Huuuge, Inc. v. Olivia Taylor Gann (Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court: CV-23-900125).

Rel: April 25, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025

_________________________

SC-2024-0454
_________________________

Zynga, Inc.

v.

Gayla Hamilton Mills

Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court
(CV-23-900033)

_________________________

SC-2024-0455
_________________________
SC-2024-0454 and SC-2024-0455

Huuuge, Inc.

v.

Olivia Taylor Gann

Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court
(CV-23-900125)

COOK, Justice.

These consolidated appeals arise from a dispute over whether the

claims asserted by the plaintiffs are subject to arbitration. The

defendants are online-game companies that own and operate casino-

themed, social gaming applications. The "Terms of Service" for those

applications include an arbitration provision and are made available

when a player initially downloads the games. The plaintiffs do not

purport to have played any of the defendants' games but bring these

actions pursuant to § 8-1-150(b), Ala. Code 1975, an Alabama statute that

allows "[a]ny other person" to "also recover" money paid and lost due to

gambling for the use of the gambler's wife, children, or next of kin. 1

In their complaints, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants'

1Section 8-1-150(a), Ala. Code 1975, also allows the gamblers
themselves to seek recovery of the money they have lost as a result of
gambling.
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games constitute illegal gambling and sought, on behalf of the "families"

of persons who have played the defendants' games, "all sums paid by

Alabama residents" for the games. The complaints expressly asserted

that the actions were not class actions, but they did not include the name

of any Alabama resident who had played the games.

Before the Franklin Circuit Court ("the trial court"), the defendants

moved to compel arbitration of each case, citing the arbitration

agreements between the defendants and the persons who played their

games. The defendants additionally moved to dismiss each case pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing, in pertinent part, that § 8-1-

150(b) did not permit the plaintiffs to pursue a mass claim on behalf of

"the wife, children or next of kin" of every Alabama citizen who had

played the defendants' games. And, they argued that their games were

ordinary video games for entertainment -- not gambling -- that provided

no payouts to players. The trial court denied these motions, and the

defendants now appeal.

As explained below, because the plaintiffs, in asserting claims

pursuant to § 8-1-150(b), are standing in the legal shoes of players who

undisputedly agreed to arbitrate their own claims under § 8-1-150(a),

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their claims against the defendants in these cases must be arbitrated.

We, thus, reverse the trial court's orders denying the defendants' motions

to compel arbitration.

Facts and Procedural History

As stated previously, under § 8-1-150(b), the plaintiffs in both of the

underlying actions seek to recover the money Alabama citizens have paid

and lost in alleged gambling endeavors for the use of the players' families.

Section 8-1-150 provides:

"(a) All contracts founded in whole or in part on a
gambling consideration are void. Any person who has paid
any money or delivered any thing of value lost upon any game
or wager may recover such money, thing, or its value by an
action commenced within six months from the time of such
payment or delivery.

"(b) Any other person may also recover the amount of
such money, thing, or its value by an action commenced
within 12 months after the payment or delivery thereof for the
use of the wife or, if no wife, the children or, if no children, the
next of kin of the loser.

"(c) A judgment under either subsection (a) or (b) for the
amount of money paid, thing delivered, or its value is a good
defense to any action brought for such money, thing, or its
value under the provisions of the other subsection.

"(d) A judgment recovered under the provisions of this
section is a defense to any proceeding on any garnishment
served after the recovery of such judgment, and the court may
make any order staying proceedings as may be necessary to
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protect the rights of the defendant."

On March 8, 2023, Gayla Hamilton Mills filed her complaint

against Zynga, Inc., in the trial court. Mills appeared as the sole plaintiff,

acting in a representative capacity to recover damages that, she alleged,

would be payable to various nonparties under § 8-1-150(b).

Zynga removed the case to the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Alabama on diversity grounds. However, on August

11, 2023, that court remanded the case back to the trial court for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction, specifically finding that, because the

individual claims of the yet-to-be identified nonparties could not be

aggregated, the amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity

jurisdiction had not been met. Mills subsequently filed an amended

complaint in the trial court on September 13, 2023.

The second case, against Huuuge, Inc., was commenced in the trial

court on September 14, 2023, by Olivia Taylor Gann. Like Mills, Gann

appeared in a representative capacity as the sole plaintiff, seeking,

pursuant to § 8-1-150(b), to recover damages that would be payable to

numerous, yet-to-be identified, nonparties.

A. The Complaints

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In their virtually identical operative complaints, Mills and Gann

("the plaintiffs") alleged that Zynga and Huuuge ("the defendants") made

available "online games of chance in a variety of formats including, but

not limited to, slot machines, card games and other games of chance."

