Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 14 October 2026.#Mega Pop podjetje za oglaševanje na prostem d.o.o. v European Union Intellectual Property Office.#EU trade mark – Revocation proceedings – International registration designating the European Union – Word mark FIND MY CAR – Declaration of revocation – Admissibility of the appeal before the Board of Appeal – Late filing of the statement setting out the grounds of appeal – Extension of the time limit – Application for restitutio in integrum.#Case T-451/25.

1

By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mega Pop prodjetje za oglaševanje na prostem d.o.o., seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 8 May 2025 (Case R 1259/2024‑1) (‘the contested decision’).

2

On 17 August 2016, the applicant filed an application with EUIPO for an international registration designating the European Union for the word mark FIND MY CAR.

3

On 19 December 2017, the mark referred to in paragraph 2 above was registered as an international registration designating the European Union.

4

On 13 March 2023, the intervener, Apple Inc., filed an application for revocation of the mark referred to in paragraph 2 above with EUIPO, in accordance with Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).

5

On 8 June 2023, EUIPO informed the applicant that it was refusing that additional evidence submitted by the applicant on 31 May 2023 on account of its physical form and the expiry of the time limit for submitting proof of use of the contested mark. On 27 June 2023, EUIPO informed the applicant that the additional evidence which it had submitted on 13 June 2023 in the form of hyperlinks could not be considered as valid evidence on account of its technical format.

6

By decision of 25 April 2024, the Cancellation Division upheld the application for revocation of the contested mark in its entirety, on the basis that the extent of its use had not been established.

7

On 21 June 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division of 25 April 2024.

8

On 30 August 2024, the four-month time limit laid down in Article 68(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 for the filing of the statement setting out the grounds of appeal brought before the Board of Appeal (‘the four-month time limit’) lapsed.

9

On 2 September 2024, EUIPO informed the applicant that the appeal could be deemed inadmissible, since no statement setting out the grounds of appeal had been filed within the specified time limit, and invited the applicant to submit any observations or supporting documents capable of explaining that omission.

10

On 13 September 2024, EUIPO was informed by letter submitted on behalf of the applicant and SOLAR MARKET LLC, established in Kyiv (Ukraine), that the contested mark had been transferred to SOLAR MARKET LLC by an assignment agreement dated 1 July 2024. That letter called on EUIPO to implement Decision EX‑24‑5 of the Executive Director of EUIPO of 11 June 2024 concerning the extension of time limits for parties having their residence or registered office in Ukraine (‘Decision EX‑24‑5’) and to grant the extension of the time limit until16 September 2024 as provided for in that decision (‘the extended time limit’). That letter included an application for restitutio in integrum submitted in the alternative on the basis of Article 104(1) to (3) of Regulation 2017/1001.

11

On the same day, the applicant and SOLAR MARKET filed a statement setting out the grounds of appeal.

12

In a letter of 12 November 2024, EUIPO stated that it was possible that the application for restitutio in integrum could be deemed not to have been filed, in accordance with Article 104(3) of Regulation 2017/1001, since the relevant fee had not been paid.

13

On 15 November 2024, the applicant and SOLAR MARKET reiterated the application for restitutio in integrum and informed EUIPO that they had not received any request for payment of the relevant fee.

14

By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal as inadmissible and ordered SOLAR MARKET to pay the costs, on the ground that the time limit for filing the statement setting out the grounds of appeal had lapsed, given that SOLAR MARKET could not benefit from the extension of the time limit under Decision EX‑24‑5 and that the application for restitutio in integrum was deemed not to have been filed due to a failure to pay the corresponding fee, in accordance with Article 104(3) of Regulation 2017/1001.

15

On 19 June 2025, EUIPO was informed that the contested mark had been transferred back to the applicant.

16

In the final version of the form of order sought, as set out at the hearing, the applicant claims that the Court should:

17

EUIPO contends that the Court should:

18

In the final version of the form of order sought, as set out at the hearing, the intervener contends that the Court should:

19

In support of the claim for annulment, the applicant relies, in essence, on three pleas in law, alleging (i) misapplication of Decision EX‑24‑5, (ii) unjustified rejection of the application for restitutio in integrum, and (iii) failure to take into account the additional evidence which was submitted in good faith.

