Shymikka Griggs v. NHS Management, LLC (Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-23-902261).

Rel: November 15, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025
____________________

SC-2023-0784
____________________

Shymikka Griggs

v.

NHS Management, LLC

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-23-902261)

PARKER, Chief Justice.

This appeal arises from the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of

Shymikka Griggs's data-breach action against NHS Management, LLC

("NHS"), a consulting firm that provides management services for
SC-2023-0784

nursing homes and physical-rehabilitation facilities. Because Griggs fails

to demonstrate that she sufficiently pleaded her claims, we affirm the

circuit court's judgment.

I. Facts

The relevant facts are set forth in Griggs's complaint. NHS provides

administrative services for nursing homes and physical-rehabilitation

facilities in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, and Missouri. In providing

those services, NHS collects sensitive personal-identification information

and personal-health information from employees, patients, and vendors

at each of the facilities that it services. The information that NHS collects

includes the following:

• Name, address, phone number, and email address;

• Date of birth;

• Demographic information;

• Social Security number;

• Driver's license number;

• Information relating to individual medical history;

• Insurance information and coverage;

• Health information;
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• Information concerning a patient/resident's doctor, nurse, or
other medical providers;

• Photo identification;

• Employer information;

• Payment information; and

• Similar information for patient/residents' family members or
guardians.

In May 2021, NHS discovered what it described as a "sophisticated

cyberattack" on its computer network (hereinafter "the data breach"). An

investigation revealed that cybercriminals had had unfettered access to

NHS's network for 80 days between February and May 2021. In October

2021, NHS notified the United States Department of Health and Human

Services of the data breach.

In March 2022, NHS notified the individuals whose data was

potentially accessed of the data breach, including Griggs, a former

employee of NHS. In its notice, NHS notified the potential victims that

the breached information included their names, dates of birth, Social

Security numbers, medical information, and health-insurance

information.

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It appears that Griggs initially filed a class-action complaint

against NHS in the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Alabama, but she later voluntarily dismissed her complaint. In June

2023, Griggs filed a class-action complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court.

In her complaint, Griggs alleged that, after she received NHS's letter

notifying her of the data breach, she was notified by Credit Karma, a

credit-monitoring service, that her personal-identification information

would be found on many different sites on the "dark web." She also

alleged that she spent considerable time working with Credit Karma to

freeze her credit and to correct errors on her credit report. She further

alleged that, since the data breach, she has been receiving a high number

of spam emails, calls, and texts and that she often received more than

three spam calls or texts in the same day. Griggs alleged that she

received several calls from the fraud department at Apple, Inc., asking

whether she had made certain Apple product purchases worth about

$3,000 that she had not made. She has also received harassing phone

calls and emails stating that she owes money for "payday loans" that she

does not owe. She alleged that those payday loans had resulted from the

sale of her personal information on the "dark web" after the data breach.

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Griggs also alleged that she spends about 15 minutes every day

monitoring her financial accounts and that she anticipated spending

more time and money to mitigate harm caused by the data breach. She

further alleged that all persons whose personal-identification and health

information had been compromised in the data breach have suffered and

will continue to suffer similar damage.

In her class-action complaint, Griggs asserted claims of negligence,

negligence per se, breach of contract, invasion of privacy, unjust

enrichment, breach of confidence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation

of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 8-19-1 et seq., Ala. Code

1975. Griggs requested various forms of equitable relief, compensatory

damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and pre- and postjudgment interest.

In August 2023, NHS moved to dismiss Griggs's complaint. In its

motion, NHS argued that Griggs could not establish "standing" because

the injuries she alleged were not injuries in fact. NHS also argued that

Griggs had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On

October 10, 2023, the circuit court dismissed Griggs's complaint

"pursuant to Rule 12(b)," Ala. R. Civ. P., with prejudice. Griggs appeals.

II. Standard of Review

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In NHS's motion to dismiss, it argued that Griggs's claims were due

to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction because, it said, Griggs had failed to allege an injury

in fact. NHS also argued that Griggs's claims were due to be dismissed

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. In its order dismissing Griggs's claims, the circuit court stated

that it was doing so "pursuant to Rule 12(b)."

Although the circuit court did not expressly indicate which of the

grounds for dismissal listed in Rule 12(b) was applicable, it dismissed

Griggs's claims with prejudice. Griggs conceded at oral argument before

this Court that the circuit court's dismissal of her claims with prejudice

means that it dismissed her claims on the merits, because dismissal for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is generally regarded as being without

prejudice. See Ex parte Capstone Dev. Corp., 779 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. 2000)

(holding that a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is treated

as a dismissal without prejudice). Accordingly, we address only whether

Griggs sufficiently pleaded her claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

When reviewing an order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), this

Court applies the following standard of review:

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"On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption
of correctness. Jones v. Lee County Commission, 394 So. 2d
928, 930 (Ala. 1981); Allen v. Johnny Baker Hauling, Inc., 545
So. 2d 771, 772 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989). The appropriate
standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, when the
allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the
pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any
set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief. Raley v.
Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala.
1985); Hill v. Falletta, 589 So. 2d 746 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991). In
making this determination, this Court does not consider
whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether
she may possibly prevail. Fontenot v. Bramlett, 470 So. 2d
669, 671 (Ala. 1985); Rice v. United Ins. Co. of America, 465
So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Ala. 1984). We note that a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim
that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Garrett v. Hadden,
495 So. 2d 616, 617 (Ala. 1986); Hill v. Kraft, Inc., 496 So. 2d
768, 769 (Ala. 1986)."

Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993).

III. Analysis

Griggs contends that she sufficiently pleaded each of her claims. As

noted above, Griggs asserted claims of negligence, negligence per se,

breach of contract, invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, breach of

confidence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Alabama

Deceptive Trade Practices Act. In her response to NHS's motion to

dismiss, Griggs conceded that her claim alleging violation of the Alabama

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Deceptive Trade Practices Act was due to be dismissed. Griggs also

appears to have abandoned her breach-of-contract claim because she did

not address that claim in her brief on appeal. Ex parte Riley, 464 So. 2d

92, 94 (Ala. 1985) ("[I]t has long been the law in Alabama that failure to

argue an issue in brief to an appellate court is tantamount to the waiver

of that issue on appeal."). Thus, those claims are not before us.