According to the plaintiffs, users who play those games are initially given

free coins to play. They then spend the coins to play a game. If they lose

the game, they lose the coins wagered. If they win the game, they win

additional coins that allow them to play longer. When a user runs out of

coins entirely, they have to "purchase coins if they wish to continue

playing the game with full functionality."

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' games are games of

chance. According to them, such games violate Alabama law if a user

pays money for the chance to win anything of value. They argued that

"paying money to get 'coins' that one bets hoping to win more coins so as

to gain the 'privilege of playing at a game or scheme without charge' is

gambling a thing of value in Alabama." Thus, they said, the games

constitute illegal gambling and § 8-1-150(b) explicitly authorized them to

bring these actions to recover the money lost to the defendants for the

families of the Alabamians who lost it.

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B. The Motions to Dismiss

The defendants moved the trial court to dismiss both actions. The

defendants vigorously disputed the allegations in the complaints,

arguing that their games are not gambling but merely ordinary video

games played purely for entertainment. They emphasized that their

games never require players to spend any money and also provide no

opportunity for players to win money.

In addition, the defendants argued, in pertinent part, that the

plaintiffs' actions were not authorized by § 8-1-150(b). According to the

defendants, § 8-1-150(b) permits a person to recover only the identified

gambling losses of an individual gambler and does not allow a single

plaintiff to recover multiple gambling losses for the benefit of multiple

families. The defendants thus argued that § 8-1-150(b) did not authorize

the plaintiffs to pursue their claims on behalf of the wife, children, or next

of kin of every Alabama citizen who has played the defendants' games,

and they urged the trial court to dismiss the actions for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.

In opposition to the motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs underscored

that "the legislature chose, in section (a) of [§ 8-1-150] to void 'all

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SC-2024-0454 and SC-2024-0455

contracts founded in whole or in part on a gambling consideration.' …

Not just some of them. Not just one at a time. All." According to the

plaintiffs, moreover, "[n]othing in [§ 8-1-150(b)] says anything about the

'other person' … having to sue for the losses of multiple people in separate

cases." Thus, the plaintiffs argued that § 8-1-150(b) authorized their

claims seeking to recover multiple gambling losses for the use of multiple

families, and they urged the trial court to deny the motions to dismiss.

C. The Motions to Compel Arbitration

The defendants also moved to compel arbitration of each case, citing

the arbitration agreements between the defendants and the persons who

played their games. The arbitration agreement on which Zynga relied

provides, in pertinent part:

"By voluntarily accepting these Terms, you, Zynga, and any
member of the Zynga entities all agree to the fullest extent
permitted by law to resolve any claims arising out of, relating
to, or in connection with the Terms, Feature Terms,
Community Rules, your relationship with us, or Zynga's
services, including but not limited to your use of the Services
and information you provide via the Services, through final
and binding arbitration."

The arbitration agreement between Huuuge and the users who play

its games similarly provides, in pertinent part:

"To the fullest extent allowed by law, You and Huuuge agree
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SC-2024-0454 and SC-2024-0455

to submit all Disputes between us to individual, binding
arbitration …. A 'Dispute' means any dispute, claim, or
controversy (except those specifically exempted below)
between You and Huuuge that in any way relates to or arises
from any aspect of our relationship, including, without
limitation, Your use of the Games and Services, all marketing
related to the Games and Services, enhancements, Virtual
Currency, any licensed content, and all matters relating to or
arising from these Terms of Use (including Huuuge's Privacy
Policy and all other terms incorporated into these Terms of
Use) or any other agreement between You and Huuuge,
including any disputes over the validity, enforceability, or
interpretation of this agreement to arbitrate."

In its motion to compel arbitration, Zynga argued that, because the

claims asserted by Mills derived from alleged wrongs committed against

the players who had entered arbitration agreements with Zynga, those

claims were "subject to the same limitations that bind the signatories on

whom they depend." Huuuge's motion to compel arbitration similarly

alleged that, because Gann's claims were derivative of the claims

belonging to the players, her claims must also be subject to arbitration.

In opposition to the motions to compel arbitration, the plaintiffs

argued that they could not be compelled to arbitrate their claims because

they were not parties to any contract with the defendants. The plaintiffs

also disputed that they could be compelled to arbitrate under a theory of

equitable estoppel. According to the plaintiffs, equitable estoppel did not

9
SC-2024-0454 and SC-2024-0455

apply because (1) their claims do not depend on the existence of any

provision of the defendants' contracts with the players and (2) the scope

of each arbitration provision is limited to the signatories themselves.

