Ex parte James E. Underwood and Braden Miles PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: John Long v. James E. Underwood and Braden Miles) (Walker Circuit Court: CV-19-900131).

Rel: June 27, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025

_________________________

SC-2024-0263
_________________________

Ex parte James E. Underwood and Braden Miles

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: John Long

v.

James E. Underwood and Braden Miles)

(Walker Circuit Court: CV-19-900131)

PER CURIAM.
SC-2024-0263

On April 14, 2017, Braden Miles, a deputy sheriff for the Walker

County Sheriff's Office, activated the lights and siren on his patrol car

and attempted to apprehend the driver of a motorcycle that he believed

to be stolen. The motorcyclist, however, refused to stop and led Deputy

Miles on a high-speed chase along a stretch of Alabama Highway 195.

The chase ended when the fleeing suspect lost control of the motorcycle,

swerved across the highway's centerline, and collided head-on with a

vehicle being driven by John Long. Long was injured in the collision. The

motorcyclist did not survive.

Long later sued Deputy Miles and James E. Underwood, the former

Sheriff of Walker County, in the Walker Circuit Court, seeking to recover

damages for injuries he had sustained in the collision with the fleeing

motorcyclist. As relevant here, Long asserted various negligence-based

claims against Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood in their

individual capacities. Specifically, Long alleged that Deputy Miles had

negligently pursued the fleeing motorcyclist and that former Sheriff

Underwood had negligently failed to implement policies, procedures, and

training related to high-speed pursuits.

2
SC-2024-0263

Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood moved to dismiss

Long's claims against them, arguing that they were entitled to immunity

because those claims arose from acts performed within the line and scope

of their duties. After the trial court declined to dismiss Long's claims on

immunity grounds, Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood

petitioned this Court for mandamus relief from the trial court's denial of

their motion to dismiss.

As explained below, the claims against former Sheriff Underwood

must be dismissed because, as a former executive officer of the State, he

is entitled to immunity from liability for damages for acts performed

within the line and scope of his duties. Moreover, because our precedent

requires us to extend the same immunity to deputy sheriffs, Long's

claims against Deputy Miles must likewise be dismissed. We, thus, grant

the petition for a writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to dismiss

Long's action against former Sheriff Underwood and Deputy Miles.

Facts and Procedural History

According to Long's complaint, on April 14, 2017, Deputy Miles

attempted to stop the driver of a motorcycle because he believed the

motorcycle to be stolen and had observed the driver committing a traffic

3
SC-2024-0263

violation. When, instead of stopping, the motorcyclist accelerated to

speeds of more than 100 miles per hour, Deputy Miles "activated his

lights and siren and pursued the suspect …." The complaint alleges that

Deputy Miles subsequently "gave chase over a nine (9) mile stretch of a

winding and narrow county road, while reaching speeds of 115 [miles per

hour]." As the motorcyclist fled northbound on Alabama Highway 195

("AL-195"), with Deputy Miles in pursuit, Long was driving his car south

along AL-195. Shortly after passing Bennett Road in rural Walker

County, the motorcyclist failed to negotiate a curve in the road, lost

control of the motorcycle, and crossed over the highway's centerline --

striking Long's southbound car head-on. Long was injured in the

collision. The motorcyclist did not survive the crash.

In April 2019, Long sued Deputy Miles and former Sheriff

Underwood, in their individual capacities, in the trial court. In his

complaint, Long asserted federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 as well as state-law negligence-based claims. In particular, Long

alleged that Deputy Miles had negligently pursued the fleeing

motorcyclist, causing the suspect to lose control of his motorcycle and

collide into Long's car. Long additionally alleged that former Sheriff

4
SC-2024-0263

Underwood had negligently failed to (1) establish adequate policies

regarding high-speed pursuits and (2) properly train and supervise his

officers regarding such pursuits.

The case was removed to the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Alabama on the basis of federal-question

jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Long's federal claims with

prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his

state-law claims, remanding them to the trial court.

Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood subsequently filed a

motion to dismiss in the trial court, asserting that they were immune

from Long's claims because those claims arose from actions taken within

the line and scope of their duties. The trial court entered an order denying

their motion to dismiss. Deputy Miles and former Sheriff Underwood now

petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to

dismiss the claims against them.

Discussion

In their petition, former Sheriff Underwood and Deputy Miles urge

us to conclude that the trial court erred in denying their motion to

dismiss. Specifically, former Sheriff Underwood argues that, because

5
SC-2024-0263

sheriffs are among the executive officers named in Art. V, § 112, of the

Alabama Constitution, they are immune from individual-capacity claims

for damages whenever those claims are based on acts performed within

the course and scope of their duties. He asserts that Long's complaint, on

its face, alleges negligence in the performance of decision- and policy-

making duties that fell squarely within the line and scope of his

employment as sheriff. Thus, he says, he must be afforded immunity from

Long's suit.