A. Negligence

To sufficiently plead a negligence claim, Griggs had to allege (1)

that NHS owed her a duty, (2) that NHS breached that duty, (3) that

NHS's breach of duty caused her damage, and (4) that she incurred

damages. See Prill v. Marrone, 23 So. 3d 1, 6 (Ala. 2009) (" 'The elements

of a negligence claim are a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and

damage.' " (citation omitted)).

First, Griggs contends that she sufficiently alleged that NHS owed

her a duty. She points to the following allegations in her complaint:

• "[NHS] had clearly-defined and mandatory obligations created by

HIPAA, [i.e., the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability

Act] contract, industry standards, common law, and

representations made to [Griggs] and Class Members, to keep their

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Personal Information confidential and to protect it from

unauthorized access and disclosure."

• "[NHS] has obligations created by HIPAA, industry standards[,]

and common law to keep Class Members' Personal Information

confidential and to protect it from unauthorized access and

disclosure."

• "NHS is a business associate of a 'covered entity' under HIPAA.

Business associates of covered entities must implement safeguards

to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of [Personal

Health Information]. Safeguards must include physical, technical

and administrative components."

• "NHS's duty included a responsibility to implement processes by

which [it] could detect a breach of its security systems in a

reasonably expeditious period of time and to give prompt notice to

those affected in the case of a cyberattack."

• "[NHS's] duty of care to use reasonable security measures arose due

to the special relationship that existed between it and the Class,

which is recognized by laws and regulations including but not

limited to HIPAA, as well as common law. [NHS] was in a position

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to ensure that its systems were sufficient to protect against the

foreseeable risk of harm to Class Members from a cyberattack and

data breach."

Griggs fails to demonstrate that those allegations were sufficient to

allege that NHS owed her a duty under Alabama law. The only authority

that Griggs cites in this section of her principal brief is Martin v. Arnold,

643 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1994), which she cites for the elements of a

negligence claim. However, as this Court has repeatedly held, citing

authority merely for the elements of a cause of action is generally not

sufficient to argue in an appellate brief that the allegations in a

complaint met the pleading standard regarding each element. See Davis

v. Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc., 965 So. 2d 1076 (Ala. 2007), and S.B. v.

Saint James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72 (Ala. 2006) (overruled on other grounds,

as recognized in Flickinger v. King, 385 So. 3d 504, 517 (Ala. 2023)). In

Davis, a widow sued her sons and the family's financial-management

firm, asserting claims of negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy (among

other claims), after the sons allegedly stole the funds from their deceased

father's IRA and the firm failed to prevent the theft. The trial court

entered a summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the widow

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argued that she had presented substantial evidence of negligence and

wantonness. However, the only legal authority that the widow cited to

support her negligence claim was the traditional four-element test of

negligence. Brief of the widow, p. 45, in Davis, supra.1 This Court held

that a "citation to a statute and a general principle of law, along with a

conclusory statement that [the widow had] presented substantial

evidence to support her [negligence and wantonness] claims" did not

satisfy Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P. Davis, 965 So. 2d at 1092-93.

Likewise, as to her conspiracy claim, her brief "quote[d] a general

proposition of the law of conspiracy" from a previous decision, followed by

a conclusory assertion that the defendants had conspired to take the

action that was the basis of her claim. Davis, 965 So. 2d at 1092.

Similarly, in S.B., this Court reviewed a summary judgment in

favor of a private school and its administrator on certain negligence

claims asserted against them by the parents of certain students. In

particular, the plaintiffs claimed that the school was negligent in failing

to prevent students from uploading pornographic images onto the

1" '[T]his court takes judicial knowledge of its own records.' " Austill

v. Prescott, 293 So. 3d 333, 339 n.6 (Ala. 2019) (citation omitted).
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computers in the school's computer lab. In their brief on appeal

challenging the summary judgment, the plaintiffs cited "a single case"

that "merely sets forth the general duty a school owes to its students."

S.B., 959 So. 2d at 89. "Aside from the single case cited, the [plaintiffs

did] not discuss or cite any authority relative to their negligence claims."

Id. Instead, the argument in their brief "consist[ed] primarily of a series

of factual statements and conclusory statements of liability on the part

of [the school and its administrator], with no real explanation as to how

or why [the school and its administrator were] liable." Id. Accordingly,

we concluded that the plaintiffs' argument failed to comply with Rule

28(a)(10).

Like the appellants' arguments in Davis and S.B., Griggs's

argument before this Court is deficient. Davis and S.B., like this case,

presented legal theories in which the existence of a duty was not

necessarily obvious. Under such circumstances, citation to the traditional

negligence test alone constitutes citation to only a general proposition of

law. Aside from her lone citation to Martin, Griggs merely quotes the

allegations in her complaint. Griggs's argument that NHS owed her a

duty to safeguard her personal information or to timely notify her after

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it discovered the data breach fails to comply with Rule 28(a)(10). Horn v.

Fadal Machining Ctrs., LLC, 972 So. 2d 63, 80 (Ala. 2007) (holding that

authority supporting only general propositions of law is not sufficient to

satisfy Rule 28(a)(10) and that, when no authority is cited, the effect is

the same as if no argument had been made).2

2In her reply brief, Griggs cited the Alabama Data Breach
Notification Act ("the ADBNA"), § 8-38-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, in
support of her argument that NHS owed her a duty to safeguard her
personal information. That statute provides that entities such as NHS
"shall implement and maintain reasonable security measures to protect
sensitive personally identifying information against a breach of security."
§ 8-38-3(a), Ala. Code 1975.

However, as NHS points out in its motion to strike portions of
Griggs's reply brief, Griggs did not rely on that statute in her response to
NHS's motion to dismiss or in her opening brief on appeal. Although
Griggs cited the ADBNA once in a footnote in the facts section of her
opening brief, she did so only to note that NHS's notice of the data breach
was untimely. Because Griggs cited the ADBNA in support of her duty
argument for the first time in her reply brief, Griggs has waived the issue
whether the ADBNA imposed a duty on NHS.