They further insisted that, because the contracts containing the

arbitration provisions in these cases were based on gambling

consideration, the provisions of those contracts -- including the

arbitration provisions -- were void and unenforceable.

D. The Trial Court's Rulings

On June 7, 2024, the trial court entered orders denying the

defendants' motions to dismiss and motions to compel arbitration. As

relevant here, the trial court rejected the defendants' argument that § 8-

1-150(b) does not permit a plaintiff to recover multiple gamblers' losses.

According to the trial court,

"nothing in the text of the statute limits the recovery to a
single gambler's loss. Instead, the Alabama legislature chose
to begin the code section by declaring that all contracts
founded, even in part, on a gambling consideration are void.
Not some of them. Not one contract a time. All gambling
contracts are void. The rest of the statute must be read as
flowing from this initial statement. Because such contracts
(all of them) are void, people who lose money at gambling can
get their money back within a short time, and if they do not
do so, then 'any other person' can come along and recover that
money for the use of the family members. There simply is no
prohibition in this statute against the joinder of multiple
10
SC-2024-0454 and SC-2024-0455

claims."

The trial court similarly rejected the defendants' claim that the

nonsignatory plaintiffs should be compelled to arbitrate their claims

against the defendants. The trial court explained that there was no

evidence indicating that these named plaintiffs had ever agreed to any

contract with the defendants. It further explained that the nonsignatory

plaintiffs could not be equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration

because they were not seeking to vindicate any rights that depended on

the existence of a contract containing an arbitration provision. Thus, the

trial court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss and motions to

compel arbitration. The defendants subsequently appealed to this Court.

This Court consolidated the appeals.

Discussion

The primary issue presented by these appeals is whether the trial

court erred in declining to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' claims. The

defendants argue that the nonsignatory plaintiffs in these cases are

obligated to arbitrate their claims against the defendants because, they

say, those claims are derivative of claims that fall within the scope of the

arbitration provisions. According to them, the nonsignatory plaintiffs

11
SC-2024-0454 and SC-2024-0455

stepped into the players' shoes for the purposes of seeking recovery of the

players' funds and, thus, are bound by the arbitration provisions between

the defendants and the players. We agree.

Although our Court acknowleges that, generally "a nonsignatory to

an arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate his or her

claims," UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Johnson, 943 So. 2d 118, 122 (Ala. 2006),

that general rule is not without exceptions. One such exception can be

found in our caselaw considering when the executor or administrator of

an estate may be bound by an arbitration provision executed by the

decedent. See, e.g., SouthTrust Bank v. Ford, 835 So. 2d 990 (Ala. 2002),

and Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661 (Ala. 2004).

In SouthTrust Bank, the decedent entered into a checking-account

contract with SouthTrust Bank. That contract included an arbitration

provision. Before his passing, the decedent and the bank were involved

in a dispute concerning the bank's cashing of an allegedly forged check

that was drawn on the decedent's account. Following the decedent's

death, his daughter, acting as the administratrix of her father's estate,

asserted various claims against SouthTrust Bank related to the bank's

cashing of the allegedly forged check. This Court held that her claim to

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SC-2024-0454 and SC-2024-0455

recover the value of the improperly paid check was subject to arbitration

and explained as follows:

"For the same reason the powers of an executor or an
administrator encompass all of those formerly held by the
decedent, those powers must likewise be restricted in the
same manner and to the same extent as the powers of the
decedent would have been. Thus, where an executor or
administrator asserts a claim on behalf of the estate, he or she
must also abide by the terms of any valid agreement,
including an arbitration agreement, entered into by the
decedent."

Id. at 993-94 (emphasis added).

In Briarcliff, the fiduciary parties for two nursing-home residents

signed admissions contracts containing mandatory arbitration provisions

on behalf of those residents. 894 So. 2d at 663. Following the residents'

deaths, those same parties, acting as personal representatives of the

residents' estates, asserted wrongful-death claims against the nursing

home. Id. Our Court held that, because the residents had been bound by

the arbitration provisions, so too were the personal represenatives of

their estates. As we explained:

" ' We recognize that [a personal
representative] of a decedent's estate stands in the
shoes of the decedent. We also recognize that the
"[p]owers [of a personal representative], in
collecting the debts constituting the assets of the
estate, are just as broad as those of the deceased."
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SC-2024-0454 and SC-2024-0455

For the same reason the powers of an executor or
an administrator encompasses [sic] all of those
formerly held by the decedent, those powers must
likewise be restricted in the same manner and to
the same extent as the powers of the decedent
would have been. Thus, where an executor or
administrator asserts a claim on behalf of the
estate, he or she must also abide by the terms of
any valid agreement, including an arbitration
agreement, entered into by the decedent.'

