Scott King v. Courtenay Carty

Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER .
Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
corrections@akcourts.gov.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
SCOTT KING,
Appellant,
v.
COURTENAY CARTY,
Appellee.
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Supreme Court No. S-19268
Superior Court No. 3DI-23-00110
O P I N I O N
No. 7834 – October 16, 2026
CI
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
Judicial District, Dillingham, Stephen B. Wallace, Judge.
Appearances: Kara A. Nyquist, Nyquist Law Group,
Anchorage, for Appellant. Patsy Shaha, Yuraq Legal
Services LLC, Anchorage, for Appellee.
Before: Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices.
[Carney, Chief Justice, not participating.]
BORGHESAN, Justice.
INTRODUCTION
A man and a woman were in a romantic relationship for nearly eight years.
After they separated, they disputed ownership of various property, and the man filed a
lawsuit. The parties agreed that they had been in a domestic partnership, which is a
committed relationship in which the parties agree to share the fruits of their relationship
as though married. But they disagreed whether certain items of property belonged to
the partnership and should be split between them. The superior court decided that all
of the disputed property belonged to the partnership and divided that property’s value

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between the parties. The man appeals the court’s rulings that two items were
partnership property: a building that the man owned before the relationship began; and
a boat acquired during the relationship but titled in the man’s name only and purchased
with his separate funds.
We hold that the special property rules that apply to domestic partnerships
do not apply to property that was acquired before the partnership began. Because the
man owned the building before the partnership began, it was not partnership property
even though it was used as the site for the couple’s vacation rental business.
We also hold that the rules for tracing ownership of property that apply to
married couples also apply to domestic partners. Applying these rules to the undisputed
facts of this case establishes that the boat did not belong to the partnership. The boat
was purchased during the partnership and used for the couple’s joint charter business
and family outings. But because it was titled in the man’s name only and purchased
and improved exclusively with his own separate funds, it was his separate property.
Therefore, we reverse these portions of the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Scott King and Courtenay Carty were in a romantic relationship from
October 2015 until late July 2023. During this time they had a daughter together. King
and Carty’s relationship ended in 2023, and King filed a complaint in superior court
seeking a division of domestic partnership assets.1 At the start of trial, King and Carty
stipulated to the existence of a domestic partnership. They then testified about their
relationship, businesses, and property. They asked the court to decide whether two
residences, two businesses, and a boat were partnership property.2
1 King also sought custody of the parties’ daughter. Custody is not an issue
in this appeal.
2 Neither party claimed that funds in the other’s personal bank account were
partnership property.

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King testified that he purchased unimproved land in Dillingham in 2008,
before he and Carty began their relationship. By 2011 he had built a structure on the
land; he did not take out a mortgage. The property is located on Highbush Drive and is
a converted garage/shop with a living room, bedroom, full bathroom, full laundry, and
full kitchen. Evidence in the record showed that King lived in the Highbush property
both before and early in his relationship with Carty.
The parties testified that around the time their daughter was born in
November 2016, King moved into a small home with Carty and her two children from
a prior relationship. In 2019 they moved into a home on Wood River Road, which was
purchased with joint funds and titled in Carty’s name.
King and Carty testified that they owned and operated two businesses
during their domestic partnership: Lake Road Lodge and West Side Charters. They
disputed ownership of these businesses at trial.
Lake Road Lodge used the Highbush property as a short-term rental
property that was primarily advertised through a short-term rental website. Both King
and Carty were listed as owners on the Lake Road Lodge business license, which was
purchased by Carty using her personal credit card.
West Side Charters was a fishing guide business. The business license for
West Side Charters was also purchased by Carty using her personal credit card in April
2017. The West Side Charters business license only lists King as the owner, but Carty
applied for permits for West Side Charters and had the insurance receipts for the
business sent to her personal email.
Both businesses shared the same joint bank account to which both King
and Carty had access. Carty prepared the city taxes while King handled the federal
taxes for the businesses.
In 2019 King purchased a boat, called the CAROLE M AE, for $25,000. The
boat was titled in King’s name only. He made the down payment and monthly loan
payments using funds in his personal bank account. The boat was used for West Side