In her response to the motion to strike, Griggs contends that she
merely cited the ADBNA as additional authority to refute NHS's
arguments, which she says opened the door to her to cite statutes that
impose a duty on NHS to safeguard personal information. That argument
might be plausible if Griggs had cited some authority in her opening
brief. But without any authority cited in the first place, any authority
cited in the reply brief cannot be additional. Authority cited for the first
time in a reply brief cannot cure a complete failure to cite authority in

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Because Griggs fails to demonstrate that she sufficiently pleaded

an essential element of her negligence claim, we need not consider that

claim any further. Nevertheless, we note that Griggs's arguments that

she sufficiently alleged the elements of breach and causation fail for the

same reason -- she cited no authority demonstrating that her allegations

regarding those elements were sufficient. Again, she simply restates the

allegations of her complaint and baldly asserts that those allegations

were sufficient.

Although we recognize that the issue of the sufficiency of pleadings

alleging negligence in the specific context of a data breach is a question

of first impression in Alabama, that fact alone does not relieve an

appellant from his obligation to cite some authority in support of his

the opening brief. Steele v. Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So. 2d 488, 493 (Ala.
2005) (observing that when authority is cited for the first time in an
appellant's reply brief, the effect is the same as if the argument was made
for the first time in a reply brief).

Griggs also relied on the ADBNA at oral argument, but because
Griggs, in effect, failed to timely cite the ADBNA in her briefs, her
reliance on the ADBNA at oral argument was the equivalent of raising
the issue for the first time at oral argument. But an issue cannot be raised
for the first time at oral argument. Hutchins v. Shepard, 370 So. 2d 275,
276-77 (Ala. 1979) (refusing to consider an argument raised for the first
time during oral argument).
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argument, even if it is from another jurisdiction that has considered the

issue or if it addresses an analogous situation. As noted by one

commentator, "[a] critical part of an appellate lawyer's job is to compare

and contrast his case to previous judicial opinions to persuade a court to

rule his way." Ed R. Haden, Alabama Appellate Practice § 12.12[2]

(2023). Griggs does not attempt to compare or contrast her allegations

here with prior decisions addressing the sufficiency of allegations of duty,

breach, or causation in cases involving at least analogous, if not identical,

facts.

For these reasons, we conclude that Griggs fails to demonstrate

that the circuit court erred in dismissing her negligence claim as

insufficiently pleaded.

B. Negligence Per Se

Next, Griggs contends that she sufficiently alleged the elements of

her claim of negligence per se. Griggs contends that, in that claim, she

sufficiently alleged the elements of duty and breach by alleging that NHS

violated various provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996),

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and the Federal Trade Commission Act ("the FTCA"), see 15 U.S.C. §§

41-58.

Although Griggs recognizes that neither of those statutes creates a

private right of action, she contends that even a statute that creates no

private right of action can serve as the basis for a negligence per se claim.

In support of that argument, Griggs relies on Allen v. Delchamps, Inc.,

624 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. 1993), in which this Court allowed a negligence per

se claim to proceed under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("the

FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., even though the FDCA did not provide

for a private cause of action for civil damages. But regardless of whether

a violation of HIPAA or the FTCA will support a negligence per se claim,

an allegation that NHS violated those statutes is not sufficient to plead

a claim for negligence per se. This Court has held that "negligence per se

does not arise by the mere violation of a statute or regulation. The

element of proximate cause is also required." Elder v. E.I. DuPont De

Nemours & Co., 479 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Ala. 1985).

Here, Griggs contends only that she alleged that "HIPAA and the

FTCA established a duty or standard of care in support of her negligence

per se claim." She makes no argument that she pleaded that NHS's

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alleged violations of HIPAA and the FTCA were the proximate cause of

her alleged damages. To the extent that Griggs falls back on her

argument that she sufficiently alleged proximate causation regarding her

negligence claim, as noted above, she failed to cite any authority in

support of that argument. For this reason, Griggs fails to demonstrate

that she sufficiently pleaded her negligence per se claim.

C. Invasion of Privacy

Next, Griggs contends that she sufficiently pleaded her invasion-of-

privacy claim because the personal information that was accessed --

Social Security numbers, names, and birth dates -- was highly sensitive

and because failure to secure such information would be highly offensive

to a reasonable person. Griggs relies on federal cases for the proposition

that a third party's procurement of personal data can give rise to a claim

of invasion of privacy.

" 'This Court defines the tort of invasion of privacy as the

intentional wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such a

manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation

to a person of ordinary sensibilities.' " Rosen v. Montgomery Surgical Ctr.,

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825 So. 2d 735, 737 (Ala. 2001) (emphasis added; citation omitted).

Further, in Alabama,

"invasion of privacy consists of four limited and distinct
wrongs: (1) intruding into the plaintiff's physical solitude or
seclusion; (2) giving publicity to private information about the
plaintiff that violates ordinary decency; (3) putting the
plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory, position in
the public eye; or (4) appropriating some element of the
plaintiff's personality for a commercial use."

Johnston v. Fuller, 706 So. 2d 700, 701 (Ala. 1997). Regardless of the type

of invasion of privacy Griggs alleges occurred as a result of the data

breach, Griggs makes no effort to demonstrate that she alleged that

NHS's conduct was intentional. This omission is fatal to her claim.

D. Unjust Enrichment

Next, Griggs contends that she sufficiently pleaded her unjust-

enrichment claim by alleging that she conferred a benefit on NHS.

Specifically, Griggs points to her allegation that "[p]art of the wages or

pay terms that these Class Members negotiated with ["NHS"] was

intended to be used by ["NHS"] to fund adequate security of ["NHS's"]

computer property and [Griggs's] and Class Members' Personal

Information." She also points to her allegation that NHS "retained the

benefits of its unlawful conduct including the amounts received for data

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and cybersecurity practices that it did not provide." In support of her

argument, Griggs relies on Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th

Cir. 2012), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit held:

"To establish a cause of action for unjust
enrichment/restitution, a Plaintiff must show that '1) the
plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant; 2) the
defendant has knowledge of the benefit; 3) the defendant has
accepted or retained the benefit conferred; and 4) the
circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying fair value for
it.' "

693 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Della Ratta v. Della Ratta, 927 So. 2d 1055,

1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).

Griggs's allegation that she somehow conferred a benefit on NHS

in exchange for data protection is insufficient. As the United States

District Court for the Central District of Illinois noted when dismissing

an unjust-enrichment claim in a data-breach action, the plaintiff "paid

for food products. She did not pay for a side order of data security and

protection." Irwin v. Jimmy John's Franchise, LLC, 175 F. Supp. 3d 1064,

1072 (C.D. Ill. 2016). Further, as NHS notes, Resnick is distinguishable

because there the plaintiffs alleged that they had paid a monthly

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premium to the defendant for data security. For these reasons, Griggs

fails to demonstrate that she sufficiently pleaded her unjust-enrichment

claim.

