Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 9 July 2026.#Štátny fond rozvoja bývania v GL and Others.#Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Directive 93/13/EEC – Article 2(c) – Concept of ‘seller or supplier’ – Loan and guarantee agreements – State Housing Development Fund – Task carried out in the public interest – Loans granted on preferential terms – Referral back for reconsideration following an appeal – Obligation to comply with the legal rulings of a higher court – Principle of the primacy of EU law – Limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment.#Case C-188/25.

Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber)

9 July 2026 (*)

( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Directive 93/13/EEC – Article 2(c) – Concept of ‘seller or supplier’ – Loan and guarantee agreements – State Housing Development Fund – Task carried out in the public interest – Loans granted on preferential terms – Referral back for reconsideration following an appeal – Obligation to comply with the legal rulings of a higher court – Principle of the primacy of EU law – Limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment )

In Case C‑188/25,

REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Krajský súd v Prešove (Regional Court, Prešov, Slovakia), made by decision of 30 January 2025, received at the Court on 10 March 2025, in the proceedings

Štátny fond rozvoja bývania

v

GL,

KL,

SC,

THE COURT (First Chamber),

composed of F. Biltgen, President of the Chamber, I. Ziemele (Rapporteur), A. Kumin, S. Gervasoni and M. Bošnjak, Judges,

Advocate General: D. Spielmann,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:

–        Štátny fond rozvoja bývania, by M. Garaj, advokát,

–        GL, KL, SC, by Z. Pitoňáková, advokátka,

–        the Slovak Government, by E.V. Larišová, acting as Agent,

–        the European Commission, by P. Kienapfel and R. Lindenthal, acting as Agents,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion,

gives the following

Judgment

1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 1(1) and Article 2(b) and (c) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

2        The request has been made in proceedings between the Štátny fond rozvoja bývania (State Housing Development Fund, Slovakia; ‘the ŠFRB’) and GL, KL and SC concerning the repayment of the balance of a housing loan terminated early.

 Legal context

 Directive 93/13

3        The fourteenth recital of Directive 93/13 states:

‘Whereas Member States must … ensure that unfair terms are not included [in mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions], particularly because this Directive also applies to trades, business or professions of a public nature’.

4        Article 1 of Directive 93/13 provides:

‘1.      The purpose of this Directive is to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer.

2.      The contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions … shall not be subject to the provisions of this Directive.’

5        Article 2(b) and (c) of the directive provides:

‘For the purposes of this Directive:

…

(b)      “consumer” means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession;

(c)      “seller or supplier” means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned.’

 Slovak law

6        Paragraph 52 of zákon č. 40/1964 Zb. Občiansky zákonník (Law No 40/1964 establishing the Civil Code) of 26 February 1964 (čiastka 19/1964) (the ‘Civil Code’), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, stated:

‘…

2.      A “seller or supplier” is a person who, when concluding and performing a contract concluded with a consumer, acts in the course of his or her trade or of another profession.

3.      A “consumer” is a person who, when concluding and performing a contract concluded with a seller or supplier, does not act in the course of his or her trade or of another profession.’

7        Paragraph 53(1) of that code provided:

‘Contracts concluded with consumers must not contain provisions which cause a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract to the detriment of consumers (“an unfair term”).’

8        Paragraph 7 of zákon č. 607/2003 Z. z. o Štátnom fonde rozvoja bývania (Law No 607/2003 on the State Housing Development Fund) of 6 November 2003 (čiastka 247/2003), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, was worded as follows:

‘An applicant for assistance … is:

(a)      a natural person who is a citizen of the Slovak Republic residing in the territory of the Slovak Republic …, or

(b)      a legal person established in the territory of the Slovak Republic.’

9        Paragraph 12(2) of that law provided:

‘The contract shall state, inter alia:

(a)      the particulars of the parties;

(b)      the purpose, amount, type and manner of receipt of the assistance granted;

(c)      the arrangements for performance of the parties’ obligations;

(d)      the guarantees;

(e)      the method of payment of the assistance …;

(f)      the technical characteristics of the work and the duration for which it is to be carried out;

(g)      the penalties applicable in the event of breach of the terms of the contract;

…’

 The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling

10      The ŠFRB is a legal person governed by public law whose activity consists of the grant of public housing assistance, in particular through the grant of housing loans at preferential rates.

