Brian F. Hall v. State of Alaska

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

BRIAN F. HALL,
Court of Appeals No. A-13794
Appellant, Trial Court No. 3AN-14-09493 CI

v.
OPINION
STATE OF ALASKA,

Appellee. No. 2821 — November 28, 2025

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
Anchorage, Adolf V. Zeman, Judge.

Appearances: Julia Bedell, Assistant Public Defender, and
Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney
General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell,
Judges.

Judge ALLARD.

In 1995, Brian F. Hall was convicted, following a jury trial, of first- and
second-degree murder for shooting and killing two young men, Mickey Dinsmore and
Stanley Honeycutt, following an altercation in a parking lot. 1 Hall testified in his own
defense at trial, claiming that he shot the men in self-defense because he reasonably
(albeit mistakenly) believed that they were armed and going to shoot him and his
friends. Hall claimed specifically that a fifteen-year-old girl who was present at the
scene, Monica Shelton, told him that the two men were armed. (In fact, the two men
did not have a gun.) At trial, however, Shelton denied telling Hall that the two men had
a gun.
Seventeen years after the trial, Shelton told a defense investigator that her
trial testimony was not correct and that she actually had told Hall that the two men had
a gun. Hall filed an untimely and successive application for post-conviction relief,
arguing that Shelton’s recantation constituted newly discovered evidence of innocence
that showed he had acted in self-defense.
Following litigation related to the successive nature of the post-conviction
relief application, the State moved to dismiss Hall’s post-conviction relief application
for failure to state a prima facie case under AS 12.72.020(b)(2), the statutory exception
to the statute of limitations for otherwise untimely post-conviction relief claims based
on newly discovered evidence of innocence.2 The superior court granted the motion,
ruling under AS 12.72.020(b)(2) that (1) Hall had not acted with due diligence in
securing Shelton’s recantation; (2) the recantation did not qualify as newly discovered
evidence that was not known within eighteen months of Hall’s conviction; (3) the
recantation was cumulative of the evidence presented at trial; (4) the recantation was

1
Former AS 11.41.100(a) (1993) and former AS 11.41.110(a) (1993), respectively.
2
AS 12.72.020(b)(2) provides that a post-conviction relief claim based on newly
discovered evidence may be untimely filed if (1) the applicant acted with due diligence and
sets out admissible facts; (2) the new evidence was not known within eighteen months of
the entry of the judgment of conviction; (3) the evidence is not cumulative; (4) the evidence
is not impeachment evidence; and (5) the evidence “establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that the applicant is innocent.”

–2– 2821
merely impeaching; and (5) the recantation would probably not produce an acquittal at
retrial. Hall now appeals.
Whether a defendant has pleaded a prima facie case under
AS 12.72.020(b)(2) is a question of law that we review de novo using our independent
judgment.3 For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that the superior court
erred when it ruled that Hall had not acted with due diligence in obtaining Shelton’s
recantation, that Shelton’s recantation did not qualify as newly discovered evidence,
and that the recantation was cumulative and merely impeaching.
This leaves the final requirement under AS 12.72.020(b)(2)(D) — that the
newly discovered evidence “establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
applicant is innocent.” We recently construed this statutory language in Marino v. State
to require a defendant to show that it is “highly probable” that the newly discovered
evidence of innocence would lead to an acquittal.4
For the reasons explained here, we conclude that Hall’s pleadings do not
meet this standard. While Shelton’s recantation and her admission that she did tell Hall
that the victims were armed makes Hall’s subjective fear more believable, it does not
alter the fact that there is significant evidence demonstrating that Hall’s actions were
not objectively reasonable. Accordingly, because we conclude that Hall has failed to
show that it is “highly probable” that the recantation would result in an acquittal, we
affirm the dismissal of Hall’s post-conviction relief application.5

3
David v. State, 372 P.3d 265, 269 (Alaska App. 2016); see also James v. State,
2023 WL 5423505, at *1 (Alaska App. Aug. 23, 2023) (unpublished summary disposition).
4
Marino v. State, 577 P.3d 992, 1023 (Alaska App. 2025).
5
Id.

–3– 2821
Relevant background facts
We previously described the facts of Hall’s underlying murder
convictions in Hall’s direct appeal.6 We recount them briefly here.
Late in the evening of April 16, 1993, Brian F. Hall and his friends,
Binyon Wright, Christina Thompson, Jacob Hoecker, and Dwight Wilson, drove
together to a bonfire in Stuckagain Heights in Anchorage. Wright was driving. Hall was
in the front passenger seat, and Thompson, Hoecker, and Wilson were in the back seat.
Hall was seventeen years old, and he was carrying a loaded .44 pistol. Hall put the
loaded gun under his seat.7
Wright parked the car in an upper parking lot above where the bonfire was
being held. There, the group met a fifteen-year-old girl, Monica Shelton, who was
retrieving a sweater from her friend’s car. Hall called Shelton over to the car, and the
two engaged in a friendly conversation. When Hall asked Shelton what her name was,
Shelton said that it was “Sally.” Hall responded that his name was “Trig.”8
A few minutes later, another car came speeding into the parking lot. The
car fishtailed around, stopped behind Wright’s car, and began to flash its lights and
honk repeatedly. Shelton walked over to the passenger side of the second car and had a
conversation with the driver, Stanley Honeycutt, and the passenger, Mickey Dinsmore.
The two men were in their twenties and seemed intoxicated. They stopped honking and
flashing their lights when they were talking to Shelton, and Honeycutt gave Shelton a
bottle of beer.9

