CourtListener 10289340

Full text

Rel: December 6, 2024

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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
_________________________

SC-2024-0081
_________________________

Derrick Crenshaw, as parent and next friend of Iyana
Crenshaw, a minor

Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc.

Appeal from Butler Circuit Court
(CV-23-900074)

BRYAN, Justice.

Derrick Crenshaw ("Crenshaw"), as parent and next friend of Iyana

Crenshaw ("Iyana"), a minor, appeals from the Butler Circuit Court's
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judgment dismissing his negligence action against Sonic Drive In of

Greenville, Inc. ("Sonic"). The circuit court concluded that the exclusive-

remedy provisions of the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act ("the

Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, bar Crenshaw's negligence action.

On appeal, Crenshaw argues that the Act violates Article I, § 13, of the

Alabama Constitution of 2022. We conclude that the Act does not violate

§ 13, and, thus, we affirm.

In July 2023, Crenshaw, as parent and next friend of Iyana, sued

Sonic, alleging a negligence claim. Crenshaw alleged that Iyana was

working for Sonic when she was injured in an accident caused by Sonic's

negligence. Although the complaint alleged that the injury was caused

by an accident "arising out and in the course of Iyana['s] employment"

with Sonic, the complaint did not seek workers' compensation benefits

under the Act; rather, the complaint alleged only the negligence claim.

Sonic filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.,

asserting that Crenshaw's negligence claim is barred by the exclusive-

remedy provisions of the Act, §§ 25-5-52 and -53, Ala. Code 1975. Those

provisions state that, if an employee's injury or death is covered by the

Act, the Act provides the employee's exclusive remedy for that injury or

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death. The first provision, § 25-5-52, states that the Act provides the

exclusive remedy "for an [employee's] injury or death occasioned by an

accident or occupational disease proximately resulting from and while

engaged in the actual performance of the duties of his or her employment

and from a cause originating in such employment or determination

thereof." Similarly, § 25-5-53 provides that, "[t]he rights and remedies

granted in [the Act] to an employee shall exclude all other rights and

remedies of the employee ... at common law, by statute, or otherwise on

account of injury, loss of services, or death." Section 25-5-53 further

provides that, except as provided for under the Act, no employer shall be

civilly liable for an employee's injury or death that is "due to an accident

or to an occupational disease while engaged in the service or business of

the employer, the cause of which accident or occupational disease

originates in the employment."

In response to the motion to dismiss, Crenshaw did not dispute that

Iyana's injury is subject to the Act. Instead, Crenshaw challenged the

Act itself, arguing that it is unconstitutional on various grounds.

Crenshaw served the attorney general with notice of the constitutional

challenges, as required by § 6-6-227, Ala. Code 1975. The attorney

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general filed a brief arguing that the Act is constitutional, and Sonic also

defended the constitutionality of the Act. In February 2024, the circuit

court entered a judgment rejecting Crenshaw's constitutional challenges

and dismissing his negligence action on the ground that the action is

barred by the Act's exclusive-remedy provisions. Crenshaw appealed to

this Court. The attorney general filed an amicus curiae brief in support

of Sonic, and the Alabama Self-Insurers Association and the Alabama

Council of Association Workers' Compensation Self-Insurance Funds also

submitted a joint amici curiae brief in support of Sonic.

Initially, we note that "acts of the legislature are presumed

constitutional." State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (Ala.

2006). " 'In reviewing the constitutionality of a legislative act, this Court

will sustain the act " 'unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt' " ' " that

the act violates the constitution. Id. (quoting Dobbs v. Shelby Cnty.

Econ. & Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So. 2d 425, 428 (Ala. 1999), quoting in

turn White v. Reynolds Metals Co., 558 So. 2d 373, 383 (Ala. 1989),

quoting in turn Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9,

18 So. 2d 810, 815 (1944)).

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On appeal, Crenshaw makes only one of the arguments that he

made below challenging the constitutionality of the Act. Crenshaw

argues that the Act violates Article I, § 13, of the Alabama Constitution

of 2022. Section 13 provides "[t]hat all courts shall be open; and that

every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or

reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right and

justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay." Crenshaw

argues that the Act violates the requirement in § 13 that every person

"shall have a remedy by due process of law" because, he says, there is no

longer a mutual right of a covered employer and an employee to opt out

of coverage under the Act. Crenshaw argues that only an employer, not

an employee, may choose to completely opt out of coverage under the Act.

Crenshaw argues that the Act is unconstitutional in its entirety.

In arguing that the Act is unconstitutional under § 13, Crenshaw

relies heavily on two decisions released by this Court on the same day in

1978, Grantham v. Denke, 359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978), and Pipkin v.

Southern Electrical & Pipefitting Co., 358 So. 2d 1015 (Ala. 1978). In

Grantham, this Court considered the constitutionality of 1975

amendments to the Act that prohibited an injured employee from

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maintaining a tort claim against a co-employee. This Court concluded

that the co-employee-immunity provision barring claims by an injured

employee against a co-employee violated § 13. In relevant part, the Court

stated:

"To permit the … Act by means of the 1975 amendments
… to immunize a co-employee from suit by an injured
employee would deprive him of rights and remedies he
enjoyed under the common law which are preserved under §
13 of our constitution. The Act, adopted in 1919, is a
voluntary substitute for the common law, Alabama
Employer's Liability Act, and other statutory rights of action
for personal injuries against the employer applicable to those
who elect to come within its provisions.[1] Gentry v. Swann
Chemical Co., 234 Ala. 313, 174 So. 530 (1937). It is this
elective option between employer and employee, the parties
being free to accept or reject to operate under and abide by the
Act, that reconciles the Act with § 13 of the Constitution.
Chapman v. Railway Fuel Co., 212 Ala. 106, 101 So. 879
(1924). The election is made upon the basis of a quid pro quo
between employer and employee. Each voluntarily gives up
rights guaranteed by § 13 in exchange for benefits or
protection under the … Act.

"The quid pro quo is solely between employer and
employee. The employee retains his right to sue third parties,
including co-employees. An election by the employee to be

1The Alabama Employers' Liability Act became effective in 1886

and mostly codified the common law regarding the relationship between
an employer and an employee, but it did modify the common law in some
ways. See 1 Terry A. Moore, Alabama Workers' Compensation § 1:6 (2d
ed. 2013).