11      On 13 December 2006, the ŠFRB concluded a loan agreement with GL and KL in the amount of EUR 33 193.92 repayable over 30 years in order to purchase a home. SC acted as guarantor for GL and KL.

12      On 22 January 2018, following the non-payment by GL and KL of the monthly repayment instalments, the ŠFRB terminated the agreement in respect of the borrowers and then, by letter of 13 August 2018, in respect of SC.

13      On 24 September 2018, the ŠFRB brought an action before the Okresný súd Prešov (District Court, Prešov, Slovakia) seeking an order requiring the borrowers and their guarantor to pay the outstanding balance of the loan, that is to say, EUR 26 040.44, together with interest, costs and penalties. After that action was upheld, the defendants in the main proceedings brought an appeal against that decision before the Krajský súd v Prešove (Regional Court, Prešov, Slovakia), arguing that they were entitled to protection under Directive 93/13 in their capacity as consumers. Following dismissal of the appeal by a decision applying the provisions of zákon č. 513/1991 Zb. Obchodný zákonník (Law No 513/1991 establishing the Commercial Code) of 5 November 1991 (čiastka 98/1991) (the ‘Commercial Code’), the defendants in the main proceedings brought an appeal on a point of law before the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic), which held that the provisions of Directive 93/13 were not applicable to the dispute on the ground that the ŠFRB was not acting as a seller or supplier. Taking the view, however, that the contractual relationship between the ŠFRB and the defendants in the main proceedings was governed by the provisions of the Civil Code and not the Commercial Code, the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic) set aside the judgment delivered on appeal and referred the case back for reconsideration to the Krajský súd v Prešove (Regional Court, Prešov), which is the referring court.

14      The referring court considers that the defendants in the main proceedings have the status of ‘consumers’, within the meaning of Article 2(b) of Directive 93/13, and that the ŠFRB, in the light of its organisational and functional characteristics, could be regarded as acting as a ‘seller or supplier’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of that directive.

15      First, in so far as the ŠFRB was created by a law with a view to implementing the housing policy of the Slovak State, the referring court recalls that, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the fact that the activities of a public body fall within the scope of a not-for-profit task carried out in the public interest is not relevant for the purposes of classification as a ‘seller or supplier’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13.

16      Second, the terms of the agreement at issue in the main proceedings do not all reflect mandatory statutory provisions within the meaning of Article 1 of that directive. Although the Slovak legislature defined the legal framework applicable to the agreements concluded by the ŠFRB, it remains free to specify each of the terms contained therein, with the result that those agreements fall within the scope of that directive.

17      Third, whilst the referring court notes that, according to the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic), the Slovak legislature excluded agreements concluded by the ŠFRB from the application of the statutory rules on consumer loans, it nevertheless points out that the application of Directive 93/13 depends on the nature of the agreement, in particular its standardised nature, and not on its legal classification under national law.

18      Fourth, it cannot be ruled out that the agreements concluded by the ŠFRB contain unfair terms within the meaning of that directive. The referring court considers that the terms of the agreement at issue in the main proceedings governing its termination, penalties and the payment, even after the termination of the agreement, of interest in addition to default interest are of such a nature. The objective of protection pursued by that directive is particularly important in the context of agreements, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which reflect an imbalance in the relationship between the contracting parties.

19      Lastly, the referring court points out that, under national procedural law, it is bound by the legal rulings of the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic), in the context of the referral back for reconsideration. It considers that those rulings are not compatible with the provisions of Directive 93/13.

20      It is in those circumstances that the Krajský súd v Prešove (Regional Court, Prešov) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)      Must Article 2(c) of [Directive 93/13] be interpreted as meaning that the [ŠFRB], which has concluded with natural persons an agreement for assistance in connection with the provision of housing, is to be regarded as a “seller or supplier” within the meaning of that provision of the directive, and that the agreement in question is covered by the scope of that directive?