E. Breach of Confidence

Next, Griggs contends that she sufficiently pleaded her claim of

breach of confidence. In support, Griggs relies on Muransky v. Godiva

Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 2020), for the proposition that

"[a] breach of confidence 'is rooted in the concept that the law should

recognize some relationships as confidential to encourage uninhibited

discussions between the parties involved.' " 979 F.3d at 932 (quoting

Young v. United States Department of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir.

1989)). Griggs further cites Muransky for the proposition that "[a] breach

of confidence … involves 'the unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a

third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has learned

within a confidential relationship.' " Id. (quoting Alan B. Vickery, Note,

Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1426, 1455

(1982)). Based on that authority, Griggs contends that she sufficiently

alleged a breach-of-confidence claim by alleging that she provided NHS

her personal information with the expectation and understanding that

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NHS would protect it from unauthorized access and disclosure, but that

NHS breached that confidence by failing to secure her personal

information.

However, Griggs does not identify any Alabama authority

recognizing breach of confidence as a cause of action under Alabama law.

Further, as NHS points out, even if breach of confidence were a

cognizable claim under Alabama law, Griggs does not demonstrate that

she alleged that NHS affirmatively disclosed her information.

Affirmative disclosure is a necessary element of breach of confidence;

theft by a third party is not sufficient. Purvis v. Aveanna Healthcare,

LLC, 563 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2021) (holding that plaintiffs

failed to plead breach-of-confidence claim because they did not allege

facts suggesting that the defendants had disclosed the plaintiffs'

information; they alleged only that their information had been stolen by

third parties). For these reasons, Griggs fails to demonstrate that breach

of confidence is a recognized cause of action in Alabama, let alone that

she sufficiently pleaded it.

F. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

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Finally, Griggs contends that she sufficiently pleaded her breach-

of-fiduciary-duty claim. She cites various cases from this Court holding

that, under Alabama law, a fiduciary relationship exists when one person

has influence or dominion over another person. She also contends that

Alabama does not have a rule that there can never be a fiduciary

relationship between employees and employers. She contends that a

fiduciary relationship can be inferred from her allegations that NHS

collects and stores sensitive personal information as a precondition to

employment. She contends that, as a result, NHS has influence and

dominion over her and the class members and that NHS has obligations

to keep that information confidential.

Griggs alleged that she was an employee of NHS. Generally, in

Alabama, " 'a principal or employer is not the fiduciary of the agent or

employee.' " Miller v. SCI Sys., Inc., 479 So. 2d 718, 720 (Ala. 1985)

(quoting and adopting the trial court's order). Griggs seeks to undermine

that rule by arguing that "Alabama does not have a hard and fast rule

that there can never be a fiduciary relationship between employees and

employers." The only case that Griggs cites for that proposition is Lanfear

v. Home Depot, Inc., 536 F.3d 1217, 1224 (11th Cir. 2008). Griggs also

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relies on the same portion of Lanfear for the proposition that courts must

inquire regarding whether the nature of the relationship between the

parties is that of a fiduciary relationship. But that portion of Lanfear does

not contain any language supporting either proposition. Rather, that

portion of Lanfear addressed the issue whether an employee must

exhaust administrative remedies. The language that Griggs purports to

quote from Lanfear regarding the nature of the relationship between the

parties appears nowhere in that decision. Although NHS observes in its

brief that Lanfear does not support Griggs's argument, Griggs does not

address Lanfear further in her reply brief or attempt to explain its

relevance.

In short, Griggs cites no authority supporting her contention that

the relationship between her and NHS was an exception to Miller's

general rule that an employer is not a fiduciary of an employee, and she

does not respond to NHS's reliance on Miller in her reply brief. Griggs

contends that she alleged that there is a fiduciary relationship between

her and NHS because NHS voluntarily collected and stored her personal

information, thereby exercising influence and dominion over her. Griggs

contends that, as a result, NHS had a duty to keep her personal

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information confidential and that it breached that duty by failing to keep

her information safe and confidential. But she cites no authority

supporting those contentions. Accordingly, Griggs's argument fails to

comply with Rule 28(a)(10).

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Griggs fails to demonstrate that she

sufficiently pleaded her claims against NHS. Accordingly, Griggs does

not demonstrate that the circuit court erred in dismissing her claims

under Rule 12(b)(6). Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's judgment

dismissing Griggs's claims.

AFFIRMED.

Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.

Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

Shaw, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

Stewart, J., concurs in the result.

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COOK, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur with our Court's decision to affirm the Jefferson Circuit

Court's dismissal of Shymikka Griggs's data-breach action against NHS

Management, LLC ("NHS"). However, because data-breach actions are

likely to become more frequent in the future, I write specially to provide

additional guidance to the bench and bar on the types of claims that may

be alleged in such actions and to note issues that counsel may wish to

address in a future appropriate case.

I. Initial Observations

I start with a few initial observations about what this case concerns

and what it does not concern. First, although this is a class action, the

only claims before this Court today are the claims raised by the named

class representative -- Griggs -- against her former employer, NHS, a

consulting firm that provides management services for nursing homes

and physical-rehabilitation facilities in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, and

Missouri. 3 In other words, at this point, this is a case involving the theft

3See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313 (2011) (quoting

Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 16 n.1 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting))
(" ' [A] nonnamed class member is [not] a party to the class-action

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of a single employee's personal information from her employer's network;

it is not a case involving the theft of the health-care records of a medical

patient. Had such a claim been alleged, the outcome here might (or might

not) have been different.

Second, this is a case in which no express contract governing the

protection or use of the data at issue exists. Again, if there were such a

contract, the outcome here might (or might not) have been different.