Deputy Miles additionally argues that, as the alter egos of sheriffs,

deputy sheriffs enjoy the same immunity afforded to sheriffs. According

to him, because the acts that form the basis of his alleged liability in this

case were performed within the line and scope of his duties as a deputy

sheriff, immunity also bars Long's claims against him. We address each

argument in turn.

A. Whether Long's claims against former Sheriff Underwood must be
dismissed

Alabama has a well-developed body of law concerning the immunity

afforded to sheriffs and other executive officers of the State. Our cases in

that line of authority recognize that, because sheriffs are among the

officers named in § 112 of the Alabama Constitution, they are generally
6
SC-2024-0263

immune from "suit based on state law claims arising out of the execution

of the duties of [their] office." Boshell v. Walker Cnty. Sheriff, 598 So. 2d

843, 844 (Ala. 1992) (plurality opinion); see also Oliver v. Townsend, 534

So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Ala. 1988) (holding that the defendant sheriffs, as

executive officers, were entitled to immunity from claims that they had

negligently and wantonly supervised prisoner's health); Hereford v.

Jefferson Cnty., 586 So. 2d 209, 210 (Ala. 1991) (holding that defendant

sheriff, "as an executive officer of the State of Alabama," was entitled to

immunity from claims arising out of his allegedly negligent and wanton

release of a prisoner); Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500-01 (Ala. 2005)

(noting that "constitutional officers of this State" are entitled to

immunity from individual-capacity claims for damages "whenever the

acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the

course and scope of the officer's employment"); and Ex parte Hale, 6 So.

3d 452, 457 (Ala. 2008) (holding that breach-of-contract claim against

sheriff in his individual capacity was barred by immunity because the

7
SC-2024-0263

claim arose from "actions taken by [the defendant] in the execution of his

duties as sheriff."). 1

Importantly, the holdings in the above-mentioned decisions also

find meaningful support in the text and structure of the Alabama

Constitution. As previously noted, § 112 of the Alabama Constitution

establishes the composition of our executive branch and states that

"[t]he executive department shall consist of a governor,
lieutenant governor, attorney-general, state auditor,
secretary of state, state treasurer, superintendent of
education, commissioner of agriculture and industries, and a
sheriff for each county."

Art. V, § 112, Ala. Const. of 2022 (emphasis added). The Alabama

Constitution vests executive power in the independent executive officers

listed in § 112 -- and sheriffs are among the officers named.

1These cases affirm a sheriff's entitlement to immunity for acts
performed within the line and scope of his or her duties, subject only to
exceptions not applicable here. Our precedent recognizes only five limited
exceptions to the immunity conferred on sheriffs -- each of which concern
equitable relief (for instance, actions to compel a sheriff's performance of
ministerial acts or to enjoin a sheriff from acting beyond his or her
authority). See, e.g., Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 443 (Ala. 1987).
We reject the argument that a sixth exception, as recognized in Ex parte
Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013), permitting, under certain
circumstances, claims for damages against certain state officials, would
apply to a claim against a sheriff.
8
SC-2024-0263

Furthermore, Art. III, §§ 42(b) and 42(c) of the Alabama

Constitution explicitly mandate a separation of powers among the State's

legislative, executive, and judicial branches. See Opinion of the Justices

No. 380, 892 So. 2d 332, 334 n.1 (Ala. 2004). Section 42(b) states that

"[t]he government of the State of Alabama shall be divided into three

distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial." Section 42(c)

further provides that,

"[t]o the end that the government of the State of Alabama may
be a government of laws and not of individuals, and except as
expressly directed or permitted in this constitution, the
legislative branch may not exercise the executive or judicial
power, the executive branch may not exercise the legislative
or judicial power, and the judicial branch may not exercise the
legislative or executive power."

(Emphasis added.) In short, the separation-of-powers doctrine set forth

in §§ 42(b) and 42(c) prohibits the judicial branch from encroaching on

the authority of the executive branch, and § 112 tells us exactly who is

vested with that executive authority.

The line of Alabama decisions acknowledging that sheriffs are

immune from individual-capacity damages suits based on acts taken

within the line and scope of their duties therefore reflects both (1) the

separation-of-powers doctrine embodied in §§ 42(b) and 42(c) and (2) "the

9
SC-2024-0263

unique constitutional status of sheriffs as executive officers." Suttles v.