20

By its first plea, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal misapplied Decision EX‑24‑5 by making the extension of the time limit for filing the statement setting out the grounds of appeal conditional on the registration of the transfer of the mark before the expiry of the four-month time limit. According to the applicant, SOLAR MARKET should have benefited from such an extension since the transfer of the contested mark was reported within the extended time limit and SOLAR MARKET, as the new proprietor of the mark, had its registered office in Ukraine.

21

In that regard, the applicant submits that the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations and equal treatment require a uniform application of the extension of the time limit, irrespective of who holds the right to the mark at a given time. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal cannot deprive SOLAR MARKET of the extension of the time limit on the basis that the transfer of the mark was entered when the four-month time limit had already lapsed. Such an interpretation of Decision EX‑24‑5 is also contrary to its objective, which is to facilitate compliance with procedural obligations for companies with their registered office in Ukraine. Furthermore, according to the applicant, the argument that the extension of the time limit does not apply in the event of a transfer of the contested mark during proceedings is not justified, since no such exception is provided in Decision EX‑24‑5.

22

EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

23

As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 68(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, a written statement setting out the grounds of appeal is to be filed within four months of the date of notification of the decision of the EUIPO body subject to appeal before the Board of Appeal.

24

Under Article 23(1)(d) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation 2017/1001 and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ 2018 L 104, p. 1), the Board of Appeal is to reject an appeal as inadmissible where the statement of grounds has not been filed within the four-month time limit running from the date of notification of the decision subject to appeal.

25

Under Article 1(1) of Decision EX‑24‑5, all time limits expiring between 16 June 2024 and 15 September 2024 inclusive that affect parties in proceedings before EUIPO having their domicile or registered office in Ukraine are extended until 16 September 2024.

26

In the present case, it should be noted that the four-month time limit lapsed on 30 August 2024. SOLAR MARKET was entered in EUIPO’s register as the new proprietor of the contested mark on 13 September 2024 and filed the statement setting out the grounds of appeal on the same day, that is to say, after the expiry of the four-month time limit but before the expiry of the extended time limit.

27

It is therefore necessary to determine whether, as the applicant submits, SOLAR MARKET, which was entered in EUIPO’s register as the new proprietor of the contested mark after the expiry of the four-month time limit but before the expiry of the extended time limit, could reasonably rely on the extension of the time limits provided for in Decision EX‑24‑5.

28

In that regard, the Board of Appeal recalled in paragraph 21 of the contested decision that, ‘pursuant to Article 20[(11) of Regulation 2017/1001], the successor in title may not invoke the rights arising from the registration of the EU trade mark as long as the transfer has not been entered in the Register’. In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that SOLAR MARKET could benefit from the extension of the time limit for filing the statement setting out the grounds of appeal provided for in Decision EX‑24‑5 only if the transfer of the contested mark had been entered in the register before the expiry of the four-month time limit, namely 30 August 2024. Lastly, in paragraph 24 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal noted that, in accordance with Article 20(11) of Regulation 2017/1001, SOLAR MARKET could act as proprietor of the contested mark vis-à-vis EUIPO and third parties only as from 13 September 2024, the date on which the four-month time limit had already lapsed.

29

At the outset, it should be borne in mind that, pursuant to a combined reading of Article 20(1), (4) and (11) of Regulation 2017/1001, in the event of the transfer of an EU trade mark, the transfer must be entered in EUIPO’s register and the new proprietor may rely on the rights to the mark only from the time of that entry. It should also be pointed out that entry in EUIPO’s register does not have retroactive effect (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 2021, Marina Yachting Brand Management v EUIPO – Industries Sportswear (MARINA YACHTING), T‑169/20, EU:T:2021:609, paragraph 64).

30

It follows that, in the present case, given that the contested mark was entered in the register on 13 September 2024, SOLAR MARKET could rely on the rights arising from that mark as of that date and was thus entitled to bring proceedings before EUIPO as proprietor of that mark. Accordingly, SOLAR MARKET became a party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal on 13 September 2024. However, on that date, the four-month time limit applicable to the parties to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal had lapsed since there was no application for an extended time limit in respect of the applicant.