6
Hall v. State, 1998 WL 90885, at *1 (Alaska App. Mar. 4, 1998) (unpublished).
7
Id. at *1-2.
8
Id.
9
Id. at *2.

–4– 2821
Shelton went back to talk to Hall at Wright’s car. Hall asked her if the
occupants of the other car “got a problem with us.” Shelton told him to “chill out” and
that “we’re here to have a good time.” The other car began flashing its lights and
honking its horn again.10
Shelton went back over to talk to Honeycutt and Dinsmore, who wanted
to know what the occupants of Hall’s car had said to her. Shelton said that they had
wanted to know if there was a problem and that she had told them to chill out. According
to Shelton, Dinsmore then pointed to the glove box and said, “Well, if they want to
fight, we got a gun and we’ll shoot them.” Shelton became scared and said, “You don’t
want to mess with them because they look, you know, kind of like gangsters or gang
members.” Dinsmore responded, “If they want to fuck with us, then we got a gun and
we’ll shoot them.”11 (Evidence at trial showed that Dinsmore and Honeycutt did not
have a gun in the glove box.)
While Shelton was talking with Dinsmore and Honeycutt, Wright got out
of the car. Hall asked Wilson, who was seated behind him, to retrieve Hall’s gun, which
had slid from under Hall’s seat to the back of the car. Hall then put the loaded gun in
his back pocket and got out of the car as well.12
At this point, Dinsmore got out of the other car and engaged in a shouting
match with Hall and Wright. There was yelling and cursing about who was going to
move their car. Dinsmore was holding something indiscernible, according to Hall’s
testimony, and Wright pulled a metal rebar from the trunk of his car.13

10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.

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Wright and Dinsmore subsequently returned to their respective cars.
Dinsmore got back into the front passenger seat of Honeycutt’s car. Wright got in the
driver’s seat of his car, putting the rebar down inside the car. Witnesses presented
conflicting testimony as to whether Hall got back into Wright’s car or whether he
remained standing outside near the passenger door.
What happened next was the main subject of contention at Hall’s trial.
According to Shelton’s trial testimony, she walked past Wright’s car without talking to
anyone and she never told Hall or anyone else in Wright’s car that Honeycutt and
Dinsmore had a gun. According to Hall’s testimony, Shelton walked past Hall and said,
“They have a gun, and they’ll shoot [you], so just leave.”14
After Shelton left the area, Honeycutt pulled his car up along the driver’s
side of Wright’s car, stopping when his front passenger window was between the rear
window and the driver’s window of Wright’s car. Dinsmore extended a beer bottle,
bottom end first, out of the passenger window, saying, “We ain’t got no beef with you;
do you want some of this?”15
Hall testified that when Dinsmore extended his arm with the beer bottle,
Hall thought that it was a gun. Hall then pulled out his gun and fired three shots. One
shot struck Dinsmore on the top of the head and another struck Honeycutt in the mouth.
The other occupants of Wright’s car started yelling at Hall; they said, “What the fuck
[did] you do that for?” and “It was a beer bottle.” Hall responded, “I thought they had
a gun. I never would have shot them. I thought they had a gun.”16
Following the shooting, Honeycutt’s car sped away, only to veer off the
road and crash into a tree. Wright drove away with Hall, Hoecker, Thompson, and

14
Id.
15
Id. at *3.
16
Id.

–6– 2821
Wilson in the car and passed Honeycutt’s crashed car without stopping. Both Honeycutt
and Dinsmore died from their gunshot injuries.17
At trial, Wright and Thompson testified for the State. Wright testified that
he was friends with Hall from school but had only known him for a few months. Wright
testified that, when he got back into the car, he saw the other car pull up alongside and
the passenger (Dinsmore) offer them a beer. According to Wright, Dinsmore offered
them the beer in a non-threatening manner, saying something to the effect of, “You all
want some of this? You know, we ain’t got no problem with you all.” Wright testified
that, as he was responding to the offer, he saw Dinsmore get shot in the face. He heard
two more gunshots in quick succession. Wright turned and saw Hall standing outside
the car.
Thompson testified that she had only known Hall for a few weeks.
Thompson testified that the passenger in the other car said, “We don’t got no beef with
you,” in a “normal” tone of voice and asked if they wanted some beer, offering a bottle.
According to Thompson, Hoecker declined and then asked her if she wanted the beer.
Right after Hoecker asked Thompson if she wanted a beer, Thompson heard three
gunshots. She saw Hall standing outside the front passenger door of Wright’s car.
Hoecker testified as a defense witness.18 He testified that he had been
friends with Hall since childhood. Hoecker testified that he saw a “dark object” in
Dinsmore’s hand and that he slumped down in his seat because he was worried
Dinsmore had a gun. On cross-examination, however, Hoecker admitted that he had
previously told the police that he heard Dinsmore offer the beer and that he had declined
the offer.

17
Id.
18
The other passenger, Wilson, did not testify at trial.

–7– 2821
Thompson testified that, as they were driving away, Hall looked at her and
said, “You’re not going to say anything, are you?” She told him that she would not say
anything. According to Thompson, Hall asked for something “to wipe the prints off the
gun.” She said that Wright stopped the car on the way home and Hall got out; he did
not have the gun with him when he returned to the car. (The gun was never found.)
Later, the police obtained a warrant to record Wright’s conversations with
Hall, pursuant to which the police recorded conversations between Wright and Hall. In
the recordings, Hall can be heard saying that the gun was “swimming in the ocean” and
reminding Wright to “stick with the game plan.” When Hall was interviewed by the
police, he denied any involvement in the shooting.
Hall was eventually arrested and charged with two counts of first-degree
murder.

Prior trial court proceedings
Because he was seventeen years old at the time of the shooting, Hall was
originally charged in juvenile court. However, the State moved to waive him into adult
court.19 Following a waiver hearing, the superior court granted the motion. Hall was
subsequently indicted on two counts of first-degree murder. Trial was held two years
later, in 1995.
Prior to opening statements, the defense attorney indicated that she
intended to refer in her opening statement to Shelton’s alleged warning to Hall that
Dinsmore and Honeycutt had a gun. The prosecutor objected, arguing that there was no

19
See former AS 47.10.060 (1993). In 1994, the year after the shooting, the Alaska
Legislature enacted former AS 47.10.010(e) (effective Sep. 1994), which required
juveniles who were at least sixteen years old to be automatically waived into adult court if
they were charged with certain serious crimes, including murder. Former AS 47.10.010(e)
(effective Sep. 1994), as amended by SLA 1994, ch. 113, § 6; see also AS 47.12.030(a)
(current auto-waiver statute).