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bound by the provisions of the Act was an election to
'surrender … rights to any other method, forms, or amount of
compensation or damages' from the employer. Act No. 245,
Reg. Sess., § 10, p. 208, Acts of Alabama, 1919.

"….

"… [Section] 13 of the Alabama Constitution preserves
a right of action of the injured employee against her or his co-
employee as well as preserving a remedy for enforcement of
that right. The right existed at common law against both
employer and co-employee. Enactment of the … Act may
provide an elective substitute for the remedy of enforcement
against the employer in governance of the relationship of
employer-employee. It may not deprive the injured employee
of rights against the co-employee, the actual wrongdoer, for it
offers no elective substitute remedy for enforcement of these
rights. Nor is there any perceived social evil to be eradicated
by legislative exercise of the police power as was the case
regarding our motor vehicle guest statute (§ 95, Tit. 36, Code
1940; § 32-1-2, Code 1975)."

Grantham, 359 So. 2d at 787-88 (emphasis omitted).

This Court released Pipkin on the same day that it released

Grantham. Like Grantham, Pipkin concerned whether an employee

injured at work could maintain a negligence action against a co-

employee. Citing Grantham, the Court in Pipkin stated that the co-

employee-immunity provision was unconstitutional, and, thus, the Court

reversed the summary judgment that had been entered in favor of the co-

employee defendant. However, the Court in Pipkin also made the

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following observation about amendments made to the Act in 1973

concerning the elective nature of the Act:

"Before concluding, we feel compelled to address [the co-
employee defendant's] subtle contention that if the legislature
had the power to repeal the election option under the … Act
and make the Act compulsory through the 1973 amendments,
the legislature, likewise, had the power to immunize a co-
employee from suit by an injured employee. [The co-employee
defendant] submits the Act remained optional until it was
amended in 1973, citing the following language from the title
to the [a]ct effecting the 1973 amendments to support his
contention: '… providing compulsory coverage of subject
employers and employees ….' We disagree.

"Initially, we must make clear that the 1973
amendments, as written, only repealed those sections of the
Code pertaining to the election procedures governing whether
or not the employer and employee would be bound by the
provisions of the Act (§§ 274, 275, 276, Tit. 26, Code 1940).
The repeal of these procedures in no way affected the elective
option between employer and employee existing under the Act
as heretofore defined. The constitutional validity of the Act
rests upon the same being elective rather than compulsory."

358 So. 2d at 1016.

Relying on Grantham and Pipkin, Crenshaw argues that the Act

violates § 13 because, he says, the Act does not contain a mutual elective

option; Crenshaw claims that an employer may opt out of coverage but

that an employee may not. Before examining that argument further,

however, we must discuss this Court's 1988 decision, Reed v. Brunson,

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527 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1988), which is the seminal decision regarding

challenges to the Act made under § 13. In Reed, the Court considered a

1985 amendment to the Act that allowed claims by injured employees

against co-employees if the claims were based on "willful conduct" while

prohibiting all other claims against co-employees, e.g., claims grounded

in negligence or wantonness. See § 25-5-11, Ala. Code 1975 (containing

the co-employee willful-conduct provision adopted in Act No. 85-41, Ala.

Acts 1985). The Court in Reed explained that the Court in Grantham

had used the "common-law-rights approach" in evaluating whether the

co-employee-immunity provision at issue in Grantham violated § 13. The

Court further explained that, in addition to the common-law-rights

approach, this Court had in some cases also used the "vested-rights

approach" in evaluating whether a statutory provision violates § 13. In

a thorough opinion, the Court in Reed applied both the vested-rights

approach and the common-law-rights approach in evaluating whether

the new co-employee willful-conduct provision violated § 13. Because

Reed established the prevailing framework for evaluating challenges to

the Act under § 13, we will discuss it in some detail.

In Reed, this Court stated:

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"In Woodward Iron Co. v. Bradford, 206 Ala. 447, 90 So.
803 (1921) the constitutionality of the … Act was first
challenged. This Court held that, because coverage under the
[A]ct was elective, the employer waived his constitutional
objections by choosing coverage under the [A]ct. The
constitutionality of the [A]ct was again challenged in
Chapman v. Railway Fuel Co., 212 Ala. 106, 101 So. 879
(1924). In Chapman, the Court adopted the rule enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court in New York Central
R.R. v. White, [243 U.S. 188 (1917)]; this Court at 212 Ala. at
109, 101 So. at 881, wrote: '[N]o one has any vested right
under the Constitution to the maintenance of common-law
doctrines in statutory provisions regulating the relations
between employer and employee in respect of rights and
liabilities growing out of accidental injuries'; and 'an act
abolishing rights and defenses, the parties being free to accept
or reject, violates no constitutional rights. All such attacks
upon laws of this character have failed of their purposes.' "

527 So. 2d at 107-08.

The Court then discussed Grantham and explained that, by using

the common-law rights-approach, the Court in Grantham had departed

from the traditional vested-rights approach:

"In Grantham …, the Court held that § 13 of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901 ('That all courts shall be open;
and that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due
process of law; and right and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, or delay') invalidated the portion of the
statute that extended employer immunity to co-employees. In
Grantham, the Court changed its 'vested rights approach' to
Section 13, which it had adopted as far back as Coosa River
Steamboat Co. v. Barclay & Henderson, 30 Ala. 120 (1857);
this approach was reiterated in Peevey v. Cabaniss, 70 Ala.
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253 (1881); in Chapman v. Railway Fuel Co., [212 Ala. 106,
101 So. 879] (1924); in Gentry v. Swann Chemical Co., 234
Ala. 313, 174 So. 530 (1937); and in Pickett v. Matthews, 238
Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939). As recently as 1979, one year
after Grantham, in Mayo v. Rouselle Corp., 375 So. 2d 449,
451 (Ala. 1979), Justice Almon, writing for the Court, with all
Justices concurring, readopted the vested rights approach:

" 'Plaintiff contends that § 13 of the Alabama
Constitution of 1901 compels a finding that Code
1975, § 7-2-725, is unconstitutional. We cannot
agree. This section of the Constitution preserves
to all persons a remedy for accrued or vested
causes of action. Therefore, the right to bring an
action for breach of warranty by a third person can
be modified, limited or repealed as the legislature
sees fit, except where such cause of action has
already accrued. Pickett v. Matthews, 238 Ala.
542, 192 So. 261 (1939).' (emphasis supplied).