31

Although the applicant submits that, on the date on which SOLAR MARKET became a party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal, the extended time limit laid down in Decision EX‑24‑5 had not yet lapsed, it does not follow that SOLAR MARKET could benefit from the extension of the time limit provided for in that decision. As noted in paragraph 29 above, Article 20 of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that the new proprietor of a trade mark becomes the proprietor of the rights attached thereto – and, as a result in the present case, a party to the proceedings pending before EUIPO – only from the time when the transfer of that mark is entered in EUIPO’s register, since that transfer takes effect only prospectively. It follows that, in accordance with Article 20 of Regulation 2017/1001, the registration of SOLAR MARKET as the new proprietor of the contested mark allowed it to continue with the proceedings pending before EUIPO, by resuming those proceedings in the state they were in as of the date on which the transfer was entered in the register, without conferring on it any procedural rights which the former proprietor of the mark – namely the applicant – no longer had at that date. In that context, Decision EX-24-5 could not extend a time limit which, as in the present case, had already lapsed by the date on which the party to the proceedings that was required to comply with it – the applicant – fell outside the scope of that decision, since it did not have its registered office in Ukraine.

32

The interpretation according to which SOLAR MARKET could not rely on the extended time limit provided for in Decision EX‑24‑5 is supported by the fact that, according to settled case-law, the principles of legal certainty, non-discrimination and equal treatment require a strict application of the rules on procedural time limits (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 May 2014, Melt Water v OHIM (NUEVA), T‑61/13, EU:T:2014:265, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited, and order of 9 October 2019, Esim Chemicals v EUIPO – Sigma-Tau Industrie Farmaceutiche Riunite (ESIM Chemicals), T‑713/18, not published, EU:T:2019:744, paragraph 34). In addition, it should be noted that the extension of the time limit provided for in Decision EX‑24‑5 is an exception to the application of the normal time limits laid down by Regulation 2017/1001 and, in particular, the four-month time limit set out in Article 68(1) of that regulation. It is appropriate to recall the principle that exceptions must be interpreted restrictively (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 November 2017, Di Maura, C‑246/16, EU:C:2017:887, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). Accordingly, the applicant cannot rely on the principles of legal certainty, non-discrimination and equal treatment in support of its interpretation of Decision EX‑24‑5, since that interpretation would lead to the conclusion that circumstances arising after the expiry of a time limit could negate the effects of that expiry.

33

Lastly, the applicant submits that the refusal to grant SOLAR MARKET an extended time limit, on the sole ground that it became the proprietor of the contested mark during the proceedings, is due to the arbitrary and unequal treatment of the parties, which amounts to a breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. That argument is, however, unfounded since SOLAR MARKET was unable to benefit from an extended time limit not because the proprietor of the contested mark changed during the proceedings, but because, on the date on which SOLAR MARKET became a party to the proceedings, the four-month time limit had already lapsed, without, as stated in paragraph 31 above, Decision EX‑24‑5 having extended that time limit.

34

It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal did not err in law in finding in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the contested decision that SOLAR MARKET could not benefit from the extension of the four-month time limit under Decision EX‑24‑5.

35

That conclusion is not called into question by the other arguments put forward by the applicant.

36

First, the applicant submits that limiting the scope of Decision EX‑24‑5 solely to the parties to the proceedings would be contrary to the objective of that decision, which is to facilitate compliance with procedural obligations for companies with their registered office in Ukraine. However, the fact that such an objective is taken into account is not in itself sufficient to justify the interpretation put forward by the applicant, which is contrary, on the one hand, to the interpretation that emerges from a combined reading of Article 20 of Regulation 2017/1001 and Decision EX‑24‑5 and, on the other hand, to the principle, referred to in paragraph 32 above, according to which exceptions to the rules concerning procedural time limits must be interpreted restrictively.