–8– 2821
evidentiary basis for this claim because Shelton had never said in her police interviews,
at the grand jury proceeding, or at the waiver hearing that she had told Hall about a gun.
The defense attorney called her investigator, Michael Firment, outside the
presence of the jury in order to make an offer of proof. Firment testified that he
interviewed Shelton two times, once in 1993 and again in 1995. In the first interview,
Shelton was equivocal about whether she had told Hall that the victims had a gun. In
the second interview, Shelton was approached under the guise of talking about another
pending criminal case involving her boyfriend. Firment testified that, in the second
interview, Shelton said that she had told Hall that Honeycutt and Dinsmore had a gun
or that they might have a gun. Firment testified that Shelton told him that she was scared
people would think the shooting was her fault and that she had blocked a lot of it out.
Firment testified that she asked if it was “too late to tell the truth.” Firment told her it
was not too late. According to Firment, Shelton refused his request to record the
interview.
Following this offer of proof, the court permitted the defense attorney to
refer in her opening statement to Shelton’s alleged warning to Hall.
At trial, however, Shelton testified that she had not told Hall that the
victims told her they had a gun. The prosecutor asked her if she had ever told a defense
investigator otherwise. Shelton testified that she did not think that she told the
investigator that she had warned Hall about a gun but she “may have.” She criticized
the investigator for approaching her under the guise of talking about her boyfriend’s
case. The prosecutor then asked Shelton what the truth was. Shelton testified
unequivocally that she did not tell Hall about any gun.20

20
The prosecutor’s questioning was as follows:
Prosecutor: As you sit here right now, what’s the answer to that question?
Did you tell the people in car one what the people in car two told you about
having a gun?

–9– 2821
In contrast, Hall testified at trial that Shelton did tell him that the victims
had a gun, and he claimed that was why he believed the object in Dinsmore’s hand was
a gun. The defense attorney did not call Firment to testify regarding Shelton’s
statements to him.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor attacked Hall’s self-defense
theory, arguing that nothing other than Hall’s self-serving trial testimony supported the
defense. The prosecutor argued that this was “cold-blooded murder,” asserting that the
victims were unarmed, that Hall had no reason to think they were armed, and that the
beer bottle was recognizably not a gun. The prosecutor characterized Hall as a
manipulative liar, and he condemned Hall for having “the nerve to call Ms. Shelton a
liar.” The prosecutor also argued that Hall’s actions in trying to get his friends to lie for
him after the shooting demonstrated Hall’s consciousness of guilt.
The defense attorney argued that Hall was telling the truth when he
testified that he had reasonably (albeit mistakenly) thought that Dinsmore had a gun
based on what Hall saw and what Shelton had told him. The defense attorney also
emphasized that the State bore the burden of proving that Hall did not act in self-
defense.
Following deliberations, the jury convicted Hall of first-degree murder for
shooting and killing Dinsmore and second-degree murder for shooting and killing
Honeycutt.21
At sentencing, Hall was sentenced to a composite sentence of 159 years
to serve. At the sentencing hearing, the superior court agreed with the prosecutor’s
characterization of Hall as a manipulative, cold-blooded killer. The court found

Shelton: No, I didn’t — I didn’t speak to them.
21
Former AS 11.41.100(a) (1993) and former AS 11.41.110(a) (1993), respectively.

– 10 – 2821
specifically that Shelton’s testimony at trial was “highly credible” and that Hall’s claim
that Shelton told him that the victims had a gun was not credible.

Hall’s direct appeal and his first two post-conviction relief applications
Hall appealed his convictions and sentence to this Court.22 We affirmed
Hall’s convictions but remanded the case for reconsideration of the sentence.23 At
resentencing, the superior court imposed the same 159-year sentence.24
Hall subsequently filed two applications for post-conviction relief, one
with the aid of counsel and one without the aid of counsel. Both applications were
dismissed by the superior court, and this Court affirmed those dismissals in 2007 and
2012.25

Shelton’s 2012 recantation of her trial testimony
In 2011, Hall’s then-girlfriend, Angela Diaz, sent a letter to Shelton asking
if she would be willing to communicate with Diaz about Hall’s case. Shelton did not
respond to the letter, and she later testified that the letter “spooked” her.

22
Hall, 1998 WL 90885, at *1.
23
Id. at *8.
24
See Hall v. State, 1999 WL 34000714, at *1 (Alaska App. Mar. 10, 1999)
(unpublished).
25
See Hall v. State, 2007 WL 2069546, at *4 (Alaska App. Jul. 18, 2007)
(unpublished); Hall v. State, 2012 WL 5897312, at *5 (Alaska App. Nov. 21, 2012)
(unpublished). In both appeals to this Court, Hall argued that his trial attorney had provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise a heat of passion defense. Hall, 2007
WL 2069546, at *1; Hall, 2012 WL 5897312, at *4. Hall raised two additional claims in
his second appeal (that his trial attorney had inadequately investigated his case and that the
prosecutor had improperly prejudiced him by introducing certain evidence), but we
concluded that these claims were waived. Hall, 2012 WL 5897312, at *4-5.

– 11 – 2821
In 2012, Hall married Angela Diaz (now Angela Hall). Angela Hall
subsequently hired a defense investigator, Andy Klamser, who contacted Shelton at her
place of work in September 2012.
In a recorded interview with Klamser, Shelton said that she was nervous
and that she was afraid Hall was “mad” at her. She indicated that she knew “what it’s
all about” and that she was “willing to put the record straight.” Shelton then stated that
the truth was that she did tell the occupants of Wright’s car that Honeycutt and
Dinsmore had a gun:
Shelton: I do remember saying that to them because
the guys in the car, the ones that are deceased now, did tell
me that they had a gun in their glove box. They pointed at
their glove box.
....
And I was scared that there was gonna be some kind
of confrontation between the two. So I did go tell the car that
had Brian Hall in it. I did tell them that there was a gun. And
that might’ve been why he thought “I’m gonna shoot first.”
....
But that’s not . . . I mean that’s not the way to do it.
And that’s not right.
Shelton said that, at the time of trial, she was “scared,” and that she was
“afraid [Hall] would get out of jail” if she said that she told Hall about the gun. She
stated that she knew “that was lying on the stand” and acknowledged that she could
“face charges” for perjury. Shelton agreed to meet the defense investigator the
following day for a longer interview. However, after talking to her husband, Shelton
decided not to go to the interview. Shelton’s husband later told the investigator that
Shelton did not want to talk to the investigator.

