise to the level of purposeful
contact with a forum required by the Constitution in order to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the advertiser." ' Elliott v.
Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 732 (Ala. 2002)(quoting Federated
Rural Elec. Ins. Co. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d 1302,
1305 (10th Cir. 1994)). In such a case, the advertiser 'cannot
be said to have purposefully directed his listing specifically at
one state.' Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 732.

" 'Internet advertising over a web site falls under the
same rubric as advertising in a national publication.'
Christopher E. Friel, Notes and Comments, Downloading a
Defendant: Is Categorizing Internet Contacts a Departure
from the Minimum Contacts Test? 4 Roger Williams U.L. Rev.
293, 308 (1998). This is especially true where the Web site is
'passive,' that is, where the site serves 'as little more than an
electronic billboard for the posting of information.' Butler v.
Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d [1261,] 1268 [(N.D. Ala.
2000)]."

Ex parte Troncalli, 876 So. 2d at 465.

This Court's decision in Ex parte Troncalli was also noted in Ex

parte AutoSource Motors, LLC, 156 So. 3d 397 (Ala. 2014). In Ex parte

AutoSource Motors, the plaintiff saw an advertisement for an automobile

on the website of AutoSource Motors, LLC ("AutoSource"), a Utah
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company. The plaintiff contacted AutoSource about the automobile and

was allegedly told that the automobile had been rebuilt and could be

titled in Alabama. After traveling to Utah to purchase the automobile,

the plaintiff attempted to title it in Alabama. The plaintiff then

discovered that the title for the automobile was a junk title -- not a

salvage title -- and that, therefore, she would never be able to title it in

Alabama. She sued AutoSource in Alabama, and AutoSource moved to

dismiss the complaint, arguing that the trial court lacked personal

jurisdiction over it. After the trial court denied the motion to dismiss,

AutoSource petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.

Regarding the issue of specific personal jurisdiction, this Court

stated, in relevant part:

"AutoSource's affidavit, by and through its then
president, … established that AutoSource's advertisement of
the … automobile on its Web site did not constitute a
purposeful contact with Alabama because, like an
advertisement placed in a nationally delivered newspaper or
journal, it was not directed at Alabama specifically and the
advertisement was passive in nature. Additionally,
AutoSource's affidavit established that the sale of the
[automobile] to [the plaintiff] was a single, isolated contact
with an Alabama resident, which was initiated by the
Alabama resident rather than AutoSource. AutoSource's
affidavit also established that its only contact with Alabama
was a telephone call initiated by [the plaintiff]. Furthermore,
AutoSource's affidavit established that it is not registered to
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do business in Alabama; that it is not required to pay taxes in
Alabama; that it owns no property or has no assets in
Alabama; that it does not maintain an office in Alabama; that
it does not have any employees in Alabama; that it does not
have a telephone listing in Alabama; and that, before the sale
to [the plaintiff] of the [automobile], it had never knowingly
sold, marketed, advertised, or solicited the sale of any goods
or services to any person or entity in or from Alabama.
Accordingly, based on the principles of law set forth in Ex
parte Merches, [151 So. 3d 1075 (Ala. 2014)], we conclude that
in [its president]'s affidavit AutoSource made a prima facie
showing that it had not purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within Alabama and, thus,
that AutoSource did not have the minimum contacts
necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Alabama.
See id."

Ex parte AutoSource Motors, 156 So. 3d at 406-07.

Similarly, in this case, in support of its motion to dismiss, GBC

produced an affidavit executed by Richard Holmes, its executive vice

president and chief financial officer. Holmes averred:

"1. GBC … is a financial institution with its
headquarters [in] Los Angeles, [California]. The business is
incorporated in California and maintains its principal place of
business in California. [GBC] has never been incorporated in
Alabama nor has it ever maintained its principal place of
business within the State of Alabama.

"2. GBC … has never been registered or qualified to do
business in Alabama. It has never engaged in soliciting
deposits from the state. It has never maintained a Registered
Agent for service of process within the state and has never
consented to personal jurisdiction in any courts within the
State of Alabama. [GBC] does not own any real estate,
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personal property, or other assets within the State of Alabama
and has never maintained any telephone, computer, server, or
other electronic equipment within the State of Alabama. It
currently has no deposit accounts for residents of the State of
Alabama. GBC … has never paid any taxes within the state,
has never engaged in any state-specific targeted marketing or
advertising towards consumers in Alabama, and has never
purchased television or radio advertisements to market
towards residents of the State of Alabama."

Like the defendant's affidavit in Ex parte AutoSource Motors,

Holmes's affidavit in this case "made a prima facie showing that [GBC]

had not purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities

within Alabama and, thus, that [GBC] did not have the minimum

contacts necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Alabama." 156

So. 3d at 407. "The prima facie showing made by [Holmes]'s affidavit

shifted to [Straus] the burden of proving by affidavits or other competent

evidence that [GBC] had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of

conducting activities within Alabama. See Ex parte Merches, [151 So. 3d

1075 (Ala. 2014)]." Id.

In response to Holmes's affidavit, Straus produced a "declaration"

that concluded with the following statement: "I affirm the foregoing to be

true on penalty of perjury under the laws of Alabama." However, Straus's

declaration did not contain the date, name, or signature of a notary

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public, affirming that Straus was swearing to the truth of the factual

averments in the declaration.