(2)      If the answer to the first question is in the negative, must Article 1(1) and Article 2(b) of Directive 93/13 be interpreted as meaning that that directive applies to a guarantee agreement concluded between a natural person and the [ŠFRB] for the purpose of securing the performance of obligations arising from an agreement, where that natural person received no consideration from the [ŠFRB] and acted for purposes which are outside his or her trade, business or profession?

(3)      If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, does EU law preclude a legal opinion of a higher court from being binding on a lower court to which the case has been referred for further consideration, if, according to the legal opinion of the higher court, the [ŠFRB] is not covered by the scope of Directive 93/13?’

 Consideration of the questions referred

 Admissibility

21      The ŠFRB submits that the questions referred for a preliminary ruling are inadmissible on the ground, first, that the interpretation of Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13 is clear and therefore raises no reasonable doubt. Thus, according to the ŠFRB, it follows from that interpretation that a body governed by public law, like itself, which provides services not on a market-driven basis but only in situations defined by law, does not fall within the concept of ‘seller or supplier’ referred to in that provision. Second, the contractual relationship between itself and the defendants in the main proceedings is governed by mandatory provisions of national law, with the result that, in accordance with Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13, the terms of the agreement concluded with those defendants are not subject to the provisions of that directive.

22      It must be noted, however, that the arguments put forward by the ŠFRB to challenge the admissibility of the questions referred for a preliminary ruling relate to the substance of the case and, more specifically, as regards the first of those arguments, to the concept of ‘seller or supplier’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13, the interpretation of which is the subject of the first question. As regards the second argument referred to in paragraph 21 above, it concerns the applicability of Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13 to the terms of the agreement at issue in the main proceedings. Accordingly, those arguments cannot call into question the admissibility of the questions referred.

23      In particular, in so far as the ŠFRB submits that the content of the terms of the agreements which it concludes is determined by Slovak law, with the result that those terms are excluded from the scope of Directive 93/13 under Article 1(2) thereof, it must be borne in mind that, although, under that provision, where statutory or regulatory provisions are mandatory, contractual terms reflecting those provisions are excluded from the scope of that directive, such an exclusion does not mean that the validity of other terms, which are included in the same contract and do not reflect those provisions, may not be assessed by the national court in the light of that directive (judgment of 27 October 2022, S.V. (Building in co-ownership), C‑485/21, EU:C:2022:839, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).

24      The referring court expressly states that the terms of the agreement in the main proceedings which it considers to be unfair do not reflect national legislative provisions, within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13, in so far as, although their inclusion in the agreements concluded by the ŠFRB is provided for by law, the latter remains free to specify their exact content.

25      Therefore, subject to verification by the referring court, such terms are not excluded as such from the scope of Directive 93/13, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 23 above.

26      In any event, it should be borne in mind that those circumstances in no way prevent a national court from referring to this Court for a preliminary ruling a question the answer to which, in the submission of the parties in the main proceedings, leaves no scope for reasonable doubt (judgment of 1 December 2011, Painer, C‑145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

27      Thus, even if the answer to the question referred leaves no scope for any reasonable doubt, that question does not thereby become inadmissible (judgment of 1 December 2011, Painer, C‑145/10, EU:C:2011:798, paragraph 65).

28      In those circumstances, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling are admissible.

 Substance

 The first question

29      By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that a public body established by law for the purpose of carrying out a not-for-profit activity of housing assistance consisting, inter alia, in the grant of housing loans on preferential terms to natural persons is a ‘seller or supplier’ within the meaning of that provision.

30      First, according to the wording of that provision, ‘seller or supplier’ means ‘any natural or legal person who … is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned’.

31      The use of the term ‘any’ shows that every natural or legal person must be regarded as a ‘seller or supplier’, within the meaning of Directive 93/13, when performing a professional activity (judgment of 17 May 2018, Karel de Grote – Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen, C‑147/16, EU:C:2018:320, paragraph 49).

32      That same provision covers all professional activity, whether it is ‘publicly owned or privately owned’. Therefore, as the fourteenth recital states, Directive 93/13 also applies to professional activities of a public nature (judgment of 17 May 2018, Karel de Grote – Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen, C‑147/16, EU:C:2018:320, paragraph 50).