– 12 – 2821
Hall’s third application for post-conviction relief
Hall hired an attorney, and a year after Klamser’s recorded interview with
Shelton, that attorney filed an untimely motion for a new trial in Hall’s closed criminal
case.26 That motion was eventually denied because it was an improper procedural
vehicle in which to raise Hall’s post-conviction relief claim based on newly discovered
evidence.
Following that denial, Hall’s post-conviction relief attorney filed an
application for post-conviction relief, which was the correct procedural vehicle for
raising a post-conviction relief claim based on newly discovered evidence.27 The State
moved to dismiss the application as untimely and successive because the statute of
limitations had passed and Hall had already filed two previous post-conviction relief
applications.28
The superior court dismissed the application as successive. In doing so,
the court noted that there was a statutory exception, AS 12.72.020(b)(2), that could
apply to otherwise untimely post-conviction relief claims based on newly discovered
evidence, but that there was no similar statutory exception for successive applications
raising claims of newly discovered evidence.
Hall appealed the dismissal of his post-conviction relief application to this
Court, arguing that Alaska law should recognize a due process exception for successive
post-conviction relief applications that were based on newly discovered evidence of

26
See Alaska R. Crim. P. 33(c) (requiring a motion for a new trial to be filed within
180 days of final judgment).
27
See Alaska R. Crim. P. 35.1(a)(4); AS 12.72.010-.020.
28
See AS 12.72.020(a)(3)(A) (providing that, if a conviction is appealed, the statute
of limitations for filing a post-conviction relief application is one year after the decision on
the appeal becomes final); AS 12.72.020(a)(6) (prohibiting successive post-conviction
relief applications).

– 13 – 2821
innocence.29 We agreed that a due process exception existed for successive petitions
that raised newly discovered evidence of innocence, and we held that the exception
required the same showing as AS 12.72.020(b)(2).30 We then remanded the case to the
superior court to determine whether Hall was able to meet the requirements of
AS 12.72.020(b)(2).31
On remand, the State initially moved to dismiss the application on the
ground that Shelton’s recorded statements to Klamser were unsworn, and Hall therefore
had not shown that he had newly discovered evidence that would be admissible.
In response, Hall explained that Shelton had been unwilling to sign an
affidavit. Hall requested leave to depose Shelton, but the State objected because the
case was not at the discovery phase yet. Hall then requested that the court subpoena
Shelton to testify in court. The court granted this request over the State’s objection.
Shelton subsequently testified at a hearing before the superior court in
February 2020. At the hearing, Shelton testified that her trial testimony was incorrect
and the truth was that she had told Hall that the victims had a gun. She testified that at
the time of Hall’s trial she was “traumatized and mixed up and scared.” She said that
she refused to sign the affidavit the post-conviction relief attorney had prepared because
the affidavit said that she had lied at trial and she did not believe that she had “outright
lied.” She testified that she was worried about being charged with perjury, but that she
“truly believed” at the time of trial that she had not talked to Hall and that “later, as
[she] thought about it, [she] did recall going back one last time and telling him [about
the gun].” She testified that she “just want[ed] to come forward with the truth.”

29
Hall v. State, 446 P.3d 373, 374-75 (Alaska App. 2019).
30
Id. at 378.
31
Id. at 378-79.

– 14 – 2821
After Shelton’s testimony, the parties argued their respective positions and
filed supplemental memoranda of law. Hall’s post-conviction relief attorney argued that
the court should deny the State’s motion to dismiss because he had presented newly
discovered evidence of innocence that showed that he had acted in self-defense.
The State argued that the court should grant the motion to dismiss because
Hall’s defense counsel was aware at the time of trial that Shelton had made
contradictory statements to defense investigator Firment. According to the State,
Shelton’s 1995 statement to Firment was “conceptually identical” to Shelton’s
admissions to Klamser in the 2012 interview and this was “old news” that did not
qualify as newly discovered evidence that had “not previously [been] presented and
heard by the court.”
The State also argued that Shelton’s recantation did not establish by clear
and convincing evidence that Hall was innocent, as required by AS 12.72.020(b)(2)(D).
Additionally, the State argued that Hall had not demonstrated due diligence because he
could have contacted Shelton earlier during his first post-conviction relief application
proceedings when he was represented by counsel.
The superior court agreed with the State’s arguments and issued an order
dismissing Hall’s post-conviction relief application. The court ruled first that Hall had
failed to show due diligence in obtaining the recantation. The court also ruled that
Shelton’s recantation did not qualify as “newly discovered evidence” and that the
recantation was cumulative to the evidence presented at trial and merely impeaching.
Lastly, the court ruled that Hall had failed to show that the recantation would “probably
result in an acquittal,” which is the standard that applies to timely post-conviction relief
applications raising a claim of newly discovered evidence of innocence.32
This appeal followed.