Roy, 75 So. 3d 90, 95 (Ala. 2010). Indeed, because the Alabama

Constitution explicitly designates the officers listed in § 112 as the

holders of the State's executive power, their immunity from liability for

damages predicated on acts performed within the scope of their duties is

needed to ensure that the judicial branch does not impermissibly

encroach on executive-branch authority. 2

Here, there are no allegations indicating that former Sheriff

Underwood was acting outside the line and scope of his duties as sheriff

when the conduct that is the basis of his alleged liability took place. To

the contrary, in his complaint, Long alleges only that former Sheriff

Underwood was negligent in the performance of his official duties. In

particular, he seeks to hold former Sheriff Underwood liable for his

actions (1) in hiring, training, and supervising the officers under his

authority and (2) in developing and implementing policies related to

high-speed pursuits. Those alleged actions arose from former Sheriff

2This long line of constitutional precedent concerns the separate

and distinct immunity that is conferred on executive officers of the State
and, thus, does not stand in tension with our Court's decision in Ex parte
Pinkard, 373 So. 3d 192 (Ala. 2022), which addressed a statutory officer's
entitlement to State immunity.
10
SC-2024-0263

Underwood's performance of decision- and policy-making functions that

were clearly within the scope of his duties as sheriff. Thus, under the

principles embodied in both the Alabama Constitution and the relevant

line of Alabama precedent, former Sheriff Underwood is entitled to

immunity, and Long's claims against him must be dismissed.

B. Whether Long's claims against Deputy Miles must be dismissed

As previously noted, in the mandamus petition, Deputy Miles

argues that, because this Court has previously recognized that a deputy

sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff for the purposes of immunity, he, too,

is entitled to immunity from Long's claims.

Deputy Miles is correct that prior decisions of this Court have "held

that deputy sheriffs are immune from suit to the same extent as sheriffs."

Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Ala. 1994). Pursuant to

those decisions, deputies -- like sheriffs -- are entitled to immunity from

individual-capacity claims for damages "whenever the acts that form the

basis of the[ir] alleged liability were being performed within the line and

11
SC-2024-0263

scope of the[ir] … employment." Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 899

(Ala. 2011). 3

Nothing in Long's complaint suggests that Deputy Miles was acting

outside the scope of his employment. Indeed, the complaint's specific

factual allegations relating to Deputy Miles all concern his attempt to

apprehend a suspected criminal -- actions that fall squarely within the

duties of a sheriff and, consequently, his or her deputy. See § 36-22-

3(a)(4) and (b), Ala. Code 1975. Moreover, the complaint expressly

acknowledges that there was a legitimate explanation for Deputy Miles's

pursuit of the fleeing motorcyclist and that he was acting "pursuant to

the customs, policies or practices of the Walker County Sheriff’s Office."

The complaint does not allege that Deputy Miles's "actions were

undertaken for some personal motive … and not as a part of his duties as

a deputy sheriff." Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d at 501. Thus, because Long's

complaint fails to allege any facts showing that Deputy Miles acted

outside the line and scope of his duties, Deputy Miles is entitled to

immunity, and Long's claims against him must also be dismissed.

3Significantly, in his answer, Long also did not ask this Court to

reconsider the applicability of the principle that a sheriff's deputy is the
alter ego of the sheriff for the purposes of immunity.
12
SC-2024-0263

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition for the writ of

mandamus and direct the trial court to dismiss Long's claims against

former Sheriff Underwood and Deputy Miles on immunity grounds.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Stewart, C.J., and Bryan, McCool, and Lewis, JJ., concur.

Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

Shaw, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.

13
SC-2024-0263

COOK, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur with the Court's opinion, believing that, under the

circumstances of this case, former Sheriff James E. Underwood and

Deputy Braden Miles are entitled to immunity from John Long's claims

against them.

I write separately to address an issue not timely raised by the

parties: the effect of the Legislature's 2011 amendment to § 36-22-3, Ala.

Code 1975, on this Court's prior decisions concerning the immunity

afforded to deputy sheriffs.

Alabama Caselaw on Deputy-Sheriff Immunity

As the main opinion notes, our Court has repeatedly held that "[a]

deputy sheriff enjoys the immunity of the sheriff because of long-standing

precedent treating the deputy as an alter ego of the sheriff." Wheeler v.

George, 39 So. 3d 1061, 1093 (Ala. 2009). We have, thus, recognized that

deputies are entitled to immunity from liability for damages "whenever

the acts that form the basis of the[ir] alleged liability were being

performed within the line and scope of the[ir] … employment." Ex parte

Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 899 (Ala. 2011).

14
SC-2024-0263

The above-mentioned standard for deputy-sheriff immunity traces

back to our decision in Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So. 2d 209 (Ala.