Third, the parties agree that Alabama law controls in this case. If

Griggs were attempting to state a claim under the law of a different state

litigation before the class is certified.' " ); In re Checking Account
Overdraft Litigation, 780 F.3d 1031, 1037 (11th Cir. 2015) ("Absent class
certification, there is no justifiable controversy between [the defendant]
and the unnamed putative class members. Furthermore, because the
unnamed putative class members are not yet before the court, any claims
that they might have against [the defendant] necessarily exist only by
hypothesis."); and Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 952 F.3d 293,
301-02 (D.D.C. 2020) (Silberman, J., dissenting) ("Putative class
members are not 'parties' to the action for any purpose, so the reasoning
goes, thus before class certification there are no parties (other than those
named) for a district court to dismiss."). See also Supreme Court of
Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Jacksonville Alabama, YouTube (Sept. 19,
2024, 19:51-20:01) (at the time this decision was issued, this oral-
argument session could be located at: https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=jMUTOkd1tYk) (in which counsel for Griggs concedes that the
only claims before our Court were claims brought by Griggs against
NHS).
26
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or even under federal law, the outcome here might (or might not) have

been different.

Although Griggs raised several claims in her complaint below, 4 I

believe that, at its core, this is a negligence case because the bulk of

Griggs's claims against NHS rest on a duty that she contends it owed her

to keep her personal information safe from a cyberattack. While I agree

with the main opinion that Griggs failed to sufficiently argue that she

had adequately pleaded this element of both her negligence and

negligence per se claims, this does not mean that there will never be a

situation in which a defendant may owe a duty to a plaintiff to safeguard

such data from a criminal engaging in a cyberattack. And, even when

such a duty does exist, as I also explain below, a plaintiff may still have

to sufficiently allege that he or she has been damaged as a result of the

breach of that duty.

II. To Recover for Negligence, a Plaintiff Must Establish That a
Legal Duty Exists to Protect Personal Information from a
Cyberattack by Criminals

As explained in the main opinion, a negligence claim under

4Iconcur fully with the main opinion's analyses of Griggs's
arguments concerning those remaining claims.
27
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Alabama law includes several elements. Among those elements is that

the defendant must owe a duty to the plaintiff. The question whether a

duty exists is a question of law for the trial court to consider. See, e.g.,

Rosenthal v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., 303 So. 3d 1172, 1182 (Ala. 2020)

(quoting Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887, 891 (Ala. 2004)) (" ' In Alabama,

the existence of a duty is a strictly legal question to be determined by the

court.' " ).

In her brief on appeal, Griggs argues, among other things, that she

sufficiently alleged in her complaint that NHS owed her a duty to protect

her personal information from a cyberattack. Specifically, she notes that,

in her complaint, she alleged (1) that NHS had " ' clearly-defined and

mandatory obligations created by HIPAA [i.e., the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act], contract, industry standards,

common law, and representations made to [her] and class members, to

keep their Personal Information confidential and to protec t it from

unauthorized access and disclosure,' " Griggs's brief at 43, and (2) that

"NHS had obligations created by HIPAA, contract, industry standards,

common law and representations made to class members, to keep class

members' [personal information] confidential and to protec t it from

28
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unauthorized access and disclosure," Griggs's brief at 56.

A. Griggs's Failure to Comply with Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.
App. P.

In making these assertions in her brief, however, Griggs fails to cite

any relevant legal authority -- from this State or from another

jurisdiction -- that supports her assertion that her employer, NHS, had a

duty to prevent a third-party criminal from stealing her personal

information off of its network. See Griggs's brief at 43-47. Our Court has

repeatedly stated that

"Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires that arguments
in an appellant's brief contain 'citations to the cases, statutes,
other authorities, and parts of the record relied on.' Further,
'it is well settled that a failure to comply with the
requirements of Rule 28(a)(10) requiring citation of authority
in support of the arguments presented provides this Court
with a basis for disregarding those arguments.' State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motley, 909 So. 2d 806, 822 (Ala.
2005)(citing Ex parte Showers, 812 So. 2 d 277, 281 (Ala.
2001)). This is so, because ' " it is not the function of this Court
to do a party's legal research or to make and address legal
arguments for a party based on undelineated general
propositions not s upported by sufficient authority or
argument." ' Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So. 2d 1, 20 (Ala.
2003) (quoting Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248,
251 (Ala. 1994))."

Jimmy Day Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Smith, 964 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala.

2007).

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As the main opinion correctly notes, Griggs "presented legal

theories in which the existence of a duty was not necessarily obvious,"

and, "[u]nder such circumstances, citation to the traditional negligence

test alone constitutes citation to only a general proposition of law," which

does not meet the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10). ____ So. 3d at ____.

Given that this lawsuit concerns claims arising out of an area of the law

that our Court has not yet had a chance to address -- a data breach

involving the alleged theft of an employee's personal information -- I

agree with the main opinion that Griggs's failure to provide such legal

authority is fatal to the question of whether a duty exists here and

therefore whether a negligence claim can be maintained in this case.

B. Under Alabama Law, Does an Employer Have a Legal
Duty to Protect an Employee from Third-Party Criminal
Activity?

In the event that we were to reach this question in a future

appropriate case, I note that the general rule in Alabama is that "an

employer is not liable to its employees for criminal acts committed by

third persons against an employee." Carroll v. Shoney's, Inc., 775 So. 2d

753, 755 (Ala. 2000). However, our Court has recognized that an

exception to that general rule exists "when a special relationship or

30
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special circumstances create a duty to protect … an employee from the

criminal acts of a third party." Id. Specifically, our Court has explained

that this " ' singular exception' " to the general rule " ' arises when "the

particular criminal conduct was foreseeable." ' " Id. at 756 (quoting Moye

v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1368, 1371 (Ala. 1986), quoting in

turn Henley v. Pizitz Realty Co., 456 So. 2d 272, 276 (Ala. 1984))

(emphasis added). In other words, our Court has stated that this

exception applies to employers only in the most " ' " extraordinary and

highly unusual circumstances," ' " including when the employer had

" ' specialized knowledge' " that criminal conduct was a "probability" such

that the "criminal conduct [was] foreseeable." Carroll, 775 So. 2d at 756

(citations omitted). 5

In her complaint, Griggs pleaded that she had been an employee of

NHS and that it was this relationship that created a duty for NHS to

protect her data from the cyberattack at issue here. However, other than

generally alleging that NHS had a duty to protect her against a general

5In its response brief, NHS made all of these arguments about the

limited duty to protect employees from third-party criminal activity.
However, in her reply brief, Griggs simply ignores NHS's argument and
the caselaw it cited.
31
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threat of data breaches, Griggs did not allege in her complaint (1) that

the cyberattack on NHS's network was foreseeable, (2) that NHS had

"specialized knowledge" of the criminal activity, and (3) that the

cyberattack at issue was a probability, as our caselaw discussed above

appears to require.