32
See Marino v. State, 577 P.3d 992, 1021 (Alaska App. 2025).

– 15 – 2821
Hall’s claims on appeal
As we already explained, because Hall was raising an untimely post-
conviction relief claim based on newly discovered evidence, he was required to meet
the statutory requirements of AS 12.72.020(b)(2). This provision states, in pertinent
part:
(b) Notwithstanding (a)(3) and (4) of this section [the
provisions setting forth the deadlines that apply to post-
conviction relief applications], a court may hear a claim
....
(2) based on newly discovered evidence if the
applicant establishes due diligence in presenting the
claim and sets out facts supported by evidence that is
admissible and
(A) was not known within
(i) 18 months after entry of the judgment
of conviction if the claim relates to a
conviction;
....
(B) is not cumulative to the evidence presented
at trial;
(C) is not impeachment evidence; and
(D) establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that the applicant is innocent.[33]
In Marino v. State, we explained that the requirements under
AS 12.72.020(b)(2) are similar to the requirements imposed when newly discovered
evidence underlies a timely motion for a new trial or a timely application for post-
conviction relief.34 Under Salinas v. State, to obtain a new trial, a defendant raising a
timely newly discovered evidence claim must show (1) that the evidence is newly

33
AS 12.72.020(b)(2).
34
Marino, 577 P.3d at 1011-12.

– 16 – 2821
discovered and was not available at the time of trial; (2) that the defendant has been
diligent; (3) that the evidence is not “merely cumulative or impeaching”; (4) that the
evidence is material; and (5) that the evidence is such “as, on a new trial, would
probably produce an acquittal.”35
For purposes of untimely post-conviction relief applications raising newly
discovered evidence claims, however, the requirements are slightly different. Instead of
showing that the newly discovered evidence was material and would “probably produce
an acquittal,”36 AS 12.72.020(b)(2)(D) requires a defendant bringing an untimely newly
discovered evidence claim to show that the newly discovered evidence “establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that the [defendant] is innocent.” In Marino, we
construed this statutory language to mean that the defendant must prove that it is
“‘highly probable’ that the newly discovered evidence would result in an acquittal.”37
This “highly probable” standard requires a “much stronger showing” than does the
“probably produce an acquittal” standard under Salinas.38
Thus, in the current case, to establish a prima facie case, Hall was required
to “present the superior court with well-pleaded assertions of fact which, if ultimately
proved, would be sufficient to establish his entitlement to relief” under
AS 12.72.020(b)(2).39 That is, he was required to show (1) that he exercised due
diligence in presenting his newly discovered evidence; (2) that he had newly discovered
evidence that was not known within eighteen months of his judgment; (3) that the newly
discovered evidence was not cumulative; (4) that the evidence was not merely

35
Salinas v. State, 373 P.2d 512, 514 (Alaska 1962).
36
Marino, 577 P.3d at 1012.
37
Id. at 1023.
38
Id. at 1012-13, 1023.
39
Wyatt v. State, 393 P.3d 442, 445 (Alaska App. 2017) (emphasis omitted).

– 17 – 2821
impeaching; and (5) that it is “highly probable” that the newly discovered evidence
would result in an acquittal.40
In determining whether Hall’s pleadings were sufficient to state a prima
facie case for relief, the superior court was obliged to view well-pleaded factual
allegations in the light most favorable to Hall.41 On appellate review, we also view
Hall’s well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to Hall.42 This includes Shelton’s
testimony at the 2020 court hearing. That is, at this stage in the proceedings, we are
required to treat Shelton’s recantation as credible, notwithstanding the State’s various
attacks on her credibility in its appellate briefing.43
Ultimately, whether a post-conviction relief application is sufficient to
state a prima facie case for relief is a question of law that we decide de novo.44 This
means that we resolve the question of whether Hall established a prima facie case under
AS 12.72.020(b)(2) using our independent judgment, without any deference to the
superior court’s conclusions.45 We now turn to Hall’s arguments on appeal.

40
Marino, 577 P.3d at 1023; AS 12.72.020(b)(2).
41
See Steffensen v. State, 837 P.2d 1123, 1125-26 (Alaska App. 1992).
42
Id.
43
We note that, as a general matter, courts are understandably “suspicious” of post-
conviction recantations, particularly when there is a suggestion that the witness has
something to gain or that the witness knows and has been influenced by friends or family
of the defendant. See, e.g., Ahvakana v. State, 768 P.2d 631, 633 (Alaska App. 1989). Here,
however, Shelton has seemingly nothing to gain by her recantation and has no connections
to Hall’s family and friends.
44
David v. State, 372 P.3d 265, 269 (Alaska App. 2016).
45
See id.

– 18 – 2821
Why we conclude that Hall has established a prima facie case of due
diligence
Alaska Statute 12.72.020(b)(2) requires a post-conviction relief applicant
to demonstrate “due diligence” in presenting their otherwise untimely newly discovered
evidence claim. In its order dismissing Hall’s application, the superior court ruled that
Hall had failed to establish a prima facie case of due diligence because he waited
seventeen years before sending a defense investigator to interview Shelton. On appeal,
Hall argues that this ruling fails to consider that “Hall had no way of knowing when, or
if, [Shelton] would ever have a crisis of conscience and tell the truth.” According to
Hall, the fact that “it took [Shelton] 17 years to be ready to come clean about her
perjured testimony is no fault of Hall’s.”
We agree with Hall that recantations can present particular challenges
when assessing a defendant’s diligence. In some instances, the defendant may actually
be aware at the time of trial that the witness’s trial testimony is untrue, as Hall was here;
the defendant has no control over whether the witness may eventually recant their trial
testimony and tell the truth.46 As the Florida Supreme Court has recognized, “recanted
testimony cannot be ‘discovered’ until the witness chooses to recant.”47 Other courts

46
See, e.g., Archer v. State, 934 So.2d 1187, 1194 (Fla. 2006) (“[A] recantation is not
precluded from being considered newly discovered evidence simply because the defendant
knew, as reflected by what the defendant claimed the facts to be, that the recanting witness
was not telling the truth at the time of the trial or because the defendant took the stand to
testify contrary to the witness.”).
47
Davis v. State, 26 So.3d 519, 528 (Fla. 2009); see also Burns v. State, 858 So.2d
1229, 1230 (Fla. Dist. App. 2003) (“Even though the appellant knew at trial that the
codefendant was lying, the appellant could not have gotten the codefendant to admit that
he was lying earlier, and thus the recantation is newly discovered evidence that could not
have been obtained earlier with due diligence.”); People v. Molstad, 461 N.E.2d 398, 402
(Ill. 1984) (citation omitted) (holding that affidavits of codefendants were newly
discovered evidence, as “no amount of diligence could have forced the codefendants to
violate their fifth amendment right to avoid self-incrimination if the codefendants did not
choose to do so”).