"….

"In Grantham, supra, with Chief Justice Torbert and
Justice Maddox dissenting, the Court held that the
Legislature could not grant immunity from suit to a co-
employee in a job-related accident covered by the … Act. The
majority reasoned that co-employee immunity deprives an
injured employee of rights and remedies under the common
law that are preserved under § 13 of the Alabama
Constitution. Though the opinion is silent on this issue, a
review of the record in Grantham reveals that the injuries
occurred after the enactment of Act No. 86, 4th Ex. Sess, Acts
of Alabama 1975[, i.e., the 1975 amendment to the Act at issue
in Grantham]. Therefore, Grantham was a departure from
the 'vested rights approach.' The majority held that the
'elective' option to be bound by the [A]ct reconciled the [A]ct
with § 13 insofar as immunity granted to the employer is
concerned. The election was said to be based on a quid pro
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quo, with each voluntarily giving up rights guaranteed by §
13 in exchange for benefits or protection under the [A]ct;
however, the majority was of the view that there was no quid
pro quo between the negligent co-employee and the injured
employee.

"….

"Without discussion, the Court, in Grantham, [further]
held: 'Nor is there any perceived social evil to be eradicated by
legislative exercise of the police power as was the case
regarding our motor vehicle guest statute.' 359 So. 2d at 788.

"In Fireman's Fund American Insurance Co. v.
Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1980), only Justices Faulkner
and Bloodworth concurred in the majority opinion …. The
majority readopted the reasoning in Grantham and extended
it to allow third-party suits against corporate officers and
supervising employees.

"Justice Shores, in her opinion concurring in the result
in Fireman's Fund, explained that in Grantham the Court had
changed the approach used in testing the constitutionality of
statutes against an Art. I, § 13, attack. The 'vested rights'
approach had been replaced by the 'common-law rights
approach.' She wrote, at page 352:

" 'Legislation which abolishes or alters a
common-law cause of action, then, or its
enforcement through legal process, is
automatically suspect under § 13. It is not,
however, automatically invalid. Grantham itself
restates the established rule that such legislation
will survive constitutional scrutiny if one of two
conditions is satisfied:

" '1. The right is voluntarily
relinquished by its possessor in
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exchange for equivalent benefits or
protection, or

" '2. The legislation eradicates or
ameliorates a perceived social evil and
is thus a valid exercise of the police
power.' "

Reed, 527 So. 2d at 108-10.

The Court in Reed then examined whether the Act was

constitutional using both the vested-rights approach and the common-

law-rights approach:

"I. Vested Rights Approach

"Historically, § 13 ('Every person, for any injury done
him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a
remedy by due process of law ...' (emphasis supplied)) was
viewed to apply only in instances where a litigant had a vested
interest in a particular cause of action. See Chapman v.
Railway Fuel Co., 212 Ala. 106, 101 So. 879 (1924); Mayo v.
Rouselle Corp., [375 So. 2d 449 (Ala. 1979)]; Pickett v.
Matthews, [238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939)].

" 'When a duty has been breached producing a
legal claim for damages, such claimant cannot be
denied the benefit of his claim for the absence of a
remedy. But this provision does not undertake to
preserve existing duties against legislative change
made before the breach occurs. There can be no
claim for damages to the person or property of
anyone except as it follows from the breach of a
legal duty.'

"Pickett, 238 Ala. at 545, 192 So. at 263.
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"Because Reed's injuries occurred after the Act became
law, under the vested rights approach as espoused in Coosa
River Steamboat Co. v. Barclay & Henderson, [30 Ala. 120
(1857)]; Peevey v. Cabaniss, [70 Ala. 253 (1881)]; Chapman v.
Railway Fuel Co., [212 Ala. 106, 101 So. 879 (1924)]; Gentry
v. Swann Chemical Co., [234 Ala. 313, 174 So. 530 (1937)];
Pickett v. Matthews, supra; and Mayo v. Rouselle Corp.,
supra, the Act passes constitutional muster with respect to
Article I, § 13.

"II. The 'Common-law Rights Approach'

"Justice Shores, in her opinion concurring in the result
in Fireman's Fund [American Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 394
So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1980)], with which Justice Almon concurred,
set out the common-law rights approach to reviewing
legislation under § 13:

" '1. The right is voluntarily
relinquished by its possessor in
exchange for equivalent benefits or
protection, or

" '2. The legislation eradicates or
ameliorates a perceived social evil and
is thus a valid exercise of the police
power. [emphasis supplied]

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" 'I find it helpful to think of these
alternatives as two different aspects of the quid
pro quo concept: Thus, a right may be abolished if
the individual possessor receives something in
return for it (the individual quid pro quo dwelt
upon in Grantham), or if society at large receives
a benefit (thereby justifying exercise of the police
power).'

"394 So. 2d at 352."

527 So. 2d at 114-15 (footnote omitted).

The Court in Reed then applied the common-law-rights approach in

testing whether the Act's co-employee willful-conduct provision violated

§ 13. In considering the first condition of the test, i.e., whether the right

is voluntarily relinquished by its possessor in exchange for equivalent

benefits or protection, the Court concluded that "[t]here is a quid pro quo:

remedy for remedy." 527 So. 2d at 115. The Court determined that

"[t]here is a mutuality of immunity" and that "[a]n employee relinquishes

his right to sue his co-employee for negligence or wantonness in exchange

for assurance that he will not be sued by his co-employee for negligence

or wantonness." Id. In this part of its analysis, the Court also addressed

the issue raised in Pipkin concerning whether the Act remained elective

and not mandatory:

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"In Pipkin …, the Court specifically noted that the 1973
amendments to the … Act 'in no way affected the elective
option between employer and employee existing under the Act
as heretofore defined.' The question as to whether the Pipkin
Court erred in this determination is not squarely before us in
the present case. However, for purposes of testing the
constitutionality of the Act in question in this case under the
first prong of the common law rights approach, we will
presume that the conclusion reached by the Court in Pipkin
was the correct one."