1991). There, we first held that the immunity conferred on sheriffs also

extends to their deputies and provided a single reason for that extension:

our prior caselaw embracing the principle that " '[t]he deputy sheriff is

the alter ego of the sheriff.' " Id. at 210 (quoting Mosely v. Kennedy, 245

Ala. 448, 450, 17 So. 2d 536, 537 (1944)). Applying that principle in

Hereford, we explained that, " '[i]f the deputy's acts are generally

considered the acts of the sheriff [under Alabama law], it is logical that

those acts should also enjoy the immunity covering the sheriff's own

acts.' " Id. (quoting Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th

Cir. 1990)). And, guided by that same reasoning, our Court -- in the over

three decades since we announced our decision in Hereford -- has

repeatedly treated a sheriff and his or her deputy as one officer for the

purposes of immunity.

The Legislature's 2011 Amendment to § 36-22-3, Ala. Code 1975

In June 2011, the Legislature amended § 36-22-3, Ala. Code 1975,

which prescribes the duties of a sheriff, to provide as follows:

"Any of the duties of the sheriff set out in subsection (a) or as
otherwise provided by law may be carried out by deputies,
15
SC-2024-0263

reserve deputies, and persons employed as authorized in
Section 14-6-1[, Ala. Code 1975,] as determined appropriate
by the sheriff in accordance with state law. Persons
undertaking such duties for and under the direction and
supervision of the sheriff shall be entitled to the same
immunities and legal protections granted to the sheriff under
the general laws and the Constitution of Alabama …, as long
as he or she is acting within the line and scope of his or her
duties and is acting in compliance with the law."

§ 36-22-3(b) (emphasis added).

This Court has yet to address the 2011 amendment's impact on our

prior decisions holding that deputy sheriffs are entitled to the exact same

immunity as sheriffs. As discussed above, those decisions provide that

deputy sheriffs, as the alter egos of the sheriff, are entitled to immunity

from liability for damages "whenever the acts that form the basis of

the[ir] alleged liability were being performed within the line and scope of

the[ir] … employment." Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d at 899.

In contrast to those prior decisions, § 36-22-3(b) appears to provide

that, to qualify for the immunity granted to the sheriff under the

Alabama Constitution, a deputy sheriff must act both "within the line

and scope of his or her duties and … in compliance with the law."

(Emphasis added.) Significantly, § 36-22-3(b)'s requirement that deputies

act "in compliance with the law" does not appear to be contemplated by

16
SC-2024-0263

our current precedent, which requires only that the deputies act "within

the line and scope of the[ir] … employment." Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So.

3d at 899.

Likely Questions in a Future Case

In a future case, I assume our Court will be asked to consider the

impact of the Legislature's 2011 amendment to § 36-22-3, unless the

Legislature amends this statute further. For instance, our Court may be

asked to consider the following questions:

1. Can § 36-22-3(b)'s requirement that deputies act "in

compliance with the law" be read in harmony with our

caselaw on deputy-sheriff immunity?

2. If not, is the "alter-ego" theory of deputy-sheriff immunity

embraced by our precedent based upon the common law

(which can ordinarily be altered by legislative action, see Reed

v. Brunson, 527 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1988) (holding that

legislation modifying the common law was a valid exercise of

the Legislature's police power)), or upon this Court's

interpretation of the Alabama Constitution?

17
SC-2024-0263

3. If that doctrine is based upon the Alabama Constitution

rather than the common law, does our deputy-sheriff-

immunity caselaw correctly interpret the Alabama

Constitution (and, if not, should it be overruled)? In other

words, is § 36-22-3(b) constitutional? See Magee v. Boyd, 175

So. 3d 79, 105 (Ala. 2015) (recognizing the judiciary's function

as the "ultimate interpreter of the Alabama Constitution");

Opinion of the Justices. No. 368, 716 So. 2d 1149, 1155 (Ala.

1998) (opinion of Lyons, J.) (explaining that the "Legislature

may, through statute, inform this Court's judgment as to the

meaning of a constitutional provision; however, it has long

been held that courts, ultimately, must determine the

meaning of constitutional provisions").

These are difficult questions. Overruling existing precedent --

especially precedent that we have repeatedly affirmed for over 30 years

-- should be done only after very careful consideration. See Bryan A.

Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 333, 352 (2016).

On the other hand, our Court must follow the instructions of the

Legislature except in the rare circumstances when its actions are

18
SC-2024-0263

inconsistent with the Constitutions of the State of Alabama or the United

States. We should strive, whenever possible, to construe statutes as

consistent with our Constitution. See Jay Mitchell, Textualism in

Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1117 (2023) ("A statute should be

interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt.").