– 19 – 2821
have likewise held that a defendant’s diligence in presenting a claim based on a
recantation should primarily be judged from the time the defendant could reasonably
have learned of the recantation.48 Indeed, it would seemingly not be good public policy
to condition a finding of diligence on a defendant’s willingness to repeatedly harass a
witness (or victim) for a recantation.
Here, Shelton testified that she was young (fifteen years old) at the time
of the shooting and that she was very traumatized by the case. She said that she blocked
out her memories of the case until at least 1998, when her mother died and she moved
back to Alaska. She recalled receiving Angela Hall’s letter in 2011, which she did not
respond to and which “spooked” her. It was only in 2012, when contacted by Klamser,
a defense investigator, that she first admitted that her trial testimony was not true.
Moreover, even then, she remained reluctant to cooperate with Hall’s legal team.
Notably, immediately after talking to Klamser, she spoke to her husband, who
convinced her she should not get involved. She then did not attend the scheduled follow-
up interview with Klamser and, ultimately, Hall’s attorney had to subpoena her to court
in order to obtain her statements under oath.

48
See, e.g., United States v. Loudner, 203 F.upp. 2d 1083, 1094-95 (D.S.D. 2002)
(finding defendant diligent because he acted within a year of learning of the witness’s
recantation); State v. Scott, 207 P.3d 495, 501 (Wash. App. 2009) (concluding that
defendant acted with diligence in discovering recantation by the alleged victim and two
witnesses because defendant was imprisoned, subject to a no-contact order with regard to
the victim, and it was “unlikely the[] witnesses would have changed their stories earlier”
or that the defendant could have influenced them to do so); People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d
524, 527-28 (Ill. 2004) (noting that recantation of eyewitness’s trial testimony seventeen
years after defendant’s conviction was “newly discovered” where it “was not available at
defendant’s original trial and . . . the defendant could not have discovered it sooner through
diligence”); Cammarano v. State, 602 So.2d 1369, 1370 (Fla. App. 1992) (noting that an
untimely application is permissible if recantation could not have been reasonably
discovered prior to filing of first post-conviction relief application); see also People v.
Wideman, 52 N.E.3d 531, 543-44 (Ill. App. 2016) (emphasizing that defendant must
provide specific well-pleaded assertions regarding why an affidavit could not reasonably
have been discovered sooner and affirming dismissal of application where defendant
offered only conclusory general assertions regarding diligence).

– 20 – 2821
Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Hall, the record strongly
suggests that earlier attempts to contact Shelton either were or would have been
unsuccessful and that 2012 was the earliest that Shelton was willing to come forward
with a recantation.49 Accordingly, even if Hall had done more to contact Shelton other
than send the 2011 letter, it is unlikely that additional efforts would have made any
difference.50
On appeal, the State notes that Hall did not file this post-conviction relief
application until two years after the 2012 recantation. The State asserts that this two-
year delay reflects a lack of diligence. But a review of the record shows that at least six
months of that time was spent litigating the procedurally improper motion for a new
trial that Hall’s post-conviction relief attorney initially filed. There is little question that
it was incompetent for Hall’s post-conviction relief lawyer to file a motion for a new
trial rather than an application for post-conviction relief.51
Moreover, the filing of the new trial motion provided notice to the State
regarding the recantation. The State was therefore aware of the underlying substance of
Hall’s newly discovered evidence claim within twelve months of Shelton’s recantation

49
In his pleadings, Hall asserted that one of his prior attorneys had previously
attempted to contact Shelton at her workplace, but Shelton was unwilling to talk to the
attorney. However, Hall failed to provide an affidavit from that attorney supporting this
assertion.
50
See, e.g., Davis v. State, 26 So.3d 519, 528 (Fla. 2009) (“Logically, even if counsel
had or could have located these witnesses at an earlier date such earlier date does not
conclusively establish that the witnesses would have recanted their testimony at that earlier
time.”).
51
See Alaska R. Crim. P. 33(c) (providing that a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence must be filed within 180 days of the final judgment); Alaska R.
Crim. P. 35.1(a)(4) (authorizing the filing of a post-conviction relief action for claims
related to new evidence of material facts not previously heard).

– 21 – 2821
— even though it would take another eleven months before the post-conviction relief
attorney’s mistake was corrected and the right procedural vehicle was filed.52
Given these circumstances, we conclude that Hall established a prima
facie case that he acted with due diligence in response to the 2012 recantation.

Why we conclude that Shelton’s recantation qualifies as newly discovered
evidence that was not known within eighteen months of the criminal
judgment
Alaska Statute 12.72.020(b)(2)(A)(i) provides that new evidence must not
have been known “within 18 months after entry of the judgment of conviction if the
claim relates to a conviction.” In its order, the superior court ruled that Shelton’s
recantation did not meet this requirement because Hall and his attorneys were aware, at
the time of trial, that Shelton had previously admitted to defense investigator Firment
that she told Hall about the alleged gun.
But, as Hall argues on appeal, this ruling fails to recognize what “newly
discovered evidence” is at issue in this case. What is “new” is not the fact that Shelton
made contradictory statements to Firment about whether she told Hall about the gun,
but rather her recantation and sworn statements that “the truth” is that she did tell Hall
about the alleged gun. At trial, Shelton testified that she did not tell Hall about the gun,
although she also acknowledged telling Firment that she “might” or “may have” made
such a statement because she could not remember. Asked in court to clarify, she
adamantly denied that she had said anything about a gun to Hall. Calling Firment as a
witness to Shelton’s unsworn, unrecorded admission and/or further cross-examining
Shelton about her past admission would not have provided Hall with what he has now:
sworn testimony from Shelton that what she said at trial was not true and that the truth

52
Cf. Alex v. State, 210 P.3d 1225, 1228-29 (Alaska App. 2009) (recognizing that
equitable tolling may apply when defendant pursues their claim through the wrong
procedural vehicle).

– 22 – 2821
is that she did tell the occupants of Wright’s car — including Hall — that Dinsmore
and Honeycutt had a gun.
We accordingly conclude that Shelton’s recantation qualifies as newly
discovered evidence that was not “discovered,” for purposes of Hall’s post-conviction
relief claims, until 2012.