Given that our caselaw discussed above has not been overruled and

given that it would clearly apply to Griggs's allegation concerning the

duty that she believes NHS owed to her, it was essential for Griggs to

plead facts demonstrating that those circumstances existed here.

In making this observation, however, I do not wish to be understood

as reaching or deciding what should be pleaded or what is necessary to

prove the duty element for a negligence claim in a future data-breach

case concerning a nonemployee in a sensitive context or when a special

relationship exists or sensitive data is involved. 6

6See, generally, Buckley v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (Case

No. C17-5813 BHS, Mar. 29, 2018) (W.D. Wash. 2018) (not reported in
the Federal Supplement) (declining to find a "common law legal duty"
that could support plaintiff's negligence claim when the plaintiff alleged
"failure to maintain adequate security" but then failed to allege negligent
affirmative acts or a special relationship with defendant); Parker v.
Carilion Clinic, 296 Va. 319, 347, 819 S.E.2d 809, 825 (2018) (explaining

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C. The Alabama Data Breach Notification Act Does Not
Establish a Legal Duty Actionable by a Private Plaintiff

Rather than addressing the caselaw discussed above, Griggs

instead argues on appeal that NHS -- regardless of its status as her

employer -- owed her a duty under the Alabama Data Breach Notification

Act of 2018, ("the ADBNA"), § 8-38-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. According

to Griggs, the ADBNA "firmly establishes NHS's duty to safeguard data,"

Griggs's brief at 23, which, she says, includes, among other things,

providing " ' notice within 45 days of the covered entity's … determination

that a breach has occurred and is reasonably likely to cause substantial

harm to the individuals to whom the information relates,' " Griggs's reply

brief at 24 (quoting § 8-38-5(b), Ala. Code 1975) (emphasis omitted).

This argument is mistaken, at least as to private litigants. Section

8-38-9(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, expressly states that the ADBNA cannot be

that "[n]one of our precedents has ever imposed a tort duty on a
healthcare provider" to safeguard personal health information from
unauthorized access); and McConnell v. Department of Lab., 345 Ga.
App. 669, 677, 814 S.E.2d 790, 798 (2018) (finding no "general duty to
safeguard personal information" under the Georgia Personal Identity
Protection Act, Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-910 through 10-1-915), aff'd, 305
Ga. 812, 828 S.E.2d 352 (2019).

33
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used to manufacture a duty for a common-law claim, like negligence,

because it cannot be used to alter a common-law claim: "Nothing in [the

ADBNA] may otherwise be construed to affect any right a person may

have at common law, by statute, or otherwise." (Emphasis added.)

Further, the Alabama Legislature has made absolutely clear that any

alleged violation of the ADBNA is not actionable by a private citizen. See

§ 8-38-9(a)(1) ("A violation of [the ADBNA] does not establish a private

cause of action under Section 8-19-10."). In fact, § 8-38-9(b)(2) states that

the "Attorney General shall have the exclusive authority to bring an

action for damages in a representative capacity on behalf of any named

individual or individuals." (Emphasis added.)

By recently passing the ADBNA in 2018, the Legislature made

clear that it was concerned with cybersecurity and cybercrime. In doing

so, the Legislature made an important policy choice -- expressed in the

text of the statute -- that the State of Alabama through the Attorney

General's office has the authority and discretion regarding when and how

34
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to apply this statute.7

D. Is There an Actionable Legal Duty Requiring Timely
Notification of a Data Breach?

In addition to arguing that she sufficiently pleaded that NHS had

breached its duty to her by failing to prevent the cyberattack in this case,

Griggs also contends that she sufficiently plead that NHS had breached

its duty by failing to timely notify her of the data breach itself. It appears

undisputed by the parties that NHS did not notify Griggs as well as

others impacted by the data breach until 10 months after it discovered

that the breach had occurred. This 10-month period is troubling to me.

In my view, it might be possible to argue that a duty exists once an

employer like NHS becomes aware of the data breach. In other words,

7In addition to the issues I have identified above, there are multiple

procedural problems with this argument also. First, Griggs admits in her
brief on appeal that the ADBNA "was not cited in the complaint." Griggs's
brief at 7 n.3 (emphasis added). In fact, based on my review of the record,
it does not appear that she alleged in any of her filings with the trial court
that the ADBNA applied in her case, much less that it established a duty
for NHS. Second, Griggs raises this argument for the first time in her
reply brief on appeal. It is well settled that our Court will not consider
completely new arguments that are raised for the first time in a reply
brief. See Sverdrup Tech., Inc. v. Robinson, 36 So. 3d 34, 46-47 (Ala. 2009)
(noting that "this Court will not consider arguments raised for the first
time in a reply brief").
35
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perhaps Griggs could have argued that NHS had " ' specialized

knowledge' " that criminal conduct was a "probability" and, thus, was

"foreseeable" once it had actual knowledge of the data breach. Carroll,

775 So. 2d at 756. However, this is far from clear and might depend upon

the exact knowledge NHS had acquired and the type of data involved. In

any event, Griggs did not make this argument on appeal, and I see no

reason to address it any further here. 8

III. Does an Alleged Violation of Federal Regulations Create a Legal
Duty for a Negligence Per Se Claim?

Griggs also argues on appeal that she sufficiently alleged the

elements of her negligence per se claim. However, as the main opinion

correctly notes, Griggs contends only that she alleged that the Health

8Even if Griggs had made such an argument, as explained below,

she would still need to argue that she experienced damage resulting from
this delayed notification. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer
Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 1010 (S.D. Cal. 2014)
(recognizing that unreported California cases and courts in other
jurisdictions analyzing statutes mirroring California's Database Breach
Act have held that "a plaintiff must allege actual damages flowing from
the unreasonable delay," not simply damages from "the intrusion itself,"
in order to recover actual damages). I cannot find any explanation in
Griggs's brief that she suffered any form of damage as a result of the
delay in notification (as opposed to the data breach itself).

36
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Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110

Stat. 1936 (1996)) ("HIPAA"), 9 and the Federal Trade Commission Act

("the FTCA"), see 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, each "established a duty or

standard of care in support of her negligence per se claim." Griggs's brief

at 47. She made no argument that she had pleaded that NHS's alleged

violations of those federal laws were the proximate cause of her alleged

damages. As was the case with Griggs's negligence claim, I agree with

the main opinion that this failure is fatal to whether such a claim can be

maintained in this case. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P.

However, in the event that we were to reach this question in a

future appropriate case, I note that in Allen v. Delchamps, Inc., 624 So.

2d 1065, 1067 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Fox v. Bartholf, 374 So. 2d 294, 295-

96 (Ala. 1979)), our Court explained that a plaintiff must allege the

following in order to establish a claim of negligence per se:

" (1) The statute must have been 'enacted to protect a class of
persons which includes the litigant seeking to assert the
statute';

" (2) The injury complained of must be 'of a type contemplated
by the statute';

9HIPAA, as amended, is codified in various sections of Titles 18, 26,

29, and 42 of the United States Code.
37
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" (3) 'The party charged with negligent conduct must have
violated the statute'; and
" (4) 'The jury must find [that] the statutory violation
proximately caused the injury.' "

(Emphasis added.)

Here, although Griggs relies on Delchamps in support of her

assertions related to her negligence per se claim, she does not point to a

violation of any specific statutory provisions in either HIPAA or the

FTCA in arguing that those statues created a duty for her employer,

NHS. Instead, all of her allegations in her complaint concern HIPAA

violations based upon violations of HIPAA regulations.10

10While Delchamps spoke about only violations of a "statute"
providing a basis for a negligence per se claim, it also discussed alleged
regulatory violations. Regardless, we are bound by the words quoted
above -- words that have been repeated in other decisions. See, generally,
Fox v. Bartholf, 374 So. 2d 294, 295-96 (Ala. 1979) (articulating the
elements necessary for a negligence per se cause of action based on "the
amalgam of Alabama case law," which are all based on statutory
violations).

Moreover, I would be especially concerned with extending the words
of Delchamps when a broader rule would cause significant constitutional
and prudential concerns. For instance, allowing regulations issued by an
agency (not a legislature) to create private legal liability would cause
serious separation-of-powers concerns. These concerns are heightened
because the legislative branch made a deliberate decision to vest

38
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Further, Griggs makes no effort to explain how any of the other

elements quoted in Delchamps have been met here. For instance,

Delchamps requires that the "statute must have been 'enacted to protect

a class of persons which includes the litigant seeking to assert the

statute.' " 624 So. 2d at 1067 (emphasis added; citation omitted). Here,

enforcement powers in only a regulatory agency and not in private
parties.

Such an extension would also create federalism concerns. These
regulations were issued by an entirely different sovereign -- the federal
government. Because of this federalism concern, there would be other
practical problems that such an expansion of liability standards would
bring. Defendants in future cases could (and I am sure would) attack such
regulations as improper under federal law -- that is, as being inconsistent
with the federal legislation authorizing the regulation or otherwise
arbitrary and capricious. Courts in our State would then need to
determine the validity of federal regulations under federal law. See Loper
Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024)
(explaining that courts should not defer to agency interpretation of an
ambiguity in a law that the agency enforces). In sum, if Alabama wishes
to subcontract its decision to create tort claims to federal agencies, our
Legislature rather than our Court needs to make such a significant
decision.

Finally, the text of the Delchamps decision is ambiguous as to
whether it is ruling on the "duty" question or the "standard of care"
question. Delchamps, 624 So. 2d at 1068. The question before our Court
today is a question of duty, and I do not reach the question whether a
federal regulation might (or might not) constitute evidence of a standard
of care for a state-law tort claim in particular situations.
39
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Griggs is an employee, not a medical patient, yet she seeks application of

the data provisions found in HIPAA with no explanation for why she is

in the "class of persons" protected by HIPAA.

The only other case that Griggs cites on this point is Smith v. Triad

of Alabama LLC (Case No. 1:14-CV-324-WKW, Sept. 29, 2015) (M.D. Ala.

2015) (not reported in Federal Supplement). Smith was a medical-data-

breach case that involved allegations invoking HIPAA. In that case, the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama cited our

Court's decision in Delchamps for its negligence per se analysis, and it is

therefore distinguishable for the same reasons that Delchamps is

distinguishable. Smith is also distinguishable because the plaintiffs in

that case were medical patients. In other words, unlike in this case, in

Smith there were allegations showing that the plaintiffs were part of the

"class of persons" protected by HIPAA.

Additionally, Griggs's argument that NHS owed her a duty under

the FTCA is even weaker. In support of this assertion, Griggs, in her

complaint, relied on (1) a nonbinding "publication" (Protecting Personal

Information: A Guide for Business, Federal Trade Commission (2016)),

and (2) an administrative decision (citing In the Matter of LabMD, Inc.,

40
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2016-2 Trade Cas. (CCH), ¶ 79708 (July 28, 2016)). I find neither of these

sources to be compelling or persuasive on this point because (1) Griggs

cites no caselaw in which a court has found negligence per se based upon

such a "publication" and (2) the administrative decision has been vacated

(something that Griggs fails to mention). See LabMD, Inc. v. Federal

Trade Commission, 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018). Moreover, neither of

these sources indicate that the FTCA creates a duty for an employer to

protect an employee's personal information from a cyberattack.

If a plaintiff in a future data-breach case were to raise a negligence

per se claim similar to the one that Griggs alleges here, he or she would

have to plead (at least) that he or she was part of the actual "class of

persons" that the statute he or she is relying on was enacted to protect

and that the injury complained of -- the theft of personal information as

a result of a cyberattack -- was "contemplated by the statute." He or she

would also have to plead (at least) that the defendant not only violated

the statute but that the injury complained of proximately caused the

injury. Without such allegations, a plaintiff may not be able to proceed

with his or her negligence per se claim.