While our Court is tasked with determining the meaning of the

Constitution, we are tasked with determining only what it says -- not

what we might want it to say. Our Court has made clear that we are "not

at liberty to rewrite statutes or to substitute [our] judgment for that of

the Legislature." Ex parte Carlton, 867 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala. 2003).

Further, our Court has repeatedly made clear that "public-policy

arguments should be directed to the legislature, not to this Court." Ex

parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 420 (Ala. 2013).

Moreover, the Alabama Constitution includes a separation-of-

powers clause that provides that, "[t]o the end that the government of the

State of Alabama may be a government of laws and not of individuals, …

the judicial branch may not exercise the legislative or executive power."

Art. III, § 42(c), Ala. Const. of 2022. Thus, unless a statute is

unconstitutional, substituting our own meaning for the words used in a

19
SC-2024-0263

statute "turn[s] this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of

course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of

powers." DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270,

276 (Ala. 1998). 4

Would Application of the Statute Have Changed the Outcome of This
Mandamus Petition?

Sometimes, there may be no difference between the immunity

provided to a sheriff and the immunity provided to a deputy, even if we

4I believe that we are required to apply the "original public
meaning" of the words in a statute or our Constitution, thus ensuring
that we do not apply our own subjective meaning to the words used. New
Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 105, 113 (2019) (" '[I]t's a "fundamental
canon of statutory construction" that words generally should be
"interpreted as taking their ordinary ... meaning ... at the time Congress
enacted the statute. " ' Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S.
274, 284 (2018) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42
(1979))."). Because our Court is in the judicial branch, our role is limited,
and applying the "original public meaning" of the words in a statute helps
this Court to stay within its constitutional role, which is a fundamental
part of democracy. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts, § 7, pp. 82-83 (Thomson/West 2012)
("Originalism is the only approach to text that is compatible with
democracy. When government-adopted texts are given a new meaning,
the law is changed; and changing written law, like adopting written law
in the first place, is the function of the first two branches of government
-- elected legislators and … elected executive officials and their
delegates."). See also Jay Mitchell, Textualism in Alabama, 74 Ala. L.
Rev. 1089, 1092 (2023) ("[T]he meaning of a law is its original public
meaning, not its modern meaning.").

20
SC-2024-0263

read § 36-22-3(b) as conditioning immunity on a deputy's compliance with

the law. For instance, if Long had raised § 36-22-3(b) in this case, the

result might well have been the same as the one we reach today. Indeed,

Long's complaint does not appear to allege any violations of the law and

also expressly alleges that Deputy Miles had engaged his patrol car's

lights and siren during the pursuit.5 Because Long fails to allege any

facts showing that Deputy Miles acted either outside the line and scope

of his duties or illegally, Deputy Miles may have been entitled to

immunity even if the additional requirement set forth in § 36-22-3(b)

applied.

5I additionally note that, because it is undisputed that the patrol

car driven by Deputy Miles never made any contact with Long's vehicle,
I fail to see how Deputy Miles could have proximately caused Long's
injuries. Our Court explained in Ex parte City of Warrior, 369 So. 3d 116
(Ala. 2022) that " ' " ' "[t]he rule governing the conduct of [a] police [officer]
in pursuit of an escaping offender is that he must operate his car with
due care and, in doing so, he is not responsible for the acts of the
offender. " ' " ' " Id. at 126 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Further, we
stated that, " ' " ' "[a]lthough pursuit may contribute to the reckless
driving of the pursued, the officer is not obliged to allow him to
escape. " ' " ' " Id. (citations omitted); see also Doran v. City of Madison, 519
So. 2d 1308, 1313 (Ala. 1988) (holding that, when a fleeing offender
injures a third party, it is the offender's conduct, and not the conduct of
the pursuing police officers, that is the proximate cause of the third
party's injuries).
21
SC-2024-0263

Regardless, because the parties did not timely raise the issue of

§ 36-22-3(b)'s effect on our deputy-sheriff-immunity caselaw, now is not

the time to reach these difficult questions.

22
SC-2024-0263

SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).

I respectfully concur in the result. John Long filed a complaint

against Sheriff James Underwood and Deputy Sheriff Braden Miles, in

their official and individual capacities, seeking damages for, among other

things, negligence. Our extensive body of existing caselaw clearly

establishes that, under Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. I, § 14,6

Underwood and Miles are immune from suit in this case. This is not a

new holding.

The State of Alabama acts through people. The executive

department, which executes the law and thus performs most of the "acts"

of the State, is made up of nine positions: "The executive department

shall consist of a governor, lieutenant governor, attorney-general, state

auditor, secretary of state, state treasurer, superintendent of education,

commissioner of agriculture and industries, and a sheriff for each

county." Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), Art. V, § 112. The people in

these positions perform the acts of the executive department; when

6The facts underlying this case, and its commencement, occurred

before the Alabama Constitution of 2022 was adopted, and all references
in this writing are to the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Official
Recompilation). As to the content of the provisions discussed, there is no
material difference between the two constitutions.
23
SC-2024-0263

acting in the course and scope of their duties, they are performing the

actions of the State, and thus, practically speaking, they are the State.

Our Constitution further provides that "the State of Alabama shall never

be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." § 14. We have long

recognized that § 14 does not provide immunity merely when the State is

simply named as a defendant in a complaint; § 14 can also protect from

suit the people who perform actions for the State. In terms of the

executive department, those people include the people occupying the

positions listed in § 112.

There are other positions, and people in those positions, who can

perform actions on behalf of the State and its agencies, subdivisions, and

other entities. Those positions are not created by § 112 but by law,

including statutes and regulations, and other inherent powers. In the

context of the immunity provided by § 14, we have recognized a

distinction between those people, who I will refer to as "statutory

officers," and the "constitutional officers" listed in § 112:

"When determining whether a State interest in an
action against a state official or employee in his or her
individual capacity is sufficient to trigger the immunity
granted by § 14, our cases distinguish between the standards
applied to those state agents or employees whose positions
exist by virtue of legislative pronouncement and those who
24
SC-2024-0263

serve as the constitutional officers of this State. We have held
that State-agent immunity may bar an action against a state
agent or employee under the principles announced in Ex parte
Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000). See Ex parte Butts, 775
So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000) (adopting, by majority, the Cranman
restatement of the rule governing State-agent immunity).
However, this Court has consistently held that a claim for
monetary damages made against a constitutional officer in
the officer's individual capacity is barred by State immunity
whenever the acts that are the basis of the alleged liability
were performed within the course and scope of the officer's
employment."

Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500-01 (Ala. 2005) (emphasis added). See

also Ex parte Lawley, 38 So. 3d 41, 46 (Ala. 2009) (recognizing and

applying the distinction between "statutory officers" and "constitutional

officers" and the different immunity provided to each); Reynolds v.

Calhoun, 650 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1276 (M.D. Ala. 2023) ("[T]he Alabama

Supreme Court has two distinct lines of cases for officers created by

legislative statute and those created by the Alabama Constitution.").

These "two different forms of immunity" are "rooted in the unique

constitutional status of" constitutional officers provided by § 112. Suttles

v. Roy, 75 So. 3d 90, 93, 95 (Ala. 2010). Suits against constitutional

officers "for actions taken in the line and scope of their employment

inherently constitute actions against the State, and such actions are

25
SC-2024-0263

prohibited by § 14." Ex parte Shelley, 53 So. 3d 887, 895 (Ala. 2009)

(emphasis added).

In addressing this distinct form of § 14 immunity for constitutional

officers, we have had more occasion to discuss its application to sheriffs,

as compared to other § 112 constitutional officers. 7 In Parker v. Amerson,

519 So. 2d 442, 442-43 (Ala. 1987), this Court stated: "A sheriff is an

executive officer of the State of Alabama, who is immune from suit under

Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, in the execution of the

duties of his office …." In that case, a sheriff who was alleged to have

"committed negligent and wanton acts ... while executing his

discretionary duties of hiring a jailer" was held to be immune from suit.

519 So. 2d at 446. In Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795 (Ala. 1996),

the plaintiff claimed that a sheriff and his deputy "were responsible for

implementing and enforcing appropriate policies and procedures for

7But this immunity applies to other § 112 constitutional officers as

well. Wheeler v. George, 39 So. 3d 1061, 1092-93 (Ala. 2009) (holding
that the Governor is entitled to the "same immunity" as a sheriff in a suit
based on actions taken within the course and scope of the Governor's
duties). See also Ex parte Worley, 46 So. 3d 916, 925 (Ala. 2009)
(plurality opinion) (discussing the application of § 14 immunity, and the
relevance of § 112, to the Secretary of State).

26
SC-2024-0263

approaching, detaining, and apprehending dangerous fugitives; that they

had failed to carry out their duties; and that their failure had proximately

caused her injuries."8 This Court, noting that it was undisputed that the

sheriff and the deputy "were both acting within the line and scope of their

employment," concluded that they were immune under § 14. Id. As

Parker, Ex parte Purvis, and numerous other cases indicate, the analysis

focuses on whether the constitutional officers, here a sheriff and a deputy

sheriff, were executing their duties or acting within the line (or course)

and scope of their employment; the "capacity" in which they are sued is

of no consequence. See, e.g., Ex parte Burnell, 90 So. 3d 708, 710 (Ala.