Reed, 527 So. 2d at 115 n.7. In a special writing concurring in the result,

Justice Jones disagreed with the position that the 1973 amendments had

not affected the elective option, stating that "[i]t is indeed unfortunate

that all members of this Court cannot agree upon an objective,

indisputable fact -- that § 25-5-54[, Ala. Code 1975,] no longer contains

the 'right to elect' provisions that were part of the … Act from its

inception until the 1973 amendment." 527 So. 2d at 122 n.1 (Jones, J.,

concurring in the result).

The Court then considered whether the second condition of the

common-law-rights test had been satisfied, i.e., whether the " 'legislation

eradicates or ameliorates a perceived social evil and is thus a valid

exercise of the police power.' " Reed, 527 So. 2d at 115 (quoting Fireman's

Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334, 352 (Ala. 1980) (Shores,

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J., concurring in the result)). The Court indicated that the legislature's

authority in this realm is broad:

"When considered in regard to the second condition
enumerated by Justice Shores in Fireman's Fund, the Act also
passes constitutional muster. Justice Beatty, dissenting in
Fireman's Fund, wrote:

" 'The limitations upon the legislature's
exercise of the police power are few; as was said in
Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory,
246 Ala. 1, 13, 18 So. 2d 810 (1944):

" ' "[The police] power must not be
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously,
and there must be some reasonable
relation [between] the regulation and
the ends to be attained. But if upon the
matter men may reasonably differ, in
view of all the circumstances, the
legislative act in the exercise of the
police power must be sustained." '
(emphasis added by Justice Beatty)

"394 So. 2d at 357.

"The legislative findings and intent are set forth in § 25-
5-14, [Ala. Code 1975]. They are explicit. Justice Shores,
concurring in the result in Fireman's Fund, poses the
pertinent question: 'Who is to determine if society at large
receives a benefit by the deprivation of the common law
remedy, the legislature or the courts?' See 394 So. 2d at 352-
53. All questions of 'propriety, wisdom, necessity, utility, and
expediency are held exclusively for the legislative bodies, and
are matters with which the courts have no concern. This
principle is embraced within the simple statement that the
only question for the court to decide is one of power, not of
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expediency or wisdom.' Alabama State Federation of Labor v.
McAdory, supra, 246 Ala. at 9-10, 18 So. 2d at 815.

"This Court has held that the Legislature had the power
to enact the guest statute and deprive a passenger of his
common-law right to sue a host driver for negligence. Pickett
v. Matthews, [238 Ala. 542, 192 So. 261 (1939)]. This Court
has also held that the Legislature had the power to abolish
the common-law actions for alienation of affections and
criminal conversation, after changing mores had rendered
those causes of action obsolete or of no benefit to society.
Henley v. Rockett, 243 Ala. 172, 8 So. 2d 852 (1942).

"The Legislature has found that co-employee suits 'are
producing a debilitating and adverse effect upon efforts to
retain existing, and to attract new industry to this state,' that
they '[place] this state at a serious disadvantage in
comparison to ... other states with whom this state competes
in seeking to attract and retain industrial operations which
would provide better job opportunities and increased
employment for people in this state,' and that they have 'a
disruptive effect upon the relationship among employees and
supervisory and management personnel.' Ala. Code (1975),
25-5-14 (1986 Repl. Vol.). It is certainly within the police
power of the legislature to act to enhance the economic
welfare of the citizens of this state by enhancing harmony in
the work place. All questions of 'propriety, wisdom, necessity,
utility, and expediency' are exclusively for legislative
determination. McAdory, 246 Ala. at 9, 18 So. 2d at 815. The
only question for the Court is whether the Legislature has the
power to eliminate co-employee suits grounded in negligence
or wantonness. We think that the Legislature does have the
police power to eliminate such co-employee suits in an
attempt to eradicate or ameliorate what it perceives to be a
social evil.

"Justice Beatty, dissenting in Fireman's Fund, wrote:

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" 'One firmly ingrained principle of
jurisprudence which seems to have been
overlooked in Grantham and its offspring is the
presumption favoring constitutionality. Alabama
State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, supra. In
McAdory, after noting the plenary power that is
vested in the legislature, it was pointed out at 246
Ala. at 9, 18 So. 2d at 815:

" ' "[I]n passing upon the
constitutionality of a legislative act, the
courts uniformly approach the question
with every presumption and
intendment in favor of its validity, and
seek to sustain rather than strike down
the enactment of a coordinate branch of
government. All these principles are
embraced in the simple statement that
it is the recognized duty of the court to
sustain the act unless it is clear beyond
reasonable doubt that it is violative of
the fundamental law." '

"394 So. 2d at 357."

Reed, 527 So. 2d 115-17.

The Court in Reed then concluded: "Therefore, whether tested by

the traditional test of the vested rights approach or by either prong of the

common-law-rights approach, the Act is not violative of § 13 of the

Alabama Constitution insofar as it abolishes suits against co-employees

for negligence or wantonness." 527 So. 2d at 117.

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Reed established the framework that this Court has used in

evaluating § 13 challenges to the Act similar to the challenge here. For

example, in Murdock v. Steel Processing Services, Inc., 581 So. 2d 846

(Ala. 1991), the wife of an employee injured at work sued the employer,

alleging loss of consortium. Similar to the current case, the trial court

dismissed that tort action on the ground that the Act provides the

exclusive remedy. On appeal, this Court considered whether the

exclusivity provision found in § 25-5-53 of the Act violates § 13. The

Court concluded that "[t]he barring of a claim for loss of consortium under

the exclusivity provisions of § 25-5-53 does not offend § 13 under either

the vested rights approach or the common law approach set forth in Reed

…." Murdock, 581 So. 2d at 848. Similarly, in Kruszewski v. Liberty

Mutual Insurance Co., 653 So. 2d 935 (Ala. 1995), an injured employee

sued a workers' compensation insurance carrier for negligently or

wantonly failing to discover a workplace hazard during a safety

inspection. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the

insurance carrier on the basis of the limited immunity provided to

workers' compensation insurance carriers under § 25-5-11. On appeal,

the employee argued that § 25-5-11 violates § 13. In concluding that §

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25-5-11 is constitutional, the Court, relying on Reed, applied both the

vested-rights approach and the common-law-rights approach. 2 See also

Baugher v. Beaver Constr. Co., 791 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 2000) (applying both

the vested-rights approach and the common-law-rights approach in

examining whether the statute of repose found in § 6-5-220 et seq., Ala.