Why we conclude that Shelton’s recantation is not cumulative of the
testimony presented at trial and not merely impeaching
Alaska Statute 12.72.020(b)(2)(B)-(C) states that newly discovered
evidence must not be “cumulative to the evidence presented at trial” and must not be
“impeachment evidence.” In Mooney v. State, we explained that the prohibition against
mere “impeachment” evidence is a prohibition against evidence “that is cumulative of
the evidence previously available, or that simply reinforces the evidence that was
previously available to impeach the government’s case.”53 If the newly discovered
evidence impeaches the government’s case “in new and significant ways,” then it is not
considered “merely impeaching” for purposes of either the Salinas test or
AS 12.72.020(b)(2).54
Here, the superior court ruled that Shelton’s recantation was cumulative
of the evidence presented at trial because (1) Shelton admitted at trial that she may have
told a defense investigator that she told Hall about the alleged gun; and (2) Hall himself
testified that Shelton told him that Honeycutt and Dinsmore had a gun. The superior
court also ruled that the recantation was “merely impeaching.”
But these rulings overlook the fact that, although Shelton admitted that
she may have said something different to the defense investigator, she was otherwise
unequivocal in her trial testimony that the truth was that she did not tell Hall that

53
Mooney v. State, 167 P.3d 81, 83 (Alaska App. 2007).
54
Id. at 91 (citing Salinas v. State, 373 P.2d 512 (Alaska 1962)).

– 23 – 2821
Dinsmore had a gun. The superior court’s rulings also ignore the centrality of Shelton’s
testimony to the State’s theory of the case and the prosecutor’s depiction of Hall as a
cold-blooded and manipulative killer who was lying about what had occurred.
During closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized Shelton’s status as a
neutral witness who had no preexisting relationship with any of the others present:
Prosecutor: You heard, of course, from Monica
Shelton. I submit to you that of all the people that we put on,
the non-police witnesses, the non — the witnesses who were
civilian witnesses, people who were present at the crime
scene, Monica Shelton is a witness whose testimony you
should rely upon above all others. Why do I say that? First
of all, Monica Shelton is the one witness with no preexisting
relationship between any of these people. She didn’t know
them. She didn’t know them before this happened.
The prosecutor asserted that Shelton was telling the truth about what had
happened and that Hall was lying about what had occurred:
Prosecutor: And it’s at this point where Mr. Dinsmore
— or where she tells them, you better not — you know, you
shouldn’t be messing with those guys. And Mr. Dinsmore
says, well, we got a gun in here. There’s no evidence — no
evidence, no reliable evidence, other than Mr. Hall’s own
words, that that was ever passed from Ms. Shelton to
Mr. Hall. No evidence other than Mr. Hall’s own testimony.
Shelton swears, subject to cross-examination, that at that
point where she sees Mr. Wright and Hall get out of the car,
she decides, go. And she’s very definite about where she
went. . . . And she swears, I never told anybody in the
Wright-Hall vehicle, in the Trig vehicle, what Mr. Dinsmore
said.
The prosecutor disparaged the defense investigator who interviewed
Shelton and obtained her prior inconsistent statement, telling the jury they should be
“outraged” by the defense investigator’s tactics:
Prosecutor: In nine — June of 1995, a defense
investigator, posing — or using as a pretext, I guess would
probably be a better word — that he’s working on her

– 24 – 2821
boyfriend’s case, knocks on her door: Let me talk to you
about your boyfriend’s case. That’s not really what’s going
on. He wants to talk to her about this case. Well, there’s a
dispassionate inquiry for the truth; a defense investigator in
June of ’95, more than two years after this happened, after
this witness has been questioned on this point, answered this
question, shows up at the door: Let me talk to you about your
boyfriend’s case. And then switches the conversation,
doesn’t let her look at her statements. You should be
outraged by that, be outraged. Monica Shelton took the stand
and told you what happened. She’s very definite about where
she was and what she said. I urge you to rely on her
statement.
The prosecutor ultimately ended his closing argument by characterizing
Hall as a manipulative, cold-blooded killer who “had the nerve to call Ms. Shelton a
liar.” He argued:
Prosecutor: [Hall] offered you this story about
Monica Shelton passing the gun statement, Dinsmore’s gun
statement — is that a surprise? He sat in court and he’s heard
her tell that story before. Then during this trial, he sat in court
and listened to her tell that story again. Is it any surprise to
you that he takes the stand and twists the story to his
advantage, and on his word, asks you to believe him? Is that
a surprise? It didn’t happen. Mr. Hall is lying. . . . This isn’t
a self-defense case; this is cold blooded murder, people. You
should find him guilty as charged.
As these portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument demonstrate,
Shelton’s trial testimony was central to the prosecutor’s argument for why the jury
should convict Hall of first-degree murder for intentionally killing Dinsmore and
Honeycutt. The closing arguments would have looked very different if Shelton had
admitted what she now asserts is the truth: that she did tell Hall about Dinsmore’s
comments about having a gun.
Thus, contrary to the superior court’s ruling, Shelton’s recantation is not
simply cumulative of the evidence presented at trial, and it is not “merely impeaching.”

– 25 – 2821
Instead, the recantation is evidence that undermines the State’s case in a new and
significant way.

Why we conclude that Hall’s pleadings, even when viewed in the light
most favorable to Hall, do not establish a prima facie case that it is
“highly probable” that Shelton’s recantation would result in an acquittal
at a retrial
We now turn to the final requirement of AS 12.72.020(b)(2), which
requires the defendant to show that the new evidence “establishes by clear and
convincing evidence that [the defendant] is innocent.”55 As we already explained, we
recently interpreted this language in Marino v. State to require the defendant to show
that it is “highly probable” — i.e., more than just “probable” — that the newly
discovered evidence would result in an acquittal when considered with the totality of
evidence known to both parties.56 As we emphasized in Marino, this is a high standard
to meet.57 Indeed, it is higher than the Salinas “probably produce an acquittal” standard
used for timely newly discovered evidence claims, which the superior court ruled was
not met here.58
In order to understand why Hall’s pleadings do not meet this standard, we
must first explain the dual nature of a self-defense claim. There is both a subjective and
an objective component to a self-defense claim.59 In order to justify the use of deadly
force, a defendant must have “actually believed that deadly force was necessary to
protect himself,” and that belief “must be one that a reasonable person would have held

55
AS 12.72.020(b)(2)(D).
56
Marino v. State, 577 P.3d 992, 1023 (Alaska App. 2025).
57
Id. at 1021.
58
Id. (quoting Salinas, 373 P.3d at 515).
59
See AS 11.35.330-340.