33      In that regard, the EU legislature intended a broad definition to be given to the concept of ‘seller or supplier’, with the result that every natural or legal person must be regarded as falling within that concept, when performing a professional activity, including tasks of a public nature and in the public interest (judgment of 27 October 2022, S.V. (Building in co-ownership), C‑485/21, EU:C:2022:839, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

34      It follows that Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13 does not exclude from its scope of application entities that pursue a task in the public interest or those that are governed by public law. Furthermore, since tasks of a public nature and in the public interest are often conducted on a not-for-profit basis, the fact that a body is a not-for-profit organisation is irrelevant to the definition of the concept of ‘seller or supplier’, within the meaning of that provision (judgment of 17 May 2018, Karel de Grote – Hogeschool Katholieke Hogeschool Antwerpen, C‑147/16, EU:C:2018:320, paragraph 51).

35      Second, the broad definition of that concept is justified in the light of the objective pursued by Directive 93/13, which is to grant protection to all natural persons who are in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 March 2019, Pouvin and Dijoux, C‑590/17, EU:C:2019:232, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited, and of 8 June 2023, YYY. (Concept of ‘consumer’), C‑570/21, EU:C:2023:456, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).

36      Third, the concept of ‘seller or supplier’, within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13, is a functional concept, requiring the determination of whether the contractual relationship concerned is amongst the activities that that entity provides in the course of its trade (judgment of 21 March 2019, Pouvin and Dijoux, C‑590/17, EU:C:2019:232, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).

37      In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that the ŠFRB was established to implement the housing policy of the Slovak State, inter alia, by granting housing loans on preferential terms. In addition, the referring court points out that the amounts corresponding to the repayments of those loans, including the payment of interest, are reinvested in the grant of new loans and make it possible to cover the operating expenses of the ŠFRB.

38      Therefore, subject to verification by the referring court, it appears that the loan agreements concluded by the ŠFRB are amongst the activities of financing transactions for the acquisition of immovable property carried out by that body in the course of its trade.

39      The ŠFRB points out, however, in its written observations, that the assistance mechanism for the acquisition of immovable property which it implements is not driven by market considerations and that it acts as a body entrusted with a task in the general economic interest, namely the promotion of social housing.

40      In addition, the Slovak Government states in its written observations that the ŠFRB chooses the beneficiaries of the loans by applying the eligibility criteria imposed on it by law.

41      That said, as has been pointed out in paragraph 34 above, the concept of ‘seller or supplier’ defined in Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13 does not exclude entities pursuing a task in the general interest or those having public law status. Similarly, the fact that the ŠFRB acts on a not-for-profit basis, without regard to any commercial considerations, is irrelevant for its classification as a ‘seller or supplier’ within the meaning of that provision.

42      Such a circumstance cannot, in itself, deprive natural persons with whom the ŠFRB concludes loan agreements of the protection afforded to them by Directive 93/13, at the risk of jeopardising the objective pursued by that directive, which is to grant protection to all natural persons in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 June 2023, YYY. (Concept of ‘consumer’), C‑570/21, EU:C:2023:456, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). Natural persons who take out housing loans from the ŠFRB are in a weak position in relation to that body whose professional activity consists precisely in granting funding for the acquisition of immovable property.

43      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as meaning that a public body established by law for the purpose of carrying out a not-for-profit activity of housing assistance consisting, inter alia, in the grant of housing loans on preferential terms to natural persons is a ‘seller or supplier’, within the meaning of that provision, in so far as the loan agreements which it concludes with those persons fall within the scope of its professional activity.

 The second question

44      In the light of the answer given to the first question, it is not necessary to answer the second question.

 The third question

45      It is apparent from the order for reference that the referring court considers that the legal rulings of the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic) concerning the classification of the ŠFRB in the light of the concept of ‘seller or supplier’, within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13, are contrary to that provision as interpreted by the Court of Justice. Since the referring court is bound by those rulings, in the event of that higher court referring the case at issue back to it for reconsideration, it asks, in essence, whether it is possible for it to disregard them in order to comply with the Court’s interpretation.

46      In those circumstances, the view must be taken that, by its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether the principle of the primacy of EU law must be interpreted as requiring a national court, which is bound, under a rule or practice of national law, by the legal rulings of a higher national court in a case which has been referred back to it for reconsideration, to disregard those rulings where it considers that they are not consistent with the interpretation of a provision of EU law provided by the Court under Article 267 TFEU.

47      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the principle of the primacy of EU law establishes the pre-eminence of EU law over the law of the Member States. That principle therefore requires all Member State bodies, and accordingly also their courts, to give full effect to the various EU provisions, and the law of the Member States may not undermine the effect accorded to those various provisions in the territory of those States (judgment of 11 January 2024, Global Ink Trade, C‑537/22, EU:C:2024:6, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).

48      That principle requires, inter alia, national courts, in order to ensure the effectiveness of all provisions of EU law, to interpret, as far as possible, their domestic law in conformity with EU law (judgment of 18 January 2022, Thelen Technopark Berlin, C‑261/20, EU:C:2022:33, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).

49      The Court has thus held that the obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with EU law requires national courts to change established case-law, where necessary, if it is based on an interpretation of their domestic law that is incompatible with the objectives of a directive and to disapply, on their own authority, the interpretation adopted by a higher court which it must follow in accordance with that law, if that interpretation is not compatible with that directive (judgment of 30 April 2025, AxFina Hungary (Continued existence of the contract), C‑630/23, EU:C:2025:302, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited).

50      Consequently, a national court cannot validly claim that it is impossible for it to interpret a provision of national law in a manner that is consistent with EU law merely because that provision has consistently been interpreted in a manner that is incompatible with EU law (judgment of 30 April 2025, AxFina Hungary (Continued existence of the contract), C‑630/23, EU:C:2025:302, paragraph 89 and the case-law cited).

51      It must be borne in mind, in addition, that, in principle, EU law does not preclude national rules or a national practice under which a lower court of a Member State is bound by a decision of a higher court of that Member State, having regard to the competence of the Member States in the organisation of justice (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 45).

52      That said, the national court, having exercised the discretion conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, is bound, for the purposes of the decision to be given in the main proceedings, by the interpretation of provisions of EU law provided by the Court and must therefore, if necessary, disregard the rulings of a higher national court if it considers, in the light of the interpretation provided by the Court, that those rulings are not consistent with EU law, if necessary refusing to apply the national rule requiring it to comply with the decisions of that higher court (judgment of 11 January 2024, Global Ink Trade, C‑537/22, EU:C:2024:6, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited).

53      In the present case, the fact that the national court adjudicating in the context of a referral back for reconsideration must comply with the legal rulings of a higher national court in the case which is the subject of that referral is not such as to call into question the former’s obligation to disregard such rulings if they are contrary to EU law, if necessary by disapplying the national rule requiring it to comply with the decisions of that higher court.

54      In those circumstances, having regard to the principle of the primacy and the effects attached to preliminary rulings delivered under Article 267 TFEU, the national court cannot be required, by its national law or a national practice, to adhere to the legal rulings of a higher national court which refuses to classify as a ‘seller or supplier’, within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13, a body which satisfies the criterion referred to in paragraph 36 above.

55      Consequently, the answer to the third question is that the principle of the primacy of EU law must be interpreted as requiring a national court, which is bound, under a rule or practice of national law, by the legal rulings of a higher national court in a case which has been referred back to it for reconsideration, to disregard those rulings where it considers that they are not consistent with the interpretation of a provision of EU law provided by the Court under Article 267 TFEU.

 Limitation of the temporal effects of the present judgment

56      Should the Court find it necessary to conclude that a body such as the ŠFRB may be classified as a ‘seller or supplier’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13, the ŠFRB and the Slovak Government have asked the Court to limit the temporal effects of the present judgment to pending proceedings which were not the subject of a final decision before that judgment was delivered.

57      They state, first, that the ŠFRB has acted in good faith, in accordance with the decisions of the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic) since 2019 and, second, that failure to limit the temporal effects of the present judgment would have financial consequences which would jeopardise the activities of the ŠFRB.

