ECLI:EU:T:2026:432

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JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

1 July 2026 (*)

( EU trade mark – Application for EU word mark FOR BETTER GAMING – VEIKKAUS – Absolute ground for refusal – No distinctive character – Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Element of the mark having distinctive character acquired through use – Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 )

In Case T‑615/25,

Veikkaus Oy, established in Helsinki (Finland), represented by M. Nousiainen, lawyer,

applicant,

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Frydendahl, acting as Agent,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of K. Kecsmár, President, L. Madise (Rapporteur) and P. Nihoul, Judges,

Registrar: V. Di Bucci,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Veikkaus Oy, seeks the annulment in part of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 10 July 2025 (Case R 829/2025-4) (‘the contested decision’).

Background to the dispute

2 On 27 August 2024, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the word sign FOR BETTER GAMING – VEIKKAUS.

3 The mark applied for covered, inter alia, the services in Classes 35, 41 and 42 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:

– Class 35: ‘Commercial advisory services; retail services relating to computer software, entertainment software relating to computer games, downloadable software, electronic games software and downloadable video games; retail services for computer game software containing interactive multimedia, gaming software for mobile phones, smartphones, tablets and other electronic mobile devices; retail services for downloadable game software on mobile phones, smartphones, tablets and other electronic mobile devices; retail services for applications containing computer games; retail services for virtual games and gaming software; retail services for extensions and components for computer games and video games’;

– Class 41: ‘Entertainment; organisation and presentation of competitions; television entertainment; online entertainment services; provision of gaming services [directly on computer networks]; provision of online games via the internet; gaming services relating to betting; betting services; online betting services; entertainment services relating to horse-race betting; casino, betting and gambling services; organisation of lotteries; sports result services; gaming facility services; training services relating to gaming; online provision of non-downloadable electronic publications; virtual gaming services offered online from a computer network; gaming facility services based on virtual reality’;

– Class 42: ‘Gaming design services; quality testing, verification and control; scientific and technological services; design, development and maintenance of computer software and online gambling sites; maintenance of online gaming sites’.

4 By decision of 11 March 2025, the examiner rejected, in respect of the services mentioned in paragraph 3 above, the application for registration of the mark applied for on the basis of Article 7(1)(b), read in conjunction with Article 7(2), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

5 On 7 May 2025, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the examiner’s decision.

6 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld the appeal in so far as it related to the following services:

– Class 35: ‘Commercial advisory services’;

– Class 41: ‘Online supply of non-downloadable electronic publications’;

– Class 42: ‘Quality testing, verification and control; scientific and technological services’.

7 By contrast, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal in respect of the services covered by the mark applied for other than those referred to in paragraph 6 above (‘the services in question’) on the ground that that mark was devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 7(2) of that regulation. It found, in essence, that the mark applied for would be understood by the Finnish-speaking part of the relevant public as meaning ‘for better gambling – betting, prediction betting’ and would be perceived not as an indication of the commercial origin of the services in question, but as an advertising message in relation to those services.

8 Lastly, the Board of Appeal remitted the case to the examiner for it to examine, as regards the services in question, the applicant’s subsidiary claim relating to the distinctive character acquired through use of the mark applied for under Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001.

Forms of order sought

9 The applicant claims that the Court should:

– annul the contested decision in so far as it refused registration of the mark applied for in respect of the services in question;

– order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred before the Board of Appeal.

10 EUIPO contends that the Court should:

– dismiss the action;

– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that an oral hearing is convened.

Law

11 In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 7(2) of that regulation, in so far as the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the mark applied for was devoid of inherent distinctive character in relation to the services in question.

12 Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character must not be registered. Pursuant to Article 7(2) of that regulation, Article 7(1) thereof is to apply notwithstanding that the grounds of non-registrability obtain in only part of the European Union.

13 For a trade mark to possess distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, it must serve to identify the good or service in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that good or service from those of other undertakings (see judgment of 21 January 2010, Audi v OHIM, C‑398/08 P, EU:C:2010:29, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).

14 The distinctive character of a trade mark, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be assessed, first, by reference to the goods or services in respect of which registration has been applied for and, second, by reference to the perception of the relevant public (see judgment of 29 April 2004, Henkel v OHIM, C‑456/01 P and C‑457/01 P, EU:C:2004:258, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).

15 The signs which are devoid of any distinctive character that are referred to in Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 are deemed to be incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the origin of the goods or services covered by that mark, thus enabling the consumer who acquired those goods or services to choose to acquire them again if it was a positive experience, or to avoid doing so, if it was negative (see judgment of 28 June 2017, Colgate-Palmolive v EUIPO (AROMASENSATIONS), T‑479/16, not published, EU:T:2017:441, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).

16 As regards marks made up of signs or indications that are also used as advertising slogans, indications of quality or incitements to purchase the goods or services covered by those marks, registration of such marks is not excluded by virtue of such use (see judgment of 17 January 2024, Ilovepdf v EUIPO (ILOVEPDF), T‑60/23, not published, EU:T:2024:9, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). As regards the assessment of the distinctive character of such marks, it is inappropriate to apply to slogans criteria which are stricter than those applicable to other types of sign (see judgment of 21 January 2010, Audi v OHIM, C‑398/08 P, EU:C:2010:29, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

17 It is also apparent from case-law that although all marks made up of signs or indications that are also used as advertising slogans, indications of quality or incitements to purchase the goods or services covered by those marks convey by definition, to a greater or lesser extent, an objective message, even a simple one, they are nevertheless still capable of indicating to the consumer the commercial origin of the goods or services in question. That can be the position, in particular, where those marks can have a number of meanings, constitute a play on words or be perceived as fanciful, surprising and unexpected and, in that way, be easily remembered, so that they are not merely an ordinary advertising message, but possess a certain originality or resonance, require at least some interpretation by the relevant public, or set off a cognitive process in the minds of the public concerned (see judgment of 13 November 2024, DDCF v EUIPO (SUSTAINABLE BY DESIGN), T‑3/24, not published, EU:T:2024:811, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).

18 It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to examine whether, as the applicant claims, the Board of Appeal infringed Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 7(2) of that regulation, in finding that the mark applied for was devoid of inherent distinctive character in respect of the services in question.

The relevant public

19 The Board of Appeal noted that the services in question were aimed at the general public, whose level of attention was average, and at professionals, whose level of attention was higher than average (paragraphs 24 and 25 of the contested decision). It also noted that the mark applied for consisted of English words and a Finnish word and, after holding that, in some Member States, particularly in Finland, English was widely understood, it found that its assessment would relate to the Finnish-speaking part of the relevant public, which would understand the meaning of all the elements of the mark applied for (paragraph 27 of the contested decision).

20 Those findings of the Board of Appeal, which are not, moreover, disputed by the applicant, must be upheld.

The assessment of the distinctive character of the mark applied for

21 First of all, the Board of Appeal noted that the mark applied for consisted of the English word elements ‘for’, ‘better’ and ‘gaming’ and, separated by a hyphen, of the Finnish word element ‘veikkaus’ (paragraph 28 of the contested decision). As regards the meaning of those word elements, the Board of Appeal referred to the dictionary definitions submitted by the examiner, finding that they had not been disputed by the applicant. It also stated that the examiner did not call into question the meaning of the expression ‘for better gaming’ used by the examiner (paragraph 29 of the contested decision).

22 Next, the Board of Appeal examined the applicant’s claim that the mark applied for, taken as a whole, had distinctive character on account of the distinctive character of the word ‘veikkaus’ for the Finnish-speaking public, which would have lost, in the mind of that public, its initial meaning, namely ‘betting’ or ‘prediction betting’, for it now to be specifically associated with the applicant’s undertaking and its services and perceived as indicating their origin (paragraph 30 of the contested decision).

23 In that regard, the Board of Appeal found that it could assess the mark applied for and the word ‘veikkaus’ in that mark solely from the point of view of their inherent distinctive character, since the applicant’s argument relating to the distinctive character acquired through use of that mark had been put forward in the alternative (paragraph 31 of the contested decision). It held, inter alia, that the evidence adduced by the applicant did not provide any indication as to the inherent distinctive character of the mark applied for or of the word ‘veikkaus’ (paragraph 31 of the contested decision). It also found that the fact that the marks containing that word had acquired distinctive character through use did not show that the mark applied for had inherent distinctive character (paragraph 31 of the contested decision).

24 Furthermore, the Board of Appeal found that the word ‘veikkaus’ had, in the field of gambling, a meaning referring to betting and prediction betting, with the result that the Finnish-speaking public would perceive the mark applied for as meaning ‘for better gambling – betting, prediction betting’ (paragraph 32 of the contested decision). Separating the English part and the Finnish part of that mark by means of a hyphen does not give it any different meaning or otherwise affect its intelligibility for that public (paragraph 32 of the contested decision).

25 The Board of Appeal also found that, for services relating to gambling and betting, the mark applied for was neither ambiguous nor original and did not contain any element or characteristic capable of triggering a cognitive process in the mind of the relevant public or of requiring an interpretative effort. It has an immediately understandable meaning and a clear link with the services in question. It conveys to the Finnish-speaking public an unequivocal advertising message highlighting the positive characteristics of those services. Consequently, that public would perceive the mark applied for primarily as a promotional formula and not as an indication of the commercial origin of those services (paragraphs 33, 34 and 36 of the contested decision).

26 Lastly, the Board of Appeal noted that the taking into consideration of the earlier registrations of EU trade marks and Finnish trade marks relied on by the applicant could not lead to a different assessment (paragraphs 39 to 45 of the contested decision).

27 The applicant complains that the Board of Appeal merely took into account the meaning of the word ‘veikkaus’ in everyday Finnish language, which led to an incorrect assessment of the inherent distinctive character of the mark applied for, taken as a whole. It submits that that word is no longer perceived by the Finnish-speaking public in its original meaning, but as specifically designating its undertaking and the origin of the services which it offers, with the result that its presence within the mark applied for would confer on that mark an inherent distinctive character. That word corresponds to its trade name and its main trade mark, which has acquired distinctive character through its prolonged use and is highly reputed in Finland. In support of its assertions, the applicant relies on the entry of the sign VEIKKAUS in the register of trade marks with a reputation in Finland, the registration, on the basis of distinctive character acquired through use, of two EU trade marks and an earlier Finnish trade mark consisting of that sign, and the existence of a family of trade marks also including that sign.

28 The applicant emphasises, in that context, that a trade mark which has acquired distinctive character through use must enjoy the same protection as a trade mark with inherent distinctive character. It submits that since even before the date of filing of the application for registration of the mark applied for, the sign VEIKKAUS had acquired distinctive character through use in relation to goods and services in the field of gambling, it must be held, without any need for a new assessment, that it constitutes a component, having a distinctive character, of the mark applied for as a whole and it must be treated in the same way as any other element with inherent distinctive character.

29 Furthermore, the applicant submits that the mark applied for cannot be treated as a mere promotional formula. It notes that that trade mark consists of two elements, namely the slogan ‘for better gaming’ linked by a hyphen to the principal trade mark VEIKKAUS, which has distinctive character and by virtue of which the mark applied for, taken as a whole, clearly fulfils the primary function of a trade mark. It also emphasises that, in the mark applied for, the principal mark VEIKKAUS is presented independently, being separated from the slogan by a hyphen. The mark applied for does not therefore form a grammatical ‘whole’ in which the word ‘veikkaus’ appears according to its original meaning in Finnish. Citing examples of EU and Finnish trade marks combining the principal mark of an undertaking, separated by a hyphen, with a slogan, such as PAULIG – THIS CUP COUNTS, ASSA ABLOY – CREDENTIALS AS A SERVICE, TEFEL – KUN RAPEUS RATKAISE and BALLERINA – TÄYTETTÄ TULVILLAAN, the applicant adds that the relevant public is accustomed to encountering such combinations on the market and understands from the outset that they serve to designate the commercial origin of the goods or services concerned.