37

Secondly, the applicant submits that, where the text is silent, Decision EX‑24‑5 must be interpreted as meaning that the extended time limit must also benefit undertakings which became parties to the proceedings before EUIPO following the transfer of the mark at issue during the proceedings. In that regard, it should be noted that Article 68(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 and Decision EX‑24‑5 do not provide for any derogation from the conditions in which they apply in the event of the transfer of the mark at issue during proceedings pending before EUIPO. Consequently, in the absence of any provision to that effect, neither Article 68(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 nor Decision EX‑24‑5 can be interpreted as meaning that a change in the proprietor of the trade mark during the proceedings allows time limits that have already lapsed to be resumed. Therefore, the applicant is not justified in claiming that, in the present case, notwithstanding the expiry of the four-month time limit, SOLAR MARKET should have benefited from the extended time limit on the ground that it became the proprietor of the contested mark during the proceedings.

38

In the light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal was therefore correct in concluding that the extension of the time limit provided for in Decision EX‑24‑5 was not applicable in the present case and that the written submission filed on 13 September 2024 had therefore been lodged out of time.

39

It follows that the first plea must be rejected.

40

By its second plea, the applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for having rejected its application for restitutio in integrum on the sole ground that the corresponding fee had not been paid, even though EUIPO did not request that it pay the fee or inform it of its obligation to do so. Consequently, it was deprived of the opportunity to rectify that omission and to submit its observations on the consequences of non-payment of that fee. Consequently, the Board of Appeal acted in breach of its right to be heard, the principle of legal certainty and its right to an effective remedy.

41

EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

42

In paragraphs 25 and 26 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal concluded that the application for restitutio in integrum was deemed not to have been filed since the corresponding fee had not been paid.

43

Under Article 104(3) of Regulation 2017/1001, the application for restitutio in integrum is not to be deemed to be filed until the fee for the re-establishment of rights has been paid.

44

In the present case, it should be noted that neither the applicant nor SOLAR MARKET has paid such a fee.

45

Although the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal neglected to inform it of its obligation to pay the fee and did not request payment of the fee, it is necessary to make the following observations.

46

It is apparent from the letter of 12 November 2024, referred to in paragraph 12 above, that EUIPO reminded the applicant that, under Article 104(3) of Regulation 2017/1001, an application for restitutio in integrum is not to be deemed to be filed until the fee for the re-establishment of rights has been paid. That letter also set out the amount of the fee to be paid by the applicant, namely EUR 200. It also stated that, in the absence of payment of that sum, the application for restitutio in integrum risked not being deemed to have been filed. Accordingly, as EUIPO submits, the applicant was duly informed of the obligation to pay the fee and of the consequences likely to result from a failure to pay. On the basis of that information, the applicant was given the opportunity to remedy the failure to pay the fee.

47

Furthermore, the applicant submits that EUIPO should have sent it a formal request to pay the fee for restitutio in integrum. However, the applicant is not justified in claiming that, failing such an invitation, its right to be heard, its right to an effective remedy and the principle of legal certainty were breached, since, in any event, as stated in paragraph 46 above, the applicant was informed by EUIPO of the obligation to pay the fee for restitutio in integrum and of the consequences likely to result from the non-payment of that fee. Furthermore, Article 104(3) of Regulation 2017/1001 does not lay down an obligation to issue a formal request to pay the fee for restitutio in integrum. Moreover, the applicant does not rely on any other provision laying down such an obligation.

48

It follows that the second plea must be rejected.

49

By its third plea, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal should have taken into consideration the evidence put forward by the applicant as proof of genuine use of the contested mark during the relevant period. That evidence had been erroneously rejected on account of its physical form and then its technical format during the revocation proceedings. The applicant claims that, by finding that the appeal was inadmissible, the Board of Appeal thus acted in breach of its right to be heard and deprived it of the effective exercise of its procedural rights.

50

EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.

51

It is sufficient to note that the contested decision is not based on a failure to take into account the evidence in question, but correctly rejects the appeal as inadmissible. That evidence, at any rate, has no impact on a finding of inadmissibility. Therefore, the applicant is not entitled to rely on the failure to take that evidence into account.

52

The third plea in law must therefore be rejected and consequently the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

53

Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

54

Since a hearing has taken place and the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by EUIPO and the intervener.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)

hereby: