Katherine Blanche Noatak v. State of Alaska

NOTICE
This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a).
Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska
Appellate Rule 214(d).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
KATHERINE BLANCHE NOATAK,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA,
Appellee.
Court of Appeals No. A-14513
Trial Court No. 4BE-16-00640 CR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
No. 0492 — August 12, 2026
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District,
Bethel, Nathaniel Peters, Judge.
Appearances: Anna Jay, Attorney at Law, under contract with
the 	Public 	Defender 	Agency, 	and 	Terrence 	Haas, 	Public
Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Jessica R. Haines,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions,
Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General,
Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Beach,
Judges.
In 2016, Katherine Blanche Noatak was charged with manslaughter and
driving under the influence after she drove her four-wheeler while intoxicated and
struck and killed a seventy-six-year-old woman. 1 Noatak entered into a plea agreement
with the State in which she pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide and the
1 	AS 11.41.120(a)(1) and AS 28.35.030(a)(1)-(2), respectively.

– 2 – 	0492
remaining charges were dismissed.2 Noatak stipulated to an aggravating factor — that,
under AS 12.55.155(c)(10), her conduct was among the most serious within the
definition of the offense. The superior court imposed a sentence of 10 years with all but
15 months suspended. Pursuant to the agreement, the court imposed a 5-year term of
probation and several probation conditions, including a condition prohibiting Noatak
from consuming alcohol.
In the years since Noatak was released to probation, she repeatedly
violated the conditions of her probation, resulting in seven petitions to revoke her
probation. With respect to each of these petitions, the court found, inter alia, that
Noatak violated her probation by consuming alcohol. Each time, the court imposed a
sanction, from a requirement to reside at a community residential center while
completing treatment to periods of incarceration ranging from 45 days to 230 days.
In the latest petition to revoke probation — Noatak’s seventh — the State
alleged that Noatak violated her probation conditions by consuming alcohol and by
committing the offense of disorderly conduct. Noatak admitted that she had violated the
terms of her probation by consuming alcohol, and the State withdrew the remaining
allegation. Sentencing was left open to the court.
At disposition, the State asked the court to impose all of Noatak’s
remaining time, arguing that, while Noatak had at times participated in treatment, she
had not meaningfully engaged in or committed to rehabilitation and did not appear
willing or able to stop drinking. The probation officer stated that a long period of
incarceration was necessary to protect the public, and that she hoped Noatak would
complete treatment and achieve sobriety while in custody before continuing on
supervision through parole. Defense counsel asked the court to impose 1 year of
suspended time and extend probation by 1 year, and to set a deadline for Noatak to
complete treatment and aftercare.
2 	AS 11.41.130.

– 3 – 	0492
The court found that rehabilitation was no longer the primary sentencing
goal for Noatak and that its focus had shifted to isolation, followed by deterrence and
community condemnation. The court noted that Noatak had repeatedly returned to
drinking, despite completing or being in treatment, and found that “at this point in time
her actions speak louder than her words.” In particular, the court found that Noatak
would continue to drink and that, even if the court followed defense counsel’s
recommendation, Noatak would soon be facing a new violation. Given Noatak’s
repeated drinking and her failed attempts at treatment, the court imposed the remainder
of Noatak’s suspended time, approximately 5 years and 7 months.
Noatak now appeals, arguing that her sentence is excessive.
Noatak first argues that that court erred in imposing a maximum term of
imprisonment for her underlying offense — 10 years — without making the requisite
“worst offender” finding and that a “worst offender” finding is unsupported by the
record.3 A worst offender finding may be based on the defendant’s history, the criminal
offense itself, or both.4
Although the court did not expressly find Noatak to be a worst offender,
that finding is implicit in the court’s comments. The court relied heavily on Noatak’s
history of repeated probation violations and continued drinking. The court recognized
that “if Ms. Noatak’s not drinking, she will be a benefit to society,” but found that
3 	AS 11.41.130(b) (providing that criminally negligent homicide is a class B felony);
AS 12.55.125(d) (setting a 10-year maximum term of imprisonment for a class B felony);
see Foley v. State, 9 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Alaska App. 2000) (“Under Alaska law, a sentencing
judge must find that a defendant is a ‘worst offender’ before the judge is authorized to
sentence the defendant to the maximum term of imprisonment.”).
4 	Foley, 9 P.3d at 1041; see also Hintz v. State, 627 P.2d 207, 210 (Alaska 1981)
(stating that a “worst offender” is “the worst type of offender ‘within the group of persons
committing the offense in question’” and that a court evaluating whether a defendant is a
worst offender should consider “the manner in which the crime was committed, as well as
the character and background of the defendant” (quoting Wilson v. State, 582 P.2d 154,
157 n.3 (Alaska 1978))).