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Charters’ guiding operations. It was also used for family outings. King modified the
boat by adding an enclosed cabin and bed.
King and Carty separated in July 2023. When the final short-term tenant
left in September 2023, King moved back into the Highbush property, where he resided
at the time of trial. Carty remained at the Wood River house.
The superior court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law in
August 2024. It found that all of the disputed property — the Wood River house, the
Highbush property, the Lake Road Lodge and West Side Charters businesses, and the
CAROLE M AE — was partnership property. It found that the Highbush property was a
partnership asset because “[t]here is no way to meaningfully segregate the operation”
of the Lake Road Lodge rental business from the property where it was located, which
was “essential to the operation of the lodge business.” Though “King maintained that
the [Highbush property] was, and always has been, his separate property,” the superior
court was “unable to view the property as anything other than an intended asset of the
partnership businesses.” The court found that the Highbush property was therefore “an
asset of the domestic partnership.”
The court also found that the CAROLE M AE was partnership property. The
boat was purchased “[a]s part of the West Side Charter business” and “used for charter
fishing [and] . . . family outings.” It ruled that “the boat was intended to be an asset of
the domestic partnership and the two businesses [King and Carty] had formed and were
operating together.”
The court allocated the Highbush property, the boat, and the cash in the
business account at the time of separation to King. It allocated the Wood River house’s
equity and debt to Carty. The court then ordered King to make an equalization payment
of $100,688 to Carty to effectuate a 50/50 split of partnership assets.
King moved for reconsideration, arguing (among other things) that the
court incorrectly valued the Highbush property and that neither the Highbush property

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nor the CAROL M AE should have been considered a partnership asset. The court denied
reconsideration.
King appeals the court’s classification of the Highbush property and the
boat as partnership assets and the valuation of the Highbush property.
DISCUSSION
A. It Was Error To Classify The Highbush Property As Partnership
Property.
“Alaska has long recognized unique legal standards for property disputes
between two people ending a domestic partnership.”3 A domestic partnership forms
between unmarried cohabitants when they “intend[] to share in the fruits of their
relationship as though married.”4
Property acquired during a domestic partnership is subject to a different
property division scheme than property disputes between married parties or unmarried
non-cohabitating parties.5 When there is no dispute that a domestic partnership existed,
the court must first classify property acquired during the domestic partnership as either
separate property or partnership property.6 “[P]roperty must be classified [as either
partnership or separate] strictly according to the parties’ intent.”7 “Partnership property
generally must be distributed equally (or unequally if the parties intended unequal
shares), while separate property must be distributed solely to its owner.”8
3 Tomal v. Anderson, 426 P.3d 915, 920 (Alaska 2018).
4 See Reed v. Parrish, 286 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Alaska 2012).
5 See Tomal, 426 P.3d at 922 & n.4, 923-24.
6 Gallagher v. Majors, 559 P.3d 615, 619 (Alaska 2024); see also Tomal,
426 P.3d at 923, 925.
7 Tomal, 426 P.3d at 923.
8 Id. at 924.

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The trial court’s underlying findings about the parties’ intent with respect
to disputed property items are factual findings that we review for clear error.9 “We will
find clear error only if ‘we are left with a definite and firm conviction on the entire
record that a mistake has been made.’ ”10 But “the legal significance of that intent” is
an application of law to fact that we review de novo.11 “Whether the superior court
applied the correct legal standard is a question of law that we review de novo . . . .”12
King argues that the court erred by classifying the Highbush property —
property he owned prior to his relationship with Carty — as partnership property. He
argues that Alaska’s domestic partnership framework applies only to property acquired
during a domestic partnership. King is correct: Because the Highbush property was
not acquired during the domestic partnership, it was error to classify it as a partnership
asset.
The domestic partnership doctrine applies to property accumulated during
the domestic partnership.13 In Tomal v. Anderson we considered whether a domestic
partner’s pension was partnership property and described rules for “distributing
9 Id. at 923.
10 Id. at 923 n.8 (quoting Wood v. Collins, 812 P.2d 951, 954 n.2 (Alaska
1991)).
11 Id. at 923 & n.15.
12 Rego v. Rego, 259 P.3d 447, 452 (Alaska 2011).
13 See, e.g., Wright v. Dropik, 512 P.3d 655, 659, 663-65 (Alaska 2022)
(applying Tomal to property acquired during purported domestic partnership); Bishop
v. Clark, 54 P.3d 804, 810-11 (Alaska 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Tomal v.
Anderson, 426 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2018) (considering “distribution of property
accumulated during cohabitation”); Jaymot v. Skillings-Donat; 216 P.3d 534, 544
(Alaska 2009) (“When two people reside together in an intimate relationship, the
property they acquire while cohabiting should be distributed according to the parties’
express or implied intent.” (emphasis added)).

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property acquired during a domestic partnership.”14 “Property acquired by domestic
partners during a domestic partnership should be distributed according to the partners’
intent,” but “property acquired after the partnership terminates is governed by the
ordinary rules of Alaska property law.”15 Therefore, a key question in the domestic
partnership analysis is determining “when the partnership began and ended.”16
Applying these rules, we decided that “only the portion of the pension accumulated
during the partnership” was partnership property.17 Although Tomal involved portions
of a pension that accumulated after the partnership ended, its logic supports the
conclusion that property acquired before the partnership is not partnership property.
Our other decisions also reflect the rule that only property acquired during
the domestic partnership is partnership property. We first recognized the domestic
partnership doctrine in Wood v. Collins, holding that “property accumulated during
cohabitation” should be divided according to the parties’ express or implied intent.18
The decision cited Beal v. Beal, an Oregon case that also dealt with division of property
“accumulated during a period of cohabitation.”19 Neither case divided property
acquired before a domestic partnership began.20 Later, in McConville v. Otness, we
considered whether “the parties intended property acquired in the course of the
partnership to belong to the partnership,”21 applying this inquiry only to property
14 Tomal, 426 P.3d at 925.
15 Id. at 922 (emphasis added).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 925.
18 812 P.2d 951, 56 (Alaska 1991) (citing Beal v. Beal, 577 P.2d 507, 510
(Or. 1978) (en banc)).
19 577 P.2d at 510.
20 See Wood, 812 P.2d 951; Beal, 577 P.2d 507.
21 498 P.3d 632, 635 (Alaska 2021).

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acquired during the alleged partnership.22 And in Tolan v. Kimball, which the superior
court quoted in its decision, we again resolved a dispute about “the property acquired
during [the parties’] relationship.”23 Notably, Carty does not cite any cases in which
we have treated property acquired before the start of a domestic partnership as
partnership property.
Because the Highbush property was not acquired during King and Carty’s
domestic partnership, it was error to classify it as partnership property. The
uncontroverted testimony and other evidence in the record show that King purchased
the land on which the building sits in 2008 and that he completed construction on the
building in 2011. King and Carty did not begin their romantic relationship until 2015.
Neither party challenges the superior court’s finding that their domestic partnership
began in October 2015 and ended in July 2023.
The superior court classified the Highbush property as partnership
property because it was used by Lake Road Lodge, a partnership business. It reasoned
that “[t]here is no way to meaningfully segregate the operation” of the Lake Road Lodge
rental business from the Highbush property.
This reasoning is not persuasive. The fact that a business operates out of
property owned by one of the partners does not automatically transfer ownership of the
property. Consider two friends who start a baking business out of a kitchen in one of
their houses. If the friends decided to end their business partnership, one business
owner would not own a share of the other’s kitchen even though the space was essential
to the bakery’s operation.24 The same logic applies here. The fact that the couple’s
22 Id. at 634, 636-37.
23 33 P.3d 1152, 1155 (Alaska 2001).
24 This analogy is meant only to illustrate the distinction between a business
itself and the physical place of the business’s operation. It is not meant to disregard the
core element of a domestic partnership: that the partners intend to share the fruits of
their relationship as if they were married.

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business used King’s property as a short-term rental did not, by itself, make the business
or Carty an owner of the property.
Nor does the close relationship between the lodge business and the real
property make these distinct assets impossible to segregate for purposes of property
division. Based on the parties’ testimony and other evidence in the record, Lake Road
Lodge had assets that were acquired during the partnership, including cash in the
business account and a sleeper sofa and a queen bed purchased for use by the business.
Therefore, it would have been possible to separate the business’s assets from the real
property itself, treating only the former as partnership property subject to division.
The domestic partnership doctrine applies only to property acquired
during a domestic partnership, and any property acquired before or after a domestic
partnership should be classified according to the ordinary rules of property law.25
Because the Highbush property was not acquired during the parties’ domestic
partnership, it was error to classify it as partnership property.26
B. It Was Error To Classify The C AROLE M AE As Partnership
Property.
King challenges the superior court’s ruling that the CAROLE M AE is
partnership property. The court found that “at the time of the purchase, the boat was
intended to be an asset of the domestic partnership.” It found that the CAROLE M AE
was purchased “[a]s part of the West Side Charter business,” which it classified as a
partnership asset,27 and “also was used for family outings.”
25 See Tomal v. Anderson, 426 P.3d 915, 922 & n.4 (Alaska 2018).
26 Because the Highbush property is not partnership property, we need not
address King’s argument that the trial court improperly valued it. Only partnership
property is subject to valuation and assignment by the court. Id. at 924 (“[S]eparate
property must be distributed solely to its owner.”).
27 King’s brief argues that the court erred in ruling that the charter business
was partnership property. But because he did not raise this issue in his notice of appeal,

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King argues that this finding was error, primarily because it is undisputed
that the boat was titled in his name only and that the money for the down payment,
monthly loan payments, and improvements to the boat came from his personal account.
He argues that he always intended for the C AROLE M AE to be his separate property.
Property acquired during a domestic partnership must be distributed
according to the parties’ intent; that is, the court must determine whether the parties
intended to share the item of property as though married.28 We have instructed courts
to determine the parties’ intent by considering “the totality of the circumstances,”29
using the factors identified in Bishop v. Clark to guide this analysis.30 These factors are
not exclusive, and explicit findings on each factor are not required.31
it is waived, and we will not consider it. In re Estate of Fields, 219 P.3d 995, 1011
(Alaska 2009); Laughlin v. Laughlin, 229 P.3d 1002, 1007 n.19 (Alaska 2010) (“[W]e
will not treat issues that were argued in the brief but not set forth in the Points [on
Appeal].” (alterations in original) (quoting Wetzler v. Wetzler, 570 P.2d 741, 742 n.2
(Alaska 1977))); see also Alaska R. App. P. 204(e) (providing appellate court will only
consider issues included in statement of points on appeal).
28 Tomal, 426 P.3d at 922.
29 McConville v. Otness, 498 P.3d 632, 635 (Alaska 2021).
30 Id. at 635-36. These factors are whether the parties
(1) made joint financial arrangements such as joint savings
or checking accounts, or jointly titled property; (2) filed joint
tax returns; (3) held themselves out as husband and wife;
(4) contributed to the payment of household expenses;
(5) contributed to the improvement and maintenance of the
disputed property; and (6) participated in a joint business
venture. Whether they have raised children together or
incurred joint debts is also important.
Bishop v. Clark, 54 P.3d 804, 811 (Alaska 2002) (footnotes omitted), abrogated on
other grounds by Tomal, 426 P.3d 915.
31 See Boulds v. Nielsen, 323 P.3d 58, 64 (Alaska 2014), abrogated on other
grounds by Tomal, 426 P.3d 915.