Code 1975, violates § 13).

Accordingly, we will apply both the vested-rights approach and the

common-law-rights approach in determining whether the Act violates §

13. Crenshaw argues that the vested-rights approach should not be used

in this case. He seems to argue that the vested-rights approach should

be used only if the legislature removes a remedy after a right has vested,

i.e., after the injury in this case. See Crenshaw's brief at 22 n.13. That

is, he seems to say that the vested-rights approach should be used only if

it can successfully be used to strike down the challenged law. However,

2In Yarchak v. Munford, Inc., 570 So. 2d 648 (Ala. 1990), this Court

considered whether the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act violate §
13 insofar as those provisions do not allow a wrongful-death action.
Because a wrongful-death action is purely statutory, i.e., it did not exist
at common law, the Court did not apply the framework applied in Reed
but instead determined only whether the Act's preclusion of a wrongful-
death action was arbitrary and capricious, concluding that it was not.
Yarchak, 570 So. 2d at 649-50.
21
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that is simply not how we have viewed the application of the test, and we

decline to depart from our precedent in this regard. See Reed, Murdock,

Kruszewski, and Baugher.

Under the vested-rights approach, Crenshaw's constitutional

challenge clearly loses. Iyana's workplace injury occurred after the Act

became law. Thus, Crenshaw did not have a vested right in a cause of

action when the Act was enacted. Under the vested-rights approach, the

Act does not violate § 13 because the Act does not deprive Crenshaw of a

vested right in a cause of action. See Reed, Murdock, Kruszewski, and

Baugher.

Crenshaw's constitutional challenge also fails under the common-

law-rights approach. Under the common-law-rights approach, the Act

" 'will survive constitutional scrutiny if one of two conditions
is satisfied:

" '1. The right is voluntarily relinquished by
its possessor in exchange for equivalent benefits or
protection, or

" '2. The legislation eradicates or ameliorates
a perceived social evil and is thus a valid exercise
of the police power.' "

Reed, 527 So. 2d at 115 (quoting Fireman's Fund, 394 So. 2d at 352

(Shores, J., concurring in the result)) (emphasis in Reed omitted).
22
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Crenshaw mostly focuses on the first condition above. As noted,

Crenshaw relies on Grantham, in which this Court stated that "[i]t is

th[e] elective option between employer and employee, the parties being

free to accept or reject to operate under and abide by the Act, that

reconciles the Act with § 13 of the Constitution." 359 So. 2d at 787.

Crenshaw also cites Pipkin, in which the Court stated that "[t]he

constitutional validity of the Act rests upon the same being elective

rather than compulsory." 358 So. 2d at 1016. Crenshaw contends that,

contrary to the assertion made by the Court in Pipkin, the 1973

amendments to the Act removed the elective option for both employers

and employees; that 1992 amendments to the Act restored the elective

option for employers but not for employees; that there is therefore no

longer a mutual right to opt out of coverage under the Act; and, thus, that

the Act is unconstitutional under § 13.

It does not appear that Sonic or the amici dispute Crenshaw's

contention that there is no longer a mutual right to opt out of coverage

under the Act, and we essentially agree with Crenshaw on this point.

The 1973 amendments removed those provisions of the Act providing a

procedure by which employers and employees could opt out of the Act,

23
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thus essentially removing the elective option. As Justice Jones noted in

his special writing in Reed, as of 1988 (when Reed was released), "§ 25-

5-54[, Ala. Code 1975,] no longer contain[ed] the 'right to elect' provisions

that were part of the ... Act from its inception until the 1973 amendment."

527 So. 2d at 122 n.1 (Jones, J., concurring in the result). However, the

1992 amendments returned the employer's choice to opt out of coverage.

See Ala. Acts 1992, Act No. 92-537. Before the 1992 amendments, § 25-

5-54, Ala. Code 1975, provided that "[a]ll contracts of employment ... shall

be presumed to have been made with reference to and subject to the

provisions of this article[, i.e., Article 3 of the Act, §§ 25-5-50 through -93,

Ala. Code 1975, concerning compensation for injury or death caused by

work-related accidents]." Following the 1992 amendments, § 25-5-54

now provides that "[e]very employer and employee, except as otherwise

specifically provided in this article, shall be presumed to have accepted

and come under this article." The 1992 amendments amended § 25-5-50,

Ala. Code 1975, to allow employers the option to reject coverage under

the Act; § 25-5-50(a), which has been amended several times more times

since 1992, now provides, in relevant part, that

"an employer electing not to accept coverage under this
article[, i.e., Article 3 of the Act, §§ 25-5-50 through -93, Ala.
24
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Code 1975, concerning compensation for injury or death
caused by work-related accidents,] and Article 4 of [the Act,
i.e., §§ 25-5-110 through -123, Ala. Code 1975, concerning
compensation for injury or death caused by work-related
occupational diseases,] shall notify in writing each employee
of the withdrawal of coverage. Additionally, the employer
shall post a notice in a conspicuous place notifying all
employees and applicants for employment that workers'
compensation insurance coverage is not available."

The Act contains no parallel provision to § 25-5-50(a) generally

allowing an employee to opt out of coverage under the Act. We do note

one small exception, however. A corporate officer who works for a

corporation under a "contract of hire" would be considered an employee

of the corporation under the Act. Ex parte A-O Mach. Co., 749 So. 2d

1268 (Ala. 1999). Section 25-5-50(b) provides, in part, that "an officer of

a corporation or individual limited liability company member may elect

to be exempt from coverage by filing written certification of the election

with the employer's insurance carrier." Thus, although employees

generally may not opt of coverage under the Act, an employee who is also

an officer of a corporation or an individual limited-liability company

member may elect to be exempt from coverage under § 25-5-50. See

Hooks v. Coastal Stone Works, Inc., 164 So. 3d 592 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)