30 The applicant also relies on the fact that it is the proprietor of two Finnish trade marks, PAREMMAN PELIN PUOLESTA – VEIKKAUS and VEIKKAUS – ILOA ELÄMÄÄN, structured in a manner similar to the mark applied for, the former also covering the same services as the services in question. The Finnish Patent and Registration Office considered that those marks, taken as a whole, had inherent distinctive character. The Board of Appeal of EUIPO did not, however, duly take them into consideration.

31 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

32 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that it was only in the alternative that the applicant had claimed that the mark applied for had acquired distinctive character through use for the purposes of Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001, with the result that, in the absence of a decision by the examiner in that regard, that issue was not examined by the Board of Appeal. The parties agree that the main issue raised in the present case lies in the importance to be attached, where appropriate, in the assessment of the inherent distinctive character, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation, of the mark applied for taken as a whole, to the fact that the word element ‘veikkaus’ in that mark was previously registered as a trade mark on the basis of distinctive character acquired through use.

33 In the first place, it is necessary to uphold the Board of Appeal’s assessment that, in its literal sense, the mark applied for will be understood by the Finnish-speaking public as meaning, in the field of gambling, ‘for better gambling – betting, prediction betting’. That assessment is supported by dictionary definitions reproduced in paragraph 2 of the contested decision and not disputed by the applicant, from which it is apparent, inter alia, that the Finnish word ‘veikkaus’ refers to betting and prediction betting.

34 As the Board of Appeal found, it must be held that the separation by means of a hyphen of the first part of the mark applied for, consisting of the group of English words ‘for better gaming’, from the second part of that mark, consisting of the Finnish word ‘veikkaus’, is not in itself sufficient to confer on that mark a meaning different from that resulting from its literal meaning, as indicated in paragraph 33 above, or to alter its intelligibility for the Finnish-speaking public.

35 In the second place, the applicant cannot criticise the Board of Appeal for having taken into account the literal meaning of the word ‘veikkaus’ in Finnish, as recalled in paragraph 33 above, in order to conclude that the mark applied for, taken as a whole, was devoid of inherent distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

36 More specifically, the Court cannot accept the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal should have found that the presence of the word element ‘veikkaus’ in the mark applied for conferred on it, taken as a whole, inherent distinctive character on the sole ground that that element constituted an earlier mark registered on the basis of distinctive character acquired through use which is highly reputed in Finland.

37 In that regard, it should be recalled that the structure of Article 7 of Regulation 2017/1001 draws a clear distinction between the intrinsic characteristics of a sign, on the one hand, and its characteristics acquired through use on the market, on the other. Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation concerns the inherent distinctive character of a sign, whereas Article 7(3) governs acquired distinctive character. It is only in the context of the application of Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 that the actual use of a sign for which registration is sought and its reputation must be assessed (see judgment of 30 March 2022, Daimler v EUIPO (Representation of three-pronged elements on a black background I), T‑277/21, not published, EU:T:2022:194, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

38 Accordingly, it is settled case-law that the actual use of a mark for which registration is sought cannot have any effect on the inherent distinctive character of that mark, which must be assessed solely in the light of its representation provided with the application for registration (see judgment of 2 March 2022, Distintiva Solutions v EUIPO – Makeblock (Makeblock), T‑86/21, not published, EU:T:2022:107, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited).

39 That principle also applies where not the actual use of the mark applied for as a whole is relied on but that of an element of which it is composed.

40 Accordingly, in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 30 March 2022, Daimler v EUIPO (Representation of three-pronged elements on a black background I) (T‑277/21, not published, EU:T:2022:194), the Court was called upon to rule on the inherent distinctive character, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, of a pattern sign consisting of recurring elements in the shape of three-pronged white stars in grid form on a black background. In support of its action, the applicant in that case claimed, inter alia, that the Board of Appeal had erred in law by failing to take into account the ‘reputation’ acquired by another mark of which it was the proprietor, the characteristic elements of which were set out in the sign at issue, in that it represented a ‘three-pronged star in a ring’. In paragraph 26 of that judgment, the Court held that ‘[the applicant] cannot validly rely either on the actual and specific use which it has made of the mark applied for or on the reputation of another mark, distinct from the mark applied for’.

41 Similarly, in the case which gave rise to the judgment of 13 March 2024, Quality First v EUIPO (MORE-BIOTIC) (T‑243/23, not published, EU:T:2024:162), an action had been brought before the Court against a decision of a Board of Appeal refusing registration of the word sign MORE-BIOTIC on the ground that it was devoid of inherent distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. In paragraph 44 of that judgment, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument that ‘its goods marketed under the sign MORE are increasingly known on the market’, noting that, through that sign, the applicant ‘relies, in essence, on the actual use of the mark applied for’.

42 Where, as in the present case, an applicant relies on the inherent distinctive character of a mark applied for, despite EUIPO’s analysis, it is for that applicant to provide specific and substantiated information to show that that mark has intrinsic distinctive character (see judgment of 3 July 2013, Airbus v OHIM (NEO), T‑236/12, EU:T:2013:343, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

43 In order to contribute to the assessment of the distinctiveness of a mark for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, the evidence must show that consumers did not need to become accustomed to the mark through the use made of it, and that it immediately enabled them to distinguish the goods or services bearing the mark from the goods or services of competing undertakings (judgment of 7 October 2004, Mag Instrument v OHIM, C‑136/02 P, EU:C:2004:592, paragraph 50).

44 In the present case, the applicant has not shown that the mark applied for had inherent distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. All of its arguments are based on the fact that the word element ‘veikkaus’ has acquired distinctive character following the exposure of the relevant public to that element in the context of its commercial activities. In so doing, it does not seek to establish that that element, nor a fortiori the mark applied for taken as a whole, would be perceived as distinctive on account of their own intrinsic characteristics, irrespective of any prior use on the market.

45 In that context, it is necessary to uphold the Board of Appeal’s assessment, set out in paragraph 31 of the contested decision, that the evidence adduced by the applicant during the proceedings before EUIPO and relating in particular to the scope of its commercial activities, its turnover and its results does not provide any information on the inherent distinctive character of the mark applied for or of the word element ‘veikkaus’. Moreover, the applicant itself acknowledges, in the application, that the evidence which it adduced is not intended to establish that that word element has inherent distinctive character. Nor has it adduced evidence, such as a dictionary extract, to establish that the word ‘veikkaus’ relates, in its very meaning, to its business, or evidence showing that that word is no longer used in everyday language to describe betting and prediction betting.

46 As EUIPO correctly observes, to accept the applicant’s argument would entail, from a methodological point of view, disregarding the fundamental distinction made by Regulation 2017/1001 between the assessment of inherent distinctive character provided for in Article 7(1)(b) thereof and the assessment of distinctive character acquired through use referred to in Article 7(3) thereof. To follow that argument would lead to the conclusion that it is sufficient that a word element has acquired distinctive character through use and is included in a mark composed of several elements for which registration is sought in order for that mark to be regarded as inherently distinctive.

47 The applicant cannot, in the present context, usefully rely on the principle that a mark which has acquired distinctive character through use for the purposes of Article 7(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 must enjoy the same level of protection as a mark with inherent distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation. As EUIPO correctly observes, that principle relates exclusively to the protection conferred on trade marks which have already been registered, and not to the conditions for examination prior to the registration of a mark.

48 The applicant’s argument drawing on the fact that it is the proprietor of a family of marks containing the word element ‘veikkaus’ is also irrelevant. In that regard, according to the case-law, the concept of a family of marks does not come under absolute grounds for refusal, but only under relative grounds for refusal, with the result that the Board of Appeal had to assess whether the mark applied for was distinctive in the light of its inherent characteristics, without taking into consideration the other allegedly similar marks of which the applicant was the proprietor (see judgment of 24 September 2025, Quality First v EUIPO (CRAVE NO MORE), T‑33/25, not published, EU:T:2025:886, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

49 It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the Board of Appeal was right to take account of the literal meaning of the mark applied for, understood by the relevant Finnish-speaking public as meaning ‘for better gambling – betting, prediction betting’, in order to assess whether that mark had inherent distinctive character.

50 In order to call into question the Board of Appeal’s assessment that, on the basis of that meaning, the mark applied for has, for the relevant Finnish-speaking public, a direct link with the services in question and will be perceived by that public as conveying a promotional message highlighting the positive characteristics of those services, and not as an indication of their commercial origin, the applicant relies, in essence, on two arguments, which cannot be upheld.

51 First, the applicant submits that the mark applied for is not a slogan ‘used in isolation’, but results from the combination of a slogan, namely ‘for better gaming’, with the word element ‘veikkaus’, which is its main mark and has distinctive character, with the result that, taken as a whole, the mark applied for would not be perceived as a mere promotional formula. However, that claim is merely a repetition of the arguments previously put forward by the applicant that were already rejected.

52 Contrary to what the applicant claims, the presence of a hyphen between the expression ‘for better gaming’ and the word element ‘veikkaus’ in no way precludes the mark applied for from being perceived by the Finnish-speaking public as a promotional message relating to the services in question. As has been stated above, the word element ‘veikkaus’, understood in its literal meaning in Finnish, refers to a concept which is perfectly coherent with the expression which precedes it, with the result that the mark applied for forms, for that public, a logical whole conveying such a message.

53 Second, as regards the examples of EU trade marks and Finnish trade marks relied on by the applicant, combining the principal mark of an undertaking with a slogan by means of a hyphen (see paragraph 29 above), it must be held that the applicant claims that there is a structural similarity between the marks which it cites and the mark applied for. However, such a similarity is not sufficient to establish that the mark applied for has inherent distinctive character, since that assessment must be carried out in the light of the specific characteristics of the sign at issue. The applicant’s line of argument continues to be based on the incorrect premiss that the presence, within the mark applied for, of the word element ‘veikkaus’, corresponding to its principal mark which has acquired distinctive character through use, is sufficient to confer on the mark applied for, taken as a whole, inherent distinctive character.

54 In the third place, as regards the applicant’s argument based on its earlier marks registered in Finland PAREMMAN PELIN PUOLESTA – VEIKKAUS and VEIKKAUS – ILOA ELÄMÄÄN, it must be recalled that the EU trade mark regime is an autonomous system with its own set of objectives and rules peculiar to it; it applies independently of any national system (see judgment of 6 September 2018, Bundesverband Souvenir – Geschenke – Ehrenpreise v EUIPO, C‑488/16 P, EU:C:2018:673, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited). Consequently, the registrability of a sign as an EU trade mark must be assessed by reference only to the relevant EU rules. EUIPO and, as the case may be, the Courts of the European Union are not bound by a decision given in a Member State, or in a third country, that the sign in question is registrable as a national mark (see judgment of 11 May 2010, Abadía Retuerta v OHIM (CUVÉE PALOMAR), T‑237/08, EU:T:2010:185, paragraph 137 and the case-law cited). That is so even if such a decision was adopted in a country belonging to the linguistic area in which the word sign in question originated (see judgment of 14 June 2007, Europig v OHIM (EUROPIG), T‑207/06, EU:T:2007:179, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).

55 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the Board of Appeal was entitled to conclude that the mark applied for lacked any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

56 It follows that the single plea in law must be rejected as unfounded and, consequently, the action must be dismissed.

Costs

57 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

58 Although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is held. Since no hearing was held, it is appropriate to order each party to bear its own costs.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

hereby:

1. Dismisses the action;

2. Orders each party to bear its own costs.

Kecsmár

Madise

Nihoul

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 1 July 2026.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: Finnish.

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