Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 1 July 2026.#KJ and Others v European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation.#Civil service – Members of the temporary staff – Fixed-term contract – Europol decision concerning the extension of contractual relationships up to 10 years – Exclusion of contract staff who have already been renewed – Rejection of the request for an additional year of service – Plea of illegality – Equal treatment – Temporal application of the rules of substantive law – Legal certainty – Liability.#Cases T-424/25 to T-428/25 and T-439/25 to T-443/25.

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)

1 July 2026 (*)

( Civil service – Members of the temporary staff – Fixed-term contract – Europol decision concerning the extension of contractual relationships up to 10 years – Exclusion of contract staff who have already been renewed – Rejection of the request for an additional year of service – Plea of illegality – Equal treatment – Temporal application of the rules of substantive law – Legal certainty – Liability )

In Cases T‑424/25 to T‑428/25 and T‑439/25 to T‑443/25,

KJ, represented by M. Velardo, lawyer,

applicant in Case T‑424/25,

KK, represented by M. Velardo,

applicant in Case T‑425/25,

KL, represented by M. Velardo,

applicant in Case T‑426/25,

KM, represented by M. Velardo,

applicant in Case T‑427/25,

KN, represented by M. Velardo,

applicant in Case T‑428/25,

KO, represented by M. Velardo,

applicant in Case T‑439/25,

KP, represented by M. Velardo,

applicant in Case T‑440/25,

KQ, represented by M. Velardo,

applicant in Case T‑441/25,

KR, represented by M. Velardo,

applicant in Case T‑442/25,

KS, represented by M. Velardo,

applicant in Case T‑443/25,

v

European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), represented by O. Sajin, M. Mitkovic and A. Nunzi, acting as Agents, and by A. Duron, lawyer,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),

composed of G. De Baere, President, C. Mac Eochaidh (Rapporteur) and D. Jočienė, Judges,

Registrar: P. Núñez Ruiz, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure,

further to the hearing on 24 March 2026,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By their action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicants, KJ, KK, KL, KM, KN, KO, KP, KQ, KR and KS seek the annulment of the decisions of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) of 15 and 16 October 2024 and of 27 February 2025, refusing their requests to remain in service for an additional year (together, ‘the contested decisions’) and compensation for the damage they claim to have suffered.

 Background to the dispute

2        The applicants were employed by Europol as members of the temporary staff under Article 2(f) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union (‘the CEOS’) in order to occupy ‘restricted posts’, that is, posts which can be filled only by staff employed by the competent authorities of the Member States.

3        For that purpose, the applicants each concluded a contract as a member of the temporary staff with Europol for an initial duration of five years (‘the initial contracts’), which was renewed, by mutual agreement, for an additional period of four years.

4        On 12 February 2024, the Executive Director of Europol informed that agency’s staff that it intended to increase the maximum overall duration of employment contracts of staff occupying a restricted post from 9 to 10 years, comprising a first period of service of 5 years covered by their initial contract and a second period of service of 5 years resulting from the renewal of that contract.

5        In the communication to staff of 8 March 2024, the Deputy Executive Director of Europol, Capabilities Directorate, stated that Europol’s initial intention was to apply that reform to all members of the temporary staff occupying a restricted post. However, following a legal analysis, Europol concluded that it was not possible for all temporary staff occupying a restricted post and whose contract had already been renewed to benefit from that reform because of, in particular, Article 53(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA (OJ 2016 L 135, p. 53).

6        On 21 March 2024, the Executive Director of Europol adopted the Decision on the duration of contracts of employment for temporary agents under Article 2(f) of the [CEOS] at Europol (‘the decision of 21 March 2024’). That decision came into force on 22 March 2024.

7        On 14, 16, 18 and 19 June and 18 December 2024, the applicants each submitted a request to the Executive Director of Europol, on the basis of the decision of 21 March 2024, that the duration of their second period of service, as resulting from the renewal of their initial contract, be considered to be five years rather than four years.

8        On 15 and 16 October 2024 and 27 February 2025, the Executive Director of Europol adopted the contested decisions rejecting the applicants’ requests.

9        On 2, 3, 5, 6, 12 and 18 December 2024 and 24 March 2025, the applicants each submitted a complaint against the contested decisions.

10      On 25 March and 15 May 2025, the Europol Complaints Committee rejected the applicants’ complaints (together, ‘the decisions rejecting the complaints’).

 Forms of order sought

11      The applicants claim, in essence, that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decisions;

–        annul the decisions rejecting the complaints;

–        order Europol to pay compensation for the material damage in respect of the fact that the applicants did not receive one year of their salary, the material damage in respect of the loss of their pension contributions and the non-material damage estimated on an equitable basis, for each of them, at EUR 2 000, together with interest and adjusted for inflation from the time when the right arose until final settlement;

–        order Europol to pay the costs.

12      Europol contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the actions in their entirety;

–        in the alternative, dismiss the claims for compensation;

–        order the applicants to pay the costs.

 Law

13      Having heard the parties, the Court has decided to join Cases T‑424/25 to T‑428/25 and T‑439/25 to T‑443/25 for the purposes of the present judgment, in accordance with Article 68(1) of its Rules of Procedure.

 Subject matter of the action

14      By their second head of claim, the applicants seek annulment of the decisions rejecting the complaints.

15      In that regard, according to settled case-law, a claim for annulment formally directed against the decision rejecting a complaint has the effect of bringing before the General Court the act against which the complaint was submitted, where that claim, as such, lacks any independent content (see judgment of 23 March 2022, OT v Parliament, T‑757/20, EU:T:2022:156, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).

16      In the present case, given that the decisions rejecting the complaints merely confirm the contested decisions, which the applicants do not dispute, the claims seeking annulment of the decisions rejecting the complaints lack any independent content and there is therefore no need to rule on those claims specifically. However, when examining the legality of the contested decisions, the statement of reasons for the decisions rejecting the complaints should be taken into account, as it is deemed to cover the statement of reasons in the contested decisions (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 March 2022, OT v Parliament, T‑757/20, EU:T:2022:156, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited).

 Substance

 The claims for annulment

17      In support of their claims for annulment, the applicants raise two pleas in law.

–       The first plea in law, alleging that Article 6 of the decision of 21 March 2024 is unlawful

18      By the first plea in law, under Article 277 TFEU, the applicants allege that Article 6 of the decision of 21 March 2024 is unlawful, on the ground that it infringes the principle of equal treatment. The applicants claim that Europol treated differently, and without objective justification, members of the temporary staff occupying a restricted post depending on whether their contract had already been renewed before 22 March 2024. Like the applicants, staff whose initial contract had already been renewed before that date were excluded from the benefit of the decision of 21 March 2024. Consequently, the total duration of their service with Europol could not exceed nine years, that is to say, the combination of a first period of service of five years and a second period of service of four years. By contrast, where the initial contract of those staff had been renewed after 22 March 2024, they were able to combine two periods of service of 5 years, for a total duration of 10 years of service with Europol. Since Article 6 of the decision of 21 March 2024 infringes the principle of equal treatment, it must be disapplied and, consequently, the contested decisions must be annulled.

19      Europol disputes those arguments.

20      At the outset, the Court notes that Article 1(2) of the decision of 21 March 2024 provides as follows:

‘[Temporary staff employed under Article 2(f) of the CEOS] recruited to occupy a restricted post may be awarded only fixed-term contracts. They are in principle engaged under their initial contract for a fixed period of five years.

This contract may be renewed only once for a fixed period. Such renewal will in principle be for a fixed period of five years.’

21      Article 6 of the decision of 21 March 2024 provides as follows:

‘The overall maximum limit of [10] years referred to in Article 1(5)(b) [of the decision of 21 March 2024] shall not apply to [temporary staff recruited under Article 2(f) of the CEOS] recruited to occupy restricted posts, whose contracts have already been renewed once for a fixed period and taken effect, at the time of entry into force of [that] decision, except in the case of a new engagement following the successful participation in a selection procedure for another restricted post.’

22      Furthermore, during the hearing and in response to a question of the Court, the applicants accepted that Article 1(5)(b) of the decision of 21 March 2024, referred to in Article 6 of that decision, did not apply to their situation since they did not satisfy the conditions set out therein. The applicants stated that, by their plea alleging that Article 6 of the decision of 21 March 2024 is unlawful, they sought, in actual fact, to obtain, in accordance with the principle of equal treatment, the benefit of the overall maximum limit of 10 years, provided for in Article 1(5)(b) of that decision, by application of Article 1(2) of that decision.

23      In that regard, first of all, the Court notes that Article 1(2) of the decision of 21 March 2024 provides that the initial contract and its renewal are, each, ‘in principle’ for a duration of five years.

24      It is inferred from that information, and in particular from the words ‘in principle’, that Europol has discretion which allows it to propose to its staff that the duration of their initial contract and that of the renewal of that contract is different from 5 years, provided that the overall maximum limit of 10 years is respected. Moreover, the Court notes that Article 2(1) of the decision of 21 March 2024 provides specifically for the possibility to conclude, where justified in the interest of the service, contracts of a shorter duration than those set out in Article 1 of that decision.

25      Article 1(2) of the decision of 21 March 2024 cannot therefore be interpreted as conferring any right on temporary staff occupying a restricted post, such as the applicants, to benefit from the maximum periods of five years provided for by that article, taking account of Europol’s contractual freedom and discretionary power to conclude or renew such contracts for a shorter period than the maximum allowed (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 16 December 2010, Commission v Petrilli, T‑143/09 P, EU:T:2010:531, paragraph 34).

26      Moreover, in so far as, in practice and regardless of the process used (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 February 2016, DE v EMA, F‑58/14, EU:F:2016:16, paragraph 43), the grant of an additional year would be similar to a second renewal of the applicants’ initial contract, the Court recalls that, according to settled case-law, a member of staff with a fixed-term contract cannot assert any right to a renewal of his or her contract, since such renewal is only a mere possibility left to the discretion of the competent authority (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 May 2019, WP v EUIPO, T‑407/18, not published, EU:T:2019:290, paragraphs 57 and 74 and the case-law cited, and of 10 July 2024, RS v EIB, T‑624/22, not published, EU:T:2024:461, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited).

27      Next, and in any event, Article 1(2) of the decision of 21 March 2024, the legality of which is not disputed by the applicants, states expressly that the initial contract may be renewed not more than once. In so doing, Article 1(2) of the decision of 21 March 2024 restates the choices made by the EU legislature in the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS and Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794.

28      As Europol observed, both during the administrative stage and in its written pleadings before the Court, the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS provides that the fixed-term contract of a member of the temporary staff engaged under Article 2(f) of the CEOS may be renewed not more than once for a fixed period and that any further renewal is to be for an indefinite period. According to settled case-law, the objective of the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS is neither a certain stability of employment nor a certain continuity of the employment relationship of temporary staff on fixed-term contracts, but the prevention of the wrongful use of successive fixed-term contracts and, therefore, that article seeks to ensure that the institution which engages the member of temporary staff complies with the need to protect him or her from such abuses (see, to that effect, judgments of 16 September 2015, EMA v Drakeford, T‑231/14 P, EU:T:2015:639, paragraphs 23 and 30 of the case-law cited, and of 5 July 2023, SE v Commission, T‑223/21, EU:T:2023:375, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited).

29      In addition, Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794 provides that temporary staff recruited by Europol to occupy restricted posts may be awarded only fixed-term contracts, renewable once for a fixed period. That article gives concrete expression to the intention of the EU legislature expressed in recital 59 of that regulation, under which the length of service of those members of the temporary staff should be limited in order to maintain the principle of rotation, as the subsequent reintegration of such staff members into the service of their competent authority facilitates close cooperation between Europol and the competent authorities of the Member States.

30      In the present case, it is common ground that, before the decision of 21 March 2024 came into force, the initial contract of each of the applicants had already been renewed. In addition, the applicants do not allege that either the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS or Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794 is unlawful. The legality of those two provisions has therefore not been challenged by the applicants.

31      In such a situation, and since the principle of equal treatment must be reconciled with the principle of legality (judgment of 28 June 2018, EUIPO v Puma, C‑564/16 P, EU:C:2018:509, paragraph 22; see, also, judgment of 25 March 2021, Slovak Telekom v Commission, C‑165/19 P, EU:C:2021:239, paragraph 119 and the case-law cited), the applicants cannot criticise Europol for having infringed that principle where the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS and Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794 precluded that agency from being able to renew, for a second time, their initial contract for a period of one year.

32      As Europol explained in its written pleadings, only through intervention by the EU legislature could the initial contracts of the applicants have been extended by one year even though they had already been renewed.

33      In that regard and by way of comparison, the Court observes that the EU legislature has empowered the European External Action Service (EEAS) to extend, in exceptional circumstances, in the interest of the service, and for a fixed term, the contracts of members of the temporary staff that have already been renewed (Article 50b(2) of the CEOS). That article therefore confirms that the extension for a fixed term of the contract of a member of the temporary staff, which has already been renewed, is possible only in the single specific case where that extension has already been authorised by the EU legislature.

34      In the absence of such specific authorisation of the EU legislature, to accept the applicants’ argument and allow Europol to extend the length of their second period of service by one year would infringe the prohibition on the wrongful use of successive fixed-term contracts, referred to in the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS, whether read in isolation or in the light of Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43) (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 5 July 2023, SE v Commission, T‑223/21, EU:T:2023:375, paragraphs 79 to 84), and the principle of rotation, laid down in Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794 (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above).

35      Lastly, contrary to what the applicants submit and irrespective of the foregoing considerations, the decision of 21 March 2024, as a binding act of general application, cannot, under any circumstances, extend by itself, and without any contractual renegotiation, the length of their second period of service.

36      According to settled case-law, by contrast with officials, whose security of tenure is guaranteed by the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, members of the temporary staff are subject to different conditions based on the contract of employment entered into with the institution concerned. It is clear from Article 47(b) of the CEOS that the duration of the employment relationship between an institution and a member of the temporary staff engaged for a fixed term is, necessarily, governed by the conditions laid down in the contract concluded between the parties (see judgments of 9 November 2022, QM v EUROPOL, T‑164/21, EU:T:2022:695, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited, and of 14 December 2022, SU v EIOPA, T‑296/21, EU:T:2022:808, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

37      Furthermore, it has previously been held that the validity of a contract of employment of a member of the temporary staff required an unconditional acceptance by that member of the temporary staff of all the essential particulars necessary for entering the service, inter alia, the duration of that contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 6 February 2019, TN v ENISA, T‑461/17, not published, EU:T:2019:63, paragraph 51). There is nothing to prevent that solution deriving from the case-law, based on the necessary consent of the member of the temporary staff concerned, from extending to the case of the renewal of his or her contract, especially since Article 15(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union enshrines, inter alia, the right to pursue a ‘freely’ chosen or accepted occupation.

38      It follows from those factors, and in particular from Article 15(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 47(b) of the CEOS, that the duration of the contract of a member of the temporary staff is set by the contract itself, so that that duration cannot be extended entirely at the discretion of the authority or that agent, but must result from the free and reciprocal consent of the parties to the contract.

39      For the sake of completeness, during the hearing and in response to a question from the Court, Europol accepted that some of the clauses of the applicants’ renewed contracts could be amended by mutual agreement between the parties. However, as regards the clause setting the duration of the applicants’ second period of service at four years, Europol stated that the parties could not amend it, even by mutual agreement, because of the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS and Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794.

40      As Europol observed, the Court finds that, in the light of the principles of legality and the hierarchy of norms, the parties cannot amend that clause in order to extend the applicants’ second period of service from four to five years without infringing the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS and Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794. To permit the parties to extend that second period of service by one year would infringe the objective pursued by the EU legislature, namely the prohibition of any second renewal of fixed-term contracts (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above).

41      All of the foregoing considerations preclude therefore the argument advanced by the applicants that the decision of 21 March 2024, as a binding act of general application, would have amended automatically (ex lege) the duration of all (erga omnes effect) the ongoing contracts of members of the temporary staff occupying restricted posts whose contracts had already been renewed before that decision came into force.