58      According to settled case-law, the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, the Court gives to a rule of EU law clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time of its entry into force. It is only quite exceptionally that the Court itself may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict for any person concerned the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties. Those criteria are cumulative (judgment of 22 June 2021, Latvijas Republikas Saeima (Penalty points), C‑439/19, EU:C:2021:504, paragraphs 132 and 136 and the case-law cited).

59      Consequently, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, notably where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with EU law by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of EU provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the European Commission may even have contributed (judgment of 22 September 2016, Microsoft Mobile Sales International and Others, C‑110/15, EU:C:2016:717, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

60      As regards the criterion relating to the existence of a risk of serious economic repercussions, it should be borne in mind that it is for the Member State requesting a limitation of the temporal effects of a preliminary ruling to produce before the Court figures establishing the risk of such repercussions (judgment of 20 December 2017, Erzeugerorganisation Tiefkühlgemüse, C‑516/16, EU:C:2017:1011, paragraph 91 and the case-law cited).

61      In the present case, it is true that the Slovak Government submitted, in its written observations, data relating to the number of housing loans granted by ŠFRB and the corresponding financial volume.

62      However, neither that government nor the ŠFRB have explained the legal and financial effects that the classification of that body as a ‘seller or supplier’, within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Directive 93/13, would have on the agreements which it concluded. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, if the application of that directive to those agreements results in some of their terms being found to be unfair, that does not necessarily mean that those agreements are void in their entirety, since the agreements must continue in existence without the terms held to be unfair, in so far as, in accordance with the rules of national law, such continued existence of those agreements is legally possible (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 April 2021, Bank BPH, C‑19/20, EU:C:2021:341, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

63      In those circumstances, it must be held that the criterion relating to the risk of serious difficulties is not satisfied, so that it is not necessary to determine whether the criterion relating to the good faith of those concerned is satisfied.

64      It is therefore not appropriate to limit the temporal effects of the present judgment.

65      That said, attention must be drawn to the importance, both for the EU legal order and for the national legal systems, of the principle of res judicata. In order to ensure both stability of the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is important that decisions of courts or tribunals which have become definitive after all rights of appeal have been exhausted or after expiry of the time limits provided for in that connection can no longer be called into question (judgments of 30 September 2003, Köbler, C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513, paragraph 38, and of 9 April 2024, Profi Credit Polska (Reopening of proceedings concluded with a final judicial decision), C‑582/21, EU:C:2024:282, paragraph 37).

66      Therefore, EU law does not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring the authority of res judicata on a decision of a court or tribunal, even if to do so would make it possible to remedy a domestic situation which is incompatible with EU law. EU law does not therefore require that, in order to take account of the interpretation of a relevant provision of EU law adopted by the Court, a national court must, as a matter of principle, go back on a decision having the authority of res judicata. That said, if the applicable domestic rules of procedure provide the possibility, under certain conditions, for a national court to go back on a decision having the authority of res judicata in order to render the situation compatible with national law, that possibility must prevail if those conditions are met, in accordance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, so that the situation at issue in the main proceedings is brought back into line with EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 July 2014, Impresa Pizzarotti, C‑213/13, EU:C:2014:2067, paragraphs 59 to 62, and of 9 April 2024, Profi Credit Polska (Reopening of proceedings concluded with a final judicial decision), C‑582/21, EU:C:2024:282, paragraphs 38 and 42).

 Costs

67      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:

1.      Article 2(c) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts

must be interpreted as meaning that a public body established by law for the purpose of carrying out a not-for-profit activity of housing assistance consisting, inter alia, in the grant of housing loans on preferential terms to natural persons is a ‘seller or supplier’, within the meaning of that provision, in so far as the loan agreements which it concludes with those persons fall within the scope of its professional activity.

2.      The principle of the primacy of EU law must be interpreted as requiring a national court, which is bound, under a rule or practice of national law, by the legal rulings of a higher national court in a case which has been referred back to it for reconsideration, to disregard those rulings where it considers that they are not consistent with the interpretation of a provision of EU law provided by the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU.

[Signatures]

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*      Language of the case: Slovak.