– 26 – 2821
under the circumstances.”60 Thus, to raise a viable claim of self-defense at trial, Hall
was required to put forward evidence (1) that he subjectively believed that deadly force
was necessary to protect himself and/or his friends; and (2) that this subjective belief
was objectively reasonable based on the circumstances known to Hall at the time the
deadly force was used.61
There is no question that Shelton’s recantation supports the first prong of
Hall’s self-defense claim. At trial, Hall testified that he shot Honeycutt and Dinsmore
because he subjectively believed that the beer bottle that Dinsmore was extending was
actually a gun and that Dinsmore was about to shoot Hall and/or his friends. Hall
explained that he believed that Dinsmore had a gun primarily because Shelton had just
told him that “[Honeycutt and Dinsmore] have a gun, and they’ll shoot [you], so just
leave.” Hall was impeached at trial with Shelton’s trial testimony, in which she swore
that she had not told Hall about Dinsmore’s comment about having a gun. And, as we
already explained, the prosecutor used Shelton’s trial testimony to argue that Hall was
lying about being subjectively afraid and that the truth was that Hall was a cold-blooded
killer who had murdered Dinsmore and Honeycutt without any provocation.
Shelton’s recantation makes Hall’s original trial testimony more credible
and his mistake in thinking the beer bottle was a gun more believable. As the only
person who heard Shelton’s comment about the gun, Hall was particularly primed to
misinterpret the situation.
That said, the problem that Hall still faces, notwithstanding Shelton’s
recantation, is that the rest of the evidence from trial indicates that Hall’s mistaken
belief that he had to use deadly force against Honeycutt and Dinsmore was not
objectively reasonable. As the superior court noted in its order, “the ‘altercation’ was

60
Weston v. State, 682 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Alaska 1984).
61
Id.

– 27 – 2821
seemingly over” by the time Honeycutt’s car pulled up alongside Wright’s car. Wright
(the driver) and Thompson (one of the backseat passengers) both testified that they saw
the two men in the other car and heard Dinsmore offer a beer and extend the beer bottle.
Wright and Thompson testified that Dinsmore’s tone was calm and non-threatening.
Thompson also testified that Dinsmore was holding a beer bottle by the neck, with the
round bottom extended, and that the beer bottle was clearly recognizable as a beer
bottle.
Moreover, as the superior court ruled, the testimony showed that “there
was ample time for Hall to realize that deadly use of force was not necessary to avoid
death or serious injury.” Thompson testified that backseat passenger Hoecker answered
“no” to Dinsmore’s offer of a beer and there was time for Hoecker to ask Thompson if
she wanted the beer prior to Thompson hearing any gunshots.
It is true that Hoecker, who was a childhood friend of Hall’s, testified that
he saw Dinsmore with a “dark object” and that he slumped down in his seat because he
was worried the object might be a gun. But Hoecker was impeached at trial not only by
Thompson’s contrary testimony but also by Hoecker’s prior statements to the police in
which he admitted that he had declined Dinsmore’s offer of a beer.
Ultimately, to establish a prima facie case for relief, Hall was required to
show that, viewing all the well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to Hall, it is
“highly probable” that Shelton’s recantation would result in an acquittal at any retrial.
But while Shelton’s recantation constitutes important new evidence that sheds more
light on Hall’s motivations and the reasons for his subjective fear, it does not alter the
fact that his actions in shooting both men still appear overly impulsive and objectively
unreasonable under the circumstances.
At trial, it was the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hall did not act in self-defense.62 Now, thirty years later, it is Hall’s burden to show that

62
Jones-Nelson v. State, 512 P.3d 665, 672 (Alaska 2022).

– 28 – 2821
it is “highly probable” that the jury would acquit him in light of Shelton’s recantation.
Having carefully reviewed Hall’s post-conviction pleadings and the original trial, we
conclude that Hall has failed to meet this burden, even viewing Shelton’s recantation in
the light most favorable to Hall, as we are required to do at this stage of the proceedings.
We note, however, that this does not mean that Shelton’s recantation will
have no effect on Hall’s future prospects. Both at trial and at sentencing, Hall was
depicted as a manipulative, cold-blooded killer who had the audacity to claim that
Shelton was lying about what she told Hall. Indeed, at sentencing, the superior court
specifically found that Shelton’s trial testimony was credible and that Hall’s account of
what had been said was not credible. Knowing now that Shelton apparently did tell Hall
about the (nonexistent) gun makes Hall’s fear more believable and his actions more
understandable than they appeared at the time to either the prosecutor or the superior
court.
At sentencing, the court sentenced Hall to 159 years to serve, one of the
highest sentences — if not the highest sentence — that a juvenile tried as an adult in
Alaska has ever received. As a juvenile sentenced in 1995 to a de facto life without
parole sentence, Hall has been granted the opportunity for a resentencing in which his
youth and the unique attributes of youth will be appropriately considered.63 As part of

63
See Fletcher v. State, 532 P.3d 286, 308 (Alaska App. 2023); see also Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (holding that “children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of criminal sentencing”).
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court noted “three significant gaps between
juveniles and adults” that warranted differential treatment at sentencing:
First, children have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-
taking. Second, children “are more vulnerable … to negative influences and
outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have limited
“contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. And third, a child’s
character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and
his actions less likely to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”

– 29 – 2821
that resentencing, the court should take into account Shelton’s recantation and the effect
of that recantation on Hall’s level of culpability.

Conclusion
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (alterations in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
569-70 (2005)).

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