42      In conclusion, the claim that Article 6 of the decision of 21 March 2024 is unlawful must be rejected as ineffective. Even if Article 6 of the decision of 21 March 2024 were set aside, no right to any renewal can be inferred from Article 1(2) of that decision. Further, Article 1(2) of the decision of 21 March 2024, the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS and Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794 preclude the initial contracts of the members of the temporary staff concerned from being renewed for a second time. Lastly, contrary to what the applicants submit and irrespective of the foregoing, Europol cannot unilaterally extend, even by means of a binding act of general application, the duration of service of a member of the temporary staff occupying a restricted post as was agreed when his or her initial contract was renewed.

43      Consequently, the first plea in law must be rejected.

–       The second plea in law, alleging breach of the principles of succession of rules over time, legal certainty and equal treatment

44      By the second plea in law, the applicants claim that Europol infringed the principles of succession of rules over time and legal certainty by refusing to apply the provisions of the decision of 21 March 2024 to their situation. Those principles require that a new rule, in the present case the decision of 21 March 2024, apply to situations arising under an old rule which still produces effects at the time that the new rule comes into force. In so far as the applicants’ initial contracts, as renewed, still produced effects at the time that the decision of 21 March 2024 came into force, that decision was applicable to them. Europol’s refusal to extend their second period of service from four to five years in accordance with that decision also infringes the principle of equal treatment.

45      Europol disputes those arguments.

46      In that regard, and as Europol submits, the applicants’ arguments concerning the principles of succession of rules over time and legal certainty are irrelevant. Article 1(2) of the decision of 21 March 2024, the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS and Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794 preclude Europol from renewing the applicants’ initial contract for a second time (see paragraph 42 above). Europol did not therefore err in law, in the contested decisions, by refusing to extend by one year the applicants’ second period of service.

47      As regards the principle of equal treatment, the Court recalls that, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 31 above, that principle must be reconciled with the principle of legality. The alleged difference in treatment results neither from the decision of 21 March 2024 nor from the contested decisions, but from the choices made by the EU legislature in the first paragraph of Article 8 of the CEOS and Article 53(2) of Regulation 2016/794, the legality of which is not disputed by the applicants.

48      Lastly, the Court states that it is true that the applicants have referred to the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in their written observations, but that reference is not supported by any arguments. That being so, even if the applicants allege that Europol infringed that principle – which is not clearly apparent from the applications – that complaint must be rejected as inadmissible in so far as it does not satisfy the minimum requirements set out in Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure. In any case, the communication to staff of 8 March 2024, referred to in paragraph 5 above, is sufficient to set aside the existence of any precise, unconditional and consistent assurances that the applicants’ second period of service could have been extended by one year.

49      In the light of the foregoing, the second plea in law must be rejected.

50      Consequently, the claims for annulment must be rejected.

 The claims for compensation

51      The applicants request that Europol be ordered to compensate them for the material damage in respect of the fact that the applicants did not receive one year of their salary, the material damage in respect of the loss of their pension contributions and the non-material damage estimated on an equitable basis, for each of them, at EUR 2 000, together with interest and adjusted for inflation from the time when the right arose until final settlement.

52      Europol disputes that argument.

53      In accordance with settled case-law, where an application for compensation is closely related to an application for annulment, the rejection of the latter, either as inadmissible or as unfounded, also results in the rejection of the application for compensation (see judgment of 30 November 2022, KN v Parliament, T‑401/21, EU:T:2022:736, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

54      In the present case, the claims for annulment and the claims for compensation are closely related, as the applicants accept, in so far as the damages for which they seek compensation arise from the unlawfulness allegedly vitiating the contested decisions.

55      The claims for compensation must therefore be rejected and, consequently, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

56      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

57      Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by Europol.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),

hereby:

1.      Joins Cases T‑424/25 to T‑428/25 and T‑439/25 to T‑443/25 for the purposes of the judgment;

2.      Dismisses the actions;

3.      Orders KJ, KK, KL, KM, KN, KO, KP, KQ, KR and KS to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol).

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 1 July 2026.

[Signatures]

---

*Language of the case: Italian.