"[SouthTrust Bank v. Ford, 835 So. 2d 990] at 993-94 [(Ala.
2002)] (citations omitted). Therefore, in this case, [the
personal representatives] are bound by the arbitration
provisions contained in the admission contracts."

Id. at 665 (emphasis added).

Both SouthTrust Bank and Briarcliff embrace the principle that,

because an executor or administrator stands in the decedent's shoes

when asserting claims that are derivative of the decedent's rights, he or

she "must also abide by the terms of any valid agreement, including an

arbitration agreement, entered into by the decedent." SouthTrust Bank,

835 So. 2d at 994. We think this logic applies just as forcefully to the

plaintiffs in these cases.

In reaching this conclusion, we follow other jurisdictions, like

Florida, that require "a non-signatory plaintiff to arbitrate when the

underlying action is 'derivative' of a wrong committed against a signatory

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to an arbitration provision." Lubin v. Starbucks Corp., 122 F.4th 1314,

1322-23 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109

So. 3d 752, 762 (Fla. 2013)). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

explained that under Florida law " ' [ d]erivative claims' are claims where

the plaintiff's right to recover is predicated on another party's right to

recover." Lubin, 122 F.4th at 1323 (citing Laizure, 109 So. 3d at 760).

Lubin referred to this as the "derivative claim doctrine." Lubin, 122 F.4th

at 1322. 2

Here, the plaintiffs' right to recover under § 8-1-150(b) is clearly

2Unlike the court in Laizure or our Court in SouthTrust and
Briarcliff, the Lubin court utlimately found that the claim asserted by
the nonsignatory plaintiff in that case was not derivative. In Lubin, the
nonsignatory plaintiff was the husband of a Starbucks employee and had
asserted certain statutory rights pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1166, which had
been enacted as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act ("COBRA"). 122 F.4th at 1321. Specifically, he alleged that Starbucks
had failed to comply with § 1166(a), which required Starbucks to provide
"each covered employee and spouse" with adequate COBRA notice. The
Lubin court explained that the statute at issue provided the nonsignatory
plaintiff with his own separate right to COBRA notice. Lubin, 122 F.4th
at 1321 (holding that husband had an "independent statutory right to an
adequate COBRA notice"). In contrast to the present cases, the claim
asserted by the nonsignatory plaintiff in Lubin was not premised on a
wrong committed against the signatory to an arbitration agreement but,
instead, was based on the defendant's alleged violation of "a statutory
duty [that] it owed to [the nonsignatory plaintiff] himself, not to his wife."
Id. at 1322.
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SC-2024-0454 and SC-2024-0455

predicated on the players' right to recover under § 8-1-150(a). As

previously noted, § 8-1-150 provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) All contracts founded in whole or in part on a
gambling consideration are void. Any person who has paid
any money or delivered any thing of value lost upon any game
or wager may recover such money, thing, or its value by an
action commenced within six months from the time of such
payment or delivery.

"(b) Any other person may also recover the amount of
such money, thing, or its value by an action commenced
within 12 months after the payment or delivery thereof for the
use of the wife or, if no wife, the children or, if no children, the
next of kin of the loser."

(Emphasis added.)

Section 8-1-150(a) gives the loser a cause of action to recover his or

her money ("Any person who has paid any money … may recover such

money …."). Section 8-1-150(b) authorizes any other person to bring an

action to "also recover" "such money" (that is, the same money) on behalf

of the loser's family in the event that the loser does not invoke his or her

right to recovery.

Claims under § 8-1-150(b) are necessarily derivative because a

plaintiff cannot prevail on such a claim without showing that the alleged

gambler could also have recovered under subsection (a). Thus, the right

created by § 8-1-150(b) depends on the wrong that was directly committed
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against the alleged gambler. In short, a plaintiff can prevail under

§ 8-1-150(b) only if the alleged gambler could have prevailed under § 8-1-

150(a).

And, this is confirmed by the express limitation in the statute to a

single recovery -- whether the claim is brought under subsection (a) or

subsection (b). See § 8-1-150(c) ("A judgment under either subsection (a)

or (b) for the amount of money paid, thing delivered, or its value is a good

defense to any action brought for such money, thing, or its value under

the provisions of the other subsection.").