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In ruling on the CAROLE M AE, the superior court did not explicitly discuss
the Bishop factors or make findings that correspond to most of them. Its decision rested
on findings that King consulted Carty about which boat to buy and that the boat was
used for both the charter business (which may be related to the Bishop factor concerning
joint business ventures, although the court did not frame it as such) and family outings.
And while the court noted King’s testimony that the boat was purchased and improved
entirely with money from his personal account, which was undisputedly his separate
property, it did not discuss the significance of these facts. This prompts a legal question
of whether such actions are sufficient to make property that was purchased during a
domestic partnership, but with undisputedly separate assets, partnership property.
To answer this question, it is helpful to consider how the analysis would
unfold if King and Carty had been married. Only marital property is subject to equitable
distribution by the court, and the court must decide which assets are marital and which,
if any, are separate.32 “Assets acquired during marriage as compensation for marital
services — most commonly salaries earned by either spouse during marriage — are
considered primary marital assets.”33 “Assets acquired by one spouse before marriage,
property acquired by gift, and property acquired by inheritance are primary separate
assets.”34 “Assets acquired through exchange, appreciation, or income are secondary
assets, and their classification as marital or separate depends on their source asset.”35
“Tracing is the process of classifying a secondary asset by identifying its
source asset. If a source asset is primary marital property, then the secondary asset is
32 Pasley v. Pasley, 442 P.3d 738, 745 (Alaska 2019).
33 Id. at 745 (quoting Schmitz v. Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1127 (Alaska 2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
34 Id.
35 Id.

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secondary marital property, while a source asset that is a primary separate asset yields
a secondary separate asset.”36
Had King and Carty been married, the tracing doctrine would apply to the
classification of the CAROLE M AE. King testified that the CAROLE M AE was purchased
with a $5,000 down payment and monthly loan payments made from funds in his
personal account and that Carty did not make any payments toward the boat. Carty did
not dispute this testimony. There was also no dispute that the funds in King’s and
Carty’s personal bank accounts were their separate property; neither party made a claim
that the other’s personal bank account was partnership property. Under the tracing
doctrine, these facts would mean that the CAROLE M AE was a separate asset because its
source asset was separate property.37
In the marital context, then, the only remaining question would be whether
King had intended to gift the boat to the marital estate, resulting in its transmutation
from separate to marital property.38 The superior court did not apply the doctrine of
transmutation, and Carty has disavowed any argument based on transmutation by
implied gift. Therefore, we need not decide whether the doctrine of transmutation
applies to domestic partnerships. But considering how transmutation might apply had
King and Carty been married offers a helpful comparison.
Transmutation by implied interspousal gift occurs when the owning
spouse intends to gift the separate asset to the marital estate.39 It is error for the court
to focus on the couple’s intent; the intent of the non-owning spouse is not controlling.40
And the fact that the owning spouse shared the property during the marriage is not
36 Id. (footnote omitted).
37 Id.
38 See Kessler v. Kessler, 411 P.3d 616, 618-19 (Alaska 2018).
39 Id. at 619.
40 Id.

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enough to prove transmutation.41 The “mere use of a separate asset for marital purposes
cannot transform the separate asset into a marital asset.”42 Rather, it must be proved
that the owning spouse intended to “ ‘donate’ or ‘convey’ separate property to the
marital unit.”43 Even contributions of effort or money by the non-owning spouse may
not be enough to establish donative intent. These contributions to the upkeep or
improvement of separate property must be significant enough to evince “an intent to
operate jointly” in order to prove transmutation.44
Therefore, had King and Carty been married, Carty would have had to
clear this high bar to prove that the CAROLE M AE, which was purchased entirely with
King’s separate funds and titled in his name only, was gifted to their partnership. This
hypothetical analysis shows that even in marriage, with its formal commitment to union
and default rule that property is shared, the law gives significant protection to people’s
separate property.
Should the law of domestic partnership offer comparable protection for
separate property? We think so, and there is some precedent for this approach. In
Armstrong v. Woods, an unpublished decision, we stated that it would be “logical” to
41 Id.
42 Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 333 (Alaska 2006).
43 Kessler, 411 P.3d at 619 (quoting Sparks v. Sparks, 233 P.3d 1091, 1094
(Alaska 2010), overruled on other grounds by Engstrom v. Engstrom, 350 P.3d 766
(Alaska 2015)).
44 See id. at 620-21 (quoting Abood v. Abood, 119 P.3d 980, 988 (Alaska
2005)) (deciding that installing new countertops, windows, and blinds; painting; and
buying new washer and dryer were “minor” upgrades by non-owning spouse that did
not evidence owning spouse’s intent to gift property to marriage); accord Pasley v.
Pasley, 442 P.3d 738, 751 (Alaska 2019) (holding that owning spouse’s apartment did
not transmute to marital property even though non-owning spouse “installed a
ban[n]ister, carpeted the stairs, installed vinyl in the kitchen and the bathroom, painted
the bathroom, worked on creating an egress point for the basement, and redid the front
wall and reinsulated it” (alteration in original)).

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apply the doctrine of tracing to domestic partnerships.45 We then applied the doctrine
to a fishing vessel one partner purchased as the partnership was ending.46 There was
evidence that partnership funds were used to purchase the vessel, but the court had not
made findings on this point.47 Therefore, we vacated the trial court’s ruling that the
vessel was one partner’s separate property and remanded for further consideration.48
Applying the doctrine of tracing to domestic partnerships is logical not
only because of the similarities between the two types of relationships but also because
of the differences. Unlike marriage, there is no specific act that establishes a domestic
partnership. Some people may not even know they have entered a relationship that
supports another person’s legal claim to their property. And sometimes people in a
committed relationship choose not to marry because they want to protect their separate
assets. Here, in fact, Carty testified that although she and King entered their relationship
with the intention of a life-long commitment, they also consciously chose not to marry
because “if [they] didn’t marry on paper, [they] wouldn’t have to divorce in court.”
And, she continued, “if [they] maintained separate assets, [they] wouldn’t have to divide
them if [they] were ever to separate.” These aspects of a domestic partnership support
a conclusion that the tracing doctrine — which protects married peoples’ interests in
their separate property — should apply to domestic partnerships too.
Therefore, we hold that the tracing doctrine applies to cases of disputed
items of property acquired during a domestic partnership. If the disputed item is a
secondary asset that is acquired using only one partner’s separate assets, and it is titled
45 See No. S-16864, 2019 WL 2613433, at *6 (Alaska June 26, 2019).
46 Id.
47 Id. at *6-7.
48 Id. at *7.

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only in that partner’s name,49 then the item remains that partner’s separate property,
regardless of what the Bishop factors show.50 Because the superior court did not apply
tracing to determine the ownership of the CAROLE M AE, and because it is undisputed
that the vessel was titled in King’s name only and purchased and improved using only
King’s undisputedly separate funds, we reverse the court’s ruling that the vessel was
partnership property.
CONCLUSION
The superior court’s classification of the Highbush property as partnership
property is REVERSED. Its classification of the CAROLE M AE is REVERSED. This
matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
49 “[P]lacing the [disputed] property in joint title . . . is presumptive evidence
of intent and shifts the burden of proof to the owning spouse” to rebut the presumption
of donative intent. See Kessler, 411 P.3d at 620 (emphasis in original). “If evidence is
presented that is sufficient to overcome this presumption, tracing can take place.”
Schmitz v. Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1128 (Alaska 2004).
50 In this case the superior court did not discuss the Bishop factors. It is
worth noting that these factors do not offer strong support for the finding that the parties
intended to share the CAROLE M AE. Bishop v. Clark, 54 P.3d 804, 811 (Alaska 2002),
abrogated on other grounds by Tomal v. Anderson, 426 P.3d 915 (Alaska 2018) (listing
partnership factors). Reviewing the factors that apply to the boat, it was not jointly
titled; there was no testimony that Carty paid for its expenses or contributed to its
improvement; and it was not jointly financed. The only relevant factor that arguably
cuts in favor of intent to share is the fact that the boat was used for the charter business,
which the court found to be partnership property, and for family outings.

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