(concluding that a corporate officer who had elected to be exempt from

25
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coverage under § 25-5-50(b) was not entitled to benefits under the Act

following a subsequent work-related injury). Thus, with the exception of

the narrow opt-out provision in § 25-5-50(b), the Act allows an employer

to opt out of coverage but does not allow an employee to do the same. See

also Ward v. Check Into Cash of Alabama, LLC, 981 So. 2d 434, 437 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2007) (noting that, under § 25-5-50(a), "covered employers may

still 'opt out' of coverage"). 3

The parties and the amici spend a good part of their briefs arguing

about how the absence of a mutual right to opt out of coverage under the

Act affects the evaluation of the first condition under the common-law-

rights approach, i.e., whether a right is voluntarily relinquished in

exchange for equivalent benefits or protection. On this issue, the parties

and amici focus on Grantham and Pipkin, debating the precise holdings

of those decisions and whether the analysis in those decisions was

3In his special writing in Reed, Justice Jones stated that he had

found only one reported decision "in which the employer (to its dismay)
was held to have effectively elected not to be covered" under the Act:
Belcher v. Chapman, 242 Ala. 653, 7 So. 2d 859 (1942). 527 So. 2d at 122
n.2. We have found no additional decisions in which an employer has
elected to not be covered under the Act.

26
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correct. However, we need not grapple with those issues in this case

because, under the common-law-rights approach, the Act is

constitutional if either of that test's two conditions are satisfied. Reed,

527 So. 2d at 115. Because the second condition, i.e., the police-power

condition, is easily satisfied here, we pretermit discussion of the first

condition.

Under the second condition of the common-law-rights approach, the

Act will pass constitutional muster under § 13 if it " 'eradicates or

ameliorates a perceived social evil and is thus a valid exercise of the

police power.' " Reed, 527 So. 2d at 115. In Reed and subsequent

decisions, this Court has given much deference to the legislature in

evaluating whether the second condition of the test has been met. In

Reed, this Court began its analysis of the second condition by observing

that

"Justice Beatty, dissenting in Fireman's Fund, wrote:

" 'The limitations upon the legislature's
exercise of the police power are few; as was said in
Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory,
246 Ala. 1, 13, 18 So. 2d 810 (1944):

" ' "[The police] power must not be
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously,
and there must be some reasonable
27
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relation [between] the regulation and
the ends to be attained. But if upon the
matter men may reasonably differ, in
view of all the circumstances, the
legislative act in the exercise of the
police power must be sustained." '
(emphasis added by Justice Beatty)

"394 So. 2d at 357."

527 So. 2d at 116. The Court in Reed later noted that " [a]ll questions of

'propriety, wisdom, necessity, utility, and expediency' are exclusively for

legislative determination." 527 So. 2d at 116 (quoting McAdory, 246 Ala.

at 9, 18 So. 2d at 815). Later in its analysis, the Court stated:

"Justice Beatty, dissenting in Fireman's Fund, wrote:

it is the recognized duty of the court to
sustain the act unless it is clear beyond
reasonable doubt that it is violative of
the fundamental law." '

"394 So. 2d at 357."

Reed, 527 So. 2d 116-17.

It does not appear that this Court has precisely considered whether

the enactment of the Act as a whole eradicated or ameliorated a perceived

social evil and was thus a valid exercise of the legislature's police power.

In Reed, the Court considered the narrower issue of the enactment of the

co-employee willful-conduct provision found in § 25-5-11. The legislature

provided explicit findings supporting its decision to adopt that provision,

making it easy for this Court to uphold the provision. See § 25-5-14, Ala.

Code 1975; and Reed, 527 So. 2d at 116. Following Reed, this Court in

Murdock, in the context of an employee's spouse's tort claim for loss of

consortium, considered whether the enactment of the exclusive-remedy

provision found in § 25-5-53 was a valid exercise of the legislature's police

power. In the current case, although Crenshaw frames his constitutional

challenge as one attacking the Act as a whole, the challenge may also be

characterized more narrowly as one challenging the Act's exclusive-

remedy provisions, given that Crenshaw's negligence claim directly
29
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challenges those provisions. Thus, the current case and Murdock, which

also concerned an attempt to maintain a tort claim barred by the

exclusive-remedy provisions, are analogous. In Murdock, this Court

demonstrated substantial deference to the legislature with this succinct

analysis in considering the police-power condition of the test:

"The intent of the Alabama Legislature in adopting the
exclusivity provisions of the … Act was 'to provide complete
immunity to employers and limited immunity to officers,
directors, agents, servants or employees of the same employer
... from civil liability for all causes of action except those based
on willful conduct.' § 25-5-14. The Legislature added: '[S]uch
immunity is an essential aspect of the workers' compensation
scheme. The legislature hereby expressly reaffirms its intent,
as set forth in section 25-5-53, as amended herein, and
sections 25-5-144 and 25-5-194, regarding the exclusivity of
the rights and remedies of an injured employee, except as
provided herein.' Section 25-5-14.

"The question of whether to exclude loss of consortium
claims against employers was for the Legislature. The
Legislature spoke, by enacting the exclusivity provisions.
There is nothing in the Alabama Constitution that bars the
Legislature from treating a husband and wife as an entity for
such purposes."

581 So. 2d at 848.

Following Murdock, this Court in Kruszewski considered the

constitutionality of § 25-5-11 insofar as it granted limited immunity to

workers' compensation insurance carriers. The Court's discussion of the

30
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second consideration under the common-law-rights approach was even

more succinct than the discussion in Murdock:

"Our consideration of the second condition requires the
same conclusion[, i.e., that the provision is constitutional]. As
in Reed …, the only question for this Court in the present case
is whether the Legislature has the power to eliminate actions
by employees against workers' compensation insurance
carriers based on negligence or wantonness. We hold that it
has such power."

Kruszewski, 653 So. 2d at 938. Thus, with respect to § 13 challenges

evaluated under the common-law-rights approach, this Court has shown

considerable deference to the legislature in deciding whether the

legislature has validly exercised its police power regarding the Act. Reed,

Murdock, and Kruszewski.

In passing the Act, the legislature validly exercised its police power

by eradicating or ameliorating a perceived social evil. The Court in Reed

discussed the problems that the Act was designed to address:

"It is prudent to view the Act in its historical
perspective. To do so, it is necessary for us to view American
workmen's compensation acts in their historical perspective.
The growth of the Industrial Revolution resulted in many job-
related injuries for which compensation was sought in the
courts. The common law was not kind to these actions, and
the vast majority of the claims were defeated by the common-
law defenses of assumption of the risk, contributory
negligence, and the fellow-servant doctrine. 1A A. Larson,
The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 4.30 (1972). The non-
31
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responsiveness of the common law to an idea whose time had
come caused legislators to devise a compromise system for the
recovery of compensation for job related injuries and deaths."

527 So. 2d at 105. Similarly, this Court in Ex parte City of Guntersville,

728 So. 2d 611, 615-16 (Ala. 1998), observed:

"[W]e must look to the origins and purposes of [the Act]. As
Professor Larson has written, '[t]he necessity for workers'
compensation legislation arose out of the coincidence of a
sharp increase in industrial accidents attending the rise of the
factory system and a simultaneous decrease in the employee's
common-law remedies for his or her injuries.' 1 Arthur
Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation
Law, § 4.00 (1997). In an effort to meet changing societal
needs more efficiently than they were being met by the
common law and early statutory law, the states began
enacting workers' compensation statutes, in their modern
form, in the first part of [the 20th] century. Larson, § 5.30. In
doing so, the states created a new system that was delicately
balanced between the interests of employees and the interests
of employers. Under this new system, the employer is
automatically responsible for paying medical and disability
benefits to employees who are injured on the job. '[T]he
employee and his or her dependents, in exchange for ... modest
but assured benefits, give up their common-law right to sue
the employer for damages for any injury covered by the act....'
Larson, § 1.10(e)."

In his exhaustive treatise, Alabama Workers' Compensation, Judge

Terry Moore discusses the problems that the Act was intended to address:

"To thoroughly understand the genesis of Alabama's
workers' compensation laws, the history of American workers'
compensation law must first be considered.

32
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"The Alabama Workers' Compensation Act is hardly a
product of a unique legislative movement in this state.
Instead, the Act resulted from the harsh realities of
industrialization and the inadequacies of the common-law
system that affected almost the entire Western world at the
turn of the 20th century.

"Industrial development in the late 1800s transformed
the relatively safe and individualized workplace into an often-
dangerous and densely populated site. In urban factories,
workers increasingly became the victims of modernization,
suffering an increasing amount of injuries related to their
work. In leading industrial nations, it soon became apparent
that the price of updating their economies was the safety of
the common laborer. Statistics from this time show that the
number of accidents at the workplace skyrocketed and that
more and more of these accidents involved industry-related
hazards.

"The law provided little relief for the victims of
industrial accidents. During this age of great economic
expansion, decisional and statutory law lagged behind
economic realities. The common law that regulated employer-
employee relations had developed staid rules that may have
effectively regulated the relationship of master and servant
but were not suited to regulating the relationship between a
capitalist and his or her proletariat. As a result, employers
rarely incurred legal liability for work-related personal
injuries and deaths of employees.

"The main inadequacy of the common law at this time
lay in its continuing reliance on the notion of fault. Under the
presiding law of the late 19th and early 20th century, an
employee could not recover from his or her employer without
proving the latter's negligence. The problem facing injured
workers becomes quite apparent when one considers that over
70% of all industrial accidents during this time did not result
primarily from the employer's negligence. Because the
33
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employee could not meet the burden of proving the employer's
fault, in the vast majority of cases, the courts denied damages.
As a whole, workers injured in industrial accidents failed to
find any substantial relief in the case law of the time.
Consequently, early industrial workers and their families
were forced by judicial doctrine to bear the brunt of the costs
of their own unfortunate accidents."

1 Terry A. Moore, Alabama Workers' Compensation § 1:1 (2d ed. 2013)

(footnotes omitted).

Judge Moore further discusses circumstances existing before the

adoption of the Act in 1919:

"Assuming an injured worker could convince a judge
that the defendant owed him or her a legal duty, Alabama
courts strictly required that the worker prove that the
defendant had breached the standard of care. An employee
who could not prove that the employer had acted negligently
could not recover damages. By adhering to the concept of
fault, Alabama courts assured that most workers who were
injured on the job would not receive financial relief from
employers. In most cases, employment-related injuries did
not arise out of the employer's negligence but were caused by
unforeseeable occurrences or other causes aside from the
employer's negligence. By relying on the concept of negligence
in employer liability cases, the Alabama courts practically
foreclosed employees from meaningful redress for the injuries
they suffered due to their employment.

"… A sudden termination of income resulted in the
employee's inability to seek a common-law remedy because
the employee could not afford legal fees or endure the two-
year waiting period for resolution of the case. …"
_______________________________________

34
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"Common-law defenses presented another devastating
legal impediment to employees. Application of the fellow-
servant rule, the doctrine of contributory negligence, and the
defense of assumption of risk precluded recovery in many
cases even when the employee could prove the breach of a
duty by an employer. These affirmative defenses proved so
overwhelming to employees that the legislature specifically
targeted them as a justification for imposing the first
workmen's compensation act in this state."

Moore, § 1:4 and § 1:5 (footnotes omitted).

Judge Moore also observes how the Act was intended to address

problems faced by employers as well:

"While generally favoring the provision of compensation
to injured workers, the Act at the same time is intended to
insulate the employer from wasteful litigation and
extravagant verdicts. The Act dispenses with most of the
issues of liability and damages that prompted employers to
incur litigation costs in defense of common-law actions. More
importantly, the statute eliminates employer liability for pain
and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, and
punitive damages in most cases. Under the statute, the
employee generally is entitled only to medical expenses,
limited compensation for lost wages and disability, and, in
some cases, vocational rehabilitation costs. In exchange for
this compensation, the employee and his or her dependents
surrender rights to sue the employer for additional common-
law damages, and the employer is generally immunized from
further liability."

Moore, § 2:7 (footnotes omitted). See also Chapman v. Railway Fuel Co.,

212 Ala. 106, 109, 101 So. 879, 881 (1924) (quoting Jensen v. Southern

Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 524, 109 N.E. 600, 602 (1915), rev'd on other
35
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grounds, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)) (" '[A workers' compensation act] protects

both employer and employee, the former from wasteful suits and

extravagant verdicts, the latter from the expense, uncertainties, and

delays of litigation in all cases, and from the certainty of defeat if unable

to establish a case of actionable negligence.' ").