Here, in bringing their claims under § 8-1-150(b), the plaintiffs are

standing in the legal shoes of the players and are bound by the

arbitration provisions to the same extent as the players. At oral

argument, counsel for the plaintiffs correctly conceded that, had the

players asserted claims under § 8-1-150(a), those claims would be subject

to those provisions. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' derivative claims are

subject to arbitration, and the trial court erred in denying the defendants'

motions to compel arbitration in these cases.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's orders denying

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the defendants' motions to compel arbitration and remand the cases for

the trial court to grant the motions. 3

SC-2024-0454 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

SC-2024-0455 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.

Stewart, C.J., and Mendheim and McCool, JJ., concur in the result.

Sellers, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

3Because our Court concludes that the disputes in these cases must

be arbitrated, we pretermit discussion of the parties' arguments
concerning the trial court's orders denying the defendants' motions to
dismiss.
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SELLERS, Justice (concurring in the result).

Gayla Hamilton Mills and Olivia Taylor Gann ("the plaintiffs")

commenced separate actions against Zynga, Inc., and Huuuge, Inc. ("the

defendants"), respectively, in the Franklin Circuit Court ("the trial

court"), pursuant to § 8-1-150(b), Ala. Code 1975. In their complaints,

the plaintiffs seek to recover unspecified amounts of money lost by

numerous unidentified Alabama citizens, who played the defendants'

casino-themed, social gaming applications during a certain period. They

further assert that the money they seek to recover is for the benefit of the

"families" of the alleged gamblers who paid and lost money. The

defendants moved the trial court to compel arbitration in each case, citing

the arbitration agreements between the defendants and the unidentified

persons who played the defendants' games. The defendants also moved

to dismiss the actions for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court denied both motions. The main

opinion reverses the trial court's orders on the ground that the plaintiffs

are required to arbitrate their claims. Although I agree that the plaintiffs

are required to arbitrate their claims based on the procedural posture of

the cases, I nonetheless concur in the result because, in my opinion, the

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plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action under § 8-1-150(b) and their

complaints should therefore be dismissed. Section 8-1-150 provides, in

relevant part:

"(a) All contracts founded in whole or in part on a
gambling consideration are void. A person who has paid
money or delivered any thing of value lost upon any game or
wager may recover such money, thing, or its value by an
action commenced within six months from the time of such
payment or delivery.

"(b) Any other person may also recover the amount of
such money, thing, or its value by an action commenced
within 12 months after the payment or delivery thereof for the
use of the wife or, if no wife, the children or, if no children, the
next of kin of the loser."

(Emphasis added.)

Here, the plaintiffs seek recovery under the statute for unspecified

amounts of money lost by numerous unidentified Alabama citizens.

However, the use of the definite article "the" before the words "amount"

and "loser" indicates specificity. See 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D.

Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 21:16 (7th ed.

2009) (Supp. 2021-2022 at p. 43) ("The word 'the' is a definite article, and

unlike 'a' or 'an,' that definite article suggests specificity."). Thus, § 8-1-

150(b) contemplates the identity of "the loser" and "the amount" of money

lost through gambling. Moreover, § 8-1-150(a) permits any person who

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has lost money to commence an action to recover that loss within six

months from the time of delivering the money to the winner. If the loser

does not bring an action within six months from the time of that delivery,

then § 8-1-150(b) provides that any other person may recover the amount

of such money by an action commenced within 12 months "after the

payment or delivery thereof for the use of the wife or, if no wife, the

children or, if no children, the next of kin of the loser."4 The plaintiffs do

not allege that a loser failed to commence an action within 6 months from

the time of delivering money to the defendants, nor can they allege that

they timely brought their actions within 12 months after such delivery

without alleging the date of a loss. The right to recover under § 8-1-150(b)

or the right of action depends upon bringing the suit within the time

prescribed. See Bowery v. Babbit, 99 Fla. 1151, 1163, 128 So. 801, 807

(1930)("[W]here a statute confers a right and expressly fixes the period

within which suit to enforce the right must be brought, such period is

treated as the essence of the right to maintain the action, and ... the

4The statutory framework of § 8-1-150(b) is similar to Alabama's

wrongful-death statute insofar as it provides a single plaintiff a cause of
action in a representative capacity to collect damages to distribute on
behalf of statutory beneficiaries, specifically the loser's heirs at law.
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plaintiff or complainant has the burden of affirmatively showing that his

suit was commenced within the period provided."). Here, the complaints

lack the most basic elements necessary to support a cause of action under

§ 8-1-150(b): the plaintiffs are suing on behalf of unidentified parties and

the injury, damages, and relief are undetermined. In short, the

complaints fail to allege that a specific loser lost a certain amount of

money on a certain date. Because the plaintiffs' failure to plead the

statutory requirements is fatal to their claims, their complaints should

ultimately be dismissed. For this reason, I concur in the result.

22