IV. Even If a Duty Exists in a Data-Breach Case, a Plaintiff Must

41
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Still Plead That He or She Suffered Damages As a Result of Any
Alleged Breach of a Duty to Protect Personal Information

Finally, even if we were to assume that a duty can arise in the

circumstances alleged by Griggs here for either her negligence or

negligence per se claims, a plaintiff in a future case would still need to

show that he or she suffered damage as a result of the data breach. 11

Current Alabama law makes clear that the risk of damage is not enough

to recover. Instead, Alabama law requires the existence of "a manifest,

present injury before a plaintiff may recover in tort." Southern Bakeries,

Inc. v. Knipp, 852 So. 2d 712, 716 (Ala. 2002) (citing Hinton ex rel. Hinton

v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 829 (Ala. 2001) (plurality opinion);

DeArman v. Liberty Nat'l Ins. Co., 786 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 2000);

Stringfellow v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 743 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1999);

Williamson v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 741 So. 2d 1057 (Ala. 1999); and

11To be clear, I am not referring to standing here, and I therefore

am not opining on whether standing applies to private-law negligence
claims. Instead, I mean that the fact of damage is an element of a
negligence claim. See, e.g., Hilyer v. Fortier, 227 So. 3d 13, 22 (Ala. 2017)
(noting that, " ' " [t]o establish negligence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a
duty to a foreseeable plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate
causation; and (4) damage or injury"'" (quoting Lemley v. Wilson, 178 So.
3d 834, 841 (Ala. 2015), quoting in turn Martin v. Arnold, 643 So. 2d 564,
567 (Ala. 1994))).
42
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Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 682 So. 2d 405 (Ala. 1996)).

Counsel for Griggs was asked twice at oral argument whether

Griggs had incurred actual out-of-pocket damages as a result of the data

breach in this case. In both instances, counsel for Griggs could not

provide a specific answer to that question. See Supreme Court of

Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Jacksonville Alabama, YouTube (Sept. 19,

2024, 27:08-27:26; 27:26-27:33; 28:09-28:37; 28:37-31:05) (at the time this

decision was issued, this oral-argument session could be located at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jMUTOkd1tYk). In my view, given

this concession and the examples of damages pleaded in the complaint, it

is not plausible that Griggs can establish a "manifest, present injury."

Counsel for NHS similarly argued that it was not plausible that such a

proximately caused actual damage existed today.

With all of this said, this case is at the pleading stage and not yet

at the summary-judgment stage. Alabama is a notice-pleading state.

Extensive caselaw (including cases that I have authored) states that a

dismissal on the pleadings is not allowed if " ' " it appears that the pleader

could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief." ' "

Flickinger v. King, 385 So. 3d 504, 511 (Ala. 2023) (emphasis altered;

43
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citations omitted). Further, our caselaw makes clear that, at the pleading

stage, the question is not " ' " whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail,

but only whether she may possibly prevail." ' " Id. (citations omitted).

At oral argument, counsel for NHS could not deny that there were

"any set of circumstances" that would constitute damage. Thus, the

problem with my conclusion and the acknowledgement by NHS's counsel

during oral argument is that plausibility is not the pleading standard

today in Alabama. Because of this, I cannot rely upon the lack of actual

damages to affirm the dismissal on the pleadings and must instead base

my concurrence on the other issues discussed above.

In contrast to Alabama's pleading standard, I note that federal

courts do consider whether a plausible claim has been pleaded. See,

generally, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (requiring that the complaint state a

"plausible claim"). Notably, the substance of the relevant Alabama rules

of civil procedure are identical to the relevant federal rules of civil

procedure. Compare Rules 8 and 12, Ala. R. Civ. P., with Rules 8 and 12,

Fed. R. Civ. P.

I have previously noted this inconsistency between the Alabama

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and the federal pleading standards in a special writing and have invited

parties to raise this question in an appropriate case. See Ex parte

McKesson Corp., [Ms. SC-2023-0289, Dec. 22, 2023] ____ So. 3d ____, ____

n.6 (Ala. 2023) (Cook, J., concurring in the result) ("I make this

observation in the hope that future litigants may consider raising this

issue in an appropriate case for our Court to fully consider after input

from members of the public wishing to file amicus briefs (including

whether the heightened standard might be appropriate in all cases or

only in a subset of cases).").

Yet, NHS has not asked us to reconsider our current pleading

standard and adopt the federal pleading standard as discussed in Iqbal

and Twombly, supra. Absent extraordinary circumstances, our Court will

not reach out and overrule past precedent without an express request to

do so. See, e.g., American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Tellis, 192 So. 3d

386, 392 n. 3 (Ala. 2015) (noting that the Court follows "'controlling

precedent'" unless " ' invited to' " overrule it (citation omitted)). However,

I raise this issue here to once again invite parties in a future appropriate

case to argue whether we should reconsider our pleading standard in

light of the federal pleading standard.

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V. Conclusion

It is for all of these reasons that I agree that the circuit court's

dismissal of Griggs's data-breach action against NHS is due to be

affirmed.

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SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result)

I concur in the result. Additionally, I note the following.

I agree that the plaintiff below, Shymikka Griggs, has not

demonstrated on appeal that the dismissal of her negligence claim is due

to be reversed. In its motion to dismiss, the defendant below, NHS

Management, LLC ("NHS"), acknowledged the elements of a negligence

action, which, generally stated, require a plaintiff to show a duty, a

breach of that duty, causation, and damages. But NHS argued that no

legal duty existed in this case. Specifically, NHS cited caselaw and

provided a discussion of the various factors and considerations used to

determine when the law imposes a duty and argued that, under that

authority and analysis, no duty existed in this case. See, e.g., DiBiasi v.

Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp., 988 So. 2d 454, 461-63 (Ala. 2008)

(discussing "a number of factors [used] to determine whether a duty

exists" and noting that the foreseeability of a risk of harm alone can be

insufficient to create such a duty), and New Addition Club, Inc. v.

Vaughn, 903 So. 2d 68, 73-76 (Ala. 2004) (discussing when one has a duty

to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person). Whether a

duty exists is a question of law. Bryan v. Alabama Power Co., 20 So. 3d

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SC-2023-0784

108, 116 (Ala. 2009). It can be a complicated issue. See DiBiasi and New

Addition Club, supra. The trial court, which did not specify the reasons

for its dismissal, could have accepted NHS's argument.

Thus, it was incumbent upon Griggs, in her initial brief on appeal,

to present a legal argument as to whether the law imposes a duty in this

case, or the issue is deemed waived. Soutullo v. Mobile Cnty., 58 So. 3d

733, 739 (Ala. 2010), and Fogarty v. Southworth, 953 So. 2d 1225, 1232

(Ala. 2006). While Griggs argues on appeal that her complaint alleged

that a duty existed and alleged that there was a foreseeable risk, this

does not address the issue, presented to the trial court, that, despite those

allegations, no duty existed. Although I am not wholly convinced that, in

a case like this, the law will not impose a duty for purposes of a negligence

action, the issue has been waived.

48