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the legislature acted

within its police power in passing the Act, thus satisfying the second

condition under the common-law-rights approach. The Act is

constitutional under both the vested-rights approach and the common-

law-rights approach. Thus, we affirm the circuit court's judgment

dismissing Crenshaw's negligence action on the ground that it is barred

by the Act's exclusive-remedy provisions.

AFFIRMED.

Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ.,

concur.

Mitchell, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

Cook, J., recuses himself.

36
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur in the main opinion, which faithfully applies our

precedents. I write separately because I am concerned that some of those

precedents conflict with the original public meaning of Article I, § 13, of

the Alabama Constitution. As best I can tell, Article I, § 13, was

originally understood to guard against the corruption of justice. But in a

line of cases beginning in the 1970s, our Court has relied on Article I, §

13, to declare a statute "automatically suspect" if it alters a common-law

remedy. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d

334, 352 (Ala. 1980) (Shores, J., concurring in the result); Grantham v.

Denke, 359 So. 2d 785 (Ala. 1978); Pipkin v. Southern Elect. & Pipefitting

Co., 358 So. 2d 1015 (Ala. 1978). In my view, those cases may have

unmoored Article I, § 13, from its text and original understanding.

Therefore, I would welcome the opportunity to revisit those precedents in

a future case, where a party asks us to do so and provides strong briefing

in support of that request.

For now, we have been presented with an excellent amicus brief by

the Alabama Attorney General's Office. This is an optimal starting point.

37
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Relying on this brief and the additional research I have been able to

conduct, here are the issues as I presently see them.

Article I, § 13, states "[t]hat all courts shall be open; and that every

person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation,

shall have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be

administered without sale, denial, or delay." Ala. Const. 2022, Art. I, §

13. This provision, in nearly identical form, has been included in each of

Alabama's seven constitutions since 1819. And 39 of our sister states

contain comparable "open courts" clauses. Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the

Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State

Constitutions, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1279 (1995).

These clauses draw on Magna Carta as interpreted by Sir Edward

Coke. Id. at 1281. In fact, our Court has itself noted that Article I, § 13,

"is known to have been taken in substance from" Magna Carta. Swann

v. Kidd, 79 Ala. 431, 432 (1885). Coke's interpretation of Magna Carta

stressed the independence of the judiciary and the importance of

protecting justice from corruption. He wrote that Magna Carta's early

"open courts" provision protected the right of "every subject of this

realme, for injury done to him … [to] take his remedy by the course of the

38
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law, and have justice, and right for the injury done to him, freely without

sale, fully without any deniall, and speedily without delay." Sir Edward

Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, 55-56

(1642).

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania relied on Coke's writing when

drafting its first "open courts" provision in 1790, which was a precursor

to Article I, § 13.4 Hoffman, By the Course of the Law at 1294 n.96; Penn

Const. Art. IX, § 11 (1790). The Pennsylvania provision stated "[t]hat all

courts shall be open, and every man, for an injury done him in his lands,

goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by the due course of law,

and right and justice administered, without sale, denial or delay." Penn.

Const. Art. IX, § 11 (1790). It was adopted against the backdrop of heated

opposition to the Crown's interference with the colonial courts --

opposition that ultimately played a role in instigating the American

Revolution. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law at 1300-07. In fact,

4This was the first "open courts" provision adopted by a State after

ratification of the United States Constitution. Delaware had adopted a
similar provision immediately after the signing of the Declaration of
Independence but before the adoption of the United States Constitution.
Hoffman, By the Course of the Law at 1307-11.
39
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during this same period of turmoil on the eve of the Revolution, colonial

leaders extensively referenced Coke's writings on Magna Carta. Id.

Courts have since recognized, based in part on Coke's

interpretation, that the relevant "open courts" provision of Magna Carta

was designed to protect against the abuse of justice. See, e.g.,

Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 101 Wis. 343, 347, 77 N.W. 174,

175 (1898). For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court understood this

language to prohibit the Crown's use of arbitrary power and bribery to

pervert the course of justice. Id. The Oklahoma and Rhode Island

Supreme Courts similarly read Coke’s interpretation of Magna Carta to

" 'abolish, not fixed fees, prescribed for the purposes of revenue, but the

fines which were anciently paid to expedite or delay law proceedings and

procure favor.' " In re Lee, 64 Okla. 310, 312, 168 P. 53, 55 (1917) (quoting

Perce v. Hallett, 13 R.I. 363, 364 (1881)). In addition, the Connecticut

Supreme Court interpreted Magna Carta to prohibit "the practice by a

corrupt judiciary of demanding gratuities for giving or withholding

decisions in pending cases." Doe v. State, 216 Conn. 85, 97, 579 A.2d 37,

43 (1990).

40
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Our Court's "common-law rights" interpretation of Article I, § 13,

does not appear to reflect this historical understanding. The "common-

law rights" approach is based on the premise that "[l]egislation which

abolishes or alters a common-law cause of action … is automatically

suspect" under Article I, § 13. Fireman's Fund, 394 So. 2d at 352 (Shores,

J., concurring in the result). Under this approach, a statute will survive

scrutiny only if "one of two conditions is satisfied": (1) "[t]he right is

voluntarily relinquished by its possessor in exchange for equivalent

benefits or protection," or (2) "[t]he legislation eradicates or ameliorates

a perceived social evil and is thus a valid exercise of the police power."

Id. In other words, the "common-law rights" approach reads Article I, §

13, to curtail the Legislature's right to modify existing remedies.

But I see nothing in the text or history of Article I, § 13, to suggest

that it was intended to "freeze traditional common-law remedies."

Hoffman, By the Course of the Law at 1288. Rather, Article I, § 13,

appears to exist to preserve the independence of the courts and to ensure

that justice is not arbitrarily denied. Nothing more. And if Article I, § 13,

does not limit the Legislature's ability to alter common-law remedies,

then the "common-law rights" approach to interpreting Article I, § 13,

41
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may be unfounded. Because we must "interpret the Alabama

Constitution … in accordance with its original public meaning," Barnett

v. Jones, 338 So. 3d 757, 766 (Ala. 2021) (Mitchell, J., concurring

specially), this may indicate that we should abandon the "common-law

rights" test going forward.

Derrick Crenshaw, as parent and next friend of Iyana Crenshaw, a minor v. Sonic Drive In of Greenville, Inc. (Appeal from Butler Circuit Court: CV-23-900074).

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