In Ex parte Puccio, 923 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Ala. 2005), this Court

considered an unsworn affidavit produced by a defendant in support of

his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We noted:

" 'An affidavit sufficient to satisfy Rule 56(e)[, Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] is a written declaration or statement of facts, made
voluntarily and based on personal knowledge, and confirmed
by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before
a person having authority to administer an oath or
affirmation.' Couch v. City of Sheffield, 708 So. 2d 144, 152-
53 (Ala. 1998). [The defendant]'s affidavit does not contain
the date, name, or signature of a notary public, affirming that
[the plaintiff] was swearing to the truth of the factual
averments in the affidavit."

Ex parte Puccio, 923 So. 2d at 1071 n.3. The Ex parte Puccio Court

suggested that the trial court could not have properly considered the

defendant's unsworn affidavit in that case but that, even if the trial court

could have considered it, the contents of the unsworn affidavit did not

address pertinent allegations made by the plaintiffs. Id. at 1073.

Although the unsworn affidavit at issue in Ex parte Puccio was

produced by the defendant moving for a dismissal based on an alleged

lack of personal jurisdiction, the rationale of Ex parte Puccio regarding

the insufficiency of unsworn affidavits as evidence is equally applicable
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to nonmovants responding to a prima facie showing by the movant that

the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. See Ex parte Kentucky

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., ____ So. 3d at ____ (" ' "When a defendant

files a motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(2), and supports that

motion with affidavits, plaintiff is required to controvert those affidavits

with his own affidavits or other competent evidence in order to survive

the motion." ' " (quoting Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d

226, 230 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Hansen v. Neumueller GmbH, 163

F.R.D. 471, 474-75 (D. Del. 1995))(emphasis added)).

In this case, the circuit court's order denying GBC's motion to

dismiss indicates that the circuit court considered the contents of

Straus's unsworn declaration in disposing of the motion to dismiss.

Under the rationale of Ex parte Puccio, the circuit court could not have

properly done so. Nevertheless, as in Ex parte Puccio, even if the circuit

court could have properly considered Straus's unsworn declaration, its

contents fail to demonstrate that the circuit court has specific personal

jurisdiction over GBC.

It is undisputed that the events giving rise to this action stem from

a single transaction between Straus and GBC that, at least as concerns

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them, was initiated by Straus. Namely, Straus unilaterally decided to

wire $60,000 to a GBC account owned by Apex. This unilateral contact

by Straus was insufficient to render GBC amenable to the personal

jurisdiction of Alabama courts. " 'Th[e] purposeful-availment

requirement assures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction

as a result of " ' the unilateral activity of another person or a third

person.' " ' " Ex parte Alamo Title Co., 128 So. 3d at 710 (quoting Elliot v.

Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 731 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985), quoting in turn

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417

(1984)). "[S]omething more than an isolated contact initiated by an in-

state plaintiff is required to satisfy the 'purposeful-availment' prong of

the due-process analysis." Ex parte Troncalli, 876 So. 2d at 465.

In Straus's unsworn declaration, he asserted the following

regarding GBC's statements on its website concerning its compliance

with federal law: "I respectfully submit that any bank that holds itself

out to a citizen of Alabama in this way must foresee being called to

account in the courts of Alabama for any harm suffered in reliance on

such representations."

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However, when general representations appear on a company's

website that is viewable by anyone with access to the Internet, the

company " 'cannot be said to have purposefully directed [its

representations] specifically at one state.' " Ex parte Troncalli, 876 So.

2d at 465 (quoting Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 732). Moreover, GBC's general

representations concerning its compliance with federal law "w[ere]

passive in nature." Ex parte AutoSource Motors, 156 So. 3d at 407.

"[T]hat is," at least insofar as those general representations were

concerned, "the site serve[d] 'as little more than an electronic billboard

for the posting of information.' " Ex parte Troncalli, 876 So. 2d at 465

(quoting Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (N.D.

Ala. 2000)).

Consequently, even considering the contents of Straus's unsworn

declaration, he failed to rebut GBC's "prima facie showing that it had not

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within

Alabama and, thus, that [GBC] did not have the minimum contacts

necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Alabama." Ex parte

AutoSource Motors, 156 So. 3d at 407.

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Conclusion

Straus failed to rebut GBC's prima facie showing that it had not

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within

Alabama and, thus, that GBC did not have the minimum contacts

necessary to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Alabama. Even if the

circuit court could have properly considered Straus's unsworn

declaration asserting that he had relied on representations appearing on

GBC's website when deciding to wire money to an account maintained by

GBC, those general representations made on GBC's website that were

viewable by anyone with access to the Internet are insufficient to support

the circuit court's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over GBC

based on its suit-related conduct.

Therefore, GBC has demonstrated a clear legal right to a dismissal

of Straus's complaint based on the circuit court's lack of specific personal

jurisdiction over it. Accordingly, GBC's petition is due to be granted, and

the circuit court is hereby directed to vacate its order denying GBC's

motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing Straus's complaint.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

20
SC-2024-0778

Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, Cook, McCool,

and Lewis, JJ., concur.

21