– 4 – 	0492
Noatak had engaged in treatment multiple times and had not been successful. The court
expressly found that Noatak’s words — stating that she would refrain from alcohol use
— “ring hollow for the court and don’t really carry any weight.” In short, the court
found that, at this point, Noatak had shown no promise of rehabilitation with respect to
the root cause of the underlying criminal conduct in this case.
Moreover, we have previously recognized that “[w]here the defendant
pleads guilty to a lesser offense and a review of the facts establishes that [the defendant],
in fact, committed a greater offense, the court may legitimately find that [the defendant]
is a worst offender for purposes of sentencing [the defendant] for the lesser offense.”5
As part of her underlying plea agreement, Noatak stipulated that her conduct was among
the most serious included within the definition of criminally negligent homicide
because, according to the plea agreement, “it approximate[d] the higher level of
manslaughter.”
For these reasons, we reject Noatak’s claim that the court’s implicit worst
offender finding is unsupported.
Second, Noatak challenges the court’s prioritization of the 	Chaney
criteria.6 In particular, Noatak argues that the court erred in finding that rehabilitation
was no longer a relevant sentencing factor and that the court gave undue weight to
deterrence and isolation.
But a sentencing judge has substantial discretion when evaluating the
priority and weight to afford the different Chaney criteria under the facts of a particular
case.7 Here, the court’s focus reasonably shifted from rehabilitation to other criteria in
light of Noatak’s habitual and uncontrolled alcohol use.
5 	Fee v. State, 656 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Alaska App. 1982).
6 	State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970); AS 12.55.005 (codifying the
goals of sentencing).
7 	Evan v. State, 899 P.2d 926, 931 (Alaska App. 1995).

– 5 – 	0492
At the original sentencing hearing on Noatak’s underlying offense, the
court expressed concern that Noatak had not internalized the serious impacts of her
drinking. The court’s sentence at the time focused on rehabilitation, but the court noted
that if Noatak did not internalize the real risks of her drinking, she would “just come
back, and . . . chip away at . . . the suspended time.” The court’s prediction proved
correct. At the disposition hearing on Noatak’s fifth petition to revoke probation, the
court warned Noatak that its focus on rehabilitation was nearing its end and that future
violations might result in the imposition of her remaining suspended time. The court
nonetheless did not impose the remainder of Noatak’s suspended time upon disposition
of the next petition to revoke probation and waited until the seventh petition before
imposing Noatak’s remaining suspended time.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the court could reasonably
find at this point that rehabilitation was entitled to significantly less weight than at the
time of sentencing on the underlying offense and that increased emphasis on isolation
and deterrence called for a lengthy period of incarceration and period of sobriety before
Noatak was released on parole. We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion in weighing the Chaney criteria. And having independently reviewed the
record, we conclude that the sentence imposed is not clearly mistaken.8
Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.
8 	See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974); see also Erickson v.
State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997) (recognizing that the “clearly mistaken”
standard of review contemplates that different judges, confronted with identical facts, will
differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence, and that a reviewing court will not
modify a sentence that falls within a “permissible range of reasonable sentences” (quoting
State v. Wentz, 805 P.2d 962, 965 (Alaska 1991))).