2012) (holding that a jail warden "being sued for money damages for

actions that arose out of his performance of his duties as a deputy sheriff"

was immune from a suit by an inmate who was injured when she slipped

and fell in a shower area of the jail); Ex parte Fielding, 86 So. 3d 354, 358

(Ala. 2011) (holding that a deputy "acting within the line and scope of his

employment as a deputy sheriff" was entitled to immunity from the tort

claims asserted against him in both his individual and official capacity);

8Deputy sheriffs, as the "alter egos" of sheriffs, are immune from

suit to the same extent as sheriffs. Drain v. Odom, 631 So. 2d 971, 972
(Ala. 1994), and Wright v. Bailey, 611 So. 2d 300, 303 (Ala. 1992).
27
SC-2024-0263

Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 899 (Ala. 2011) (holding that because

sheriffs "are constitutional officers," and because deputy sheriffs act as

their alter egos, "a claim for monetary damages made against a deputy

sheriff in his or her individual capacity is barred by [§ 14] whenever the

acts that form the basis of the alleged liability were being performed

within the line and scope of the deputy sheriff's employment"); Ex parte

Sumter Cnty., 953 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (Ala. 2006) (plurality opinion)

("[S]heriffs and deputy sheriffs are executive officers of this State" under

§ 112, and "claims against sheriffs and deputy sheriffs" are barred by §

14 when the sheriffs or their deputies are " 'acting within the line and

scope of their employment.' "); Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303, 305

(Ala. 2004) (stating that, because it was undisputed that a deputy sheriff

was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time he

was involved in an automobile accident, § 14 bars an action against the

deputy sheriff for damages arising out of the accident "because an action

against a sheriff -- or a deputy sheriff -- for damages arising out of the

performance of his duties is essentially a suit ' "against the state" ' "

(citations omitted)); Ex parte McWhorter, 880 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Ala.

2003) (holding, where it was undisputed that a deputy sheriff "was acting

28
SC-2024-0263

within the line and scope of his employment as a deputy sheriff" at the

time of a motor-vehicle accident, that the deputy was immune from a suit

seeking damages for negligence and wantonness arising from that

accident); Ex parte Haralson, 871 So. 2d 802, 806-07 (Ala. 2003) (holding

that a deputy sheriff was immune under § 14 in a suit stemming from a

motor-vehicle accident because he was "on duty" and performing an

"activity [that] falls within the official duties of a deputy sheriff");

Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Ala. 1994) (holding that a

deputy sheriff was immune from a suit in her individual and official

capacities seeking damages for negligent and/or bad-faith service of

process; the deputy was "on duty" when she attempted to serve the

papers); Boshell v. Walker Cnty. Sheriff, 598 So. 2d 843, 844 (Ala. 1992)

(plurality opinion) (upholding the dismissal of a complaint against a

sheriff sued for the alleged "assault and false arrest" by the sheriff's

deputy because "a sheriff, as an executive officer of the State of Alabama,

is immune, under ... § 14 ..., from suit based on state law claims arising

out of the execution of the duties of his office"); Hereford v. Jefferson

Cnty., 586 So. 2d 209, 209-10 (Ala. 1991) (upholding, on the basis of § 14

immunity, the dismissal of a suit against a sheriff, in his official and

29
SC-2024-0263

individual capacities, seeking damages for negligence and wantonness

stemming from the mistaken release of an inmate); and White v.

Birchfield, 582 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (Ala. 1991) ("[T]he sheriff cannot be held

liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the actions of his jailer

because he is an officer of the state and the hiring of the jailer is one of

his official duties. Thus, he is immune from this type of suit under Article

I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901.").

However, sheriffs, and presumably other § 112 constitutional

officers, are not immune from certain types of actions.

"A sheriff ... is immune from suit ... in the execution of the
duties of his office, except for actions brought (1) to compel
him to perform his duties, (2) to compel him to perform
ministerial acts, (3) to enjoin him from enforcing
unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin him from acting in bad
faith, fraudulently, beyond his authority, or under mistaken
interpretation of the law, or (5) to seek construction of a
statute under the Declaratory Judgment Act if he is a
necessary party for the construction of the statute."

Parker, 519 So. 2d at 442-43.9 These "exceptions" were drawn from those

articulated in Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So. 2d 677 (1977). The

9Additionally, a sheriff or deputy sheriff might not be immune for

conduct that is deemed outside the course and scope of their duties. See,
e.g., Ex parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 933 (Ala. 2003) ("It is conceivable
that Griffith could prove facts that would show that at the time of the
30
SC-2024-0263

Aland "exceptions" are also used in cases involving statutory officers, and

have been expanded and modified over the years:

" 'There are six general categories of actions that
do not come within the prohibition of § 14: (1)
actions brought to compel State officials to perform
their legal duties; (2) actions brought to enjoin
State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional
law; (3) actions to compel State officials to perform
ministerial acts; (4) actions brought against State
officials under the Declaratory Judgments Act,
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et seq., seeking
construction of a statute and its application in a
given situation; (5) valid inverse condemnation
actions brought against State officials in their
representative capacity; and (6) actions for
injunction or damages brought against State
officials in their representative capacity and
individually when it was alleged that they had
acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their
authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law.
…'

"Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Fin., 991 So. 2d 1254, 1256-57
(Ala. 2008). The sixth 'exception' to § 14 immunity was
restated in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1141 (Ala.
2013), as follows:

" '(6)(a) actions for injunction brought against
State officials in their representative capacity
where it is alleged that they had acted
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority,
or in a mistaken interpretation of law, … and (b)
actions for damages brought against State officials

accident Deputy Haralson was on a personal errand or otherwise had
departed from the line and scope of his employment.").
31
SC-2024-0263

in their individual capacity where it is alleged that
they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond
their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of
law, subject to the limitation that the action not
be, in effect, one against the State.' "

Ex parte Hampton, 189 So. 3d 14, 17-18 (Ala. 2015).

In discussing the various forms of immunity that exist in this State,

our caselaw has used different terms to describe the people who occupy

the numerous positions within our government: state officials, state

officers, executive officers, state agents, state employees, etc. While the

constitutional officers designated in § 112, including sheriffs, might

accurately be described with such terms, we must be careful not to

assume that certain prior decisions, and the exceptions to immunity

addressed in them, are discussing the distinct form of immunity

applicable to constitutional officers. The second part of the "sixth

exception," dealing with actions for damages brought against "State

officials" when it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad faith,

beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law, Ex parte

Hampton, supra, is used in determining whether statutory officers are

immune from suits brought against them in their individual capacities.

However, as the caselaw cited above illustrates, the immunity afforded

32
SC-2024-0263

constitutional officers looks to whether they were executing their duties

or acting within the line and scope of their employment, and bars both

official-capacity and individual-capacity suits. See, e.g., Ex parte Davis,

930 So. 2d at 500 ("[A] claim for monetary damages made against a

constitutional officer in the officer's individual capacity is barred."). See

also Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 383 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that

"Alabama case law makes it clear" that the then-applicable version of the

sixth "exception" does not apply to a sheriff's immunity). In Poiroux v.

Rich, 150 So. 3d 1027 (Ala. 2014), numerous government officials,

including several sheriffs, were sued over the collection of certain bail-

bond fees. This Court addressed the "exceptions" discussed in Ex parte

Hampton, supra, but, as to the claims against the sheriffs, this Court

found that none of the exceptions articulated in Parker applied and thus

held that the sheriffs were immune from suit. Poiroux, 150 So. 3d at

1038. The "exceptions" to these different forms of immunity have

developed along different paths. 10

10In Birmingham Broadcasting (WVTM-TV) LLC v. Hill, 303 So. 3d

1148, 1159 (Ala. 2020), the plaintiff "contend[ed]" that a sheriff's and a
deputy sheriff's actions in that case were "subject" to the sixth "exception"
discussed in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1141 (Ala. 2013). In
addressing that "contention," and without actually holding that the
33
SC-2024-0263

This Court's decision in Ex parte Pinkard, 373 So. 3d 192 (Ala.

2022), addressed § 14 immunity in the context of statutory officers,

specifically overruling an analysis developed in Barnhart v. Ingalls, 275

So. 3d 1112 (Ala. 2018). However, the distinct immunity afforded

constitutional officers long preexisted Barnhart and was not impacted by

that decision or Pinkard. See Reynolds, 650 F. Supp. 3d at 1277 ("Cases

granting State immunity to sheriffs -- even in individual-capacity

suits -- were not discussed or overruled in Pinkard ….").

In this case, the alleged tortious conduct by Underwood and Miles

clearly involved acts or omissions performed in the course and scope of

their duties as a sheriff and a deputy sheriff, respectively. None of the

"exceptions" in Parker, supra, are applicable to these claims. Underwood

and Miles are thus immune from Long's negligence claims. This form of

immunity afforded to sheriffs and their deputies is not new and has long

been applied in this State.

"exception" applied to sheriffs and their deputies, this Court held that the
evidence "failed to demonstrate" that the sheriff and deputy sheriff had
"acted in bad faith or … under a mistaken interpretation of the law." Id.
at 1160. That decision did not hold that the sixth "exception" applies to
suits against constitutional officers.
34